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 This dissertation used a qualitative, case study to explore how the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) applied strategic public relations management during peace 
operations in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 to 1996.  The purpose of this research 
was to propose a model of ethical communication that extended the excellence theory in 
public relations and contributed to a global public relations theory.  This proposed model 
relies on an ethical framework for moral reasoning that helps justify public relations 
decisions.  The model incorporates interdisciplinary concepts drawn from the situational 
theory of publics, the excellence theory, an activist theory of communication, a moral 
theory of just war, and game theory.   
 Fourteen long interviews, four elite interviews, and three focus group interviews 
explained how NATO applied principles of the excellence theory and global theory in 
public relations, how organizational culture and conflict influenced NATO 
communication management, and how NATO leaders made communication decisions.  
  
 It had been assumed that NATO’s political-military, authoritarian nature would 
lead the alliance to reject symmetrical communication and to adopt asymmetrical 
communication strategies.  The study found that NATO mixed symmetrical 
communication – and other principles of the excellence theory and global public relations 
– with asymmetrical strategies like coercion to manage conflict.  The study also identified 
a constellation of divided cultures among NATO’s 26 member nations that influenced 
alliance public relations.  Furthermore, senior NATO leaders relied heavily on intuitive 
knowledge when making decisions, leaving communication choices vulnerable to ethical 
relativism.   
In conclusion, this study has significant implications for theory and practice.  The 
integrated, coercive-collaborative model of ethical communication developed through 
this study offers normative and positive value for managing asymmetrical conflict 
situations in which one or more parties demonstrate no willingness to cooperate.  This 
model retains the value of excellence in public relations, which produces strategic, long-
term, symmetrical relationships.  Demonstrating how symmetrical outcomes can be 
achieved through ethical application of short-term coercive as well as collaborative 
communication tactics represents a major leap forward for the excellence theory.  
Practical implications of this study extend to any organization that relies on 
communication to manage conflict, build strategic relationships, and reduce costs – 
especially in a global, multinational context.  
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PREFACE 
Locating the Researcher as Practitioner and Scholar 
Professor William P. Ehling, my teacher, mentor, and master’s advisor at 
Syracuse University, once observed that we are all products of our education and 
experience.  My approach to public relations practice and study – including this 
dissertation – was shaped by more than 19 years of formal education and 25 years of 
experience as a public relations practitioner in the U.S. Navy.  Wolcott (2001) reported 
that personal accounts of such experience can serve as an effective way to introduce and 
provide essential context to qualitative studies.  Thus, I begin by describing two deeply 
personal and profound experiences that provide inspiration and context for this study.   
1988: The Persian Gulf 
The white missile roared skyward in a cloud of smoke and streaked for the 
horizon, as the men on the Williams' bridge cheered wildly….  A flash and white 
smoke erupted on the horizon, followed by a long series of heavy explosions as 
the weapons and ammunition aboard the [Iranian Navy warship] Sahand blew 
up….. [A] U.S. pilot who observed the Sahand reported it ‘listing badly, with a 
big hole in its port side, the superstructure on fire and a lifeboat with some 
survivors in the water.’ (Pyle, 1988, ¶ 17) 
This excerpt, part of an Associated Press wire service report transmitted from a pool of 
journalists on board the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate USS Jack Williams (FFG-24) 
on April 18, 1988, described a brief but violent moment in Operation Praying Mantis.1 
                                                 
1 The term pool refers to a group of journalists formed to cover military operations taking place in a 
location not normally accessible to members of the news media (e.g., at sea or remote land-based site).  
Pools consist of up to a dozen journalists representing wire service, magazine, newspaper, television, radio, 
and photographic media.  Material reported by these journalists is pooled, or made available to other news 
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This U.S. military operation sank Sahand and destroyed or severely damaged half of 
Iran’s active navy (Marolda & Schneller, 1998).  The exchange of military hostilities 
between U.S. and Iranian forces also resulted in the loss of two U.S. Marine helicopter 
crewmen and the deaths of 44 Iranian sailors (Willey, 1991; Ziade, 1988).  The U.S. 
government authorized Praying Mantis shortly after another U.S. Navy guided-missile 
frigate, USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), struck a mine that Iran had sown in 
international shipping lanes of the central Persian Gulf.  The blast injured 10 U.S. sailors 
and nearly sank the ship, prompting the United States to take retaliatory action. Of note, 
 
Figure 1.  The Iranian frigate IS Sahand burns after retaliatory strikes by U.S. Navy ships 
and aircraft on April 18, 1988.  (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004) 
                                                                                                                                                 
organizations that do not have access to the operations in question.  See Thompson (2002) for historical 
background on pools. 
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the United States severed direct diplomatic channels with Iran in 1980, several months 
after Iranian revolutionaries overran the U.S. embassy in the Iranian capital of Tehran 
and took hostage 52 U.S. citizens (U.S. Department of State, 2003). Consequently, with 
limited communication options, the U.S. response to the USS Samuel B. Roberts mining 
took the form of military combat strikes.   
As one of two U.S. military escorts for the pool of journalists aboard the USS 
Jack Williams on April 18, I participated in Operation Praying Mantis.  I also helped 
carry out a public relations program that sought to explain the U.S. rationale and to 
promote public support for Praying Mantis.  Finally, I observed firsthand the lethal 
results of this conflict.  I felt the shockwaves ripple across the sea from the dying Sahand 
and minutes later heard an emergency band radio above my head broadcast cries of men 
screaming for help.  I still hear these screams and they remind me of the close 
relationship between conflict and communication.  Moreover, this experience has led me 
to confront the ethical nature of public relations activities that could result in lethal 
consequences – and the moral responsibility that the managers of such activities must 
bear.   
 Jack Fuller, president of Tribune Publishing, once wrote about the daunting social 
and technological barriers that complicate communication and inhibit understanding in 
today’s complex world.  Fuller (1996), a former soldier and Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist, observed, “In some of the most complicated fields, misperception can mean 
errors in social policy that have mortal consequences” (p. 169).  I am a witness to these 
mortal consequences.  Following my Persian Gulf experience and after much reflection, I 
sought opportunities to apply public relations management to political-military operations 
v  
in a way that might save rather than take lives.  I was presented with that opportunity 
seven years after Praying Mantis, in another region torn apart by war. 
1995-1996, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Between 1991 and 1995, close to three hundred thousand people were killed in 
the former Yugoslavia.  The international response to this catastrophe was at best 
uncertain and at worst appalling.  While both the United States and the European 
Union initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem, the Europeans 
chose not to take a strong stand, restricting themselves to dispatching U.N. 
‘peacekeepers’ to a country where there was no peace to keep, and withholding 
from them the means and authority to stop the fighting.  Finally, in late 1995, in 
the face of growing atrocities and new Bosnian Serb threats, the United States 
decided to launch a last, all-out negotiating effort….  Belatedly and reluctantly, 
the United States came to intervene and … that intervention brought the war in 
Bosnia to an end. (Holbrooke, 1998, p. xv) 
On December 14, 1995, a peace agreement signed in Paris, France, ended nearly 
four years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Two days later, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) began deploying to this region a heavily armed military force that 
would eventually include 60,000 troops from more than 30 nations to implement military 
provisions of the peace agreement.  Joint Endeavour also exemplified a new era of Post-
Cold War political-military missions: using powerful military forces to wage peace 
instead of war and diplomacy instead of combat.   
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Figure 2. “Welcome to Sarajevo” house, near Sarajevo airport – symbol of war’s 
destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina, circa 1995.  (Allied Forces Southern Europe, 1996) 
 
On December 20, 1995, I stood in a bombed-out airport in Sarajevo, capital of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, arranging a press conference marking the establishment of NATO’s 
new peace implementation force (IFOR) in the Balkans.  As IFOR’s chief of public 
information, I was finally able to apply strategic public relations principles to a cause 
designed to save lives.  I flew out of that same Sarajevo airport 12 months later under 
peaceful conditions.  IFOR’s second commander, U.S. Navy Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, 
credited public relations with being instrumental in managing IFOR’s peace mission and 
preventing a return to war.  According to Lopez, public relations was “the single most 
important action that again prevented loss of life…. Public [relations] leadership can not 
only report war and near war, but more importantly use their skills to prevent war and 
loss of life” (personal communication, July 10, 2000).    
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              Doctoral study has provided me with a unique opportunity to apply what I have 
learned through decades of graduate work and practical experience in public relations.  
When I arrived at the University of Maryland in the fall of 2000, I continued a search that 
began in 1988 with deadly conflict in the Persian Gulf.  This search has led me to identify 
public relations strategies that could provide public relations managers and the 
organizations they serve with ethical means to manage international conflict.  Both my 
education and my experience have convinced me that ethical management of 
communication is the cornerstone of professional public relations.  Ethics is the dividing 
line that distinguishes professional public relations from, as my mentor Bill Ehling once 
described, cheap imitations of public relations that are “sleazy, shoddy, simplistic, and 
shallow” (personal communication, October 24, 1988).  An ethical framework that guides 
use of persuasive communication could allow public relations managers to remain 
engaged in strategic decision making even after collaborative communication fails.   
I am hopeful that my work will be well received by scholars and practitioners 
alike.  Still, critics may find my motives suspicious – especially given my political-
military background.  Nevertheless, I have done my best to produce a credible study that 
will present new possibilities for others to explore.  Together, as considering the ideas in 
this dissertation, I propose agreement on at least one ideal: the need to belong to a global 
public relations community, guided by moral principles, which places the utmost value 
on peaceful resolution of conflict.   
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DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to the people who inspired it.  First, I will always 
remember the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croats, Muslims, and Serbs alike.  
Between 1992 and 1995, war in Bosnia-Herzegovina killed between 100,000 
(Dervišbegovic, 2004) and 250,000 men, women, and children (U.S. State Department, 
1997).  Every survivor of that war seems to have a story to tell; and Balkan graveyards – 
marked and unmarked – provide mute testimony of those who perished.  I hope that 
NATO operations that began there in 1995 bring lasting peace to this beautiful country. 
I also dedicate this dissertation to NATO’s peace implementation force (IFOR).  I 
remember the nearly 60,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and 
civilian workers from more than 30 nations who risked their lives and endured long 
separations from their homes and families in order to bring peace to Bosnians. 
Finally, I dedicate this research to the journalists who reported on the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and on subsequent peace operations there – especially to Kurt 
Schork, the Balkan’s bureau chief for Reuters wire service.  Kurt and other 
correspondents risked their lives to provide war-time accounts of atrocities in the Balkans 
that shamed and angered the world into taking action.  Kurt, who was widely respected as 
one of the finest war correspondents of his time, was later killed during a rebel ambush 
while covering conflict in Sierra Leone on May 24, 2000.  Before he died, Kurt used his 
reporting to shine the light of truth into the darkest places on earth in an effort to right a 
few wrongs.  It was a privilege to have known and worked with Kurt.  I miss him and 
hope that this dissertation contributes in some small way to the work he committed 
himself to – and ultimately gave his life for (see http://www.ksmemorial.com/). 
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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
One thing that we probably did not do was pay enough attention to the situation in 
certain individual NATO governments, which of course had public opinion which 
was not always favorable to what NATO was doing.  And one lesson in the future 
is that we probably need a more diversified information strategy … and not just 
an Anglo-Saxon essentially addressing an Anglo-Saxon world in the hope that it 
will also be picked up favorably in other countries.  In an alliance like NATO of 
19 countries … you definitely do need not just a general media strategy, but also 
individual national media strategies.  (Shea, 2000) 
-- Dr. Jamie P. Shea, NATO Spokesperson  
 
Introduction 
On April 4, 2000, Dr. Jamie P. Shea, then deputy director of press and 
information and spokesperson for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, addressed a 
conference hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC.  Shea described a 
variety of lessons learned during Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO-led combat 
operations to halt Serb aggression against ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region of 
former Yugoslavia.  Allied Force exemplified controversial, political-military missions of 
the post-Cold War era: using military force to preempt threats to national and regional 
security and issuing threats of military force as a means of coercive diplomacy. Allied 
Force also generated international attention, which required NATO to develop a public 
relations program to support the operation’s political and military goals.  However, Shea, 
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noting the unique nature of NATO’s multinational alliance, lamented the absence of a 
public relations strategy that could address the needs of NATO headquarters and each of 
NATO’s 19 member nations during post-Cold War hostilities.   
Shea’s remarks underscore how the end of the Cold War, advances in 
communication technology, and growth of a globalized society have transformed 
economic, political, military, news media, and other organizations around the world.  
This transformation has been characterized by a convergence of cultures; and this 
convergence has threatened or changed traditional social norms that constitute nations 
and their citizens (Huntington, 1996; Wakefield, 1996).  Although many regions, nations, 
and social groups have embraced these changes, others have resisted them.  Thus, 
globalization has spawned asymmetrical turmoil such as terrorism, economic instability, 
political conflict, and activism (Aldoory & Van Dyke, 2004; Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997; 
Danzig, 1999; Fitzpatrick & Whillock, 1993; Gandy, 1992; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & 
Dozier, 2002; Naples, 2002).   
The excellence theory2 in public relations links the type of turmoil or conflict 
described by Shea with the need for public relations.  According to the excellence theory, 
public relations creates value by establishing and maintaining effective relationships 
between an organization and its publics, thus reducing costly conflict (Dozier, 1995; J. 
Grunig, 1992a; L. Grunig et al., 2002).  Furthermore, “Communicators can develop 
relationships more effectively when they communicate symmetrically with publics rather 
than asymmetrically” (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. xi).  
                                                 
2  Readers familiar with published reports of excellence theory may be accustomed to seeing its name 
capitalized.  However, with due respect to authors of this theory, I will lowercase its name in order to 
comply with American Psychological Association style, which prohibits capitalization of “laws, theories, 
models, or hypotheses” (American Psychological Association, 2001, p. 97) that are not personal names.  
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Problem and Purpose for Study 
As the preceding introduction suggests, conflict, communication, and public 
relations are deeply intertwined.  I adhere to Deutsch’s (1973) definition of conflict as the 
occurrence of “incompatible activities” (p. 10) and his notion that communication can 
represent a cause of conflict, a symptom of conflict, and a mode of conflict.  I also refer 
to Roloff’s (1987) observation that lines of communication are necessary to reduce 
conflict.  Furthermore, I align myself with public relations scholars who have described 
public relations from a conflict-management perspective (e.g., Ehling, 1984, 1985; J. 
Grunig, 1992a).  Hence, communication and conflict are interdependent and this 
interdependence “produces relationships and the need for public relations” (J. Grunig & 
L. Grunig, 1992, p. 313). 
Perhaps no single factor has been more influential in producing post-Cold War 
conflict than the rapid advances in communication and information technology 
(Solomon, 2004).  As Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) observed, the Internet and other 
information media empower individuals and small groups to influence large 
organizations – even states – by converting information into power and applying it in 
non-traditional ways. Conversely, advances in communication – such as development of 
public relations theory – can help reduce conflict.  However, symmetrical communication 
strategies suggested by public relations theory (J. Grunig, 1992a) may not be sufficient to 
help organizations cope with asymmetrical situations like the threat of terrorism (Cancel, 
Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997; Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999; Leichty, 1997; 
Leichty & Springston, 1993; Murphy, 1991).  Moreover, scholars such as L. Grunig, J. 
Grunig, & Verčič (1998) and Sriramesh and Verčič (2001, 2003a) are only beginning to 
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develop a global theory of public relations, which is needed to manage international 
conflict like that faced by NATO.   
I used the case of NATO’s historic entry into former Yugoslavia, between 1995 
and 1996, to examine and reveal how multinational organizations apply principles of 
public relations to their operations.  I investigated the existence of generic principles that 
support a global theory of public relations.  I analyzed how NATO managed public 
relations activities during international conflict.  I presumed upon entry into this study 
that NATO would apply a variety of asymmetrical and symmetrical communication 
strategies to its operations – given the authoritarian, political-military nature of the 
NATO alliance.  Furthermore, public relations theory predicted that NATO’s hierarchical 
organizational culture would influence the alliance to reject symmetrical strategies in 
favor of asymmetrical strategies – at least in some situations (J. Grunig, 1992a).  This 
confirmed these presumptions.  Therefore, I proposed an ethical framework for 
communication, based on moral reasoning and principles of an emerging global theory in 
public relations, which NATO and other multinational organizations could use to guide 
integration of symmetrical and asymmetrical communication strategies.  This ethical 
framework should be of particular value to scholars and practitioners who study or work 
in international settings. 
Recent development of a general public relations theory and work toward a global 
theory have added much to the field’s body of knowledge and understanding of public 
relations practices in various regions of the world.  Efforts to professionalize the field of 
public relations around the world have been helped by globalization: “Globalization has 
… resulted in the influx of multinational corporations and public relations agencies into 
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new markets, which has helped push the industry in these countries to greater 
professionalism” (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2003a, p. xxix).  However, globalization also has 
created new theoretical, practical, and ethical questions for public relations practitioners 
and scholars.   
This study examined how a single multinational organization applied principles of 
the excellence theory in a turbulent, globalized environment: NATO in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 1995-1996.  However, this study was not merely descriptive.  Rather, 
description of NATO’s behavior in Bosnia-Herzegovina promoted deeper understanding 
of how a multinational organization applied the excellence theory – even while using 
coercive communication to manage international conflict.  This understanding contributes 
to development of a global theory of public relations by exemplifying how ethics 
becomes a generic principle in global communication management (see L. Grunig et al., 
2002, p. 554).  Hence, my purpose in this study was to propose a model of ethical 
communication that extends excellence theory and contributes to development of a global 
theory in public relations.  Results of this study add to the public relations body of 
knowledge and inform practice by promoting development of professionalism, ethics, and 
global perspectives in communication management. 
Theoretical Concepts and Terminology 
 Interpretation of research results in this study requires understanding of several 
theories and concepts.  Before proceeding, I will define the terms theory and concept in a 
general sense.  Second, I will identify classifications of theory used in this dissertation.  
Third, I will describe theoretical concepts derived from studies of organizations, 
communication and public relations management, conflict management, and ethical 
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behavior.  Finally, I will explain how specific theories construct a theoretical framework 
for this dissertation. 
 First, I adopted Littlejohn’s (2002) broad definition of theory “as any organized 
set of concepts and explanations about a phenomenon” (p. 19).  Theories are abstract 
constructions that explain how individuals see the world and understand experiences in 
that world.  By explain I refer to practical explanation rather than causal explanation.  
Since this study incorporated a qualitative methodology, I did not attempt to identify 
causal relationships between communication activities and outcomes.  Instead, I sought to 
understand how NATO applied principles of the excellence theory in public relations – 
principles that address communication outcomes.  In a practical sense, the excellence 
theory helped to explain how NATO’s strategic management of public relations guided 
controllable actions and choices that were associated with excellent communication and 
outcomes (e.g., production of mutually beneficial, long-term relationships between 
NATO and the alliance’s key publics).   
 Concepts are the building blocks of theory.  Concepts are equivalent to categories 
of “observed qualities” (Littlejohn, 2002, p. 20) that represent classifications or patterns, 
which become integral parts of a theory.  For example, in the excellence theory in public 
relations, concepts are represented by principles of communication and public relations 
management that are grouped according to program level, departmental level, 
organizational level, and effects of excellent public relations (see Table 2). 
 Second, theories can be classified according to their explanatory or descriptive 
nature and according to their scope and precision.  In this study, I refer to normative or 
positive theories.  Simply, normative theories explain how natural phenomena or 
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activities should occur.  Positive theories explain phenomena or activities that do occur.  
According to J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1992), “a normative theory defines how things 
should be or how some activity should be carried out” (p. 291).  Normative theories 
provide models that could theoretically improve a practice like communication if the 
model were implemented.  However, as J. Grunig and L. Grunig reported: 
In developing normative theory, theorists have no obligation to show that an 
activity actually is conducted in the way the theory describes.  They must show 
only that if an activity were to be conducted as the theory prescribes, it would be 
effective. (p. 291) 
Hence, normative theories are thought to provide logical and useful means to understand 
problems (J. Grunig & L. Grunig); however, some scholars consider normative theories 
to be underdeveloped because they do not apply to actual practices or describe what 
practitioners actually do in many situations (Cancel et al., 1997, 1999; Murphy, 1991).   
Positive theories, on the other hand, are useful in explaining real-world 
experiences and problems.  Comparing normative and positive theories, J. Grunig and L. 
Grunig (1992) reported, “Positive theories describe phenomena, events, or activities as 
they actually occur” (p. 291).  The Grunigs also observed that normative and positive 
aspects of theory often overlap and suggested that such is the case with the dialogic 
model of communication prescribed by the excellence theory in public relations: “We 
believe, therefore, that – normatively – the two-way symmetrical model defines the most 
excellent way of practicing public relations and that – positively – research will show that 
model does the most to make organizations effective” (p. 292). 
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 I also discuss in this study a general theory of public relations.  Littlejohn (2002) 
described the concept of generality as “the idea that a theory’s explanation must be 
sufficiently general to cover a range of events beyond a single observation” (p. 30).  
Therefore, general theories apply to many phenomena and explain many activities.  For 
instance, J. Grunig (1992a) posited that the study of excellence in public relations had 
produced a general theory of public relations that “integrates the many theories and 
research results existing in the field” (p. 2). 
 Littlejohn (2002) also noted that a theory does not need to be broad in order to be 
judged as a good theory.  Theories could also be narrow in scope yet still apply to many 
situations.  Burleson (1992) wrote that theories of communication must also be precise 
and he warned that general theories of communication could be difficult to achieve: 
“While it is desirable for philosophies [of communication] to be broad, expansive, and 
general, scientific theories need to be focused and specific” (p. 84).  He added, “Taking 
communication seriously means giving up the idea of developing a general scientific 
theory of communication” (p. 85).  As an alternative to general theories, Burleson 
suggested building theories that focus on specific communication features, processes, or 
situations.  For example, this research examined the ethical nature of communication 
management practiced by NATO in the turbulent setting of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 
1995 and 1996.  Therefore, this study focused on a single organization, a specific range 
of communication processes, and a narrow timeline.  However, any models or theories 
developed by this study could become powerful if they also explain and describe ethical 
communication processes in other organizations and in similar situations. 
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 Third, I conceptualized an organization to include an alliance such as NATO. I 
operationalized this concept by describing how NATO performed in an international, 
intercultural environment.  Conceptualization identifies the fundamental concepts or 
building blocks of theory.  A concept is “the most basic element of a theory” (Littlejohn, 
2002, p. 20).  Operationalization explains how to observe and understand a concept or 
concepts in a research setting.  Hence, this study explains how concepts of 
communication and conflict are intertwined in organizational settings.  My 
conceptualization grew from Deutsch’s (1973) representation of communication as a 
cause, symptom, and mode of conflict; and from Roloff’s (1987) description of 
communication as conflict resolution.  I also borrowed from J. Grunig and L. Grunig 
(1992), who reported on the interdependency among conflict, communication, and public 
relations.  Thus, conflict, interorganizational communication, and public relations are co-
created.  Herein, I define public relations as a strategic management process described by 
a set of empirical principles.  Finally, I discuss how a philosophy of public relations 
requires a moral framework that guides the ethical decision-making of organizational 
leaders and public relations managers – especially in times of international conflict. 
Interorganizational Theory: Multinational Alliances and Coalitions 
 I adopted an interorganizational approach in this case study, similar to that taken 
by J. Grunig and Hunt (1984), Mintzberg (1983), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).  
Interorganizational theory has grown from the development of open systems theory. 
Wakefield (1996), drawing upon the work of Katz and Kahn (1966), posited that 
effective organizations apply an open systems perspective to adapt to their external 
environments.  Thus, rapid changes in an organization’s environment could generate 
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unorthodox approaches to communication.  Given that NATO often operates in hostile, 
life-threatening situations, such multinational organizations might rely on a variety of 
communication strategies and tactics to manage dynamic and turbulent situations. 
In this regard, I focused on the interaction between organizations and their publics 
and the often hostile context in which these organizations operate.  Hence, I was more 
interested in how organizations manage this interaction than I was in the specific 
structure or purpose of individual organizations.  Mintzberg (1983) discussed how power 
is exercised through internal and external forces that control organizational decision-
making.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) observed that organizational effectiveness “derives 
from the management of demands, particularly the demands of interest groups upon 
which the organizations depend for resources and support” (p. 2).  J. Grunig and Hunt 
(1984) were among the first scholars to conceptualize how demands placed on 
organizations and organizational power can be managed most effectively by building 
effective relationships between organizations and their publics.  By definition, public 
relations then becomes an essential management function in organizations. 
 I used the case of NATO’s deployment of a peacekeeping force to Bosnia-
Herzegovina to illustrate how powerful internal and external forces could influence an 
organization’s operations and how the success of organizations like NATO depends on its 
relationships with publics.  I regarded NATO as an alliance of nations, joined for the 
purpose of collective defense, “united in their determination to preserve their security 
through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries” (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, 1998, p. 23).  More precisely, I examined a subordinate 
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organization under NATO’s political and military authority: the peace implementation 
force (IFOR) deployed by NATO to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996.   
I described IFOR as a coalition.  Pien (1994) described coalitions as a product of 
“conflict between an organization and its stakeholders or of the desire by disparate 
groups, each with a stake in an issue, to collectively address that issue” (p. 11).  
Furthermore, like Pien, I regarded coalitions as “strategic alliances” (p. 133) in which 
public relations is viewed as communication management activity. L. Grunig (1992a) 
explained that coalitions are characterized by interaction between groups of people, 
formed for a specific purpose, and focused on external goals that require cooperation 
between members (p. 487).  Mintzberg (1983) described a typology of internal and 
external coalitions that form “rather stable systems of power, usually focused in nature” 
(p. 27), that combine to influence organizational decisions.   
I differentiated my concept of coalition from that of L. Grunig (1992a) and 
Mintzberg (1983), however.  I agree with L. Grunig (p. 487) that examination of 
coalitions as a unit of analysis extends research from the individual level to group level 
and that coalitions change composition and remain stable only as long as each coalition’s 
purpose remains relevant and effective.  However, I disagree with L. Grunig’s and 
Mintzberg’s conceptualization of coalitions as groups of individuals.  I favor Pien’s 
(1994) notion of coalitions, which she conceives of as groups of agencies or 
organizations, rather than groups of people.  This approach allowed me to focus attention 
on the interaction between organizations – or between organizations and their publics.  
Thus, I identified the IFOR coalition as a group of nations, born of the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, formed by a NATO alliance that was rapidly changing to meet post-Cold 
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War security needs, and focused on the specific purpose of implementing the post-war 
peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Furthermore, like L. Grunig’s concept of 
coalition, IFOR existed and remained relevant only for one year: from the time it 
deployed in December 1995 until it completed its mission in November 1996.   
The multinational nature of NATO and IFOR also differentiates the concepts of 
alliance and coalition used in this study from similar concepts used in other public 
relations studies.  I drew upon the work of Kruckeberg (1996a) to further distinguish 
NATO and IFOR as multinational organizations.  Kruckeberg defined multinationals as 
organizations whose “impact may, indeed, extend across several nations” (p. 82), rather 
than transnational organizations that also operate across national borders but “neither 
belong to, nor … pledge any patriotic allegiance to, any home nation-state” (p. 82).  
Thus, NATO and IFOR, by virtue of their external operations across national borders and 
their internal, political commitments to member nations, represent multinational 
organizations.   
Multinationalism also provided fruitful ground for the theoretical study of 
worldview and acculturation within organizations.  I applied Kearney’s (1984) definition 
of worldview as sets of assumptions and J. Grunig and White’s (1992) definition as 
“abstract structures of knowledge” (p. 33) that people use to make sense of the world 
around them.  The excellence theory posits that a dominant organizational worldview of 
public relations as symmetrical communication is most likely to produce mutually 
beneficial relationships.  I also referred to Wakefield’s (1996) discussion of acculturation 
and acculturation theory from anthropology as it relates to public relations and 
communication management in multinational organizations.  As other scholars have 
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explained, communication is culture specific (e.g., Sriramesh & White, 1992); and 
dimensions of culture can identify nations and societies (e.g., G. Hofstede, 1980, 2001; 
Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001).  Furthermore, according to Wakefield, acculturation helps to 
explain how intersections of culture could produce changes in organizational behavior, 
culture, or both.  He also suggested that these changes could depend on situational factors 
such as nature of conflict and communication processes.  Thus, theory suggests that 
acculturation in culturally diverse, multinational organizations like NATO and IFOR 
could lead to cultural changes or production of sub-cultures that operate within the 
dominant culture and affect communication.  I used qualitative interviews with current 
NATO officials and former IFOR officials to identify characteristics of NATO’s and 
IFOR’s public relations worldview, communication programs, and possible effects of 
acculturation.  
Public Relations as Management of Communication and Conflict 
Scholars have documented as many as 472 definitions of public relations (Cutlip, 
Center, & Broom, 1999; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Guth & Marsh, 2003; Seitel, 2000).  
There is a much smaller number yet confusing array of perspectives from which public 
relations can be viewed.  I referred to Toth’s (2002) identification of four paradigms that 
have been the focus of much post-modern and critical research in public relations: 
communication management (e.g., J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984), relationship management 
(e.g., Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000; Ferguson, 1984; Ledingham & Bruning, 2000), 
issues management (e.g., Heath, 1997), and rhetorical (e.g., Toth & Heath, 1992).  
Scholars and practitioners also have discussed and studied at length the controversial 
concept of integrated marketing communication, which merges the historically separate 
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functions of public relations and marketing functions into one (see Wilcox, Ault, Agee, & 
Cameron, 2000; Wilcox & Nolte, 1997). 
To delimit my conceptualization of public relations, I adhered to one definition 
and one perspective of public relations in this research.  Many definitions are worth 
considering and several of the perspectives addressed by Toth (2002) have merit; 
however, it was not feasible to discuss them here.  Therefore, I subscribed to J. Grunig 
and Hunt’s (1984) widely-used and parsimonious definition of public relations as “the 
management of communication between an organization and its publics” (p. 6).  
Furthermore, I adopted Ehling’s (n.d., 1984, 1985, 1992) multidisciplinary perspective of 
public relations as communication management, which draws upon management theory, 
conflict theory, organization theory, and communication theory (see Van Dyke, 1989). 
This perspective has evolved into the excellence theory in public relations, which 
provides a set of principles and a single excellence factor (Dozier, 1995; L. Grunig et al., 
2002).  This factor, which “provides a concrete measure” (Dozier, p. 19) of 
communication excellence, characterizes an organization’s level of professional public 
relations knowledge, the degree to which organizational leaders and public relations 
managers share understanding, and the extent to which the organization adopts a 
participative culture.  This conceptualization enables empirical study of communication 
management and decision-making in multinational organizations like NATO.   
New Directions: Toward Ethical Theories of Public Relations 
Ethics has been the focus of much recent debate and criticism in public relations, 
which has fueled the need for research in this area.  Critical scholars such as L’Etang 
(1996) have challenged the excellence theory based on the notion that public relations is 
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inherently “partisan and, furthermore, by operating on behalf of certain interests, 
intrinsically undemocratic” (p. 105).  Citing the influence of self-interest and advocacy in 
public relations, L’Etang (1996) reduced public relations to “a technique or tool for 
enhancing reputation” (p. 105).  Holtzhausen and Voto (2002) extended this critical 
notion of public relations advocacy to a postmodern perspective.  J. Grunig (2001) 
challenged such critical views and provided support for the ethical nature of public 
relations.  In supporting his position, J. Grunig referred to Heath (1992), who posited that 
public relations contributes to the “marketplace of ideas – the dialogue in behalf of 
various self interests” (p. 20).  In this marketplace, “each practitioner labors on behalf of 
some specific interest, but collectively these statements add to or weaken the standards by 
which activities – corporate, nonprofit, and governmental – are evaluated” (p. 30).  
Furthermore, development of the excellence theory in public relations over the last two 
decades has produced a substantial body of empirical evidence supporting the notion that 
symmetrical communication in public relations is ethical and represents “the most 
effective model in practice as well as in theory” (J. Grunig, p. 17).   
The debate over public relations ethics – in both a normative and positive sense – 
establishes the need for additional research in this area.  L. Grunig et al. (2002) cited 
ethics as one of the principal directions for future research in public relations.  J. Grunig 
(2001) also concluded, “In a professional field such as public relations … scholars must 
go beyond criticizing theories; they also have the obligation to replace theories with 
something better” (p. 17). Research by scholars such as Bowen (2000), who proposed a 
theory of ethics that supports decision-making in public relations from an issues 
management perspective, responds to this call.  I contributed to further development of 
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ethical theory in public relations by using this research to build on the work of Bowen 
(2000) and others.  I also refrained from continued debate about the ethical nature of 
public relations.  Instead, I relied on evidence provided by the excellence theory to 
establish as ethical certain forms of public relations; but I acknowledged the existence of 
certain situations that require elaboration of ethical models in public relations. Hence, I 
used my research to explore and propose an ethical framework that could be applied to 
organizational decision-making and mixed-motive communication programs in 
asymmetrical conflict situations.   
I intended this dissertation to extend the excellence theory rather than replace or 
reconstruct it, as others have suggested.  Murphy (1991) drew from game theory, which 
incorporates an interactive approach to decision-making, to propose an alternative to the 
symmetrical model of communication from the excellence theory.  She recommended 
reconceptualizing symmetrical communication “along less rigorous lines that include 
shades of behavior along a continuum ranging from conflict to cooperation” (p. 124).  
Other scholars (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997; Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 
1999) have proposed an alternative contingency theory of public relations that identified 
dozens of situational variables presumed to affect choice of communication strategies and 
the degree to which accommodation can be achieved.  Furthermore, Leichty and 
Springston (1993) distinguished between integrative approaches to conflict management 
such as symmetrical communication that are “most desirable” and other approaches that 
might be “most appropriate under the circumstances” (p. 334).  However, other scholars 
have argued that contingency approaches and shaded boundaries in ethical decision-
making render public relations susceptible to ethical relativism (e.g., J. Grunig & L. 
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Grunig, 1996; Pearson, 1989a).  Relativism could enable organizations to justify any 
means of communication to achieve desired end states.  Thus, a relativist approach could 
lead public relations practitioners down a slippery slope, which ultimately ends in the 
adoption of distributive win-lose strategies that are generally unethical (L. Grunig et al., 
2002, pp. 551-552).   
Dozier (with L. Grunig & J. Grunig, 1995) and L. Grunig et al. (2002) 
incorporated elements of situational and contingency theories in latter phases of the 
excellence theory.  Building on the work of Murphy (1991) and guided by results of the 
excellence study, Dozier (1995) developed a new contingency model of communication 
that incorporates a mixed-motive continuum of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
communication strategies. Excellence theory research has confirmed that pure asymmetry 
does not produce excellent results, however: 
Persuasive tactics sometimes may be used to gain the best position for 
organizations within the win-win zone. Because such practices are bounded by a 
symmetrical worldview that respects the integrity of long-term relationships, the 
two-way model assumes that professional public relations is based on 
symmetrical, collaborative values. (L. Grunig et al., p. 358) 
Finally, J. Grunig and L. Grunig’s (1997) review of research on activism 
contributed to knowledge of mixed-motive communication by proposing a framework 
that could guide public relations practitioners’ use of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
strategies.  Specifically, this framework described how activist groups could employ both 
symmetrical and asymmetrical communications to establish and manage relationships 
with organizations.  This framework strengthens the positive aspects of the excellence 
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theory and extends the range of situations in which symmetrical communication might 
apply.  However, this framework still “represents a relatively undeveloped normative 
theory of public relations for activist organizations” and requires additional empirical 
support (J. Grunig, 2001, p. 19).  
Next Steps: An Approach to Just Communication 
I find critical approaches to theory of value, in that criticism could stimulate the 
kinds of debate that might lead to tests of theory; and I support, in general, J. Grunig’s 
(2001) call for building as well as criticizing theory.  By critical approaches, I mean 
perspectives of public relations that “focus on the symbolic processes of organizational 
behavior” (Toth & Heath, 1992, p. 7).  Critical perspectives of public relations break 
from studies that focus on the processes of communication management.  Critical 
scholars like L’Etang (1996) examine sources of power in organizations and ask 
questions about how public relations is used to control power and dominate publics, 
including members of an organization or profession.  For instance, some public relations 
scholars have directed their research toward feminization of the public relations 
profession and gender differences that affect the advancement of women in the field (e.g., 
L. Grunig, 1988; Toth, 2002).   
By criticizing theory, I refer in a rhetorical sense to a need to question the value of 
a theory and propose improvements.  According to Toth and Heath (2002), “critical 
judgment is needed to improve skills and to insure that a profession is responsible and 
sound” (p. 33).  Hence, scholars use criticism to question, interpret meaning, provide 
insight, express likes and dislikes, and offer theoretical and practical suggestions that 
might improve society.  I agree with Toth and Heath that criticism should be a 
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constructive rather than a destructive activity.  Thus, critics should “have something 
important to say and … say it to foster harmony and trust” (p. 2).  Criticism should rely 
on specific criteria to describe what is being criticized, judge and evaluate the object of 
criticism, justify claims or warrants, and support analyses by others. 
There is room in the public relations field for debate and development of specific 
theories that serve as alternatives to a broader, general theory of public relations.  As 
Burleson (1992) suggested, efforts to develop general theories of communication reflect 
misunderstanding of the complex nature of human communication. Berger (1991) 
advocated, instead, development of more varied, focused, and specific scientific theories 
in communication.  Thus, I believe critical inquiry and subsequent scholarly debate or 
criticism could help to strengthen and extend theories like the excellence theory in public 
relations – and perhaps lead to discovery of new theories.    
Like J. Grunig (2001) and Toth and Heath (1992), I believe that scholars have an 
obligation to not only criticize theory but also suggest improvements to theory.  Criticism 
and debate of theory, alone, can obscure discovery of new ideas and theories, just as 
debates over research methods can lead to “methodological fixation … in discussions of 
the relative merits of qualitative and quantitative approaches … [that] only serve to 
obscure the vastly more important issue of the scientific value of empirical data” (Berger, 
1991, p. 106).   Thus, constructive suggestions for improvement in public relations theory 
should be a product of criticism.  Therefore, in this dissertation, I did not recommend 
wholesale “replacement” of theory (J. Grunig, 2001, p. 17), since the excellence theory is 
not irreparably flawed   
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This is not to say that the excellence theory is fully developed and universal in a 
normative and a positive sense.  L. Grunig et al. (2002) said that challenges remain for 
research in public relations and there is room for growth in the excellence theory, 
especially in the areas of globalization, strategic management, relationship building, 
ethics, and change management.  In this spirit, I recommended improvement of the 
excellence theory, through extensions that could enhance the theory’s practical value – an 
aspect of the theory that is often criticized as underdeveloped (e.g., Cancel, Cameron, 
Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997; Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999; Murphy, 1991).  By 
building on the theoretical foundations provided by previous scientific discovery, the 
community of scholars and practitioners in public relations can help their field progress, 
which Kuhn (1996) defined as “the result of successful creative work” (p. 162).  This 
study was intended to contribute to growth in public relations theory – specifically, 
elaboration of ethical and global approaches to public relations.  My pursuit of this 
purpose responded to Berger’s (1991) call for development of specific theories of 
communication (as opposed to broad, general theories) and J. Grunig’s appeal for more 
“sophisticated means of symmetrical communication and conflict resolution” in 
multiparty conflicts (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 316).  
I based my dissertation on extensive work already completed in excellence theory 
research and also drew upon concepts suggested by alternatives to the excellence theory’s 
symmetrical model.  I supported this dissertation with principles of ethics and 
communication that could be applied in a variety of global settings and cultures.  In brief, 
I proposed a model of ethical communication that could help decision makers choose 
between asymmetrical, symmetrical or mixed-motive communication strategies that are 
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situation-specific strategies.  To avoid problems with relativism in this approach, I 
grounded the framework for this model in moral theory (Grassey, 1861/2000; L’Etang, 
1996).   
I recognized the need to address in this model communication strategies that 
could include persuasion and coercion, given the political-military nature of the NATO 
organization and the alliance’s role in managing international conflict. I defined concepts 
of persuasion and coercion in Chapter II.  These concepts were important to my research 
because the practice of persuasion and coercion sometimes conflicts with theoretical 
notions of excellence in public relations.  Therefore, I have addressed the significance of 
these concepts in this introduction.    
Miller (2002) associated the act of “being persuaded” with “situations where 
behavior has been modified by symbolic transactions (messages) that are sometimes, but 
not always, linked with coercive force (indirectly coercive) and that appeal to the reason 
and emotions of the person(s) being persuaded” (p. 6).  Various authors have defined 
coercion as a form of social control characterized by an application of power by one party 
over another to achieve compliance through promises of rewards or threats of punishment 
(e.g., Dillard & Pfau, 2002; Gibbons, Bradac, & Busch, 1992; Miller, 2002; Pennock, 
1972; Rosenbaum, 1986).  Furthermore, according to Miller, persuasion and coercion are 
linked.  Persuasive acts rely on rhetorical forms of communication while coercion relies 
on physical symbols like “guns or economic sanctions” (p. 4).  Still, both forms of 
communication are often associated with application of indirect (e.g., rhetorical) or direct 
(e.g., physical) power by one party over another to gain compliance of the second party. 
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As a scholar of the excellence theory in public relations, I value dialogic 
communication over one-way or asymmetrical communication as a preferred means to 
resolve conflict and establish mutually-beneficial relationships that reduce costs to 
organizations.  From an excellence theory perspective, persuasion is classified among 
two-way asymmetrical forms of communication (see J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984), which 
attempt to influence “publics to accept the organization’s point of view and to behave in a 
way that supports the organization” (p. 22).   
From this perspective, excellence theory scholars distinguish between 
symmetrical public relations and other organizational communication functions like 
marketing that are asymmetrical.  Marketing is based on “asymmetrical presuppositions” 
(J. Grunig, 1992b, p. 20) that are inconsistent with symmetrical principles of excellence 
theory in public relations.  For instance, marketing communication tends to be tactical, 
focusing on the pricing and publicity of products that are directed toward specific, target 
“markets for an organization’s goods and services” (p. 20).  On the other hand, strategic 
communication and public relations management efforts consider all publics that might 
have a relationship with an organization.   
Thus, two-way asymmetrical communication activities like persuasion and 
marketing are less likely to consider or produce healthy relationships than dialogic or 
two-way symmetrical communication forms that have as their goal a desire to create 
“mutual understanding between organizations and their publics” (p. 22).  Studies of 
excellence in public relations have shown that “communicators can develop relationships 
more effectively when they communicate symmetrically with publics rather than 
asymmetrically” (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. xi).  Therefore, excellence theory scholars like 
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J. Grunig (1989b) have expressed a preference for collaborative forms of communication 
like negotiation over asymmetrical communication like coercion as a preferred means to 
resolve conflict.  Grunig also compared coercion to “force, manipulation … or violence” 
(p. 39) and he noted: 
I am tempted to include the word persuasion here as something that should not be 
involved in conflict resolution.  I would include the word when it refers to 
manipulative kinds of persuasion as are used in the asymmetrical models [of 
communication]. (p. 39)  
This does not mean, however, that I reject persuasive or coercive approaches to 
communication.  On the contrary, I accept persuasion and coercion as legitimate, 
commonly used forms of communication.  Lucas (2004) observed, “Most of us do a 
certain amount of persuading every day, although we may not realize it or call it that” (p. 
394).  J. Grunig (1989b) also wrote that persuasive communication can be appropriate – 
even symmetrical – in that a “reasoned argument in support of one’s position is an 
important part of conflict resolution” (p. 39).  
However, parties that engage in persuasion and coercion should begin 
communicating through dialogue before switching to persuasion or coercion.  
Communicators must also remain ready and willing to switch to other tactics when 
persuasion and coercion fail.  Furthermore, uses of persuasion and coercion should be 
situationally appropriate, guided by ethical intentions and principles, and relied upon as 
something other than a central means of communication.  Lucas (2004) cautioned, “No 
matter what the … situation, you need to make sure your goals are ethically sound and 
that you use ethical means to communicate your ideas.  Meeting these obligations can be 
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especially challenging when you speak to persuade” (p. 395).  Thus, applications of 
persuasion or coercion that destroy trusting relationships or damage the credibility of a 
speaker or an organization contradict the value of excellence in communication and 
public relations management, which “comes from the relationships that communicators 
develop and maintain with publics” (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. xi). 
To ethically evaluate the viability of persuasive and coercive actions, I relied on 
the work of Gilbert (1997) in coalescent argumentation, which identified a symmetrical 
approach to persuasive arguments based on agreement rather than dispute.  From game 
theory, I referred to Schelling’s (1980) distinction between persuasive threats and 
warnings.  Also from game theory, I incorporated the notion of tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 
1984), which refers to a type of reciprocal, communication strategy that allows people in 
a bilateral relationship to “act in various ways that are unconditional” (Fisher & Brown, 
1988, p. 197).   
Practical Applications: Beyond the Limits of Symmetry 
In practice, the results of this study should help guide the decisions of public 
relations managers and ensure that choice and application of communication strategies 
are justified.  Post-Cold War threats have rendered inadequate traditional forms of 
national power (Mandelbaum, 2002) while increasing reliance on communication 
strategies such as public affairs and diplomacy (Peterson, 2002).  Alliances such as 
NATO and the member nations of such alliances have routinely employed a mixed-
motive continuum of communication strategies in various post-Cold War conflicts 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997; Clark, 2001; Ignatieff, 2000). These strategies incorporate a 
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variety of communication functions that employ various communication tactics: from 
collaboration (e.g., diplomacy) to coercion (e.g., threats of force).   
In alliances like NATO, several organizational functions play a role in planning 
and delivering strategic communication.  For example, military operations since the late 
twentieth century have incorporated the concept of information operations3 in 
communication planning.  Information operations integrates public affairs with other 
military information and communication functions such as psychological operations 
(PSYOPS), civil-military information (CIMIC), intelligence, electronic warfare, 
computer security, and diplomacy.  Psychological operations could include propaganda 
and deception operations.  I defined these and related information operations activities in 
the Glossary of Terms.  While many information operations activities are treated as 
separate functions, their planning and application to military operations are integrated 
under a single coordinating body, depicted in Figure 3 on the following page.  
Also, organizations deliver strategic messages through a variety of public 
relations and non-public relations channels.  Public information, politics, economics, and 
military force are considered by nations like the United States as elements of power in 
national security strategy.  A nation’s membership in organizations like NATO often 
diffuses thinking about strategic communication throughout a multinational alliance.  
Figure 4 depicts one way the U.S. military has identified power and considered applying 
a spectrum of powerful communication forms during times of peace and conflict.  Figure 
4, on the following page, illustrates how the United States could engage in early stages of 
conflict by using negotiation (political influence).   
 
                                                 
3 See the Glossary of Terms. 
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Figure 3. Elements of information operations, adapted from U.S. Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13 (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, p. I-10). 
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Figure 4. Elements of national power and spectrum of engagement in conflict and peace 
(U.S. Joint Warfare Analysis Center, 1999). 
  27 
 
As a crisis develops, the United States might resort to sanctions and embargoes 
(political and economic influence).  As conflict emerges, the United States could commit 
to limited, armed actions or declare war (military and political power).  As a crisis 
deescalates, the United States would hypothetically offer economic and political 
incentives, engage in democratization, and establish human rights programs to stabilize 
the situation.  Throughout this spectrum, the United States would also employ public 
information and social programs (e.g., information operations) to communicate with 
various publics. 
As Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate, it is unlikely that multinational organizations like 
NATO or their member nations would rely solely on symmetrical communication 
strategies in threat or conflict situations.  Although NATO’s charter was founded on the 
notion of collaboration and collective action, the charter also allows NATO to respond 
asymmetrically to threats or aggression. These responses could involve dialogue and 
negotiation or coercive application of economic, political, and military power – including 
military information operations.  Each of these responses represents a form of 
communication that could have significant consequences on strategic publics.  Given the 
potential effect of communication activities on key publics – regardless of the political, 
economic, or military nature of a particular communication act – such threat or conflict 
situations become public relations situations that require excellent public relations 
solutions.   
As previously defined, public relations involves “the management of 
communication between an organization and its publics” (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 6). 
Thus, in theory, public relations must become and remain involved with management of 
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all forms of communication that could have an effect on an organization’s publics – even 
forms of persuasive or coercive communication that might be carried out through 
political or economic sanctions, military demonstrations of force, and deception, 
propaganda, or psychological operations activities that are associated with information 
operations.   
It is therefore essential that public relations scholars and practitioners identify 
ways that the public relations function can remain an integral part of communication 
management.  This management process must continue from peace to conflict, through a 
spectrum of engagement strategies and tactics that might be planned and applied by 
organizations like NATO.  To limit the role of public relations is to marginalize public 
relations, allowing leaders who face certain types of asymmetrical threats to bypass 
public relations in favor of other communication functions. 
Significance 
The last two decades of the 20th century were marked by a growth in theoretical 
research and development in public relations.  The proposal of a general theory of public 
relations in the 1990s sparked acclaim, criticism, debate, and replication of public 
relations studies around the world.  Despite the growing interest and progress in public 
relations research, gaps still exist in several areas of theoretical and practical knowledge: 
global public relations, ethics in public relations, and strategic management of 
communication in multinational organizations confronted by post-Cold War turbulence 
(see L. Grunig et al., 2002, pp. 538-562).  This study has helped narrow these gaps in 
several ways.  Using Marshall and Rossman’s (1999) framework for contributory value 
in research, this study adds to the following domains. 
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Significance for Theory 
The intellectual contributions of this scholarship are perhaps most significant.  
This study responded to the need for increased theoretical understanding of global and 
ethical perspectives of public relations.  Findings also enlightened understanding of the 
role of public relations and communication in organizations undergoing changes – just as 
NATO is transforming to meet security needs of the post-Cold War period.  The use of 
qualitative methods in this study deepened theoretical understanding of mixed-motive 
communication and illustrated how public relations is situated in theoretical concepts of 
conflict and change management.   
This study’s focus on public relations in an international setting and within a 
multinational organization also revealed generic principles that add to a global theory in 
public relations.  Previous excellence theory research has focused largely on four types of 
organizations: “corporations, not-for-profit organizations, government agencies, and 
professional trade associations” (Dozier, 1995, p. 242).  L. Grunig (1992a) noted 
difficulties associated with defining and studying coalitions in their actual settings.  
Therefore, my examination of the NATO alliance and IFOR coalition helped to remedy 
the “dearth of scholarly research” (L. Grunig, p. 486) in this area. 
This study also extended the excellence theory by demonstrating how it could be 
more inclusive of communication principles and concepts related to persuasion and 
coercion – drawing on concepts from alternative approaches to public relations that 
explain how situational variables and contingencies influence choice of communication 
strategies.  This contribution will hopefully answer questions and blunt some criticism 
about the excellence theory’s applied weaknesses.   
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Finally, this study has cultivated development of ethical theory in public relations.  
Bowen (2000) found that a coherent approach to public relations ethics is an essential 
part of issues management in organizations, yet few studies have applied theories of 
ethics to the study of public relations.  By examining concepts from established moral 
theories, I have explored and illuminated how these concepts might contribute to 
construction of an ethical framework for decision-making in public relations and 
communication management.   
Significance for Practice 
Exploration of how theories of excellence, morality, and globalization might 
apply to management of public relations programs in multinational organizations also 
added to the significance of this study.  Qualitative interviews with NATO and IFOR 
officials revealed characteristics of public relations programs that were planned and 
implemented by these multinational organizations in an operational setting.   Analysis of 
data from these interviews enhanced understanding of how NATO managed its public 
relations programs – including the organization’s strategic and ethical rationale for 
decisions about communication.  This analysis identified principles that support both the 
excellence theory and a developing theory of global public relations. Furthermore, 
examination of NATO’s application of public relations in an international conflict 
generated ideas that apply to ethical practice of public relations and communication 
management in a variety of global settings. 
Significance for Social Issues 
This research also took on important social significance. Excellence theory 
research has demonstrated that public relations can add value to an organization by 
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reducing conflict and building healthy relationships that conserve capital and other 
resources.  This study of NATO has shown how ethical management of diplomatic and 
public communication between nations could help preserve and protect the sovereignty of 
nations and their citizens.  More precisely, political-military experts who are familiar 
with public relations management identified how public relations outcomes – especially 
in military operations – also can mean saving lives (e.g., Lopez, personal communication, 
July 10, 2000; Smith, 1996).  Thus, public relations studies like this that contribute to 
conflict management could have immeasurable social value.   
Furthermore, this research program was enriched by a proposal for practical 
applications or actions (e.g., adhering to an ethical framework that could save lives) that 
in strategic decision-making and public relations management.   I recognized that such 
calls for action could lead to construal of this study as action research.  Scholars such as 
Stuckey (personal communication, November 20, 2003) warned of political risks 
associated with mixing scholarly research with calls for action.  Therefore, to avoid 
confusion over terminology or purpose, my primary purpose in conducting this research 
was to contribute to the scholarly body of knowledge in public relations theory and 
practice.  Marshall and Rossman (1999) placed action research within research genres 
that “stipulate taking action as central to their work” (p. 37).  Thus, since advocacy of 
action taking is not my central purpose, it would not be accurate to categorize this 
research as action research.  However, I would welcome – as a consequence of this 
research – the adoption of any actions resulting from this study that might benefit society. 
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Methodological Considerations 
The choice of approach and methods was part of this study’s research design.  
First, I compared normative aspects of the excellence theory in public relations with 
application of this theory by a multinational organization operating in a turbulent, global 
setting.  I elected to pursue an instrumental case study approach to this research.  I 
adopted Stake’s (1995, 1998, 2000) notion of case study as a researcher’s choice of a 
topic to be studied rather than a research strategy (as suggested by Yin, 2003a, 2003b).  
My professional and scholarly interests in NATO and public relations theory were central 
to the purposes of this study; however, as Stake (2000) explained, “The case … plays a 
supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else” (p. 437).  Thus, 
my focus on NATO was secondary to my primary interest in public relations theory.  I 
scrutinized NATO’s organizational boundaries, its patterns of communication behavior, 
and the complexities of NATO’s deployment of IFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina between 
1995 and 1996.  However, I used the case as an instrument to illuminate how NATO 
applied principles of the excellence theory in public relations to its operations. 
Second, I consider myself a constructivist (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Stake, 
1995).  I favor a holistic approach to research and strive to understand co-creation of 
multiple meanings during interactions between researcher and participants in naturalistic 
settings.  I prefer qualitative research methods to quantitative methods as a means to 
produce deep understanding of phenomena under study.  Therefore, I used three 
qualitative interview methods in this study: long, elite and focus group (McCracken, 
1988; H. Rubin & I. Rubin, 1995).  These interviews allowed NATO executives and 
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public relations practitioners to explain how they selected and managed public relations 
and communication strategies in peaceful and in conflict situations.   
Third, I was constrained by temporal factors associated with my case study of the 
NATO-led peace implementation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  For example, IFOR’s 
public relations activities began and ended six to seven years prior to the beginning of 
this research project.  Therefore, I was no longer able enter the field in a traditional 
anthropological sense and perform direct observations of IFOR in action.  As an 
alternative to field study, I chose to interview public relations managers and senior 
leaders with direct experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Analysis of data from these 
interviews provided a deeper understanding of IFOR’s operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
by allowing me to trace how NATO communication managers and leaders used a 
strategic public relations program to construct and re-construct their operations in a 
rhetorical sense (e.g., Cheney, 1991, 1992).   
Locke, Spirduso, and Silverman (2000) observed that selection of methods within 
a research strategy is best determined by research purpose and questions.  Hence, my 
selection of qualitative methods to answer questions about how NATO managed public 
relations operations seemed most appropriate.  In the qualitative tradition, my interviews 
focused on how researcher and participants made meaning of theoretical principles as 
they applied to multinational public relations operations in a natural setting.  My use of 
multiple interview methods also represented an advantage of qualitative study.  By 
viewing NATO through the lenses of multiple, lived experiences, I achieved a more 
holistic perspective.  Subsequently, this perspective yielded deeper understanding of how 
interaction between various communication, cultural, and contextual variables influenced 
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multinational public relations programs.  My approach also was consistent with the 
current movement in qualitative research toward more interdisciplinary methods (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000).  I had hoped to achieve triangulation in method by using three 
different interview methods, which McCracken (1988) and Stake (1995) described as a 
means to strengthen the credibility of research results.  However, similarities between 
long and elite interviews made it difficult to claim achievement of triangulation in a 
formal sense.   
After collecting data, I followed Wolcott’s (1994) formula for description, 
analysis, and interpretation of results.  Analysis included Stake’s (1995) pattern-matching 
approach, which employs rigorous and systematic reasoning to identify key factors, 
patterns, and themes among data from interviews and textual analysis that help construct 
meaning.  I expand on discussion of methods in Chapter III.   
Reflexivity 
I am a qualitative researcher. As such, in a reflexive sense, I am an instrument of 
this research.  I have rejected the notion of complete objectivity in this study and 
accepted the existence of multiple meanings.  I recognize that my rejection of the 
traditional notion of objectivity did not absolve me of my responsibility to conduct this 
research in accordance with rigorous scientific standards.  However, I have adapted my 
approach to this study and research methods to my personal, professional, and artistic 
nature.   
Of special importance to this case study, I revealed and differentiated between my 
contemporary role as researcher and my former role as a public relations practitioner in 
the U.S. Navy and NATO.  Therefore, I identified and placed myself in the NATO case.  
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In the methods section of this report, I have discussed how I interacted with research 
settings that were new to me and with settings that I was once part of as a NATO officer.  
I also anticipated how I might influence my participants – some of whom are former 
colleagues, senior officers, or subordinates of mine.  In summary, I have throughout this 
study recognized and explained how intersections between my previous and former roles 
created a potential for internal and external biases.  I have also disclosed how I created 
critical distance between my dual roles and took other steps to manage the effects of 
potential biases. 
  As I explained in the methods section, to manage potential biases related to 
interviews, I wrote reflexive memos before and after meeting with participants, recorded 
comments about my feelings and observations during interviews, and transcribed 
interviews and comments as soon after meeting with participants as possible. Writing 
memoranda and observer comments allowed me to identify biases that I was aware of and 
disclose steps I that I took to mitigate the effect of those biases.  Furthermore, these 
reflexive activities helped me to reveal the truth as I “know it” (Locke et al., 2000, p. 25), 
explain how I arrived at this truth, and permit others to come to their own conclusions 
about my research.  Thus, reflexive thinking and writing helped make my work credible.   
Finally, I offer another note on my dual roles as researcher and practitioner. Crane 
(2000) described studies like this one as moving “into the realms of subjectivity, 
historical passions, and emotional relationships” (p. xi).  So, this study was for me a 
process of passion and emotion as well as scholarly research and scientific analysis.  
Studies of this nature generally benefit from critical distance between the observer and 
the observed (Crane, 2000; McCracken, 1988).  However, Geertz (1973) reported that 
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access to evidence is one of the keys to successful research.  Thus, my deep access and 
unique perspective as a participant-observer in IFOR was of great benefit to this study.  
As Crane (2000) concluded: “Our interest in history is inextricably part of our 
relationship to it.  Applying imagination to the past does not ‘invent’ or ‘revise’ it but 
rather allows us to express an emotional connection to history” (p. xi).  Therefore, I have 
embraced my emotional connection to the history of this case and I have used it, together 
with critical distance achieved through interview methods, to enrich this study. 
Ethical Issues in Research 
I followed strict procedures to guide my research and complied with the high 
standards required of scientific research, including adherence to a rigid institutional 
review board (IRB) process required for research projects that involve human subjects.  
These procedures helped to protect my participants from potential harm.  I disclosed my 
intent, identity, self-interests, and potential biases as a researcher.  I also used honest 
means to approach and gain access to participants.  Participants were debriefed and 
informed of any potential risks and benefits associated with this research.  Participants in 
this study were also volunteers.  I avoided coercing participants, obtained informed 
consent before each interview, and received permission to record interviews.  I allowed 
mutual control between the researcher and participants with respect to publication of 
results.  I also kept participants’ identities confidential and kept interview data under my 
direct control.   
I complied with ethical standards in writing and publishing.  It is often difficult to 
capture the truth, especially in qualitative research that involves interpretation of multiple 
meanings that are co-constructed through personal interaction.  Therefore, I have 
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attempted to present and discuss relevant literature, data, and results in a way that 
establishes credibility, allows for access and interpretation, and permits replication of the 
study.  I have also taken all reasonable means to avoid plagiarism.  Finally, I have tried to 
be diligent in writing accurately and adhering to a scientific style (APA) in reporting my 
work.   
Delimiting 
I made several research design decisions that helped me achieve a reasonable 
scope of study and accomplish the goals of this research in a timely manner.  First, I 
delimited my conceptualization of public relations by choosing one definition and 
perspective of public relations: strategic public relations and inter-organizational 
communication management. Second, I focused on a single international political-
military alliance and coalition.  I collected data and conducted pre-tests with officials 
from other multinational organizations, which could contribute to a collective case study 
(Stake, 2000); however, I focused my research in this study only on the NATO alliance 
and its subordinate coalition, IFOR.  I hope my instrumental case study design will 
conserve time but also provide a deeper understanding of a single organization, as 
recommended by Wolcott (1994).  With my understanding of this single case, I can 
attempt to reach broader understanding of a collection of cases in future research.  Third, 
I studied NATO and IFOR in the context of a specific conflict situation, bounded by a 
limited time period in history.  Fourth, I explored specific issues associated with 
communication ethics in an asymmetrical, conflict setting rather than address broader 
communication issues in a general organizational setting. 
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Furthermore, I considered factors such as cost, time, and logistics that could 
interfere with completion of any research project.  My research design incorporated 
allowances for problems that could arise during the course of this study.  I minimized 
costs by limiting travel and focusing my recruiting efforts on a purposive sample of 
participants located in the Washington, DC, area of the U.S. East Coast.  For the first four 
years of my study, I lived in close proximity to Washington, DC, which provided me with 
convenient access to military leaders and public relations managers who possessed the 
knowledge needed to answer my research questions.  However, during my last year of 
this study, I moved to the Hudson Valley region of New York State before completing 
my final focus group discussion.  Fortunately, my new home was near the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point.  This facility employs numerous experts in military public 
affairs, communication, leadership, and ethics.  Therefore, I altered plans to conduct a 
final focus group discussion at a military facility in Maryland or Virginia and instead held 
the focus group at West Point.  Finally, I overcame geographic separation between me 
and some participants by allowing for telephone interviews, which I conducted with 
participants who lived great distances from the Washington, DC, or New York areas. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Overview and Framework 
 In this study I set out to answer questions about the ethical practice of public 
relations and communication management within a multinational organization that faces 
conflict.  As Marshall and Rossman (1999) elucidated, such inquiry requires a framework 
that explains the logic of my work, places it within a tradition of scholarly research, and 
establishes contextual relationships with other studies of this kind. In this section, I use a 
literature review to locate my assumptions, questions, and values as a researcher within 
theoretical perspectives.  Second, I demonstrate my knowledge of this research and the 
scholarly traditions that bound this study.  Third, I identify gaps in this body of 
knowledge, show how these gaps relate to needs of public relations practitioners, and 
demonstrate how this study will contribute to these theoretical gaps and practical needs.  
Finally, against the backdrop of theoretical perspectives, research traditions, and body of 
knowledge I refine and make clear my research questions and propositions. 
 Following this logical framework, I use the first section of this chapter to 
contextualize the research problem within a specific case.  In the second section, I 
conceptualize the problem by locating it within theories of strategic public relations 
management, organizational management, conflict, and ethics. This section provides a 
framework for research in this study, which endeavors to extend the excellence theory in 
public relations.  In the third section, I discuss previous research that has offered a 
critique of positive aspects of the excellence theory.  Specifically, this critique explains 
how the excellence theory has been applied to the study of organizations and reveals 
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research questions that still linger.  These questions focus on three areas:  1) application 
of excellence theory principles by multinational organizations; 2) comparison of these 
principles with generic principles of global public relations; and 3) possible 
inconsistencies between public relations practices in multinational organizations and 
principles of excellence and global theory.  By examining conceptual questions related to 
these three areas, I establish the significance of this study and initiate discussion in 
subsequent chapters of how the excellence theory might be reconceptualized or extended.  
In the final section of this chapter, I conclude with a summary of research questions and 
propositions that motivated this study. 
Case and Context: NATO and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995-1996 
 Yin (2003a) wrote that a case study such as this one “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context” (p. 13).  Stake (2000) emphasized the 
importance of identify the phenomenon, or case, which is to be studied: 
A case may be simple or complex….  It may be a child, or a classroom of 
children, or an incident such as mobilization of professionals to study a childhood 
condition.  It is one among others.  In any given study, we will concentrate on the 
one. (p. 436) 
This instrumental case study was designed to advance understanding of public relations 
theory – in particular, how this theory operates in conflict situations and in a global 
setting. Therefore, my interest in the operational case was secondary to my interest in the 
theoretical dimensions that this case illuminates.  Still, the case itself is important.  
Therefore, I identify the case (NATO) under study and place it in the proper context 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) before I conceptualize the theoretical framework for this study. 
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The NATO Alliance 
Alliances and coalitions are unique organizations that often arise out of a need for 
collective security and cooperative action.  Alliances are generally broad, sustained 
organizations.  Coalitions are often formed by alliances for specific purposes and short 
durations.  This study focuses on one alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and on one coalition, the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
Established in 1949 under the Atlantic Charter, which was signed shortly after the 
end of World War II, NATO has grown from a partnership of 12 countries to become a 
powerful alliance of 26 free nations. A collective security agreement between member 
nations provides stable relations with other countries and helps to ensure “a just and 
lasting peaceful order … based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1998, p. 23).  However, the alliance 
faces the kinds of turbulence and change that provide rich material for the study and 
practice of public relations management.  For instance, Chalmer and Pierce (1998) 
observed, 
Dramatic changes since 1989 have required the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to rethink its force structure as well as to reconsider how to maintain 
the peace and security of Europe.  In the strategic vacuum created by the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO sought to establish cooperative relations 
with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. (p. ix) 
Recent developments have realized the establishment of relations with these 
central and eastern European nations and symbolized the dramatic changes experienced 
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by NATO since the end of the Cold War.  In 1995, when NATO deployed IFOR to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the alliance consisted of 16 nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Subsequent accession of new 
nations has increased the number of alliance members to 26: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland in 1997; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia in 2004.  NATO plans to continue expanding its membership to meet the 
changing security needs of the alliance and its member nations. 
The NATO alliance adheres to principles of international cooperation and respect 
for sovereign rights of nations; however, instability in financial, political, military, and 
social systems can thrust NATO into costly international conflicts – as in the case of 
IFOR’s deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Thus, NATO requires excellent public 
relations to establish and maintain cooperative relationships that sustain the alliance and 
reduce costs to the NATO headquarters and member nations.   
NATO’s Deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
On December 14, 1995, a peace agreement signed in Paris, France, ended nearly 
four years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the central region of the former 
Yugoslavia.  Two days later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began 
deploying to this region a heavily armed military force that would eventually 
include 60,000 troops from more than 30 nations to implement military provisions 
of the peace agreement.  This historic, yearlong operation, Joint Endeavour, 
represented NATO’s first deployment of combat troops outside its geographic 
area (Allied Forces Southern Europe, 2001).  Joint Endeavour also exemplified a 
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new era of Post-Cold War political-military missions: using powerful military 
forces to wage peace instead of war and diplomacy instead of combat.  NATO’s 
peace implementation force (IFOR) deployed to an uncertain setting, a virtual 
Balkan powder keg.  Combatants had agreed to cease hostilities, yet still-
simmering ethnic hatred and political strife prevented peace.  IFOR’s first military 
commander, U.S. Navy Admiral Leighton W. Smith, described the setting in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina simply as “an absence of war” (Smith, 1996, ¶ 15). Caught 
somewhere between converging concepts of war and peace, NATO faced its first 
challenge long before it deployed IFOR: to rhetorically construct a public identity 
of IFOR that would clarify the context, end war, and establish peace in the 
Balkans. (Van Dyke, 2003a, p. 2) 
Conceptualization of Strategic Management and Excellence in Public Relations  
Public Relations Theory 
Antecedents of Public Relations   
Several scholars have traced the antecedents of modern public relations to ancient 
eras: the use of stone tablets by Babylonians and the practice of rhetoric by ancient 
Greeks and Romans (Marsh, 2001; Seitel, 2000), an 1800 B.C. agricultural bulletin in 
present-day Iraq (Cutlip et al., 2000), and edicts from an Indian emperor to his subjects in 
300 B.C. (Sriramesh, 1996).  J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) credited the spread of 
Christianity from the first century A.D. as an engine for public relations in the second 
millennium.  Advances in printing technology, journalism, legal reforms, and socio-
political change such as the Revolutionary War in Britain’s American colonies promoted 
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further growth of public relations practice (Cutlip et al., 2000; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; 
Seitel, 2000).  
Public relations practice continued to grow in various regions around the world 
(Sriramesh & Verčič, 2003a; Van Ruler & Verčič, 2002); however, modern concepts and 
models of public relations did not emerge in the United States until the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.  Here, developments in publicity, government and political 
communication, and big business cultivated growing respect for the importance of 
maintaining good relations with publics.  Early practitioners such as Ivy Lee proposed 
new approaches to public relations practice based on frank and open communication with 
publics; separate public relations, advertising, and marketing functions; and prompt, 
accurate dissemination of public information (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Seitel, 2000).   
Edward L. Bernays, who was among the first to publish scholarly books and articles on 
public relations, advanced the intellectual study of public relations as a science.  He also 
taught the first undergraduate college course in public relations at New York University 
in 1923.  Moreover, Bernays was among the first scholars to promote the role of women 
in public relations and – although his early writings viewed public relations as a form of 
persuasion (e.g., Bernays, 1928/2000) – he eventually disassociated public relations from 
publicity and press agentry (Seitel, 2000).  
Professionalization of Public Relations 
The growth of public relations practice dominated the first few decades of the 20th 
century but professionalization of the public relations field distinguished the latter 
decades.  According to J. Grunig and Hunt (1984), professionalism can be demonstrated 
by five characteristics: professional values, strong professional organizations, adherence 
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to an enforceable set of norms or ethical code, an intellectual body of knowledge, and 
skills developed through professional training (p. 66).  The profession is still developing; 
however, the field now demonstrates many of these professional characteristics.  The 
research design for this study and requirements to delimit lead me to examine values and 
ethical codes in more depth than the other professional characteristics. 
Since the early 1900s, there has been increasing awareness and appreciation for 
the role of public relations in protecting values such as social and public responsibility 
(e.g., Verčič & Grunig, 2000).  J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) distinguished between the 
latter concepts by explaining that social responsibility refers to an organization’s duty to 
respect the welfare of “society at large” (p. 8) as well as the organization’s own interests.  
On the other hand, public responsibility refers to an organization’s duty to protect the 
welfare of specific stakeholders in that organization. Carroll (1991) compared the concept 
of social responsibility in organizational management with “reconciling the firm’s 
economic orientation with its social orientation” (p. 40). Since this study dealt principally 
with consequences of NATO operations on society at large rather than specific publics, I 
referred to this concept as social rather than public responsibility.  Furthermore, I 
elaborated on this concept by referring to J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1994) categorization of 
social responsibilities, which “has no boundary” (p. 55) and cannot be delineated by 
where an organization’s responsibilities begin or end: 
1. The performance of the organization’s basic tasks. 
2. The organization’s concern with the consequences of those activities on other 
groups outside the organization. 
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3. The organization’s concern with helping to solve general and social problems 
not connected to the organization. (p. 55) 
Ivy Lee is credited with being among the first practitioners to recognize the 
importance of an organization’s social responsibility to publics.  According to J. Grunig 
and Hunt (1984), Lee counseled organizational leaders in the early 1900s to adopt a 
policy of informing rather than damning publics within society.  This strategy led to new 
thinking about corporate social responsibility.  Modern practitioners such as Paluszek 
(1994) predicted, “The ‘new age’ company will be judged not only on profitability, return 
to shareholders and payment of taxes to support the government, but also on its 
‘corporate citizenship’ in relation to all of its constituencies” (p. 30). Ten years later, 
Paluszek (2004) reflected on the ways in which organizational responsibility to emerging 
global societies has helped public relations evolve from a simple message-delivery 
function to its present role as a strategic management function: 
For as Harold Burson, APR, Fellow PRSA, has so wisely observed, public 
relations has evolved over the decades from, essentially, delivering messages to 
counseling on policy, performance and communications.  More and more, we are 
being asked, ‘What should the organization do?’” (p. 7) 
To help support the role played by public relations in formulating responsible social 
policies, professional organizations like the Public Relations Society of America have 
established codes of ethics and professional interest sections (Paluszek, 2004).  Such 
actions have increased attention to social responsibility; still, scholars and practitioners 
have criticized current codes of ethics as being “unduly vague” (Bivins, 1993) and 
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lacking in universal application (Hunt & Tirpok, 1993).  I will expand on ethical concepts 
and criticism of ethical codes in the next section of this chapter. 
Professional development in public relations also is evidenced by growth in the 
number and kinds of national and international professional public relations 
organizations. For instance, the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication 
Management was established in 2000.  Within four years of its establishment, the Global 
Alliance expanded to include 28 participating public relations associations representing 
more than 75,000 individual members from around the world.  Organizations such as the 
Global Alliance and its member organizations have provided valuable skills training and 
opportunity for professional growth on a global scale.  More importantly, the Global 
Alliance has provided a framework for developing codes of ethics.  In 2003, the alliance 
adopted unanimously a standard protocol designed to establish an international code of 
ethics for the public relations profession by the end of 2005 (Global Alliance, 2003).   
Finally, the emerging profession has been populated by increasing numbers of 
public relations scholars, products of an expanding network of undergraduate and 
graduate public relations degree programs.  Near the end of the 20th century, 70 schools 
offered master’s degrees and 4 offered doctoral degrees in public relations (Seitel, 2000).  
Graduates of these programs have contributed to the healthy growth of a research 
tradition in public relations.  According to Sallot, Lyon, Acosta-Alzuru, and Jones 
(2003), 20% of the articles published in leading public relations journals through 2000 
contributed to theory-building – an increase from 4% in 1984.  This research has not only 
contributed to professionalization of the field, it has led to new theories and perspectives 
of public relations.   
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Emergence of a Strategic Management Perspective in Public Relations 
Management theory. Emergence of a management perspective in public relations 
has contributed to professionalization of the field.  Following World War II, Cutlip and 
Center (1952) published their first text describing the concept of public relations 
management.  The evolution of this management approach represented a scientific and 
ethical advance over previous public relations approaches that had been associated with 
“muckraking journalists … [and] … one-way persuasive communication” (Cutlip et al., 
2000, pp. 2-3).  As J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) pointed out, public relations managers 
become concerned with more than simple message dissemination, or “what public 
relations managers do” (p. 8). In doing public relations, J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) 
advised senior public relations managers to follow a management by objective (MBO) 
approach described by Duncan (1978). The MBO approach defines the management 
process in terms of results that are planned, implemented, and measured through action-
oriented ends.  J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) described the essential nature of these ends in 
terms of goals and objectives: 
Goals are generalized ends – ends that provide a framework for decision-making 
and behavior but are too broad to help much in making day-to-day decisions.  
Objectives, on the other hand, are ends in view – expected solutions to day-to-day 
problems that we can use to deal with that problem and evaluate whether we have 
solved it. (p. 116)  
I added terms to J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) conceptualization of MBO. Tactics 
have been written about and discussed extensively in public relations literature and are 
often assigned as responsibilities for public relations technicians to carry out. Wilcox, et 
  49 
 
al. (2000) described public relations tactics as “the ‘nuts and bolts’ part of the plan that 
describes, in sequence, the specific activities that put the strategies into operation and 
help to achieve the stated objectives” (p. 151). Also, a public relations strategy is “a well-
coordinated approach to reaching an overall goal” (Wilson, 2000, p. 2), or a framework 
of guidelines that describes “how in concept, an objective is to be achieved” (Wilcox, et 
al., 2000, p. 150).  Such strategic plans in public relations often identify strategic publics, 
preferred communication channels, potential obstacles, and even specific themes and 
messages that should be communicated. 
Public relations managers also become concerned with the effect of their strategic 
plans and actions.  Since not all outcomes of public relations actions are desired, 
responsible, or effective, public relations activities must be managed to ensure optimal 
outcomes for organizations and their publics.  Second, managing public relations 
becomes more ethical than simply doing public relations.  According to J. Grunig and 
Hunt (1984), public relations activities are part of a broader program of managing 
communication between organizations and their publics.  Hence, public relations requires 
dialogue or two-way communication designed to achieve mutual understanding rather 
than less ethical, one-way persuasive communication that attempts to satisfy only the 
interests of an organization. 
Systems theory. The emergence of a management perspective in public relations 
also was influenced by development of systems theory – specifically, a theory of open 
systems – in organizational management.  Many social scientists have adopted an open 
systems perspective for the study of complex organizations that can be traced to the study 
of physics and biology (e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1950).  According to open systems theory, 
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organizations are linked with resources contained in their external environment – and the 
external environment linked to products supplied by the organization. As von Bertalanffy 
observed, “A system is … open if there is import and export and, therefore, change of the 
components” (p. 23). Thus, organizations have no impermeable boundaries; rather 
organizations and their external environment are interdependent and open to each other.  
Katz and Kahn (1966), for instance, used open systems theory to trace patterns of 
activities between an organization and its external environment; and then determine how 
output was associated with management of resources required to sustain the organization.  
Open systems studies of this kind have led to interorganizational theories, which explain 
linkages and patterns of interaction between organizational systems and subsystems (e.g., 
J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Negandhi, 1980).    
From a public relations perspective, then, interdependence creates a need for 
communication and public relations; and an organization uses public relations to manage 
interdependent relationships, which are “the substance of public relations” (L. Grunig et 
al., 1992, p. 69).  However, J. Grunig (1992) and L. Grunig et al. (2002) realized that 
systems theory alone cannot explain how public relations management contributes to 
organizational effectiveness in practice.  For example, literature from the study of the 
excellence theory suggested that managers often construct narrow or inaccurate 
assessments of their organization’s external environment.  Moreover, certain types of 
organizations often do not choose to engage in symmetrical communication with their 
external publics.  In some cases, “an authoritarian dominant coalition sees the [two-way 
symmetrical] approach as a threat to its power” (p. 320).  Furthermore, “even in cases 
where a dynamic or hostile environment existed, organizations often exhibited a closed 
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system mind-set that failed, then, to value the kind of strategic public relations that would 
help them cope with that turbulence” (p. 94). 
Thus, other measures are required to explain how public relations could be 
managed most effectively within the organizational sphere.  Research from the excellence 
theory has drawn upon the work of other scholars (e.g., Robbins, 1990; Hall, 1991) to 
identify four possible approaches to organizational effectiveness: goal attainment, 
systems, strategic constituencies, and competing values (J. Grunig, 2003; L. Grunig, J. 
Grunig, & Ehling, 1992). I conceptualize one of these measures, the strategic 
constituencies approach, next and address others in the subsequent section on 
organizational effectiveness. 
Strategic management and situational theory. J. Grunig (1968, 1978, 1989a; 
1992a, 1997, 2003; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) refined the management approach to public 
relations by offering a strategic perspective of public relations management.  This 
perspective is consistent with the concept of strategic constituencies, which L. Grunig et 
al. (1992) and L. Grunig et al. (2002) identified in their studies of the excellence theory in 
public relations as one of four ways to evaluate organizational effectiveness.  According 
to J. Grunig (2003),  
The strategic constituencies approach … puts meaning into the term environment 
by specifying parts that are crucial for organizational survival and success.  
Strategic constituencies are the elements of the environment whose opposition or 
support can threaten the organization’s goals or help them attain them. (p. 100).  
The situational theory of publics first emerged as a monograph by J. Grunig 
(1968) that described the role of information in economic and decision-making theory.  
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Situational theory rejected the popular notion of a general public and provided a means to 
identify and manage strategically the relationships between an organization and its 
strategic publics.  I borrow from J. Grunig (2003) to define a public as “a group of people 
who face a problem, are divided on its solution, and organize to discuss it” (p. 95); and 
from L. Grunig et al. (2002) to define strategic publics as “groups most able to constrain 
or to help the organization” (p. 95).  J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) relied on situational 
theory to categorize publics according to their relationship and response to a problem: 
People who are not involved with the problem are a nonpublic.  Those who 
experience a consequence of organizational behavior but have not yet recognized 
it as a problem, are a latent public. Those who recognize the problem are an aware 
public.  Those who discuss solutions are an active public. (J. Grunig, 2003, p. 95) 
Situational theory also explains “that publics begin as disconnected systems of 
individuals experiencing common problems but that these disconnected systems can 
organize into powerful activist groups” (J. Grunig, 2003, p. 94).  Studies of situational 
theory have identified four kinds of publics that can arise from problematic situations: 
1. All-issue publics: Publics active on all problems. 
2. Apathetic publics: Publics inattentive to all of the problems. 
3. Single-issue publics: Publics active on one or a small subset of the problems 
that concerns only a small part of the population…. 
4. Hot-issue publics: Publics active only on a single problem that involves nearly 
everyone in the population and that has received extensive media coverage. (J. 
Grunig, 2003, p. 97) 
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L. Grunig (1992b) also defined a fifth type of public: activist.  An activist public 
is composed of “a group of two or more individuals who organize in order to influence 
another public or publics through action that may include education, compromise, 
persuasion, pressure tactics, or force” (p. 504).  Activist publics are distinguished from 
other publics by the notion that they can become “initiators of (rather than targets for) 
public relations programs” (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1997, p. 35).  These groups also merit 
special attention because they can organize into influential groups, even coalitions, which 
can “create issues and threaten organizational autonomy” (J. Grunig, 2003, p. 94).  The 
diverse nature of these publics and potential threats imposed by active and activist 
publics then create the need for public relations:  
Public relations contributes to strategic management by building relationships  
with publics with which it has relations…. Organizations plan public relations 
programs strategically, therefore, when they identify publics that are most likely 
to limit or enhance their ability to pursue the mission of the organization and 
design communication programs that help the organization manage its 
interdependence with these strategic publics. (J. Grunig, 2003, p. 103) 
Beyond classification of publics, situational theory consists of two dependent and 
three independent variables that explain how information behavior and decision-making 
becomes situational (J. Grunig, 2003).4  According to the theory, dependent variables 
relate to active and passive information behavior or, respectively, information seeking 
and information processing.  Information seeking consists of scanning the external 
environment for messages about a topic of interest.  Information processing involves the 
                                                 
4 According to J. Grunig (2003), research and theory building subsequent to development of situational 
theory has added “cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral effects” to dependent variables.  This addition is 
explained in more detail in J. Grunig (1997). 
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cognitive process of thinking about a topic once messages about it are discovered.  
Independent variables consist of problem recognition, or the extent to which people 
recognize a problem that affects them; level of involvement, which determines how 
personally and emotionally relevant people find a problem to be; and constraint 
recognition, or the extent to which people assume their behavior is limited by factors they 
cannot control.  Research has supported the theory’s premise that a combination of high 
problem recognition and low constraint recognition increase active and passive 
information behavior.  Succinctly, “Decision makers are most likely to seek out or use 
information from public relations sources when it is relevant to them” (J. Grunig, p. 93).  
However, people will randomly process information about problems to which they assign 
low involvement.  Furthermore, people who demonstrate more active information 
behavior are more likely to join active or activist publics. 
Strategic management of public relations is guided by what J. Grunig (2003) 
referred to as a “behavioral molecule” (p. 98) that describes functions required to manage 
strategically. The structure of this molecule was first described by J. Grunig and Hunt 
(1984) and elaborated on by J. Grunig (2003): 
Detect: Recognition of a problem requiring different behavior. 
Construct: Thinking about a problem; identifying and weighing alternative 
solutions. 
Define: Specifying how to put alternatives into operation. 
Select: Choosing one alternative to implement as a behavior. 
Confirm: Making sure the alternative chosen is the best choice. 
Behave: Moving, doing something. 
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Detect: Stopping behavior because of a new problematic situation. (pp. 99-100) 
Developing a model for strategic management of public relations, J. Grunig and Repper 
(1992) extended the behavioral molecule to a process described by stages and steps that 
contribute to effective organizational management.  This process aligns internal activities 
of an organization with external factors that influence that organization.  The model is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
The Strategic Management of Public Relations 
 
1. Stakeholder stage. An organization has a relationship with stakeholders when the 
behavior of the organization or of a stakeholder has consequences on the other. 
Public relations should do formative research to scan the environment and the 
behavior of the organization to identify these consequences. Ongoing 
communication with these stakeholders helps to build a stable, long-term 
relationship that manages conflict that may occur in the relationship. 
2. Public stage. Publics form when stakeholders recognize one or more of the 
consequences as a problem and organize to do something about it or them. Public 
relations should do research to identify and segment these publics. At this stage 
focus groups are particularly helpful. Communication to involve publics in the 
decision process of the organization helps to manage conflict before 
communication campaigns become necessary. 
3. Issue stage. Publics organize and create “issues” out of the problems they 
perceive. Public relations should anticipate these issues and manage the 
organization’s response to them. This is known as “issues management.” The 
media play a major role in the creation and expansion of issues. In particular, their 
coverage of issues may produce publics other than activist ones—especially “hot-
issue” publics. At this stage, research should segment publics. Communication 
programs should use the mass media as well as interpersonal communication with 
activists to try to resolve the issue through negotiation. 
 
Public relations should plan communication programs with different stakeholders or 
publics at each of the above three stages. In doing so, it should follow Steps 4-7. 
 
4. Public relations should develop formal objectives, such as communication, 
accuracy, understanding, agreement, and complementary behavior for its 
communication programs. 
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5. Public relations should plan formal programs and campaigns to accomplish the 
objectives. 
6. Public relations, especially the technicians, should implement the programs and 
campaigns. 
7. Public relations should evaluate the effectiveness of programs in meeting their 
objectives and in reducing the conflict produced by the problems and issues that 
brought about the programs. 
 
Note. From Excellence in Communication and Public Relations Management (p. 124) by 
J. E. Grunig (Ed.), 1992, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  Copyright 1992 by Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. Adapted with permission. 
 
The Excellence Theory in Public Relations 
Development of strategic management approaches in public relations led to a 
theory of excellence in public relations, which many scholars regard as the most 
comprehensive study of public relations in history (J. Grunig, 1992a).  Results of the 
study provide strong, empirical support for the normative and positive value of this 
theory. Therefore, the excellence theory suggests how public relations should be 
practiced in an ideal sense and describes how public relations is actually practiced in 
society. 
Launched in 1985 by a team or researchers funded by a $400,000 grant from the 
International Association of Business Communicators, this study became known as the 
excellence study.  Committed to identifying characteristics of successful public relations 
programs and their value to organizations, the study – conducted in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada – produced the excellence theory in public relations, which 
has been described as “the first general theory of public relations” (J. Grunig, 1992b, p. 
2).  Results of this 17-year study were published in three parts: a first-stage literature 
  57 
 
review (J. Grunig, 1992a); a summary of research results for public relations managers 
(Dozier, 1995); and an extended statistical analyses of study results, including the latest 
literature and data collected from case studies in several additional nations (L. Grunig et 
al., 2002).   
In their preface to the final book in the study, the authors summarized the key 
findings of their research project (L. Grunig et al., 2002, pp. xi-xii).  Public relations 
contributes value to an organization by developing and maintaining healthy relationships 
between organizations and their publics. Relationships produce reputation; and the 
quality of relationships and reputation is influenced more by organizational behavior than 
by mere dissemination of messages about an organization. Public relations managers who 
are empowered by organizational leaders and included among senior leaders can add 
value to an organization by bringing information into the organization that enhances 
strategic decision-making. Internal information programs for employees and other 
stakeholders can be strategically planned, managed, and evaluated to determine 
effectiveness. Symmetrical communication is more effective in developing and 
maintaining internal and external relationships than asymmetrical communication.   
Participative organizational cultures, which are part of an organizational structure 
chosen by senior leadership, also contribute to employee satisfaction. Diversity 
contributes to organizational effectiveness; however, barriers to women’s ability to 
assume top communication manager roles often inhibit effectiveness. The most excellent 
public relations departments are integrated with other organizational functions through a 
senior communication manager who has background in and formal knowledge of public 
relations; however, public relations and marketing functions are kept separate. Finally, 
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activism or external pressure on an organization creates the need for excellent public 
relations; and organizations with excellent public relations are able to reduce costly 
conflicts and external controls. 
These findings are displayed in Table 2 as characteristics of excellent public 
relations programs that were identified in the first phase of the excellence study (J. 
Grunig, 1992b, p. 28).  In subsequent phases of the study, quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of these characteristics isolated an excellence factor and produced a “scale of 
excellence in public relations” (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 74).  This scale can be used to 
rate the level of public relations excellence and compare public relations programs within 
a variety of organizations, since analysis of excellence study data suggested that 
“characteristics of excellence are generic for all types of organizations” (p. 87).   
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of Excellent Public Relations Programs 
I. Program Level 
1. Managed strategically  
II. Department Level 
2. A single or integrated public relations department  
3. Separate function from marketing  
4. Direct reporting relationship to senior management  
5. Two-way symmetrical model  
6. Senior public relations person in managerial role  
7. Potential for excellent public relations, as indicated by: 
a. Knowledge of symmetrical model  
b. Knowledge of managerial role  
c. Academic training in public relations 
d. Professionalism  
8. Equal opportunity for men and women in public relations 
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III. Organizational Level 
9. Worldview for public relations in the organization reflects the two-
way symmetrical model 
10. Public relations director has power in or with the dominant coalition 
11. Participative rather than authoritarian organizational culture 
12. Symmetrical system of internal communication 
13. Organic rather than mechanical organizational structure 
14. Turbulent, complex environment with pressure from activist groups 
IV. Effects of Excellent Public Relations 
15. Programs meet communication objectives 
16. Reduces cost of regulation, pressure, and litigation 
17. Job satisfaction is high among employees 
 
Note. From Excellence in Communication and Public Relations Management (p. 28) by J. 
E. Grunig (Ed.), 1992, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  Copyright 1992 by Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. Adapted with permission. 
 
The normative and positive aspects of the excellence theory provide a useful 
framework for the study of multinational public relations. The NATO alliance, indeed, 
faces the type of internal and external turmoil that produces the need for excellence in 
public relations. Comparing the excellence theory with NATO’s communication and 
public relations programs might identify how excellence theory principles could operate 
in a multinational organization. Furthermore, this comparison might suggest the level of 
excellence achieved in NATO public relations programs. This produced the first research 
question.  
RQ1: Which principles of the excellence theory in public relations did NATO 
apply to its public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996? 
Organizational culture, worldview, and structure. L. Grunig et al. (2002) opened 
Chapter 8 of their third book in the excellence study with this description of the 
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excellence theory’s key components: “If we were to choose a few keywords to describe 
the Excellence theory … we would list five: Excellent public relations is managerial, 
strategic, symmetrical, diverse, and ethical” (p. 306).  Having already addressed concepts 
of strategic management in public relations, I will turn to symmetry; but first, I will 
introduce several other key concepts that contribute to understanding of symmetry: 
worldview, culture, structure, diversity, and ethics. 
According to the excellence theory, organizational culture, worldview, structure, 
and communication are closely associated. Organizational culture was defined by Dozier 
(1995) as “the sum total of shared values, symbols, meanings, beliefs, assumptions, and 
expectations that organize and integrate a group of people who work together” (p. 135). 
According to J. Grunig, (1992b), “Organizational culture affects public relations in the 
long term by molding the worldview for public relations. In the short term, it influences 
the choice of a model of public relations” (p. 25).  Furthermore, culture and 
communication are interdependent, since “public relations is primarily a communication 
activity” and communication is culture-specific (Sriramesh & White, 1992, p. 609).  
Organizational culture arises from the broader concept of societal culture, which G. 
Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) and G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) related to a value 
system that distinguishes between social groups.   
I address culture and its relationship with public relations in the section of this 
conceptualization dedicated to global theory; however, in the context of an organization, 
culture also influences worldview, which in turn affects organizational leaders’ choice of 
communication strategies. This relationship has been described more precisely by 
Sriramesh, J. Grunig, & Buffington (1992): 
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Corporate culture thus influences public relations by providing a broad base of 
worldview, meanings, and values that affect all decisions in the organization – 
including the choice of a model of public relations and development of a schema 
that defines public relations and its purpose. (p. 579) 
 Organizational worldview has been defined by various scholars as sets of 
assumptions (Kearney, 1984) or “large abstract structures of knowledge that people use 
to organize what they know and to make sense of new information that comes to them” 
(J. Grunig & White, 1992, p. 33). Worldview is similar to the concept of schema in 
psychology (Weick, 1988, 1995; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Moussavi & Evans, 1993), 
which Schneider (aka L. Grunig, 1985); J. Grunig, Ramsey, and Schneider (1985); and 
Schmidt and Hitchon (1999) applied to public relations. Schneider (aka L. Grunig, 1985) 
noted that these structures determine what information people attend to, how people 
interpret information, and how people remember messages (pp. 38-39).   
Schema theory shows how worldview influences the nature of public relations 
and communication within organizations and society. Schneider (aka L. Grunig, 1985) 
observed that messages directed from the top of a hierarchical organization often 
influence the entire organization, filtering down through levels of the hierarchy over time 
(p. 43).  Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) found that “the chief executive officer can be seen 
as the architect, assimilator, and facilitator of strategic change” and that the initiation of 
change “involves a set of top management activities that are key to the effectiveness of 
the overall change process” (p. 433).  Furthermore, Moussavi and Evans (1993) found 
that “individual-level interpretations of top strategic managers can be expected to 
converge into an organizational interpretation because managers use identical cognitive 
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schemata when making their personal interpretations” (p. 79). Finally, Leichty and 
Warner (2001) suggested that people adhere to worldview as a means to legitimize a 
“way of life [that] consists of a preferred pattern of social relations and a cultural bias or 
set of shared beliefs about human society and the natural world” (p. 63). Thus, 
worldviews influence the way public relations is defined and practiced in organizations 
and society.  
Culture, worldview, and communication are also linked to organizational 
structure. This structure can be related to the degree of centralization in an organization, 
or “the hierarchy of authority that determines the extent to which decision-making is 
concentrated at the top of the organization” (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 484).  Hence, 
centralized organizational structures often restrict the flow of information throughout an 
organization, inhibit internal communication, and lead to low job satisfaction among 
employees.  Less centralized structures encourage free flow of information, value open 
internal communication, and promote higher job satisfaction.  L. Grunig et al. offered the 
following definitions of organizational structure: 
Traditional or craft organizations are small in scale and low in complexity. 
Mechanical organizations are large-scale, low-complexity operations. Organic 
organizations are small in scale but high in complexity. Mixed 
mechanical/organic organizations are both large in scale in high in complexity. 
(p. 485) 
Distinguishing between types of organizational culture, the excellence study 
found that participative organizational cultures were more likely to contribute to 
excellence in public relations than authoritarian cultures (Sriramesh, J. Grunig, and 
  63 
 
Buffington, 1992).  Moreover, participative cultures correlated with organic 
organizational structure, symmetrical forms of internal communication, and high 
employee morale; while authoritarian cultures correlated with mechanical structures, 
asymmetrical internal communication, and low morale (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 62). 
The multinational, political-military nature of NATO presents a unique 
opportunity to study the organization’s culture and worldview. Knowledge of NATO’s 
culture and worldview should also reveal how acculturation within this diverse, complex, 
and hierarchical organization might affect the alliance’s management of communication 
and public relations programs. This produced a second research question. 
RQ2: How did organizational culture influence NATO’s management of IFOR 
public relations and communication programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
Diversity and ethics.  L. Grunig et al. (2002) identified the need for diversity in 
public relations and associated diversity with requisite variety, a term defined by Weick 
(1979).  L. Grunig et al. explained, “The principle of requisite variety states that there 
must be as much diversity inside the organization as in its environment for the 
organization to be able to build good relationships with all critical stakeholder publics” 
(p. 11).  L. Grunig et al. also elaborated on requisite variety in the excellence theory: 
Requisite variety means that practitioners from both genders … and from 
different racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds are needed in an excellent public 
relations department – not just for the benefit of these diverse practitioners but 
because they make the organization more effective. (p. 12)   
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Thus, organizations that maintain diversity in terms of gender, race and ethnicity, and 
other socioeconomic factors are better able to scan, detect, report, and manage issues 
emerging from the external environment.   
Ethics in public relations is studied and practiced at various levels of 
conceptualization. For instance, ethics in public relations could be treated as a personal 
concept, as in telling the truth or lying (e.g., Sharpe, 2000), or as a professional business 
concept, as in complying with a code of ethics (Hunt & Tirpok, 1993). However, in the 
context of this study ethics takes on much deeper meaning as an organizational and a 
social concept.  Here, ethics equates to a combination of corporate and individual 
conscience that guides entire organizations and their membership as they try “to decide 
the right course in a situation that is fraught with danger” (Goodpaster & Matthews, 
1982, p. 132).  L. Grunig et al. (2002) suggested that public relations can become the 
conscience of an organization by serving as “the management function primarily 
responsible for introducing moral values and social responsibility into organizational 
decisions” (p. 554). I will elaborate later on ethics and moral reasoning in the section 
devoted to philosophy, ethics, social responsibility, and moral theory. 
Symmetry or the symmetrical approach to communication is a critical component 
in the excellence theory.  In fact, J. Grunig (1992b) found that “choice of the symmetrical 
model of communication is the key [italics added] choice made by effective 
organizations” (p. 24). Furthermore, excellence study scholars reported that a 
symmetrical worldview and approach to public relations is the most ethical of 
communication models (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992, p. 320; L. Grunig et al., 2002, pp. 
349-350), the most likely to produce effective relationships (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, p. 
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26; L. Grunig et al., xi), and the most likely to build collaborative structures that can help 
prevent costly conflicts between organizations and their publics (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 
pp. 312-320; L. Grunig et al., xi), thereby contributing both social and monetary value to 
an organization’s bottom line economic performance (Ehling, 1992; L. Grunig et al., xi).  
The concept of communication symmetry in public relations was first addressed 
by J. Grunig (1984).  He influenced new ways to conceptualize and operationalize public 
relations when he identified public relations as a “dependent variable to be explained” (L. 
Grunig et al., 2002, p. 308) and described public relations practices in terms of four 
conceptual models that could be measured empirically.  J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) then 
defined, traced the historic origins of, and elaborated on these models in their seminal 
textbook on public relations management.  According to J. Grunig and Hunt (p. 22), these 
models include: 
1. Press Agentry/Publicity: A form of propaganda, based on one-way 
communication from source to receiver, in which complete truth is not 
essential.  This model incorporates little research outside measuring profits, is 
associated with a P. T. Barnum style of product promotion, and is often 
practiced by sports, theatre, and other entertainment organizations.   
2. Public Information: Dissemination of information, based on one-way 
communication from source to receiver, in which truth is important.  This 
model incorporates little research other than readability or readership surveys, 
is associated with the Ivy Lee approach to public relations, and is often 
practiced in government, non-profit associations, and non-competitive 
businesses. 
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3. Two-way Asymmetric: Described as “scientific persuasion” (p. 22), based on 
two-way communication between source and receiver, in which 
communication effects favor the source of communication.  This model 
incorporates formative research designed to evaluate effects on audiences and 
their attitudes, is associated with Edward L. Bernays, and is often practiced in 
competitive businesses and agencies. 
4. Two-way Symmetric: Designed to achieve mutual understanding, based on 
two-way communication between groups, in which communication effects are 
balanced between sources and receivers.  This model incorporates formative 
research designed to evaluate understanding; also is associated with Bernays, 
educators, and other professional leaders; and is often practiced in regulated 
businesses and agencies. 
Two-way symmetric communication exhibits characteristics that make it a more 
effective public relations strategy than other communication models (Dozier, 1995; J. 
Grunig, 1992a, 2001; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; L. Grunig et al., 2002). First, the two-way 
symmetric approach promotes dialogue rather than monologue.  Second, it incorporates 
research designed to better understand the issues and interaction between organizations 
and publics that define their relationship, in contrast to other strategies that conduct 
research only to track communication effects and gain advantage over publics.  Third, 
public relations managers who practice two-way symmetric communication and are 
included in the strategic decision-making process of an organization are able to influence 
changes within the organization and among publics, according to the strategic needs of 
each. Thus, in practice and in theory, public relations managers who use two-way 
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symmetric communication act more ethically and are more likely to build and maintain 
the types of healthy relationships that determine excellent public relations results. 
Mixed-motive communication. Dozier (1995) remarked, “Excellent 
communication departments know how to practice both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
communication” (p. 51). This observation led the team of excellence study scholars to 
conclude that two-way symmetrical and two-way asymmetrical communication strategies 
actually construct a single, mixed-motive communication model that the excellence 
theory describes as a mixed-motive continuum of communication. According to Dozier, 
“This mixed-motive model involves the short-term use of asymmetrical practices within 
the context of a broad symmetrical philosophy” (p. 51).  Dozier went on to provide a 
useful elaboration of this notion that contextualized symmetry more precisely and 
underscored the overriding importance of ethical, symmetrical purpose: 
Advanced practices combine two-way communication with negotiation and 
persuasion.  Short-term asymmetrical tactics can be used to stake out more 
advantageous positions within the larger context of mutually beneficial 
relationships.  Ethical communicators always subordinate asymmetrical methods 
to broad principles of symmetrical purpose.  (p. 104) 
Commenting on the development of a mixed-motive communication continuum, 
however, J. Grunig (2001) warned, “We need to know much more about strategies that 
practitioners can and do use at different points on this continuum” (p. 27). 
A new dialogic model of public relations. The four models of public relations 
described above have been the focus of much public relations research since their 
introduction in the 1980s.  The notion of symmetry in public relations, in particular, has 
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been a topic of widespread and sometimes heated discussion, debate, and criticism.  
Drawing upon research, particularly from studies of the excellence theory, J. Grunig 
(2001) provided a strong defense of the descriptive and explanatory power contained 
within these models.  However, he also acknowledged that criticism of the symmetrical 
public relations model has prompted new thinking about this concept.  This new thinking 
still places value on the requirement to balance interests of an organization with interests 
of publics but now accepts certain types of advocacy and antagonism as acceptable 
communication, in certain situations: 
Symmetry might not have been the best choice of name for the model of public 
relations I had in mind, but unfortunately, it probably is too late to change the 
name. Mixed motives, collaborative advocacy, and cooperative antagonism all 
have the same meaning as does symmetry. (p. 28) 
J. Grunig (2001) also disclosed that research in the area of relationship 
management has influenced him to reconceptualized public relations strategies.  Instead 
of confining public relations in a typology of four separate models, he and L. Grunig et 
al. (2002) more recently conceived of public relations as part of a more comprehensive 
theory constructed from “dimensions or strategies that underlie the models” (p. 28). This 
developing theory incorporates a new two-way model of public relations excellence that 
replaces the concept of two-way symmetrical communication with dialogic 
communication, or dialogue, as a means to establish and maintain effective relationships. 
This model is supported by four dimensions or sets of variables (see J. Grunig, pp. 29-30; 
L. Grunig et al., pp. 306-382): 
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1. Symmetry or asymmetry, or the degree to which communication tends to 
move toward or away from collaboration and advocacy.  
2. One-way or two-way communication, similar to the conceptualization of 
communication in the original public relations models. 
3. Mediated or interpersonal communication, as in communicating through news 
media (e.g., press agentry and public information) or through personal 
relationships (e.g., lobbying). 
4. Ethical, which extends the concept of ethical communication to strategies 
other than symmetrical, as long as rules are applied to ensure ethical practice. 
J. Grunig (2001) and L. Grunig et al. (2002) also reported that quantitative results 
of the excellence study provided empirical support for development of a new contingency 
model for communication in public relations.  Unlike a previous model proposed by J. 
Grunig (1992a), which placed asymmetrical communication at one end of the continuum 
and symmetric communication at the other end, the revised model (Dozier, 1995; L. 
Grunig et al.) allows both symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of communication to 
operate anywhere along the continuum. Thus, symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of 
communication can be used together, as part of a broader mixed-motive strategy that has 
as its goal finding mutual agreement between parties in conflict.   
This goal is represented by a “win-win zone” (Dozier, 1995, p. 48; L. Grunig et 
al., 2002, p. 357) in the middle, or equilibrium, of the mixed-motive continuum.  On one 
side of the win-win zone lie dominant, exploitive positions and asymmetrical forms of 
communication that favor an organization.  On the other side of the win-win zone exist 
dominant, exploitive positions and asymmetrical forms of communication that favor an 
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organization’s publics. Along this continuum, organizations and publics may use purely 
cooperative, purely asymmetrical, or two-way dialogic communication to advocate for a 
position, accept a position, or reach compromise.  Furthermore, excellence theory 
scholars who helped construct this model agreed that persuasion is permissible in certain 
situations when guided by ethical rules. 
Although we found that pure asymmetry does not characterize excellent public 
relations … persuasive tactics sometimes may be used to gain the best position for 
organizations within the win-win zone. Because such practices are bounded by a 
symmetrical worldview that respects the integrity of long-term relationships, the 
two-way model assumes that professional public relations is based on 
symmetrical, collaborative values. (L. Grunig et al., p. 358) 
Hence, models have been updated and perhaps superseded by theoretical 
development in recent years.  Introduction of these models and the scholarly debate that 
surrounded them were useful in building early public relations theory.  However, as J. 
Grunig (2001) concluded, it is time to “move beyond typologies to theories composed of 
continuous rather than discrete variables” (p. 29).  
Global Theory in Public Relations 
Scholars have acknowledged the excellence study’s significant contributions to a 
rapidly growing public relations body of knowledge.  However, some scholars have 
questioned or criticized the positive aspects of such theory, suggesting that it is not 
representative of how public relations is actually practiced in non-Western nations (e.g., 
J. Grunig & Jaatinen, 1998; L. Grunig et al., 1998; Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 2003a; 
Van Ruler & Verčič, 2002; Van Ruler, Verčič, Bütschi, & Flodin, 2004; Wakefield, 
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1996, 1997).  For example, contemporary communication management theories and 
practices are based largely on U.S. and western-hemispheric concepts of organizations 
and public relations; hence, these programs may be ill suited to many nations and regions 
outside the western geographic sphere (Culbertson & Chen, 1996; Kruckeberg, 1996a, 
1996b; Van Ruler & Verčič, 2002).  
Aligning with scholars, practitioners also have taken action to adapt practical U.S. 
public relations concepts to the demands created by globalization.  For instance, Paluszek 
(2004) addressed the rhetorical question “How do we fit into the world?” by elaborating 
on efforts of professional public relations practitioners to keep up with rapid evolution of 
global markets.  These efforts include: 
1. Establishment of an international Public Relations Coalition, a partnership of 
19 large, U.S.-based organizations that represent a variety of public relations, 
investment, and corporate communication concerns. 
2. Efforts by the Public Relations Society of America to focus the attention of 
public relations practitioners on important international issues. 
3. Organization of the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication 
Management, an association of professional public relations societies linking 
practitioners in 60 countries throughout the Americas, Asia, Australia, Africa, 
and Europe. 
Within the last decade, scholars have tried to extend the excellence theory by 
replicating excellence research or conducting cross-cultural public relations studies in a 
variety of Western and non-Western cultures, including Slovenia (L. Grunig et al., 1998; 
Verčič, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1996), Norway (J. Grunig & Jaatinen, 1998), India 
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(Singh, 2000; Sriramesh, 1991), France (Sha, 1997); Greece (Lyra, 1991), China (Wu, 
2002), and Arab nations (Kanso & Nelson, 2002).  Culbertson and Chen (1996) published 
one of the first texts comparing public relations from an international perspective.   
Collectively, these studies have inspired preliminary conceptualization of a global 
theory of public relations.  Working toward development of this theory, several scholars 
(e.g., J. Grunig, L. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, & Lyra, 1995; L. Grunig et al., 1998; 
Verčič et al., 1996; Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 2003a; Wakefield, 1996, 1997) have 
collaborated on research that contributes to a theory of global public relations (L. Grunig, 
et al., 1998, 2002).  This theory would operate between a cultural relativism and 
ethnocentric approach to public relations.  Cultural relativism theories maintain that 
public relations concepts must differ according to region or country in order to 
accommodate the prevailing culture.  An ethnocentric approach would hold that a single 
public relations theory, which reflects the culture of societies that contribute to the 
theory, could apply to all societies.   
Like cultural relativism and ethnocentric approaches, international and global 
perspectives are often used to describe public relations activities that cross national and 
cultural borders.  The terms international and global are often used interchangeably but 
application of these terms to public relations differs significantly.  Few scholars have 
attempted to define international public relations in a formal sense (Wakefield, 1996).  
However, there is a growing body of literature that relates the international perspective to 
the practice of organizational public relations across borders and in many countries.  
According to Culbertson (1996), international public relations “focuses on the practice of 
public relations in an international or cross-cultural context” (p. 2).  Anderson (1989) 
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recognized that international public relations practitioners often develop individual 
programs to meet the needs of multiple markets; however, global practitioners develop 
programs based on interrelated or similar concepts and then adapt these programs to 
different settings. 
According to a theory of global public relations, similarities in public relations 
concepts are described by generic principles (L. Grunig et al., 1998, 2002).  L. Grunig et 
al. (2002) offered one of the best summaries of these principles and located them in the 
context of cultural relativism and ethnocentrism, or international and global theory.  The 
principles consist of broad, generic principles with specific applications.  In a normative 
sense, the principles are abstract public relations concepts that are understood in the same 
way around the world and could operate effectively in most nations.  In practice, 
however, the principles would have to be adapted to nation-specific variations in cultural, 
political, and other socio-economic systems.  J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1999) found that the 
principles also are generic to most kinds of organizations (e.g., government, corporate, 
agency, non-profit) but must be adapted to specific organizations. 
The excellence study produced 14 characteristics of public relations excellence, 
described previously in this paper.  Extending these principles to the practice of public 
relations in Slovenia, Verčič et al. (1996) identified nine generic principles that could be 
applied to public relations programs in most countries.  These principles include: 
1. Involvement of public relations in an organization’s strategic management. 
2. A direct reporting relationship between the senior public relations manager 
and senior organizational management. 
3. An integrated public relations function. 
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4. Public relations as a management function separate from other functions. 
5. The role of the public relations practitioner (e.g., a knowledgeable, senior 
communication manager who directs and technicians who carry out tasks). 
6. Two-way symmetrical model of public relations. 
7. Symmetrical system of internal communication. 
8. Knowledge potential for managerial role and symmetrical public relations. 
9. Diversity embodied in all roles. 
In addition to identifying generic principles, Verčič et al. (1996) described five 
external, environmental variables at a national or social level that could influence 
application of public relations principles: political system, economic system, level of 
activism, culture, and media systems.  These systems are derived from the cultural values 
that identify nations and, as explained previously, influence communication and public 
relations.  Sriramesh and Verčič (2001) collapsed these variables into three categories:  
national infrastructure, media system, and social culture.  Furthermore, Sriramesh and 
Verčič elaborated on these variables and operationalized them to create a research 
framework that supports the study of generic or global public relations practices in 
various countries.   
Finally, Sriramesh and Verčič (2003a) used the framework developed in their 
2001 study as a blueprint for an edited collection of comparative, country-specific studies 
of public relations on every continent (Sriramesh & Verčič).  These comparative studies 
have contributed to development of a global theory of public relations in two important 
ways.  First, the studies described, by nation, specific public relations practices, levels of 
knowledge and professionalism among practitioners, effect of professional organizations 
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on social responsibility and ethical communication, status of public relations education, 
challenges faced by public relations, and prevalence of strategic public relations 
processes such as measurement and evaluation.  Second, the studies linked empirical 
findings to the sociocultural factors developed from previous studies of global public 
relations theory.  This has resulted in a conceptual framework of environmental variables 
and sub-elements that could be used to explore the normative and positive dimensions of 
a global theory in public relations.  This framework is summarized, below, from 
Sriramesh and Verčič (2003b): 
1. Country Infrastructure 
a. Political system. The political ideology of a nation (e.g., Western 
democratic, Communist, developing nation). 
b. Level of economic development.  Extent of economic freedom as 
indicated by market economy, availability of goods and supplies, etc. 
c. Level of activism.  Existence of external pressure from organized labor 
unions, special interest groups, and other activist organizations. 
d. Legal system. Laws and regulations that control behavior of citizens. 
2. Societal Culture 
a. Determinants of societal culture. Ways in which nations adopt one or 
more cultures (e.g., economic, social structure, ideology, personality 
traits). 
b. Dimensions of societal culture. These include dimensions from G. 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) and G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005), 
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which I describe in a subsequent section on communication and 
culture.  
c. Corporate culture. The influence of societal culture on organizational 
culture (see Culbertson & Chen, 1996; J. Grunig & White, 1992; 
Sriramesh, J. Grunig, and Buffington, 1992; Sriramesh and White, 
1992; Wakefield, 1996, 1997). 
3. Media and Public Relations 
a. Mass media and national image. How mass media and mediated 
messages influence perceptions of nations and their citizens.  
b. Media control.  Span of control over a nation’s media or extent to 
which media are free to collect and report news. 
c. Media outreach. Extent to which citizens, including public relations 
professionals, are able diffuse information and reach mass audiences 
through the media. 
d. Media access.  Extent to which citizens are able to gain access to 
media for purposes of disseminating messages. 
Finally, European scholars (Van Ruler & Verčič, 2002; Van Ruler, Verčič, 
Bütschi, & Flodin, 2004) also produced a Delphi study of 25 European and former Soviet 
bloc nations that offered a comparative analysis of public relations in Europe and the 
United States.  Reporting results of these studies, the authors identified four parameters 
that could characterize European public relations practice and study: managerial, 
operational, reflective, and educational.  These latter studies have been exploratory in 
nature.  They also reflect current trends in efforts to study generic principles of global 
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public relations; determine how cultural, political, and societal variables influence public 
relations in practice and theory; and describe how public relations must adapt to unique 
national and cultural identities. 
Since NATO consists of 26 nations located across three continents, I make the 
assumption that the alliance’s communication and public relations programs are 
influenced by a variety of global variables and systems described above. If so, qualitative 
study of NATO’s communication behavior should reveal generic public relations 
principles agreed to and adapted by these 26 nations to the alliance’s global operations. 
This produced the third research question. 
RQ3: Which, if any, excellence theory principles applied by NATO to IFOR 
communication programs were associated with generic principles of a global theory in 
public relations? 
Public Relations and Public Diplomacy 
 Public relations and public diplomacy are both important behavioral aspects in 
multinational, political-military alliances like NATO.  Although both behaviors are 
derived from communication concepts and are often coordinated in communication 
planning, public relations and public diplomacy are distinctly different concepts.  Since 
this is a public relations study, I will distinguish between the two.  As I have previously 
defined it, public relations refers to how an organization manages communication with its 
publics.  These publics usually constitute important audiences comprised of strategic 
groups or individuals, often in a domestic sense.  In the context of this study, public 
diplomacy generally refers to how nations like the United States or an alliance of nations 
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like NATO manage diplomatic communication with other nations and with international 
audiences for the purposes of enacting foreign policy.  
 Public relations and public diplomacy both rely on communication processes but 
differ in the aim of communication.  Belay (1997) described “actors” (p. 229) or what I 
refer to as strategic audiences as a key difference between public relations and public 
diplomacy: 
 It is important to note that not individuals or groups, but countries constitute the  
primary interactional actors in diplomacy….  It is therefore useful to 
conceptualize first the specific constructions of diplomacy as a process as well as 
context of interaction between nation-states.  (p. 229) 
Public diplomacy is often conducted in concert with other communication 
activities that many governments refer to as public information or public affairs.  J. 
Grunig and Hunt (1984) explained that most U.S. government agencies practice public 
information rather than public relations due to legislation (e.g., Gillett Amendment) that 
restricts government agencies from hiring publicity specialists.  Many other nations and 
NATO also refer to public relations activities as public information, which suggests a 
government’s constitutional obligation to provide information to their citizens or 
constituents.  Public affairs, on the other hand, describes “a specialized public policy and 
government relations program that is managed by the organization’s public relations 
subsystem” (p. 285).  The U.S. Department of State combines both public affairs and 
public diplomacy into a single department.  A mission statement on the U.S. Department 
of State’s public Web site describes the difference – and the common communication 
relationship – between both: 
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U.S. engagement in the world and the Department of State's engagement of the 
American public are indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy. The Under 
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs helps ensure that public 
diplomacy (engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences) is 
practiced in harmony with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and traditional 
diplomacy to advance U.S. interests and security and to provide the moral basis 
for U.S. leadership in the world. (U.S. Department of State, 2005, p. 1) 
The Glossary of Terms in this report defines public relations, public affairs, and other 
terms that are used by the United States and NATO to describe information-related 
activities. 
In summary, building on J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) definitions of public 
relations and public affairs, public relations is a broad term that refers to communication 
management between organizations and publics, in general.  Public diplomacy is a more 
specialized function than public relations.  Sometimes carried out by public relations 
experts or integrated with public relations, public diplomacy refers to management of 
foreign policy communication between nations and publics.   
During the 1995-1996 period of this study, the NATO headquarters organization 
maintained an office of information and press – equivalent to an office of public relations 
– that was separate but coordinated with public diplomacy functions.  NATO 
headquarters subsequently combined public relations and public diplomacy in a single, 
public diplomacy division.  IFOR, while deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, maintained 
separate offices for public information (public relations) and public diplomacy.  IFOR’s 
chief of public information was a senior, U.S. military public affairs officer.  IFOR’s 
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political advisor (public diplomacy and public affairs) was a senior NATO diplomat.  The 
IFOR chief of public information and political advisor worked together closely to 
coordinate, integrate and manage IFOR’s public communication efforts. 
Organizational Management 
Theories of organizations and management are too expansive to address here in 
detail.  The literature addresses power from an interpersonal perspective (e.g., Berger, 
1985), an interorganizational perspective (e.g., Mintzberg, 1983), and even a broader 
international perspective that addresses negotiation between coalitions, cultural groups, 
and even nations (e.g., Friedland, 1976; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999). Scholars 
have addressed external dimensions of power, such as a person’s ability to alter his or her 
environment – including relationships; and internal dimensions, such as the psychological 
changes within people that power can bring about – including attitudes toward other 
people or things (Willer & Lovaglia, 1997).  Descriptions often refer to bases, means, 
strengths, costs, amount, scope, control, causality, and domains of power. The power 
literature also spans a number of theoretical boundaries: field theory, exchange theory, 
and conflict theory to name a few (see Zelditch, 2000).   
Given the complexity of this literature, I locate my research within the areas of 
theory that best conceptualize the role of strategic public relations management in 
organizations.  These areas include concepts of power in and around organizations, public 
relations management and strategic decision-making in organizations, and organizational 
effectiveness. 
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Power in Organizations 
Mintzberg (1983) made light of the many, confusing definitions of power and the 
difficulties scholars encounter in studies of power: “Everyone seems to know what it is 
except the experts…. Yet ordinary people seem to have no trouble with the concept. They 
know what it means to have power and they can sense who has it” (p. 1). 
I limit my conceptualization of power as an “exchange of ‘resources’” (Zelditch, 
2000, p. 1458) commonly associated with organizations and the external and internal 
influences that drive organizational decisions. In terms of resources, I generally refer to 
exchange of information in a public relations sense. In fairness to Mintzberg, he has done 
much as an expert and scholar to clarify the meaning of power.  Hence, I begin with his 
definition of power in organizations, which is “the capacity to effect (or affect) 
organizational outcomes” (p. 4).  My conceptualization also includes public relations as 
an important element in determining these organizational outcomes. 
Mintzberg (1983) is among a group of scholars that views power and influence as 
equivalent concepts (also see Dahl, 1957; French & Raven, 1959).  Other scholars have 
viewed power and influence as related but different concepts. For instance, Willer and 
Lovaglia (1997) conceived of power as a form of control over goods and resources, and 
influence as a means derived from power to change beliefs or persuade. Other scholars 
focus conceptualization of power on the notion of control over the behavior or outcomes 
of other people (Berger, 1985; Dahl, 1957; De Dreu, 1995; Rodrigues-Bailon, Moya, & 
Yzerbyt, 2000). Mintzberg explained that actors can gain or exercise power through 
“means or systems of influence” (p. 3). Borrowing from Dahl, Mintzberg also 
acknowledged that there is no “convenient verb form” (p. 5) of power; hence, “We are 
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forced to talk of influencing or controlling instead, and all kinds of semantic problems 
arise as a result” (p. 5).  To clarify these problems, I conceive of power as an ability to do 
something (noun) and influence as something that can be done (verb). 
This notion can be elaborated further and related to organizations and public 
relations management by explaining how influence derives from power.  First, Rubin and 
Brown (1975) described five types of power: referent (from feelings of solidarity), expert 
(from superior knowledge or abilities), legitimate (from rightful claims), informational 
(from availability of information), and reward or coercive (from ability to impose reward 
or punishment).  Thus, senior leaders derive expert power from the role they play in the 
dominant coalition of an organization.  They and public relations managers derive power 
from their control over information.  This power can then be exercised and managed 
inside and outside an organization through mixed-motive, symmetrical, and asymmetrical 
communication strategies already described in this study.  To be more precise, an 
organization can share this power with publics through purely collaborative strategies 
designed to achieve mutual understanding and cooperation; or an organization can 
exercise power through asymmetrical strategies designed to influence or persuade publics 
to adopt an organization’s point of view. 
Mintzberg (1983) explained in more precise detail how power in and around 
organizations affects organization-public relationships.  First, he identified control over 
resources, skills, and knowledge (e.g. information) as the bases of power.  This control 
takes several forms: external and internal, indirect and direct. External coalitions can 
consist of regulatory agencies, shareholders, boards of directors, and activist groups. 
Internal coalitions include an organization’s executives, managers, operators, and staff.  
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Indirect controls include social norms, formal constraints, and pressure campaigns that 
delineate boundaries between organizations and their environment.  Direct controls 
consist of means of direct access and influence: membership on boards, involvement in or 
control over decision-making, control over resources, etc. 
 Second, Mintzberg (1983) demonstrated how power can be exercised.  An 
organization can be controlled by a dependency upon its environment, or concentration of 
power in hands of one individual, group, or coalition.  It also can be influenced in a 
number of ways by internal and external publics.  According to Mintzberg, organizations 
can be: 
1. Nationalized: controlled or owned by government. 
2. Democratized: influenced by broad controls, participative decision-making. 
3. Regulated: influenced, not controlled, by government regulation or oversight. 
4. Pressured: subjected to activist campaigns, lobbying. 
5. Trusted: relied upon to act morally. 
6. Ignored: assumed to balance economic and social good. 
7. Induced: influenced by economic incentives to behave responsibly. 
8. Restored: given back to shareholders. 
Finally, Mintzberg (1983) explained how organizations respond to control.  When 
they encounter an issue or situation that challenges organizational control, leadership 
collects information, takes advice, decides on a course of action, obtains authorization for 
the action, issues instructions to execute or implement the action, and then carries out the 
action.   
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 Other scholars have linked power to the concepts of culture and communication 
described in previous sections of this study.  For instance, Mumby (1987) provided an 
explanation for how power is linked to organizational culture, ideology, and 
communication.  First, Mumby described organizational communication or narrative as 
“one of the principal symbolic forms through which organizational ideology and power 
structures are both expressed and constituted” (p. 113).  He added, 
Ideology is materially grounded in the organized practices of social actors. . . .  
Ideology and power are inextricably tied together insofar as ideology articulates 
social reality in terms of interests expressed by the dominant social group(s).  In 
the context of organizations, power is most successfully exercised by those who 
can structure their interests into the organizations framework itself.  (p. 119) 
This conceptualization of power reveals how public relations can contribute to 
strategic management and decision-making in organizations.  Using Mintzberg’s (1983) 
model of organizational decision-making, public relations contributes to scanning of the 
environment to detect emerging issues, the flow of information into the organization, 
advice and counsel to leadership, strategic decision-making in the organization, and 
dissemination of information about decisions.  Moreover, public relations activities can 
become an important part of the actions carried out by an organization in response to 
issues and control situations.  From Mumby’s (1987) perspective, public relations 
managers contribute to and may even have primary responsibility for managing the 
organizational communication, or narrative, through which organizational ideology and 
power are expressed.  As Cheney (1992) reported in a rhetorical sense, “public relations 
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experts necessarily [present and] re-present their organizations through symbols of their 
own creation” (p. 179).   
Postmodern, critical scholars, however, have questioned the role of public 
relations managers in the power structure of an organization.  For instance, Holtzhausen 
and Voto (2002) argued that control of power by an organization’s senior leadership 
marginalizes the organization’s employees. From this critical perspective, public relations 
managers should serve as organizational activists, working as intermediaries between 
leaders and employees within the organization to ensure equitable distribution of power.  
So, questions remain that require conceptualization of power in public relations. 
Strategic Decision-Making 
 Each organization is led by a dominant coalition, which L. Grunig et al. (2002) 
defined as “the group of individuals in the organization that have the power to determine 
its mission and goals” (p. 141).  In their literature review for the excellence study, J. 
Grunig and his colleagues (1992a) described the need for including public relations 
managers in the dominant coalition and involving public relations in the strategic 
decision-making process of organizations.  L. Grunig (1992a) observed that public 
relations is often conceptualized in structural terms, with regard to the place and role 
public relations assumes within the hierarchy of an organization. She also noted that most 
public relations practitioners “remain ‘outside the door’ when … top-level decisions are 
being made” (p. 483) by senior organizational leaders, which implied that most public 
relations practitioners are powerless in terms of organizational responsibility.  Public 
relations practitioners who are left outside the realm of strategic decision-making often 
are relegated to merely disseminating information and carrying out basic publicity 
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functions.  Therefore, L. Grunig suggested including public relations managers in the 
dominant coalition and involving them in strategic decision-making.  
Empowering public relations managers benefits the field of public relations and 
organizations.  First, entrusting power to public relations in terms of decision-making 
responsibility advances public relations from a technical function to a managerial 
function and professional status (L. Grunig, 1992a; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  Second, 
including public relations in the dominant coalition allows the organization to benefit 
from the expertise of a public relations manager, who contributes to strategic decision-
making by improving the flow of information between an organization and its internal 
and external publics.  Third, elevating public relations to the decision-making level 
contributes to society.  Allowing public relations to contribute to organizational 
communication and ideology helps an organization meet its commitments to society.  
Conversely, reflexive public relations can introduce into an organization social norms and 
values from the external environment that could improve organizational effectiveness. 
In the preceding section, I used Mintzberg’s (1983) conceptualization of power in 
and around organizations to illustrate how public relations might become involved with 
organizational decision-making. However, Mintzberg’s concept of power is based on the 
notion of control over resources. The excellence theory moves beyond conceptualization 
of power as a means to control.  Such power control schemes can result in one party 
benefiting to the detriment of another party. Instead, the excellence theory addresses 
empowerment of both organizations and their publics for mutual benefit, rather than 
control of power by one over another (L. Grunig et al., 2002, pp. 140-142).   
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This concept is sound in both a normative and positive sense. The symmetry 
implied by sharing power to achieve mutually beneficial goals constitutes a normative 
ideal. Furthermore, empowerment has been found to work in practice as well. 
Establishing a goal of mutual benefit, or a win-win zone, does not mean that an 
organization always has to relinquish its power. Rather, an organization negotiates power 
in an attempt to reach agreement – sometimes winning, sometimes compromising, 
sometimes losing – but always striving to establish and maintain healthy, long-term 
relationships that reduce organizational costs. Results of the excellence study have shown 
that participative organizational cultures, which rely on symmetrical internal 
communication, empower employees and promote high job satisfaction.  Entrusting 
public relations professionals to manage symmetrical communication systems between 
organizations and their publics also empowers members of external audiences, which has 
been shown to produce more effective relationships. 
The concept of empowering public relations adopted in the later stages of 
excellence theory development has led to a refinement of strategic public relations 
management model created by J. Grunig and Repper (1992) shown in Table 1 and 
explained in the section of this chapter dedicated to strategic management and situational 
theory.  As explained by L. Grunig et al. (2002), empowerment allows a public relations 
manager to contribute to strategic decision-making in several ways.  First, public 
relations managers scan the environment and identify publics that might be affected by an 
organization’s decisions. The public relations manager then discusses any issues that 
arise as a consequence of an organization’s decisions and negotiates – between the 
organization and publics – a solution that will improve relationships.   
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Programs designed to build and maintain long-term relationships are at the heart 
of the strategic decision-making process for public relations. These programs build 
relations with publics, maintain those relations, and prevent publics from arising around 
issues or crises that could generate pressure or control over an organization’s operations.  
Several scholars have associated long-term relationships with outcomes and measures 
that indicate organizational effectiveness and public relations excellence (J. Grunig & 
Huang, 2000; Hon & J. Grunig, 1999; Hung, 2002). Other scholars have developed 
theories of public relations that focus on management of relationships rather than 
management of communication (e.g., Ledingham, 2003; Ledingham & Bruning, 2000).  
This perspective moves concepts of public relations value away from evaluation of short-
term technical processes (e.g., counting news clippings that result from a press 
conference) and toward evaluation that relies on more strategic, long-range indicators of 
excellent public relations (J. Grunig & Huang).   
These programs also require public relations to manage itself strategically by 
using research, establishing goals and objectives, budgeting resources, implementing 
strategies, and conducting evaluation of public relations activities. Refinement of this 
model introduces a final element of strategic management: production of a “reputational 
relationship … based on limited involvement with an ‘audience’ (but not a ‘public’) with 
an organization” (L. Grunig et a al., 2002, p. 147). Audiences here are distinguished from 
publics, in that audiences are not affected by organizational decisions and do not organize 
into publics to discuss consequences of those decisions. 
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Organizational Effectiveness and Value of Public Relations 
I explained in the preceding section on strategic management and situational 
theory the ways that organizational effectiveness can be viewed from a public relations 
perspective.  In that section, I explained one of those approaches: the strategic 
constituencies approach.  Here, I explain the remaining three: systems, goal-attainment, 
and competing values. Finally, I elaborate the concept of public relations value to 
organizations. This conceptualization locates organizational effectiveness in studies of 
relationship management (J. Grunig & Huang, 2000), situational theory (J. Grunig, 
2003), and the theory of excellence in public relations (J. Grunig, 1992a; Dozier, 1995; L. 
Grunig et al., 2002). 
Systems perspective. The systems approach to organizational effectiveness relies 
on the theory of systems already explained in this conceptualization. This theory explains 
how public relations contributes to organizational effectiveness by managing 
communication and relationships that operationalize the interdependence between 
organizational and public systems.  In this context, public relations managers serve as 
boundary spanners that scan the environment, bring information from that environment 
into the organization, and communicate information about the organization to publics.  
Public relations managers do more than simply convey information, however.  They also 
contribute to organizational effectiveness by recognizing emerging issues, examining 
their potential effects on the organization, reflecting on potential consequences of 
organizational decisions on publics, and providing counsel to senior leaders that enriches 
strategic decision-making.   
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Public relations also contributes to organizational effectiveness by creating and 
managing internal communication systems, preferably systems that are based on a 
symmetrical worldview.  In this way, public relations is able to connect organizational 
leaders with employees and organizational systems with subsystems.  L. Grunig et al. 
(2002) concluded, however, that a systems approach to organizational effectiveness has 
limits.  First, systems approaches to evaluating organizational effectiveness emphasize 
means used to obtain resources from the external environment. Second, research from the 
excellence study has shown that organizational leaders often base decisions on inaccurate 
perceptions of their external environment.  Third, even when perceptions are accurate, 
some organizations (e.g., authoritarian dominant) elect to maintain a closed-system 
mindset.  The latter conditions inhibit public relations from contributing to organizational 
effectiveness. 
Goal-attainment perspective. The goal attainment approach to organizational 
effectiveness emphasizes ends, or accomplishment of goals, over means of achieving 
those ends; thus, organizations that meet their goals are considered effective. This 
perspective also provides a very clear, empirical means to measure effectiveness, as long 
as organizations start out with goals that are, as Ehling (n.d.) suggested, “legitimate, 
attainable, measurable, and cost-effective” (as quoted in Van Dyke, 1989, p. 26). Ehling 
and Dozier (1992), drawing upon an operations research perspective, added: 
The determination of what constitutes efficiency or effectiveness requires several  
basic ingredients: well-defined means (concrete, measurable courses of action or  
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strategies), attainable and verifiable ends (valuated, measurable outcomes), and an 
appropriate and meaningful standard or norm that can be used to determine which 
means is the most efficient or effective or both. (pp. 262-263) 
Again, however, self-interests of organizational leaders often undermine the 
ability of a goal-attainment approach to accurately determine organizational 
effectiveness. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) observed, “Most measures of efficiency are 
open to contest” (p. 34).  Hence, the degree to which organizations achieve their goals is 
often subject to interpretation by organizational leaders that might rearticulate goals as a 
way of justifying an organization’s actions in retrospect (L. Grunig et al., 1992).  
Furthermore, goal-attainment is an internal standard set by organizational leaders; 
however, “The acceptability of an organization and its activities is ultimately judged by 
those outside the organization” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 11). 
Competing values perspective. Unlike goal-attainment measures that emphasize 
ends and systems measures that emphasized means, the competing values approach to 
organizational effectiveness balances ends and means in the evaluation process. This 
approach has grown from typologies that compare measures of effectiveness with 
measures of efficiency.  In other words, effectiveness from a competing values 
perspective views the cost of means required to achieve ends and makes a relative 
assessment of priorities, costs, quality, and efficiency of performance (L. Grunig et al., 
2002).  Efficiency, like effectiveness, is an internal standard and can be measured, for 
instance, by the cost (e.g., worker hours, material, legal fees) required to produce a 
certain amount, number, or quality in terms of output.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
borrowing from Katz and Kahn (1966), explained efficiency in terms of a steam engine.  
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The steam engine converts fuel into energy. As a result of friction between parts, energy 
is lost during the energy-production process; therefore, energy production is less than 100 
percent of the energy required to fuel the engine. The ratio of energy to output becomes a 
measure of the engine’s efficiency.   
Organizational effectiveness, on the other hand, is “an assessment of the 
organization’s output and activities” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 37).  Thus, the steam 
engine’s effectiveness would be assessed by how much energy it produced; and 
efficiency measures how well the engine produces this amount of energy.  The steam 
engine’s operators, or in the context of this study the organizational leaders, would have 
to assign priorities to the values placed on efficiency, quantity, quality, cost, and other 
performance factors.  A competing values approach to effectiveness then determines how 
effective the organization has been in meeting its goals in relation to these priorities.   
Theoretical Implications of Power in Organizations and Public Relations 
Conceptualization of power in organizations and public relations has important 
implications to public relations managers, especially those who find themselves in 
activist environments.  This is even more cogent in settings that involve international 
conflict and political-military organizations that wrestle with matters of mortal 
consequence. In particular, public relations managers must be aware of and able to 
distinguish between concepts of power control and empowerment. Studies of public 
relations ethics (e.g., Bowen, 2000; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1996) have identified 
dilemmas associated with a public relations practitioner’s division of loyalties between 
self, employer, publics, and society. J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) warned of 
pragmatism, which can lead “people or organizations to do what is necessary to further 
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their own interests” (p. 15).  This pragmatism, or pursuit of self interests, could 
encourage practitioners or organizations to rely on an asymmetrical worldview of public 
relations and communication strategies that are not in the best interest of publics.  J. 
Grunig and White (1992) cautioned, “Asymmetric worldview steers public relations 
practitioners toward actions that are unethical, socially irresponsible, and ineffective” (p. 
40).  
In some cases, especially within political-military scenarios that involve 
diplomacy and military forces, these asymmetrical actions could include communication 
activities such as coercion, which might incorporate threatening messages. This fits 
within Rosenbaum’s (1986) concept of coercion, which can be enacted through physical 
and nonphysical means of force. These activities, from a theoretical perspective, could be 
considered as acceptable forms of persuasion or negotiation; however, from a public 
relations excellence perspective they are generally viewed as unethical and, at best, a 
questionable invasion of freedom and human rights.  
Yet, a review of literature indicated that many political-military organizations – 
including NATO – rely on non-physical as well as physical coercion when managing 
international communication and public relations. When the collective security of the 
NATO alliance is threatened, for instance, NATO is authorized by Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty to respond with application of military force: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or  
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognized [sic] by Article 51 of the 
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Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force [italics added], to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 1998, p. 396) 
In fact, NATO used Article 5 and a U.N. mandate to authorize deployment of 
IFOR peacekeepers to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, as instability in the Balkans was 
perceived by NATO as a threat to European member nations. IFOR then used military 
forces to implement the military provisions of the peace accords as a means to restore 
stability in the region. Combelles-Siegel (1998) described how NATO used integrated 
public information activities, at times, as a “non-lethal weapon” (p. 146) to compel 
compliance with the peace accords.  According to Jentleson (2000), the U.S. government 
utilizes coercive diplomacy (e.g., threat of political, economic, or military sanctions) to 
deter foreign nations or groups from taking specified actions, compel these nations or 
groups to cease actions, reassure them that taking certain actions is not necessary, or 
induce them to take other actions.  Jentleson characterized coercive diplomacy as a 
normative and positive concept, and characterized “threat or use of military force as 
frequently necessary parts of overall preventive strategies” (p. 5).  Citing findings from 
recent political-military studies, he concluded, “One of the key lessons of the first decade 
of the post-Cold War era, based on my own work and that of others, is that while 
coercion is rarely sufficient for prevention, it often is necessary” (p. 5). 
Coercion. Rosenbaum (1986) defined coercion philosophically as “certain forms 
of social control that are a subset of some types of exercises of power (between 
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participants in a power relationship) … an act and form of power” (p. 3). Also addressing 
coercion from a power control perspective and drawing from the Dictionary of Social 
Sciences, Pennock (1972) stated, “Coercion signifies, in general, the imposition of 
external regulation and control upon persons, by threat or use of force and power” (p. 1).   
Finally, coercion has been defined from a negotiation perspective as “the exercise of 
power through the use of particular tactics that aim to reward and punish the opponent.   
Analysis of threats and promises in this tradition indicates that the use of coercive 
tactics is a measure of last resort” (Gibbons, Bradac, & Busch, 1992, p. 160).  I also 
differentiate between coercion and broader concepts of persuasion but consider the acts 
of coercion and persuasion to often be linked.  Here, I use Miller’s (2002) comparison to 
distinguish between these two concepts and show how they might be related: 
Persuasive attempts fall short of blatant coercion; persuasion, as typically  
conceived of, is not directly coercive.  Coercion takes the form of guns or 
economic sanctions, while persuasion relies on the power of verbal and nonverbal 
symbols. Frequently of course, coercive acts are preceded by persuasive 
messages; seldom is … an armed attack launched on a neighboring state without a 
period of [persuasive] message exchanges. (p. 4) 
Coercive threats and promises. As scholars have explained, coercion is often 
expressed in the form of persuasive actions (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991; Gibbons et al., 
1992; Jentleson, 2000; Pennock, 1972; Roloff, Paulson, & Vollbrecht, 1998; Rosenbaum, 
1986; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Schelling, 1980).  Furthermore, Gibbons et al. (1992) 
described persuasion as a means of conducting negotiation – a term often used in public 
relations theory and practice as well as in interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, 
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and international conflict resolution.  Negotiation, according to Gibbons et al., “is defined 
as a method of social decision making” (p. 156).  
Among the family of persuasive actions and negotiation tactics used to coerce are 
threats and promises. According to Roloff, Paulson, and Vollbrecht (1998), a threat 
“expresses a speaker’s intention to punish the receiver by employing coercive resources 
that are controlled by the speaker” (p. 142). Schelling (1980) elaborated, “The distinctive 
character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a contingency, what he would 
manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency occurred” (p. 123). On the other hand, a 
promise “is an offer to reward someone who cooperates with you” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 
1991, p. 125). Again, Schelling elaborated, “The promise is a commitment to the second 
party in the bargain” (p. 43); and a promise is required whenever one of the members in a 
bargain is outside the other’s control.  
Gibbons et al. (1992) described threats and promises as persuasive message 
tactics in negotiation theory. Rosenbaum (1986) viewed tactics such as threats and 
promises as the equivalent of force or power.  In this regard, they are similar concepts.  
Both convey information about preferences, intentions, and perceptions in a bargaining 
relationship and they are often employed as a last resort (Rubin & Brown, 1975).  
However, threats and promises are vastly different in their application and effect. For 
instance, Rubin and Brown reported that threats generally promote feelings of hostility 
while promises promote liking.  Over the course of a negotiation, promises increase the 
chance of reaching a mutually favorable agreement and threats more than promises “tend 
to increase the likelihood of immediate compliance and concession making” (p. 283).   
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This conceptualization raises legal and ethical issues. For instance, Rosenbaum 
(1986) pointed out that a person who threatens could be guilty of criminal coercion if he 
or she unlawfully denied or restricted another person’s ability to act freely. Citing 
Kantian ethics, Rosenbaum also stated that freedom is a basic human right that implies 
independence from “arbitrary coercion” (p. 19). Pennock (1972) also expressed society’s 
general distaste for coercive actions by stating, “‘Coercion’ has no patron saint” (p. 2). 
Both Rosenbaum and Pennock, however, expressed reluctance to completely reject 
coercive communication strategies.  Rosenbaum considered this “not an unconditional 
rejection of coercion … but rather a prima facie or relative rejection. The possession of a 
basic right also gives the title holder a ‘title to compel’ respect for the right in question” 
(pp. 19-20). Pennock added:  
Even Rousseau, when he spoke of being forced to be free, would probably have  
admitted that any forcing, any coercion, entailed some limitation of freedom or  
limitation of some freedom, even though freedom in the large might be  
increased … which clearly involves coercion and the limitation of someone’s  
liberty in behalf of a greater or more important liberty. (p. 7) 
Finally, the variety of other theoretical and practical issues related to threats and 
promises is too broad to explore here. For instance, the relationship between sources and 
targets of threats can have a strong mediating effect on perceptions and outcomes of 
communication tactics. As Fink, Cai, Kaplowitz, Chung, Van Dyke, and Kim (2003) 
reported:  
Punishment, rewards, moral appeals, altruism, and a variety of other tactics …  
may affect perceptions of power and outcomes of influence by interacting with  
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the judgment of the agent and target. Understanding how social influence tactics  
differ in meaning and incorporating them into this model [of social influence] are  
fruitful areas for further study. (p. 313) 
The implication here is clear: Questions remain about the theoretical, legal, and 
ethical nature of coercive threats in public relations theory and practice – especially in 
international conflict settings. Does an organization have the freedom to compel a public 
if freedom in the large is protected?  Would limiting a single person’s liberty in favor of a 
greater or more important liberty constitute legal and ethical action? What if these 
coercive actions contributed to more effective and efficient organizational behavior or 
otherwise added value to the organization by establishing long-term symmetrical 
relationships?  Finally, how does the relationship between actors in a coercive situation 
affect message tactics and outcomes? These questions must be addressed.  
Threats and promises have important implications for public relations, yet little 
has been done to study these persuasive concepts and develop a specific understanding of 
how they operate in public relations theory and practice. J. Grunig (1989b) described the 
role of negotiation in public relations theory.  In 2001, he lamented that symmetry may 
not have been the right term for what he envisioned as the most excellent model of public 
relations. He then posited that public relations managers must engage in both listening 
and arguing in an attempt to balance the interests of an organization and the 
organization’s publics.  However, “This does not mean … that they do not argue or 
attempt to persuade” (J. Grunig, 2001, p. 28).  As L. Grunig et al. (2002) stated, 
“Multiparty conflicts do not call the efficacy of the symmetrical model into question; 
instead, they require more sophisticated means of symmetrical communication and 
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conflict resolution, methods that research is only beginning to identify” (p. 316). The 
ethics section of this literature review and the subsequent inquiry into the behavior of 
multinational organizations like NATO will attempt to address these and other questions.  
Communication, Conflict, and Cooperation 
Theories of communication, conflict, and cooperation provide an important 
conceptual foundation for the study and practice of public relations; and, as I have 
explained, conflict and cooperation are central notions in the excellence theory of public 
relations.  The strength of this foundation and centrality of these notions, however, belie 
the complex relationship between conflict, cooperation, and public relations. Concepts of 
conflict and cooperation are not only defined differently but studied in diverse ways.  
Schelling (1980), for instance, explained that some scholars “treat conflict as a 
pathological state and seek its causes and treatments” (p. 3) and others “take conflict for 
granted and study the behavior associated with it” (p. 3).  Furthermore, Schelling 
identified distinctions within the latter approach, divisions that articulate those that study 
rational and irrational behavior of participants in conflict and those that “focus on the 
more rational, conscious, artful, kind of behavior” (p. 3).  
Schelling’s (1980) descriptions of the first two categories seem to fit the 
psychological and social-psychological fields commonly associated with intra- and inter-
personal conflict. His delineation of the second category seems to distinguish between, 
first, typical approaches to the study of conflict and communication in organizational 
settings (e.g., situational publics theory, which incorporates rational and irrational 
dimensions of thought and behavior) and, second, a field of study that Schelling termed 
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“the strategy of conflict” (p. 3).5  This approach treats conflict as a “game” that 
participants in conflict try to “win” and studies choice of decisions and the alternating 
actions of players as interdependent variables. Hence, the conceptual relationship 
between communication, conflict, cooperation, and public relations deserves careful 
explanation. 
Public Relations Perspective 
As the excellence theory in public relations has explained, conflict, or turbulence, 
in an organizational environment creates the need for public relations. Public relations 
adds value to an organization by establishing and maintaining long-term, cooperative 
relationships. These relationships reduce operational costs by eliminating or mitigating 
expensive regulation, litigation, and other pressures from the external environment. 
Scholars like Ehling (1984, 1985, 1992) have also equated public relations management 
with conflict resolution.  From this perspective, Ehling (1992) identified public relations 
situations, or manifestations of “actual or potential conflict” (p. 624), that public relations 
managers are required to resolve. Given the close relationship of public relations to 
conflict and cooperation, this study then requires an understanding of concepts from these 
theories. 
Social-Psychological Perspective 
 Deutsch (1973), who wrote from a social-psychological perspective, defined 
conflict as the existence of “incompatible activities” (p. 10).  Thus, he explained that 
conflict can originate from a variety of social interactions within individuals, groups, or 
                                                 
5 Schelling (1980) associated the concept of strategy with a theory of games, which makes distinctions 
between games of skill, chance, and strategy. In game theory, strategic actions are calculated according to 
what one player expects another player to do.  Thus, players’ decisions and expectations of each other’s 
actions are interdependent. 
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nations, generating intrapersonal, intragroup, and intranational conflict.  By extension, 
conflict can assume interpersonal, intergroup, and international dimensions. Deutsch also 
identified several types of issues – including issues pertaining to relationships – around 
which conflict can arise: 
1. Control over resources. 
2. Preferences and nuisances. 
3. Values. 
4. Beliefs. 
5. The nature of relationships between parties. (pp. 15-16) 
Roloff (1987) added to Deutsch’s (1973) typology of conflict two other settings in 
which conflict could occur: organizations and mass media systems.  He also defined 
communication as “the production, transmission, and interpretation of symbols” (p. 485) 
and linked communication with conflict: 
With these two definitions in mind, we argue that communication and conflict are 
interdependent. Both processes can have important influences on each other. 
Communication can cause conflict, be symptomatic of conflict, and may be an 
effective mode of conflict resolution. (p. 485)  
Deutsch (1973) and Roloff (1987) offered two other important observations about 
communication and conflict: Communication and conflict are inherent parts of human 
nature; and communication and conflict, managed properly, can improve as well as harm 
the human condition. First, Roloff posited that conflict is “both pervasive and inevitable” 
(p. 484).  Second, Roloff observed, “Conflict is not abnormal and, if managed properly, 
may actually improve the human condition” (p. 484). By the latter observation, Roloff 
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meant that people experience inconsistency and uncertainty when they confront the 
incompatible activities that Deutsch defined as conflict. As a result, people attempt to 
reduce uncertainty by seeking information that might provide a reasonable explanation 
for the conflict. This activity also is explained by situational theory in public relations. 
The search for information and the interactions with others that result from this search 
often increase understanding and improve interpersonal relationships. On the contrary, 
suppressing conflict often leads to “misunderstanding, lack of innovativeness, 
resentment, and long-term conflict escalation” (Roloff, p. 515).  Deutsch added, “Conflict 
is not confined to competitive processes: controversy over the means to achieve a 
mutually desired objective is a common part of cooperation … [and] competition is not 
inevitably destructive to both sides” (p. 31).   
Thus, conflict and cooperation are interdependent; they should be managed rather 
than eliminated; and both can improve relationships.  As I reported in the introduction of 
this study, this interdependency among conflict and communication “produces 
relationships and the need for public relations” (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992, p. 313).  
Much of the research in conflict theory focuses on the intrapersonal and interpersonal 
levels.  The interaction of communication and conflict also can be operationalized at the 
organizational level and within mass publics (Roloff, 1987).  
Other Perspectives 
This communication approach leads naturally to other perspectives on 
relationship management, such as dispute resolution, negotiation, mediation, and conflict 
management (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992). From this perspective, certain forms of 
communication (e.g., conversation) can be viewed as “an emergent, improvised, and 
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negotiated activity” (Newell & Stutman, 1989, p. 139) or as a cooperative activity that 
can be identified and measured by approaches described in the excellence theory of 
public relations.   
According to the excellence theory, two-way symmetrical forms of 
communication are most effective in resolving conflicts and establishing lasting, effective 
relationships.  J. Grunig and Huang (2000) built on this earlier notion by identifying two 
broad categories of negotiation strategies: 
These negotiation strategies can be defined broadly as integrative strategies,  
which are symmetrical in nature, and distributive strategies, which are  
asymmetrical.  In general, we propose that integrative, symmetrical strategies will 
be more effective in developing organization-public relationships than will 
distributive, asymmetrical strategies. (p. 38) 
  This notion is supported by studies of conflict theory that found integrative, 
argumentative, and collaborative strategies to be positively associated with 
communication competence (Canary and Spitzberg, 1989) and more likely to produce 
stable relationships (Canary, Cunningham, & Cody, 1988; Infante, Chandler, & Rudd, 
1989; Sillars, 1980).  However, in practice, even excellent organizations employ both 
distributive (asymmetrical) and collaborative (symmetrical) communication tactics (J. 
Grunig, 1992; Dozier, 1995; L. Grunig et al., 2002).  
For situations that require argumentation, Gilbert (1997) offered an approach that 
fits well with symmetrical models of communication.  Gilbert warned of traditional forms 
of argument “that are primarily designed to alter a dispute partner’s point of view rather 
than uncover deeper and more meaningful issues” (p. xv).  In place of this 
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conceptualization of argument, Gilbert suggested one that is designed to “bring together 
or coalesce … diverse positions so that the goal satisfaction of both participants can be 
maximized” (p. xv).  Gilbert described three basic aspects of this approach: 
1. Acceptance that people do not necessarily argue in a logical fashion. 
2. Values strategic goals of all parties as diverse and important. 
3. Bases argumentation on mutual agreement rather than individual criticism. 
Gilbert also explained that this approach is informed by concepts from feminist and other 
theories that support the excellence theory in public relations. For instance, Gilbert 
identified as coalescent argumentation’s most important aspect a “focus on agreement, on 
consensus, on attachment, on inclusion” (p. 63).  
Gilbert (1997) acknowledged that his conceptualization departs from a classical 
notion of Aristotelian argumentation designed to convince and persuade (see Aristotle, 
2000). Yet, Gilbert’s conceptualization of argument is very much in line with rhetorical 
approaches to public relations.  For instance, Marsh (2001) identified the rhetoric of 
Isocrates, which promoted “unification and consensus” (p. 88), as most representative of 
two-way symmetrical communication in public relations. Toth and Heath (1992) referred 
to rhetoric as “a one-way flow of information, argument, and influence whereby one 
entity persuades and dominates another” (p. xi).  However, they also advanced a 
rhetorical and critical perspective of public relations based on dialogue: 
By featuring dialogue, we opt to emphasize the dynamics of rhetorical exchange 
by which interested parties seek to induce agreement and action…. Each party in 
this exchange may agree or disagree.  Through rhetorical dialogue, parties form 
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opinions and negotiate limits and obligations that are basic to their relationships – 
and mutual interests. (p. xii) 
These conceptualizations are very useful to the excellence theory in public relations, 
which shows even from a rhetorical and argumentation perspective that symmetrical 
approaches to communication and conflict resolution could be effective means to 
preserve long-term relationships.  
Some communication scholars also have approached conflict and cooperation 
from a systems, social exchange, or power perspective (e.g. Drake, 1993; Huston, 1983).  
These approaches may help explain the applications of power and influence in the 
previous section of this review; or even dominance that Jentleson (2000) conceptualized 
in coercive prevention, especially as the concept relates to implied use of military power.  
J. Grunig and Huang (2000) noted that many studies of interorganizational relationships 
are dominated by two theories related to conflict and cooperation.  Resource dependency 
theory explains how relationships form in response to an organization’s need for 
resources, and exchange theory describes how relationships form around transactions of 
resources.  According to J. Grunig and Huang, however, these two theories do not 
address all pressures on an organization (p. 35), such as those imposed by an activist 
group or hostile adversary. These types of situations require an understanding of other 
theoretical approaches to conflict management. 
Dual-concern model. The mixed-motive model of communication in public 
relations described by Dozier (1995) and L. Grunig et al. (2002) explains how 
organizations might choose from a range of asymmetrical and symmetrical 
communication activities. Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) offered a similar model of dual 
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concern in communication that is particularly useful for understanding a range of 
problem-solving communications, from coercion to collaboration. The dual-concern 
model relies on a conceptual grid to predict the convergence of problem solving 
strategies based on levels of concern for self and others. The model describes at least 
sixteen strategies that range from avoidance or acceptance to physical force, mutual 
discussion, and compromise. Pruitt and Carnevale’s model describes the dynamic way in 
which participants in conflict relationships may change communication strategies, 
searching for successful resolution.  Participants may change strategies by substituting 
another similar strategy, or they may initiate a wholesale replacement of strategy by 
jumping from one section of the conflict grid to an entirely different area.  
The dual-concern model is among those that J. Grunig and Huang (2000) 
associated with the mixed-motive model in public relations. This behavior is not unlike 
that of public relations practitioners who may change communication strategies. The 
areas of mutual concern on the dual-concern grid describe contending activities that could 
be related to two-way asymmetrical approaches to communication, which describe 
attempts by one party to exploit the other. The problem solving and compromising areas 
of the grid could be related to two-way symmetric approaches that strive for a win-win 
solution.  Other approaches located in various areas of the dual-concern grid also may 
relate closely to activities along Dozier’s (1995) mixed-motive continuum between an 
organization’s position and the position of its publics. 
Contingency theory. Some scholars have proposed a contingency theory of public 
relations as an alternative to the symmetrical model of communication (Cancel et al., 
1997, 1999).  Contingency theorists presume that dozens of situational variables affect 
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choice of communication strategies by public relations managers and the degree to which 
accommodation can be achieved.  Furthermore, Leichty and Springston (1993) 
distinguished between integrative approaches to conflict management such as 
symmetrical communication that are “most desirable” and other approaches that might be 
“most appropriate under the circumstances” (p. 334).  Cancel et al. (1997, 1999) have 
used the situational nature of communication to justify adoption of a contingency 
approach in public relations.  Other scholars, however, have argued that contingency 
approaches make public relations susceptible to ethical relativism (e.g., J. Grunig & L. 
Grunig, 1996; Pearson, 1989a), which might enable organizations to justify any means of 
communication to achieve desired end states.  Thus, a relativist approach could lead 
public relations practitioners down a slippery slope, which ultimately ends in the 
adoption of distributive win-lose strategies that could be unethical (L. Grunig et al., 2002, 
pp. 551-552).   
Game theory. The dual-concern model leads naturally to an explanation of game 
theory.  Schelling (1980) described studies of strategy in game theory: 
Crudely speaking, the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest, in which the 
participants are trying to “win.” A study of conscious, intelligent, sophisticated 
conflict behavior – of successful behavior – is like the search for rules of 
“correct” behavior in a contest-winning sense. (p. 3) 
Murphy (1989) was among the first public relations scholars to propose a game 
theory approach to the study of public relations. She suggested that the emergence of 
mathematical models used to analyze negotiating strategies and Ehling’s (1984, 1985) 
development of a decision theory model for public relations showed great promise in 
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moving the field beyond a “seat of the pants” (Murphy, p. 173) approach to public 
relations described by Dozier (1984).  However, Murphy also distinguished between 
decision theory, which “involves choosing a strategy in isolation, without considering the 
possible strategies of others” (p. 174), and game theory, which she considered 
particularly useful in managing “public relations situations in which the practitioner 
frames strategy relative to the desires of various publics” (p.175). 
 Schelling (1980) also clarified that winning in conflict or game theory does not 
necessarily equate to competition – even in international conflict.  As Schelling 
explained:  
It is not winning relative to one’s adversary. It means gaining relative to one’s 
own value system; and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual 
accommodation, and by the avoidance of mutually damaging behavior…. 
Concepts like deterrence, limited war, and disarmament, as well as negotiation, 
are concerned with the common interest and mutual dependence that can exist 
between participants in a conflict. (pp. 4-5) 
I believe this conceptualization of conflict and cooperation in public relations 
extends opportunities for the study and application of strategic management in public 
relations excellence. First, game theory contributes to the study and management of 
conflict situations.  The concepts of winning and games in these situations do involve in a 
crude sense winning and losing, but in a sense that empowers all parties to achieve a 
mutually-beneficial outcome rather than a sense of unfair competition or power control. 
More specifically, concepts from game theory support models like the mixed-motive 
communication continuum in public relations that identify “win-win” zones as an ideal 
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solution to organization-public conflict.  Second, as Schelling (1980) and Murphy (1989) 
observed, game theory expands analysis to strategies of conflict, not just causes and 
effects of conflict and how they can be managed strategically. It seems apparent that 
public relations practitioners – even those who manage strategically – must have a sense 
of the communication and conflict behaviors and strategies employed by external publics 
(e.g., activist groups) as well as organizations to properly manage relationships.   
The excellence theory has been useful in explaining normatively and positively 
how symmetrical communication helps establish and maintain healthy relationships.  
However, not all parties in conflict may want to establish a symmetrical relationship; 
rather, they could be interested in disrupting relationships through asymmetrical 
strategies that create conflict and anxiety.   For instance, Aldoory and Van Dyke (2004) 
discussed asymmetrical strategies used by bioterrorist groups that might launch attacks 
against U.S. food supplies. They acknowledged that the strategic goals of such groups – 
which are designed to create crises, disrupt relationships, confuse communication, 
intimidate, and spread fear – pose unique challenges for public relations managers who 
rely on symmetrical approaches to communication. Third, game theory, models based on 
dual concern, and contingency theory could provide the kinds of rules, called for by J. 
Grunig (2001), J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996, 1997), and L. Grunig et al. (2002) that 
could provide ethical guidelines for asymmetrical communication strategies.    
J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1997) have contributed to early development of such 
communication guidelines by describing a communication model that activist groups 
might use to communicate ethically with an organization, even when resorting to 
coalition building, media advocacy, pressure campaigns, government lobbying, litigation 
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and other asymmetrical tactics. Based on activist theory, this approach suggested how 
activist publics should practice public relations ethically when communicating with 
organizations whose decisions have created an issue or problem for that group (see pp. 
39-41): 
1. Use knowledge of situational theory in public relations to identify and 
organize other potential publics that share the same problem. 
2. Use strategic public relations planning to build a coalition powerful enough to 
deal with the problem organization. 
3. Once organized, the coalition should approach the organization and attempt to 
communicate symmetrically.  If the organization responds symmetrically, 
continue using symmetrical approaches to resolve the problem. 
4. If the organization does not respond symmetrically, use asymmetrical 
communication “to force” (p. 40) the organization into recognizing the activist 
group and considering its problem.  
5. Once pressure succeeds in gaining the organization’s attention and 
establishing cooperative relations, return to symmetrical communication, 
search for a mutually-agreeable solution, and work toward building a long-
term relationship. 
J. Grunig and L. Grunig added that two other actions within this model are essential to 
making this approach more ethical: Always begin with symmetrical communication 
attempts and, if symmetrical communication fails, always disclose the intent of 
persuasive communication.   
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Of note, J. Grunig (1989b), presupposed, “Conflict should be resolved through 
negotiation, communication, and compromise and not through force, manipulation, 
coercion, or violence” (p. 39). He also acknowledged he had been tempted to include 
non-manipulative persuasion in the list of actions that should not be considered for 
conflict resolution, given difficulties associated with using persuasion to affect long-term 
changes in attitude and behavior. He allowed that persuasion could be acceptable if used 
as part of a reasoned argument supporting one’s position, but people must be ready to 
abandon persuasive tactics and switch to negotiation or compromise. Ideas expressed in J. 
Grunig and L. Grunig (1997) seems to indicate maturation in J. Grunig’s notion of 
persuasive, even forceful communications – perhaps because of his and L. Grunig’s 
efforts to develop a theory of activism in public relations. However, he has retained the 
caveat that, to remain ethical, such pressure tactics should be preceded by attempts to 
establish collaborative communication strategies and a return to symmetrical strategies 
once pressure tactics succeed in gaining attention of all parties.  In sum, he seems to 
believe that symmetrical strategies are still more ethical and effective in producing long-
term, collaborative relationships than asymmetrical strategies. 
In studies of conflict and cooperation, several scholars (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; 
Fisher & Brown, 1989; Schelling, 1980) have provided strategies and terms from game 
theory that help conceptualize symmetry and asymmetry.  In prisoner’s dilemma 
situations from game theory (see Rubin & Brown, 1989, pp. 197-198), computer-
simulated game play suggested that a “cooperative tit-for-tat” (p. 199) strategy might be 
the best approach for substantive problem-solving.  In tit-for-tat strategy, players 
cooperate at first and “thereafter do whatever the other side did on the previous 
  112 
 
exchange” (p. 199). Axelrod proposed tit-for-tat strategies as a useful tool in building 
cooperative relationships, even on an international scale, since the reciprocal nature of 
this approach appeals to a sense of fairness. Similarities between Axelrod’s tit-for-tat 
strategy and J. Grunig and L. Grunig’s (1997) model for dialogue between activist groups 
and organizations indicates a tit-for-tat strategy may be compatible with communication 
schemes for relationship management. 
Schelling (1980) clarified terms such as threats and promises in game theory and 
illustrated where they might appear along an ethical or symmetrical-asymmetrical 
continuum.  From a game theory perspective, Schelling (1980) stated, “The distinctive 
character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a contingency, what he would 
manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency occurred, the contingency being governed 
by the second party’s behavior” (p. 123). Rubin and Brown (1975) defined threat as “an 
expressed intention to behave in a way that appears detrimental to the interest of another” 
(p. 278) and compared threats to the stick in a tradeoff between a stick and a carrot type 
of exchange.  Threats do “convey information about a bargainer’s preferences” (p. 279), 
but they also “tend to elicit greater hostility” (De Dreu, 1995, p. 652). Still, coercive 
tactics such as threats can increase the chances of quickly achieving compliance and 
concession by others (De Dreu, p. 653; Rubin & Brown, p. 283).  On the other hand, 
early use of cooperative communication strategies tends to “promote the development of 
trust and a mutually beneficial, cooperative relationship” (Rubin & Brown, p. 263) and 
use of promises “tends to elicit general liking for the transmitter” (De Dreu, p. 652). 
Like Rosenbaum (1986) and Pennock (1972), Schelling (1980) associated 
coercive threats with denial of control or freedom of choice. However, from Schelling’s 
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point of view, conditional threats not only attempt to exert control over the target of a 
threat, they also deny the freedom of a source to choose. For instance, if a source issues a 
threat and the target fails to comply, what alternatives does the source have if the threat is 
conditioned on some action the source prefers not to carry out? Commitments, according 
to Schelling, are similar to threats in that both result in a “surrender of choice, a 
renunciation of alternatives, that makes one worse off than he need be in the event the 
tactic fails” (p. 123). A threat, however, is conditional, which bases a threat source’s 
course of action on what the other player in a game of strategy does.  Schelling (1980) 
elaborated on this notion as follows: 
While the commitment fixes one’s course of action, the threat fixes a course of  
reaction, of response to the other player. The commitment is a means of gaining  
first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage; the threat is a  
commitment of a strategy for a second move. (p. 124) 
Schelling (1980) responded to this coercive dilemma over threats by suggesting 
the concept of warning, in place of threat.  Schelling (1980) explained that warning might 
be a better term than threat in some conflict situations, in that a warning is issued without 
condition.  Hence, a warning becomes more useful than a conditional threat for a case “in 
which one merely points out to an adversary, or reminds him, that one would take action 
painful to the adversary if the latter fails to comply, it being clear that one would have an 
incentive to do so” (p. 123).  
Expanding on Schelling’s (1980) notion of warning, Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) 
explained that a warning is issued “when it is in your interest to carry out a ‘threat’” (p. 
126).  However, a threat is a strategic move in game theory, which “is designed to alter 
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the beliefs and actions of others in a direction favorable to yourself” (p. 120).  A warning 
is not considered a strategic move; rather, a warning plays “an informational role” by 
merely conveying factual information or indicating intent without condition (p. 126).  
This concept can be illustrated by the following example: “A warning is used to inform 
others of the effect of their actions.  A parent who warns a child that a stove-top is hot 
makes a statement of fact, not a strategy” (p. 126).  Furthermore, warnings convey 
information about possible adverse actions that are beyond the control of the warning’s 
source, and threats communicate possible consequences that are controlled by the source 
of the threat (Roloff et al., 1998). It would seem from this conceptualization that threats 
rely on power control and conditions to exert influence, and warnings empower both 
sources and targets by virtue of their unconditional nature and efforts to share 
information as a means to reach mutual understanding. 
Thus, concepts such as warning from game theory provide a logical and ethical 
alternative to threats but, clearly, more must be known about specific conditions and 
situations before one can legally or ethically judge these types of coercive 
communication strategies.  Moreover, great care must be taken before they can be 
assigned a place along the mixed-motive continuum of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
communications in public relations.   
NATO’s post-World War II origins and IFOR’s birth as an instrument to end war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina have conflict and peace as common ancestors. This review of 
literature suggests that situational variance between conflict and peace could influence 
organizational motives, which could subsequently affect NATO’s choice of 
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communication and public relations strategies.  This produced the fourth research 
question. 
RQ4: How did conflict situations facing IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina influence 
choice of communication strategies by senior NATO leaders? 
Communication and Culture 
 I have addressed the concept of organizational culture and briefly referred to the 
linkage between culture and communication.  I now elaborate on societal culture, 
distinguish it from organizational culture and explain the importance of interplay between 
communication and culture in this study.  There are many conceptualizations of culture.  
Here, I rely on concepts described by G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005), Sriramesh 
and Verčič (2001, 2003a), Sriramesh and White (1992), Verčič et al. (1996) and 
Wakefield (1996, 1997).   
 G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) defined culture from a social-
psychological perspective as a system of rules that guide “thinking, feeling, and acting” 
(p. 3).  “It is,” according to the Hofstedes, “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (p. 4).  They 
added that cultural traits are learned rather genetic or hereditary and that characteristics of 
a person’s membership in social groups (e.g., gender, religion, regional ethnicity, 
employment, education and social class) constitute culture.  Thus, nationality becomes an 
important variable in cultural development.  The Hofstedes distinguished between nations 
and societies, however.  Common cultures may apply to societies but rarely to entire 
nations.  Nations may have dominant systems for language, media, politics, economies 
and other systems but nations are usually heterogeneous in terms of culture, consisting of 
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populations that represent many societies.  Still, despite the diverse nature of nations, G. 
Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede identified the following common determinants of national 
culture: 
• Power distance and social mobility. Social stratification, how citizens are 
assigned status, and ease with which they can move through levels of social strata. 
• Collectivism. Tendency of citizens to value the social collective. 
• Masculinity-Femininity. How gender influences assignment to roles in social 
structures (e.g., family, government, public relations, organizations). 
• Uncertainty avoidance. People’s ability to manage uncertainty or ambiguity. 
• Confucian dynamism or long-term orientation. Extent to which citizens value 
long-term commitment to social relationships. 
G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) also described organizational culture, 
which they differentiated from social culture because most members of an organization 
“did not grow up in it [the organizational culture]” (p. 35).  Moreover, people can freely 
choose to join or leave an organizational culture – which is not the same as being borne 
into and growing up within a societal culture.  Thus, G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede 
concluded that societal and organizational cultures are “two types of culture of a different 
nature” (p. 284).  Like societal culture, though, organizational cultures are acquired, not 
from birth, but from the point at which an employee joins an organization.  This 
intersection between societal and organizational culture was of special interest to my 
study, given the unique social structure and organizational culture of NATO.  Since 
multinational organizations employ people from many societies, the acculturation 
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produced by combining many national cultures could influence communication and 
public relations management.  
Many public relations scholars focus on organizational or corporate culture, since 
organizations and their publics are often units of study in public relations research.  For 
instance, Wakefield (1996) described the potential products of interacting cultures: 
convergence and divergence.   According to Wakefield, “Convergence theorists contend 
that as the world integrates, its societies become increasingly similar” (p. 21).  
Divergence theorists adopt an opposing position.  Wakefield explained, “Divergence is a 
reaction to convergence. When external values invade a culture, they create tension 
between the forces for change and for maintaining the status quo” (p. 21).  Given either 
theoretical position, interaction between cultures in an organization results in turbulence, 
which creates the need for excellence in communication and public relations management 
(e.g., J. Grunig, 1992a).  
As studies in the excellence theory of public relations have shown, 
communication, public relations and culture are closely linked.  I identified the 
interdependence between culture and communication in my introduction.  I also observed 
that public relations and communication are culture-specific (Sriramesh & White, 1992).  
Sriramesh and Verčič (2001, 2003a) and Verčič et al. (1996) identified generic principles 
of global public relations and environmental variables that influence the operation of 
these principles.  Some of these variables, which I described in the global theory and 
public relations section of this report, relate to social and national culture.  As I 
explained, a nation’s political system, economic system, level of activism, culture, and 
media system can influence development and application of public relations programs 
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(Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001; Verčič et al., 1996) – just as these characteristics influence 
development of social culture (G. Hofstede & G. J. Hofstede, 2005).  In subsequent 
studies, Sriramesh and Verčič (2003a) collapsed these variables into more general 
cultural categories:  national infrastructure, media system, and social culture.   
 This literature on communication and culture has been important to the 
development of the excellence theory and a global theory in public relations.  These 
theoretical perspectives will also contribute to an understanding of how interaction 
between cultures in a multinational organization influence communication and public 
relations programs in a specific case like NATO. 
Philosophy, Ethics, Social Responsibility, and Moral Theory in Public Relations 
Ethics has received increasing attention in theoretical studies of public relations 
since the late 20th century.  Until then, a lack of research in this important area prevented 
ethics from being included in conceptualizations of public relations theory. Pearson 
(1989b) provided an ethical imperative for a dialogic model of public relations that could 
play an important role in the ethical conduct of organizations. Seib and Fitzpatrick (1995) 
published what was arguably the first public relations textbook “devoted exclusively to 
ethics and … presenting diverse theories and cases to be presented and discussed” (p. v) 
to scholars, students, and practitioners of public relations. L. Grunig (1996) articulated a 
philosophy of public relations that provided a basis for qualitative decisions in 
organizations. J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) began development of principles that could 
define an ethical theory of public relations based on symmetrical communication. 
Kruckeberg (1996b) pushed studies of public relations ethics beyond Western nations and 
investigated global perspectives of public relations ethics in the Middle East region. 
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Edgett (2002) proposed a systematic framework of 10 ethical criteria that can be used to 
guide persuasive-advocacy approaches to public relations.  
The excellence study has addressed the notion of ethics as a principle of the 
excellence theory in public relations. J. Grunig (1992a) proposed a normative theory of 
ethical public relations based on symmetrical communication. He argued that public 
relations cannot be excellent within organizations that have an asymmetrical worldview 
of public relations or an asymmetrical approach to managing relationships with others. 
Replication of excellence studies in other countries (e.g., Slovenia) and progress toward a 
global theory also have identified the importance of ethical codes and suggested the 
addition of ethics as a principle in public relations theory (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2003a).  
However, L. Grunig et al. (2002) concluded in their final report of the excellence study, 
“If we are to add ethics to our global theory of public relations … we must acknowledge 
the need for additional research to develop a theory of ethical decision making in public 
relations” (p. 554).   
Most recently, and perhaps in the most promising way, Bowen (2000, 2004) 
responded to the call for more research in this area.  She developed a theory of ethical 
issues management in public relations based on Kantian deontology, the categorical 
imperative, and symmetrical communication.  Furthermore, she has proposed this theory 
as grounds for a tenth generic principle of public relations excellence (see Bowen, 2004). 
Still, there is much more work to be done in this area.  Hopefully, this study contributes 
to the growing body of knowledge related to ethics in public relations.  Toward that goal, 
I locate my study in several scholarly areas: philosophy, ethics, social responsibility, and 
moral theory. 
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Philosophy in public relations.  L. Grunig (1996) explained the need for a 
theoretical framework that could be used to study the ethics of public relations, examine 
applications of ethics to public relations practice, and teach public relations ethics.  
Without such a framework there could be no understanding of ethics in public relations. 
Therefore, she proposed a philosophy of public relations that can serve as this 
framework. I was moved by her call to “examine critically the grounds for our 
fundamental tenets as we analyze the basic concepts of public relations” (p. 70).  I 
interpreted her reference to our as not only a call for society, organizations, and the 
public relations profession to examine fundamental tenets but also as a call for each of us, 
individually, to examine our own personal ideology and convictions as they relate to a 
construction of public relations ethics. To reveal my own philosophy of public relations 
as it relates to this study, I borrow L. Grunig’s six dimensions that are encompassed by a 
philosophy of public relations: 1) foundations and 2) development of the public relations 
field, 3) ethics, 4) moral reasoning, 5) public and social responsibility, and 6) ideology 
and values.  I have already explained foundations and historical development of the 
public relations field and refrain from elaborating further. Therefore, I begin with a 
conceptualization of ethics. 
Ethics. Scholars of ethics and moral theory have identified three branches of 
philosophy: logic, physics, and ethics (Paton, 1956).  Of these, ethics deals “with the laws 
of free moral action” (p. 13). Seib and Fitzpatrick (1995) defined ethics in a broad sense 
as a discipline that “involves the study of standards of human conduct and moral 
judgment” and in more practical terms as “criteria by which decisions are made about 
what is right and what is wrong” (p. 29).  Teleology and deontology are among the most 
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common perspectives or theories of evaluating ethics in Western societies (J. Grunig & 
L. Grunig, 1996; Lucas et al., 2000; Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995).  British philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham is credited with leading early teleogical or utilitarian thought and 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant is often associated with deontological ethics (Seib & 
Fitzpatrick, 1995).  Considering the European origins and development of these 
philosophical approaches, teleology and deontology may not apply to non-Western 
perspectives of ethical thought (e.g., Taosim).  Still, they provide a useful framework for 
study of the Western-based NATO alliance.      
The study of ethics from teleological theory focuses on the outcomes, 
consequences, or ends of decisions. Teleology, also referred to as utilitarianism because 
of the utility found in its quantitative power, evaluates the utility of outcomes based on a 
set of criteria that measure intensity of feeling, duration of feeling, certainty or 
uncertainty, proximity, potential for productiveness, probability of producing pleasure or 
pain, and number of people affected (Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Teleological calculations 
are designed to maximize benefits and reduce harm.  According to Mill (1861/2000), one 
of history’s most prominent teleological philosophers, “actions are right … as they tend 
to promote happiness” (p. 115). Hence, ends that bring greatest happiness are considered 
most ethical and can justify whatever means were used to attain those ends.  
Teleology is considered by many to have practical value as a measure of ethics, 
since a utilitarian approach requires decision makers to carefully weigh the risks and 
benefits of decisions before they act.  I align myself with others, however, who find 
teleology flawed. The focus on happiness measures amount rather than types of 
happiness or benefits. Utilitarianism can be used to justify any means, even questionable 
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or unethical behavior, if the ends are good.  Utilitarian measures also could be viewed as 
subjective, relative, or situational (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1996), which could negate the 
value of ethical calculations that are left open to interpretation. Finally, teleology 
discriminates between those who are expected to receive the greatest good and those 
outliers who might be marginalized.   
I approach my philosophy of public relations from a deontological perspective, a 
term that derives from Greek deontos, or duty. Deontology is based on the notion that all 
humans have a duty or obligation to respect the freedoms of others and treat each other 
with dignity. Instead of judging ethical behavior according to a quantitative set of criteria 
that measures non-moral outcomes like happiness, deontologists evaluate the goodness of 
ethical behavior according to actions or means that conform to universal standards or 
laws that protect human rights. Kant described this principle as a categorical imperative 
that requires people to judge actions according to moral law (see Bowen, 2000; Paton, 
1956; Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995).  Kant meant categorical to apply to all situations and 
imperative as a requirement that “must be obeyed by all rational people” (J. Grunig & L. 
Grunig, 1996, p. 35). This notion implies that actions are ethical if they are made on the 
basis of universal law and found to be acceptable by everyone. Kant also identified a 
moral requirement to base ethical actions on good will: “A good will is good not because 
of what it performs or effects [sic], nor by its aptness for attaining some proposed end, 
but simply by virtue of its volition” (Kant, 1785/1949, p. 141).  
The virtue of deontology lies in its ability to judge actions according to moral 
laws that protect universal human rights, rather than calculating outcomes that could be 
enjoyed by a few. However, deontology also has weaknesses. First, moral laws are 
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difficult to define and universality difficult to achieve: Behaviors that are socially 
acceptable in one country or social group may not be acceptable in another. Even within 
individual societies values and morals change over time, and actions that uphold the 
human rights for one group may deny rights to others. 
J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) described deontology and teleology as 
“competing ethical theories of western philosophers” (p. 31) and suggested that combined 
approaches to these theories might be necessary in the practice of ethical decision-making 
in public relations. Furthermore, they located the operation of ethics at several levels: 
individual, organizational, and societal. Thus, decision-making – and the need for an 
ethical framework to guide decisions – occurs at each of thee levels. Individuals have 
ethical responsibilities to act morally (e.g., to determine loyalties to self, organizations, 
clients, society); individuals constitute organizations, which have ethical responsibilities 
to various internal and external publics; and organizations contribute to the construction 
of societies, which are identified among other things by their system of moral values and 
ideals.  Furthermore, ethical decision-making within these levels does not occur in 
isolation; rather, the nature of ethics at each level is interdependent.   
Grassey (1861/2000) warned of narrowing one’s conceptualization of ethics: “To 
focus one’s attention on the individual and on specific cases is to neglect the more 
consequential and difficult topics of institutional policies and practices, formal and 
informal codes of conduct, and people’s organizational roles” (pp. 8-9). This observation 
leads to the next set of dimensions required to understand my conceptualization of ethics 
and a philosophy in public relations in a broader context: moral reasoning, public and 
social responsibility, and ideology and values. 
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Moral reasoning. Most societies assign to their citizens, organizations, and 
leaders legal and moral responsibility to make decisions. Whether one adopts 
teleological, deontological, or a combination of theoretical approaches, responsibilities 
associated with decision-making require a process of intellectual reasoning to determine 
the ethical value of decisions. The excellence theory provides characteristics of 
excellence in public relations. Professional public relations organizations such as the 
Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) have adopted codes of ethics that define 
ethical behavior. Government organizations like the U.S. Department of Defense have 
also published principles of information that establish a moral duty to inform publics.  
However, each of these represents principles of behavior; alone, they lack the necessary 
framework to complete a process of moral reasoning. 
Seib and Fitzpatrick (1995) provided one model of moral reasoning that will serve 
to illustrate this concept. Borrowing from Ralph Potter of the Harvard Divinity School, 
Seib and Fitzpatrick described the “Potter Box approach to ethical decision making” (p. 
35).  This model is representative of the type of strategic decision-making process 
described in public relations management (e.g., J. Grunig & Repper, 1992; L. Grunig et 
al., 2002).  From a public relations perspective, values and priorities could be analyzed 
and prioritized by four steps in this model: 1) define the situation, 2) identify values, 3) 
select principles, and 4) choose loyalties (p. 35). Seib and Fitzpatrick also identified an 
alternative to the Potter Box, attributed to public relations scholar Mark McElreath. This 
approach to moral reasoning is based on a combination of teleological and deontological 
theory: 
1. Confront an ethical dilemma. 
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2. Experience motivation to act. 
3. Consider alternative actions based on examination of rules, duties, principles, 
outcome predictions, etc. 
4. Decide and act. (p. 36) 
Advancing theories of ethics in public relations, Bowen (2000, 2004) and Edgett 
(2002) provided models that could be useful to moral reasoning in public relations. 
Bowen criticized the Potter Box model for failing to address universal norms, allowing 
decision makers to choose their own principles relative to each situation, and assigning 
loyalties to some publics (to the exclusion of others).  She proposed an alternative, based 
on Kantian deontology, to existing models of moral reasoning in public relations. This 
model includes the following elements: consideration of how individual or organizational 
values influence a decision; identification of public relations issues; discussion, collection 
of information, research, analysis of the issue, and selection of an ethical approach to the 
issue (e.g., utilitarianism or deontology); engagement of Kant’s Law of Autonomy, which 
frees decision makers from the influence of special interests; imposition of the categorical 
imperative; consideration of duty, respect for others, and morally good will; and, finally, 
choosing the symmetrical model to communicate with publics affected by the situation. 
Bowen’s work represents an important contribution to theories of excellent and global 
public relations by proposing a model for moral reasoning; however, reliance of this 
model on symmetrical communication limits consideration of other communication 
strategies that might be required in asymmetrical situations.   
Edgett (2002) addressed ethical communication from the perspective of 
asymmetrical situations or persuasive-advocacy approaches to public relations.  She 
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proposed 10 criteria for the practice of “ethically desirable public relations advocacy” (p. 
22).  These criteria consist of evaluation, priority, sensitivity, confidentiality, veracity, 
reversibility, validity, visibility, respect, and consent. Many scholars and practitioners are 
steadfast in their view of persuasive public relations as inherently unethical (e.g., 
L’Etang, 1996). Edgett’s work, although it may not change these views, still represents 
an important contribution to the dialogue surrounding this ethical issue. However, like 
other codes or sets of ethical principles, Edgett’s criteria represent a normative list of 
ethical ideals that lack a broader framework to support logical, moral reasoning. 
In summary, progress has been made in developing a framework for moral 
reasoning in public relations; however, scholars have yet to produce a complete model for 
ethical decision-making in public relations.  Furthermore, L. Grunig (1996) suggested, 
“The related areas of moral judgment, negotiation, and conflict resolution may contribute 
to this aspect of the philosophy of public relations” (p. 81). 
Public and social responsibility. J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) distinguished 
between social responsibility and public responsibility, or “responsibility to society as 
large vs. responsibility only to the stakeholders of an organization” (p. 8).  I use the term 
social responsibility in this study for several reasons. First, society is made up of 
interacting publics; therefore, practitioners have an ethical obligation to publics that are 
affected by the consequences of an organization’s behavior. Second, this study focuses on 
global aspects of public relations that cross many cultural and national boundaries; thus, I 
address broad issues that pertain to a global society. Finally, public relations literature has 
focused on the concept of corporate social responsibility in recent years; hence, there is 
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an abundance of literature that explains the concept of social responsibility in public 
relations theory. 
According to J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996), “Social responsibility requires 
organizations to deal with the consequences they have on publics and society” (p. 47). 
Furthermore, organizations can best fulfill this responsibility by dealing with 
consequences in a symmetrical manner. As J. Grunig (1992c) reported, “One of the major 
purposes of excellent public relations is balancing the private interests of the organization 
with the interests of publics and of society” (p. 241). Finally, Verčič and J. Grunig (2000) 
traced the development of corporate social responsibility (CSR) according to the 
following stages. 
1. CSR1 (1900 – 1930s). Corporations have responsibility for improving 
society, in general, as well as returning a profit to their shareholders. 
Weaknesses: The substance of social improvement is not clearly defined. 
Critics still question whether corporations have responsibility to society. 
2. CSR2 (1970s). Corporate responsibility for improving society has now 
been accepted without question; and this improvement is seen as a 
function of managed relations between organizations and their publics 
(e.g., issues management). The term public relations is clarified. CSR 
becomes more responsive to society. Weaknesses. The substance of CSR 
is still in question. 
3. CSR3 (1980s). Values and ethics are added to concept of CSR and 
reconceptualized as “corporate social rectitude” (p. 30), which advances 
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public relations from a responsive activity to a more proactive and 
interactive way of managing public relations.  
4. CSR4 (1980s – 1990s). A call for reconceptualization of CSR as 
“corporate social reason” (p. 31). Public relations are required to 
efficiently and effectively manage relations between publics and 
organizations; but the organization is now seen as part of the social 
environment. 
Ideology and values. According to Sriramesh and White (1992), ideology is “the 
‘ideational realm’ of culture … representative of the values, norms, knowledge, themes, 
philosophies and religious principles, worldviews, and ethos held by people of a society” 
(p. 605).  Many scholars have considered ideology as a determinant of culture (e.g., 
Sriramesh & Verčič, 2003b; Sriramesh & White, 1992). Societal culture influences 
organizational culture (Dozier, 1995).  Furthermore, ideology is often determined by the 
dominant culture (senior leadership) in an organization, is grounded in the practices of an 
organization, and is expressed through the communication of an organization (Mumby, 
1987).  Thus, organizational culture influences the worldview and practice of public 
relations (J. Grunig, 1992b). From structuration and rhetorical perspectives, ideology 
forms the building blocks and identity of organizations. In this sense, ideology provides 
“rules and resources that help them proceed” (Cozier & Witmer, 2000, p. 620) and 
creates an identity that organizations need to meet responsibilities to society (Cheney, 
1992). 
 Ethical, moral, and value systems form a part of ideology.  J. Grunig and L. 
Grunig (1996) provided a useful means to distinguish between these concepts.  They 
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characterized ethics as “rules or principles that can be used to solve problems in which 
morals and values are in question” (p. 7).  The Grunigs considered morals as belief 
systems that are passed down over years or centuries, which help us judge whether 
human conduct is right or wrong.  The Grunigs added that values are “beliefs about what 
objects or ideas are important” (p. 7). 
Such conceptualizations of ideology within a philosophy of public relations are 
helpful to this study, but they do not overcome difficulties associated with applying this 
philosophy to a global theory of public relations. Given the nature of acculturation 
identified within multinational settings, it is difficult to imagine a single, universal code 
of ethics that could apply equally well to all individuals, organizations, nations, or 
societies. However, public relations scholars believe that such a code can be developed. 
Kruckeberg (1993) expressed confidence in the existence of “a plenitude of shared ethical 
values” (p. 30). Hunt and Tirpok (1993), debating the existence of a universal code of 
ethics, argued, “No single [ethical] standard appears to be supported across the entire 
industry” (p. 1); however, “a universal ethics code has long-term benefits to society and 
to the communication and information professions” (p. 2). Hunt and Tirpok went on to 
explain that such a code should provide workable guidelines, symmetry between 
organizational leaders and members in developing the code, and standards based on 
ideals of social responsibility. They concluded that a universal code might be difficult to 
achieve but merely drafting proposals for such a code and presenting them for discussion 
could promote the kind of ethical dialogue that could lead to such a code. 
 
 
  130 
 
Moral Theory 
L’Etang (1996) explained that moral theories “give an account of what is ‘good’ 
and … judge ‘right’ actions” (p. 82). Grassey (1861/2000) defined moral theory as “the 
foundation on which ethical judgments stand” (p. 10). Grassey also characterized moral 
theory as “perplexing” (p. 82), since ethics can be used to determine minimal 
performance at one extreme and the highest ideals of performance at the other extreme.  
Moreover, even the most expert and knowledgeable ethical scholars use moral theories to 
disagree and debate over perplexing problems. 
Just war theory. Just war theory exemplifies the perplexing yet useful nature of 
moral theories. Although war seems to be the antithesis of collaboration and symmetry 
that characterize excellence in public relations, I have chosen just war theory as a moral 
exemplar in this study for several reasons.  First, just war theory falls among the class of 
moral theories that can be used to judge what is good and help determine just actions. 
Second, this theory helps to conceptualize the behavior of multinational, political-military 
alliances like NATO that constantly operate between war and peace. Third, just war 
theory provides a moral framework and ethical rules that could suggest a normative and 
practical model for the ethical management of public relations and asymmetrical 
communication in threat or crisis situations. 
Few rational minds would acknowledge that war is a preferred course of action at 
any time or any place. Walzer (1977) described war as crime and considered it a form of 
aggression. According to Walzer (2000), “Aggression is the name we give to the crime of 
war. We know the crime because of our knowledge of the peace it interrupts…. 
Aggression opens the gates of hell” (p. 393). Yet just war theory represents one of 
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Grassey’s (1861/2000) perplexing moral theories that define extremes in ethics. After 
condemning war as a crime, Walzer (1977) provided a moral argument justifying war. 
Observing that aggression often forces people to respond with aggression in order to 
protect law and order in an international society, Walzer acknowledged: 
Groups of citizens respond in different ways to that choice [lose rights or fight],  
sometimes surrendering, sometimes fighting, depending on the moral condition of 
their state and army. But they are always justified in fighting; and in most cases, 
given that harsh choice, fighting is the morally preferred response. (p. 51)  
Elshtain (2003) explained how just war theory provides a foundation for moral 
reasoning and ethical decision-making about justification for war and actions related to 
the conduct of war: 
The presupposition of just war thinking is that war can sometimes be an 
instrument of justice; that, indeed, war can help to put right a massive injustice or 
restore a right order where there is a disorder.” (p. 50) 
Elshtain also traced the origins of this just war theory to the fourth-century writings of 
Roman Catholic Saint Augustine. According to Elshtain, Augustine pondered the 
dichotomy between notions of force or coercion and the religious teachings of the 
Catholic Church. This left Augustine to wonder how a Christian could then act with force 
or coercion in light of the example provided by Jesus, who was heralded as a messenger 
of peace and resisted taking up arms. The work of St. Augustine, and later Saints 
Ambrose and Thomas Aquinas, established a just war tradition that recognized 
imperfection in the human world and set moral guidelines to respond to these 
imperfections: 
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They knew that in a fallen world, filled with imperfect human beings, we cannot  
achieve perfection in earthly dominion, in religious life, or in anything else and 
that – even more important – we all have responsibility to and for one another to 
serve and to love our neighbors. If our neighbor is being slaughtered, do we stand 
by and do nothing? (p. 51) 
To distinguish between concepts commonly referred to in this theory, just war 
tradition (justum bellum) represents the historical body of knowledge that over time has 
produced rules or agreements learned from experiences with the conduct of war. 
Theorists have used this tradition to produce a moral framework for reasoning about the 
justice of going to war (jus ad bellum) and ethical principles that guide the just conduct of 
a war (jus in bello) (Elshtain, 2003; Walzer, 1977; Just War Theory, 2004):  
1. Just War (jus ad bellum).   
a. War must be declared openly by a legitimate authority (as opposed to 
indiscriminate acts of violence carried out by individuals).   
b. War must be a limited response to an unjust act of aggression or 
fought for a just cause.   
c. War must be carried out with just intentions.  
d. War must be the last resort, exercised only after all other options have 
failed or been explored.   
e. Finally, war must not be carried out unless it has a reasonable chance 
to succeed in protecting or restoring good. 
2. Just conduct in war (jus in bello). 
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a. Violence applied in war must be proportional to injury suffered or, in 
other words, limit force to a level commensurate to the threat. 
b. Application of force must discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants. Innocent non-combatants (e.g., civilian men, women, and 
children) are never legitimate targets of war. 
Finnis (1996) made an important distinction about the jus ad bellum and jus en 
bello principles of constraint: “Each of the constraints is a necessary condition of 
justifiability, and compliance with one or some of them is never a sufficient condition” 
(p. 26).  Still, like other moral theories, just war theory is not accepted universally and is 
seen as wholly insufficient by many. Many are opposed to war’s denial of human rights 
and autonomy, under any conditions. Rosenbaum (1986) chided, “Very few people are 
apostles of coercion whereas many are apostles of freedom and authority” (p. 21). 
Feminist scholar Tobias (1996) argued that ethics of war are inconsistent with “ethics of 
care” (p. 239).  Still others, like Walzer (1977) warned that the destructive power of 
modern weapons have called into question the viability of just war principles.  Arguing 
from the jus en bello principle of discrimination, Tremblay (2003) concluded that the 
indiscriminant, destructive power of nuclear weapons renders just war theory irrelevant. 
Despite their inadequacies, moral theories like the just war tradition provide a 
moral framework for ethical decisions and are preferable to the absence of such moral 
thinking. Like efforts to create a universal code of ethics (Hunt & Tirpok, 1993; 
Kruckeberg, 1993; Paluszek, 2004), moral theories of this type also provide a starting 
point for discussion and dialogue that at least encourages ethical behavior. Elaborating on 
this notion, I borrow from Jerry O’Brien, a former director of international programs for 
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the Ethics Resource Center, who observed, “Ethics are in the dialogue” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2002).     
NATO’s charter is constructed on a foundation of international law and moral 
principles that respect and protect the sovereign rights of nations and their citizens. This 
implies that NATO must depend on some type of framework for making decisions that 
result in outcomes that are legal and ethical. Given NATO’s requirement for excellence 
in public relations – especially in the context of international conflict – it follows that this 
moral reasoning process would encompass decisions about communication and public 
relations management. This prompted the fifth and sixth research questions. 
RQ5: To what extent did NATO rely on moral reasoning to judge the ethical 
nature of decisions about IFOR communication and public relations management? 
RQ6: What perceptions did senior military leaders hold about ethical 
consequences associated with coercive communication strategies?    
Reconceptualization and Synthesis of Theory 
A synthesis of theoretical approaches to the study of public relations management 
and conflict resolution may help answer important questions related to the role of public 
relations and public relations activities in alliances and coalitions.  First, the excellence 
theory (J. Grunig, 1992a; Dozier, 1995; L. Grunig et al., 2002) explains characteristics of 
excellent public relations programs. The excellence theory also located an excellence 
factor that identifies the value to organizations of symmetrical or dialogic, strategically-
managed public relations: the production and maintenance of mutually-beneficial, long-
term relationships. Second, theories of communication, conflict, and management explain 
how conflict and communication are interrelated and produce relationships that need to 
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be managed by public relations.  Third, a mixed-motive communication continuum 
explains how excellent organizations employ a variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
communication strategies.  
However, relationships are managed most effectively – and are most likely to 
produce desirable, long-term results – when dialogue empowers both the organization 
and its strategic publics. Still, persuasion – even coercion – conceptualized as a limited 
communication tactic rather than a communication strategy contributes value to public 
relations. Short term application of persuasive communication in asymmetrical settings, 
managed ethically, could help to establish, restore, or continue dialogue, which 
contributes to building and maintaining long-term relationships.   
I acknowledge that this proposal implies limited acceptance of distributive 
communication tactics and, possibly, inequitable application of power (e.g., aggression), 
which some public relations scholars and practitioners consider unacceptable or 
unethical. However, these tactics might contribute temporarily to conflict and harm 
relationships.  If managed ethically, they might also restore dialogue and result in 
healthier long-term relationships.  In conflict situations, restoration of dialogue and long-
term maintenance of healthy relationships should be the focus of such communication 
approaches. This is especially true of the international settings in which NATO operates. 
As Deetz, Cohen, and Edley (1997) observed of ethical communication in intercultural 
and international settings: 
Given the complexities of intercultural communication and building a world 
community, we suggest that a dialogic approach to organizational ethics is a more 
productive direction…. In so doing, conflict, argument and debate would not be 
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avoided but would be embraced, for it is in conflict that we begin to see a 
potential ethical path that may be otherwise hidden by our everyday routines and 
‘taken-for-granted’ ways of understanding our world. This framework suggests 
that ethics does not rest in agreement or consensus but in the avoidance of 
suppression of alternative conceptions and possibilities. (p. 222) 
Thus, even coercive communication, guided by an ethical framework based on 
moral reasoning, could contribute to public relations excellence and support the integrity 
of a broader, dialogical, public relations strategy and worldview. Finally, moral theories 
like just war theory and Bowen’s (2000, 2004) ethical theory of public relations provide a 
logical framework for moral reasoning that contributes to ethical decision-making in 
public relations. Ethical decision-making promotes efficient and effective organizational 
behavior by ensuring that organizations balance self interests with the interests of key 
publics and remain responsible to improving society at large. 
The excellence study produced a general theory of public relations that is both 
normative and positive, providing concepts that are useful to study and practice in the 
public relations field. However, even though scholars devoted 17 years to the 
construction of the excellence theory (L. Grunig et al., 2003), the theory is relatively 
young and still underdeveloped in many areas. L. Grunig et al. have already identified 
four areas that require additional research: “globalization of public relations, strategic 
management and the nature of relationships, ethics, and the role of public relations in 
change” (p. 541).  
My study attempts to reconceptualize and add to development of the excellence 
theory in two of these areas; and, in so doing, the study might contribute to the other two 
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areas. First, I extend concepts of excellence in public relations from Western culture to a 
global perspective, drawing upon generic principles of an emerging theory of global 
public relations being developed by several international scholars (J. Grunig et al., 1995; 
L. Grunig et al., 1998; Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 2003a; Verčič et al., 1996; Wakefield, 
1996, 1997). Globalizing the conceptualization of public relations will allow me to 
examine more precisely how excellent public relations principles might be applied by a 
multinational organization like NATO.   
Furthermore, I expect the examination of a multicultural alliance like NATO – 
rather than the types of ethnocentric organizations that have been observed in previous 
excellence studies – will enhance understanding of how public relations operates across 
cultures and contributes to development of a global theory. In this regard, I am influenced 
by Adler (2002), who remarked, “Managing across cultures confronts leaders with 
profound ethical questions as they attempt to adhere to the highest standards of integrity 
while making and implementing culturally appropriate decisions” (p. 190). Examining 
the NATO case in the turbulent context of a Cold War to post-Cold War transition may 
also contribute to understanding of how organizations rely on strategic public relations 
management during periods of change. 
Second, I reconceptualize the concept of public relations that was once based on 
the historical models of public relations previously described in this chapter. I also move 
this conceptualization beyond descriptions of two-way symmetric and two-way 
asymmetrical communication that were generated by these models. I conceptualize public 
relations according to the developing, dialogical model of public relations advanced 
recently by studies of excellence in public relations (see J. Grunig, 2001; L. Grunig et al., 
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2002). This model defines public relations according to maintenance strategies used in 
strategic management of communication and public relations: symmetry and asymmetry, 
one-way or two-way, mediated and interpersonal, and ethical. Moreover, I add to this 
conceptualization by incorporating into the dialogical model limited use of certain forms 
of persuasive communication (e.g., warnings) that are designed to establish or restore 
symmetrical communication and long-term, collaborative relationships. 
Application of Ethical, Global Theory of Public Relations 
Weick (1988) described challenges associated with decision-making and choice 
of communication strategies in conflict situations.  He observed, “Sensemaking in crisis 
conditions is complicated by the fact that a delicate tradeoff exists between dangerous 
action that produces understanding and safe action that produces confusion” (p. 305).  
Placed in the context of a coalition like IFOR in crisis, threats or application of military 
force might be a risky but expeditious means to resolve conflict.  However, military force 
could be counterproductive – and even unethical – if actions result in collateral damage 
and civilian casualties (Elshtain, 2003; Mueller, 1997; Walzer, 1977).   Conversely, other 
approaches to resolving conflict such as diplomacy, negotiation, and mediation can mire 
in rhetorical arguments that might last for years, thus prolonging or intensifying bloody 
rivalries and civil wars (Luttwak, 1999).   
This conceptualization can be clarified by offering a practical example of how 
these concepts and questions might apply to an actual situation involving NATO. I use an 
actual scenario from NATO’s deployment of IFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
demonstrate the need for a more comprehensive, global and ethical approach to strategic 
communication and public relations management. 
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Nine months after the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) deployed to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a small IFOR military patrol consisting of soldiers from the Czech 
Republic was threatened by a Bosnian-Serb chief of police from the city of Prijedor. 
After discovering an automatic weapon in the possession of the chief of police – a 
violation of the peace accords – the IFOR patrol asked the police chief to hand over the 
weapon.  The police official refused and pointed his weapon in the direction of the patrol. 
The IFOR patrol fired warning shots into the air and the police chief responded by firing 
his automatic weapon.  The situation quickly escalated as another ten members of the 
Prijedor police force, also armed with automatic weapons, confronted the IFOR patrol. 
Rather than provoke more violence, the IFOR patrol disengaged and reported the incident 
to senior IFOR leaders.  
Word of the incident was quickly relayed to the headquarters of the IFOR 
commander, U.S. Navy Admiral T. Joseph Lopez. Lopez realized that the incident posed 
a serious physical threat to IFOR soldiers and an even greater political threat to the peace 
accords. Lopez initiated dialogue with Bosnian-Serb government officials in an attempt 
to resolve the conflict peacefully. He quickly assembled a small staff of key advisors, 
including the chief of public information. He directed his staff to prepare a wide range of 
contingency plans. These plans ranged from a diplomatic and public information 
approach to, if political dialogue failed, use of lethal military force to recover the 
automatic weapons used by the Prijedor police force, sanction the policemen who had 
threatened IFOR troops, and protect the peace accords.  An attempt by three IFOR 
soldiers to peacefully resolve a relatively minor arms violation was now moving rapidly 
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through a continuum of conflict that had begun with collaborative communication and, 
absent opportunity for dialogue, might end in application of lethal force.   
This example clearly illustrates the dilemmas faced by NATO and IFOR in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Although the mandate for the IFOR mission relied on a dialogic 
approach to restore peace and build long-term strategic relationships in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (see Combelles-Siegel, 1998; Van Dyke, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 
2003a, 2003b), certain conflict situations often inhibited application of symmetrical and 
even two-way forms of asymmetrical communication. How could public relations and 
political communication be integrated? If two-way communication fails in a conflict 
situation, must leaders like Admiral Lopez resort to communication strategies other than 
public relations (e.g., aggression)?  How do the cultural aspects of a multinational 
organization or operation complicate this matter?  Would a western, Anglo-Saxon 
approach to public relations work equally well in managing conflicts involving North 
American, Western European, Eastern European, and even Asian cultures, as in this 
situation? Finally, could ethical management of persuasive or even coercive 
communication in this instance help resolve the conflict peacefully and restore 
collaborative relationships?  Consequently, would a persuasive approach be more ethical 
than allowing the situation to escalate if more ethical forms of communication failed? 
A Synthesis of Theoretical Approaches to Public Relations 
This study will attempt to answer these questions and more.  By conceptualizing 
public relations as a global theory I attempt to identify generic principles of the 
excellence theory in public relations that could be adapted to most cultures. Furthermore, 
I draw from other theoretical perspectives of public relations (e.g., game theory, 
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contingency theory) to help the excellence theory in public relations become more 
inclusive of special situations and, therefore, more practical.  In this attempt, I strive to 
accommodate a diversity of public relations views; show how strategic public relations 
management could be integrated with negotiation, diplomacy, and other forms of 
political-military communication; contribute to development of specific, middle-ground 
theories in communication that scholars like Berger (1991) have proposed; and identify 
rules that could contribute to development of models for ethical decision-making (J. 
Grunig, 2001; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1996, 1997; L. Grunig et al., 2002).  
Conclusion: Research Questions and Proposition 
 This conceptualization and discussion of how theoretical concepts within this 
review are related to practical issues provides insight into how principles of the 
excellence theory in public relations might be applied in multinational organizations like 
NATO.  This insight also generates interest in how this application might contribute to 
development of a global theory of public relations.  Finally, there remain important 
questions about the ethical nature of asymmetrical communication strategies employed 
by NATO in international conflict situations.  
 At the outset of this dissertation I asserted that approaches to public relations 
based on the excellence theory in public relation were most ethical and most likely to 
produce favorable outcomes for organizations.  I have extensive practical experience as a 
former public information office in NATO.  However, this experience did not provide me 
with a sound theoretical understanding of how NATO might apply public relations 
principles or how application of these principles might explain a global approach to 
public relations. Therefore, I neither presented nor tested any hypotheses in this study.  
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This qualitative research program was designed to confirm and explore. 
Deductively, I sought to confirm or deny the existence of principles from the excellence 
theory in NATO’s public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996.  
I also sought to establish the existence of generic principles of a developing global theory 
in public relations. Finally, I used inductive research strategies to explore implications of 
persuasive communication (e.g., coercion) by NATO. I assumed from practical 
experience and a review of literature that NATO would engage in persuasive 
communication strategies that some practitioners and scholars deem unethical. After my 
assumptions were supported through research, I proposed an ethical model for limited use 
when communicating in conflict situations.  
Moving ahead, I summarize five research questions that were designed to evaluate 
the level of excellence in NATO’s public relations programs; determine how culture and 
conflict affect public relations and communication management; achieve understanding 
of how NATO might manage these public relations programs from a global perspective; 
and, finally, given a conflict situation, examine how NATO leaders and public relations 
managers make ethical decisions regarding choice of communication strategies and 
tactics. Following these questions, I propose a theoretical framework for a model of 
ethical communication in conflict situations that I refined during the latter stages of this 
study. 
Research Questions 
RQ1: Which principles of the excellence theory in public relations did NATO 
apply to its public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996? 
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RQ2: How did organizational culture influence NATO’s management of IFOR 
public relations and communication programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
RQ3: Which, if any, excellence theory principles applied by NATO to IFOR 
communication programs were associated with generic principles of a global theory in 
public relations? 
RQ4: How did conflict situations facing IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina influence 
choice of communication strategies by senior NATO leaders? 
RQ5: To what extent did NATO rely on moral reasoning to judge the ethical 
nature of decisions about IFOR communication and public relations management? 
RQ6: What perceptions did senior military leaders hold about consequences 
associated with coercive communication?    
Framework for a Model of Just Communication 
 When faced with a conflict situation, an organization (e.g., NATO leaders and 
communication managers) should select communication strategies and public relations 
programs based on a logical framework for moral reasoning and strategic management.  
This framework ought to be simple enough to be of practical use yet of sufficient 
complexity to describe how decision makers might choose to behave in a variety of 
organizational settings and situations.   
The behavioral molecule (J. Grunig, 2003; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; J. Grunig & 
Repper, 1992) provides a basis for such a framework.  According to J. Grunig and Hunt, 
the molecular aspect of this framework “is the simplest structural unit that has the 
characteristics of the larger units it makes up” (p. 105).  Furthermore, the behavioral 
nature of this framework allows description of “how people make decisions about what to 
  144 
 
do – how to behave – and how managers organize larger systems to produce single 
behaviors for those systems” (p. 105).  To extend the behavioral molecule to conflict 
situations and incorporate ethical dimensions that could guide decisions about coercive 
communication I incorporated concepts from just war theory (e.g., Elshtain, 2003) and 
organizational response to activism (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1997).  This process resulted 
in the following proposal for a model of communication in conflict situations. 
Detect and Construct.  Use the excellence theory and strategic public relations 
management to detect issues or threats and construct the situation. Apply situational 
theory to identify and prioritize strategic publics affected by consequences of this 
situation.  Incorporate formative research to evaluate the nature of relationships between 
the organization and strategic publics. This research should include a coorientation 
approach that compares organizational and public perceptions of each other (see J. 
Grunig & L. Grunig, 2001; Hon & J. Grunig , 1999).  Use situational theory to organize 
or strengthen alliances or coalitions that the organization might be part of, thereby 
empowering collective action. All communication at this point should be based on a two-
way, dialogical strategy defined by the excellence theory. 
Define available strategies and tactics that could be used to communicate between 
the organization, alliance, or coalition and affected publics. Use moral reasoning, based 
on deontology or teleology, to evaluate the ethical nature of each approach. Use the 
excellence theory to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of communication options. 
Applying a public relations management approach, identify goals, objectives, tactics, 
themes, messages, channels of communication, and other elements of an overall public 
relations strategy. The current and preferred communication strategy remains two-way, 
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dialogical. Consider options that are appropriate to the situation, including secondary 
options that could be employed if two-way, dialogical communication fails.  Evaluate 
communication options according to dimensions of the most advanced model of excellent 
public relations: symmetry and asymmetry, one-way and two-way, mediated and 
interpersonal, and ethical (see J. Grunig, 2001, p. 29). Persuasive communication tactics, 
including coercion, may be considered as part of a short-term objective when dialogic 
communication fails; however, the overall communication strategy must be framed by a 
symmetrical worldview of public relations, which is based on collaborative values and 
respects the importance and integrity of long-term, mutually-beneficial relationships. 
Select primary and optional communication strategies and tactics.  Use the same 
moral reasoning approach applied to the definition stage and consider the following 
principles from just war theory (jus ad bellum):  
• Limit asymmetrical tactics to situations that justify their use. 
• Implement asymmetrical tactics only with just intentions. 
• Use persuasive communication tactics such as coercion as a last resort, after 
all other options have failed or been considered. 
• Do not use persuasive communication tactics unless they stand a reasonable 
chance to succeed in establishing, restoring, or protecting just values (e.g., 
freedom in large, long-term relationships). 
Confirm communication alternatives. Using the tradition of just war theory, obtain 
legitimate authority (e.g., legal, political) to employ any coercive means of 
communication (e.g., threats, warnings, promises, psychological) that might be under 
consideration. This authority could derive from international law or mandate, agreements 
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or treaties, or rules governing status of military forces operating within the sovereign 
territory of nations.  Avoid indiscriminate use of coercive tactics, even those limited to 
non-physical acts.  
Behave or implement strategy by attempting to communicate with affected public 
or publics through dialogue.  Disclose the strategic intent of communication. Use a “tit-
for-tat” approach defined by game theory to continue communication. If a public 
responds dialogically, continue two-way, symmetrical communication. If a public 
responds asymmetrically or refuses to communicate, use negotiation and employ 
persuasive tactics – including coercion – to restore dialogue. While communicating, 
respect the following constraints from theories of just war (jus en bello) and activism: 
• To remain ethical, continue to disclose intent of communication. 
• Limit persuasion or coercion to a level commensurate to the most severe 
threat associated with the situation. For instance, use informative tactics such as 
warnings rather than threats if the less invasive tactic is sufficient to restore 
dialogue. 
• Discriminate between publics when implementing persuasive communication. 
Use situational theory to discriminate between activist publics, active publics, 
aware publics, latent publics, and non publics. Do not use persuasive 
communication (e.g., psychological operations, coercion) that could have 
unintended consequences on publics not involved in the situation. 
Evaluate the outcomes and effects of the public relations and communication 
strategy that has been applied. If dialogue and relationships have been restored, continue 
using two-way, dialogical communication for problem-solving and long-term relationship 
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management. If conflict remains, reevaluate and reprogram.  To contribute to the 
scholarly and practical body of knowledge in public relations – including a developing 
set of rules that might define a tradition of just communication – incorporate research 
designed to better understand and report how public relations contributed to conflict 
resolution and relationship management. 
Scan. Once conflict is resolved, continue environmental scanning and relationship 
management based on a dialogical worldview of public relations until another conflict 
situation is identified. 
 This model of communication is summarized in Table 3.  The moral framework 
for guiding ethical decision within this model is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Table 3 
 
Model for Making Justifiable Communication Choices 
 
1. Detect and Construct.  Use strategic public relations management to detect threats 
and construct the situation.  Identify and prioritize key publics. Evaluate 
relationships and compare perceptions held by the organization and publics of 
each other.  Organize or strengthen coalitions to empower collective action.  Base 
communication on dialogue (two-way, symmetrical). 
2. Define available communicate strategies and tactics. Evaluate the ethical nature, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of each communication option. Identify goals, 
objectives, tactics, themes, messages, and communication media to define a 
public relations strategy. Continue dialogue.  Identify and evaluate secondary 
communication options. Consider asymmetrical communication tactics such as 
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coercion only as a short-term objective if dialogic communication fails.  Base 
overall communication strategy on a symmetrical worldview of public relations, 
which values collaboration and long-term, mutually-beneficial relationships. 
3. Select primary and optional communication strategies and tactics, guided by the 
following principles: 
a. Limit asymmetrical tactics to situations that justify their use. 
b. Implement asymmetrical tactics only with just intentions. 
c. Use persuasive communication tactics such as coercion as a last resort, 
after all other options have failed or been considered. 
d. Do not use persuasive communication tactics unless they stand a 
reasonable chance to succeed in establishing, restoring, or protecting just 
values (e.g., freedom in large, long-term relationships). 
4. Confirm communication alternatives. Obtain legitimate authority (e.g., legal, 
political) before employing coercive means of communication. Avoid 
indiscriminate use of coercive tactics – even those limited to non-physical acts.  
5. Behave by implementing strategies designed to communicate with affected 
publics through dialogue. Disclose the strategic intent of communication. Use a 
“tit-for-tat” approach to continue communication. If a public responds 
dialogically, continue two-way, symmetrical communication. If a public responds 
asymmetrically or refuses to communicate, use negotiation and employ persuasive 
tactics – including coercion, if necessary – to restore dialogue. While 
communicating, adhere to the following constraints: 
a. To remain ethical, continue to disclose intent of communication. 
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b. Limit persuasion or coercion to a level commensurate to the most severe 
threat associated with the situation. For instance, use warnings rather than 
threats if the less invasive tactic is sufficient to restore dialogue. 
c. Discriminate between publics when implementing persuasive 
communication. Do not use persuasive communication (e.g., 
psychological operations, coercion) that could have unintended 
consequences on publics not involved in the situation. 
6. Evaluate communication outcomes and effects.  If dialogue and relationships 
have been restored, continue dialogue.  If conflict remains, reevaluate and 
reprogram.  Conduct research and report lessons learned that promote better 
understanding of how strategic communication and public relations contribute to 
conflict resolution and relationship management. 
7. Scan. Once conflict is resolved, continue environmental scanning and relationship 
management based on dialogue until another conflict situation is identified. 
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 MODEL FOR
JUST COMMUNICATION 
 Model for Justifying Communication Choices in Conflict Situations
1.  DETECT
2. ORGANIZE
3. DEFINE
4. SELECT
5. CONFIRM
6. IMPLEMENT
7. EVALUATE
8. SCAN
1. Detect:
A. While scanning the environment, detect an 
emerging or active issue (e.g., conflict or threat).
B. Identify & prioritize the conflict, including 
strategic audiences that are involved.
C. Assess situation and nature of relationships 
between organization and audiences that are 
involved.
2. Organize:
A. Organize coalitions, collective 
action to strengthen capabilities 
needed to deal with the conflict.
B. Exchange information; 
communicate through dialogue.
3. Define: 
A. Strategically evaluate 
primary and alternate 
communication options 
(inform, collaborate, 
negotiate, threaten, etc.).
B. Use moral reasoning to 
determine justification and 
ethical nature of options.
C. Consider long-term, 
strategic value of  
communication options.
4. Select:
A. Choose primary & optional 
communications.
B. Use moral reasoning to 
justify choice, application of 
communications:    
-- Limit asymmetric 
communication (e.g., coercion) 
to justifiable situations.
-- Implement asymmetric tactics 
only with justifiable intentions.
-- Use threatening 
communication only after all 
other options have failed or been 
considered.
-- Avoid threats unless they 
stand a reasonable chance to 
succeed in achieving justifiable, 
ethical outcomes (e.g., 
establishing healthy relations).
5. Confirm 
A. Confirm legitimate 
authority (e.g., legal, political -
- national and international) to 
employ communication 
choice, especially coercive 
(e.g., threats, warnings, 
psychological). 
B. Avoid indiscriminate use of 
coercive tactics, even those 
limited to non-physical acts.
6. Implement 
A. Implement communications, 
beginning with dialogue:
B. Use “tit-for-tat” approach (e.g., 
mirror publics’ communication tactics), 
if necessary, to restore dialogue.
C. Abide by just constraints:
-- Remain ethical by disclosing 
communication intent.
-- Limit coercion to level commensurate 
to most severe threat.
-- Discriminate between publics: aim 
communication at target audiences; 
avoid unintended consequences to non-
publics.
7. Evaluate 
A. Evaluate outcomes, 
effects of applied 
communication.
B. If conflict remains, 
reevaluate, reprogram.
C. If conflict is resolved, 
restore dialogue, manage 
long-term relationships. 
D. Extract lessons learned; 
develop or refine rules that 
constitute tradition of just 
communication. 
8. Scan:
A. Once conflict is resolved and 
lessons are evaluated, continue 
scanning the environment for 
emerging issues.
 
 
Figure 5. Moral framework for making justifiable communication choices.  
  151 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
I open this chapter with a reflexive declaration by Thucydides (1874/1934), taken 
from his historical account, The Peloponnesian War, from 431 – 404 B.C.  I employ this 
quote not to belabor the matter of war but, instead, to illustrate the ancient roots and 
millennia-old debate over qualitative methodology. 
With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the war 
began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, others I got from 
various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one’s 
memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion 
demanded of them by various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible 
to the general sense of what they really said.  And with reference to the narrative 
of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the first source that came to 
hand, I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw 
myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always 
tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible.  My conclusions have cost me 
some labour from the want of coincidence between accounts of the same 
occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect 
memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other…. In fine, I 
have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the 
moment, but as a possession for all time. (pp. 14-15) 
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             Qualitative Choice in Methodology 
Scholars have traced the rise in importance of qualitative research to the 1920s 
and 1930s (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  During this period, the 
Chicago School introduced new sociological approaches to the study of human groups in 
natural settings. At the same time, noted anthropologists like Meade (1928/1961) were 
pioneering the field work method used in ethnographic studies of other cultures and 
societies. Qualitative research design has since spread to other social-scientific 
disciplines, including communication. In the 1980s, the strengths of this methodology led 
to “new interest in qualitative research … [that] affected research in public relations” 
(Broom & Dozier, 1990, p. 141-142).  
Thucydides seems to have been ignored in this contemporary history of 
qualitative research; yet, in a single paragraph he captured the characteristics of 
qualitative methodology. He also speaks for me. Even though our research is separated 
by the passage of more than 2,000 years, I empathize with his sentiments about 
observing, documenting, analyzing, interpreting, and reporting the meaning of warriors’ 
lived experience in conflict settings. I use Thucydides’ account as an instrument to 
illustrate the characteristics of qualitative research. 
First, qualitative methodology is descriptive and exploratory.  Qualitative research 
design represents a “systematic, empirical strategy for answering questions about people 
in a particular social context” (Locke et al., 2000, p. 96). Locke et al. went on to define 
empirical as “inquiry based on the data of experience, things that the investigator saw or 
heard that can then be employed as a warrant for a claim” (p. 117). Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000) added that qualitative research is a “situated activity that locates the observer in 
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the world” (p. 3). This world in terms of qualitative research is normally observed in 
natural settings, rather than the laboratory settings of experimental, quantitative research.  
Thucydides was a participant as well as an observer of war.  He used his study of 
speeches and oral accounts, often gathered in the natural setting of actual battles, to 
situate and describe a history of the Peloponnesian War. Thus, in the tradition of 
qualitative research, Thucydides interpreted qualitatively his material world through a 
variety of descriptive methods related to field observations, interviews, notes, records, 
and other representations. 
Strengths of Qualitative Research 
Variety of method is one of the strengths of qualitative research. Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) described the qualitative researcher as a “bricoleur” (p. 4) or quilt maker 
who relies on a patchwork of methods to make meaning of the world. The patchwork 
metaphor also extends to the variety of meanings – or social constructions of reality – 
that are co-created through interactions between the researcher and his or her world. 
Thucydides (1874/1934) referred to this variety when he spoke of gathering accounts of 
the Peloponnesian War from many sources, at different times, and “from various 
quarters” (p. 14). Marshall and Rossman (1999) described other strengths of qualitative 
research: 
The most compelling argument is to stress the unique strengths of the genre for  
research that is exploratory or descriptive, that assumes the value of context and 
setting, and that searches for a deeper understanding of the participants’ lived 
experiences. (p. 61) 
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Thucydides (1874/1934) rich descriptions of the Peloponnesian War placed great 
value on context, setting, and the meaning made by his participants of their experiences 
in war.  Context and natural setting provides a direct source of data for qualitative study’s 
inductive search for patterns and themes that help create meaning, which is an essential 
concern of qualitative researchers (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). Thucydides’ concern for 
capturing meaning and his commitment to participants was expressed as an attempt to 
adhere “as closely as possible to the general sense of what they [participants] really said” 
(p. 14). This statement also represents the empathic and ethical nature of qualitative 
research, described by Stake (1995) and conveyed by Thucydides as feelings of 
sensitivity toward his participants and his desire to represent his participants’ accounts in 
an accurate, credible, and non-hortatory manner.  Thucydides wrote, “It was in all cases 
difficult to carry them word for word in one’s memory, so my habit has been to make the 
speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by various occasions” (p. 14). 
Criticism of Qualitative Research 
Hanson (1998), commenting on Thucydides’ reflexive declaration, alluded to “the 
cleft between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ truth” (p. xvi) as a criticism of Thucydides’ 
work.  Thucydides’ (1874/1934) thought reflexively about this issue and touched on the 
unique nature of exploring multiple realities in qualitative research: 
My conclusions have cost me some labour from the want of coincidence between 
accounts of the same occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes 
from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the 
other. (p. 14). 
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The years that have passed since Thucydides’ (1874/1934) writings have not 
dulled the debate between objective and subjective realities.  Some contemporary non-
qualitative scholars criticize qualitative researchers as “journalists, or soft scientists” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 7).  These critics also describe qualitative methods as 
unscientific, critical rather than theoretical, prone to bias, politically driven rather than 
goal driven, and lacking in generalizability, validity, and reliability. Qualitative scholars 
often acknowledge many of these traits as characteristics of qualitative research, 
embracing them instead of rejecting them. Stake (1995) added that qualitative studies 
often contribute slowly to social science, raise more questions than they answer, and 
incur ethical risks and high costs in terms of time and money. 
Stake (1995) also rebutted many of these allegations. For instance, he regarded 
subjectivity as a potential strength, which is often misunderstood in science. As a 
qualitative researcher, I adopt a post-positivist approach that rejects the notion of an 
external reality that can be measured objectively. Even in quantitative studies, a 
researcher’s choice of methods, participants, and variables to be studied could introduce 
subjectivity into results. Thus, like Stake, I embrace subjectivity as strength in my 
research, “an essential element of understanding” (p. 45).  However, I also must 
recognize and disclose how human shortcomings, potential biases, personalities, and 
other subjective traits could influence research.  
Subjectivity does not prevent qualitative studies from being conducted in a 
scientific manner. Qualitative studies meet the criteria of scientific research, which 
Barzun and Graf (1992) defined as a “search for facts” (pp. 12-13).  Furthermore, 
qualitative studies like this are carried out according to a logical and rigorous research 
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strategy that incorporates research purpose and questions, operationalization of concepts, 
methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation, and reporting of results.  
Moreover, qualitative research must be strong enough to withstand rigorous and repeated 
scrutiny by scientific colleagues and other readers of the research. With regard to 
allegations of bias, Bogdan and Biklen (2003) noted that qualitative researchers 
“objectively study the subjective states” (p. 33) of participants and how the researcher fits 
in.  To this extent, qualitative researchers use objective research strategies that avoid pure 
subjectivity by revealing and managing potential biases.  However, qualitative 
researchers generally view a purely objective state as something that is impossible to 
achieve.  For instance, observer effects (e.g., Hawthorne and Heisenberg effects) are 
often unavoidable but could add insights to scientific studies (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; 
Schwartzman, 1993). 
 Qualitative studies also can contribute to development of theory. For instance, 
Stake (2000) described qualitative case research, like the current study, as “exploration 
leading up to generalization-producing studies, or as an occasional early step in theory 
building” (p. 439). Bogdan and Biklen (2003) also explained that the concept of theory 
can be used in different ways.  A qualitative researcher might restrict theoretical research 
to “a systematically stated and testable set of propositions about the empirical world” (p. 
22).  However, qualitative research is still driven by a theoretical set of “logically related 
assumptions, concepts, or propositions that orient thinking and research” (p. 22).  Hence, 
qualitative research is the theoretical perspective from which I choose to study the 
socially-constructed world around me.    
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To some extent, the political nature of society means that politics will permeate 
most social scientific research (Punch, 1998). However, as Locke et al. (2000) explained, 
research goals drive choice of research strategy, which includes choice of methods.  
Therefore, goals drive qualitative research. Recalling Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000) 
description of a bricoleur, qualitative researchers could share many goals – some of them 
even critical, as in the construction of feminist (e.g., L. Grunig, 1988) or rhetorical (Toth 
& Heath, 1992) theories and approaches to research in public relations.  Still, the overall 
goal of qualitative research is to arrive at deeper understanding of some social 
phenomenon or phenomena. 
Finally, there are many views among qualitative scholars with regard to terms 
such as generalizability, validity, and reliability.  Most qualitative scholars reject 
generalizability on the grounds that qualitative research is designed to reach thick 
descriptions (Geertz, 1973) and deep understanding of an individual phenomenon rather 
than to generalize about many phenomena (Wolcott, 1994, 1995; Stake, 1995). However, 
Stake (2000) suggested that qualitative study could contribute to generalizations or even 
“redraw a generalization” (p. 437). There is wider disagreement among qualitative 
scholars surrounding the notions of validity and reliability, however. 
Some scholars view validity and reliability as important to achieving credibility 
and defending results within the scientific community (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Kirk & 
Miller, 1986; McCracken, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Miles and Huberman 
suggested incorporating into qualitative research devices such as graphs, linear diagrams, 
and matrixes that are commonly associated with quantitative research to display data 
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credibly.  McCracken (1988) and Stake (1995) recommended adding triangulation (of 
data, researchers, analysis, and methods) to strengthen the credibility of qualitative work.  
Other scholars have rejected the notions of validity and reliability in qualitative 
work (Janesick, 2000; Kvale, 1995; Wolcott, 1990, 1994, 1995).  In their view, such 
constructs confine the humanistic, naturalistic, and constructivist nature of qualitative 
work – reducing data to basic elements instead of examining multiple meanings in the 
interaction between phenomena and in the context of natural settings.  According to 
Kvale, scholars should focus instead on the importance of communication and 
construction of meaning instead of focusing on the validity and reliability of our research 
outcomes.  Wolcott (1994, 1995) regarded an individual researcher’s sense of 
accomplishment in achieving deep meaning as more credible than what others think of a 
researcher’s work.  
Qualitative research may not achieve the kinds of reliability and validity defined 
by quantitative research; and many qualitative researchers may not attempt to do so. I 
believe, however, that scholars must bridge the gap between schools of thought on 
validity and reliability. In order to achieve credibility of results, qualitative researchers 
must adhere to a rigorous, scientific, and empirical pursuit of both art and science.  
Scholars have provided useful ideas for balancing description, analysis, and interpretation 
of qualitative data with rigorous scientific methods to achieve respect and credibility in 
qualitative research (Kirk & Miller, 1986; Wolcott, 1994). For instance, Hon (1992, 
1995) achieved triangulation – at least in method – by combining observation, long 
interview, and focus group interview methods in her study of a feminist theory of public 
relations.  Also, by paying attention to precise descriptions of her participants’ views and 
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using reporting skill to allow readers to enter her field of observation, Hon achieved 
credibility and accessibility (or in traditional terms, validity and reliability) in her work. 
Returning to Thucydides (1874/1934), he too seemed to address concern for at least some 
of these terms and attempted to achieve some form of validation and triangulation in his 
work: 
And with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive 
it from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own 
impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw 
for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and 
detailed tests possible. (p. 14) 
Finally, with regard to the costs associated with qualitative research, Punch 
(1998) acknowledged the ethical risks created by personal, institutional, programmatic, 
and societal influences on researchers. Indeed, such pressure can often interfere with 
ethical research and telling the truth – regardless of methodology. However, the empathic 
nature of qualitative research and elements of research design that protect human 
participants, which I will describe elsewhere in this chapter, help protect against such 
ethical failures. Furthermore, Stake (1995) recognized that qualitative studies often are 
labor and resource intensive but the return of these investments, in terms of social value, 
are worth the costs.  Finally, he explained that phenomena studied by qualitative 
researchers often evolve over long periods of time and understanding these phenomena 
may take even longer.  
The work of Thucydides (1874/1934) offers a fine example of the relationship 
among ethics, costs, and benefits in research. Describing his study as a selfless endeavor, 
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he created over decades a history that has endured and benefited society for more than 
2000 years. On this note, Thucydides concluded his declaration by reporting, “In fine, I 
have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as 
a possession for all time” (pp. 14-15). 
Rationale for Choice of Qualitative Methods 
This study examined how a single multinational organization applied principles of 
the excellence theory in a turbulent, globalized environment.  The setting of this study 
was situated in and bounded by historical context: NATO’s deployment of a peace 
implementation force (IFOR) to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996.  However, this 
study was not merely historical or descriptive.  Rather, description of communication 
programs related to NATO’s historic deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed deeper 
understanding of how a multinational organization might apply the excellence theory – 
even while engaged in international conflict.  This understanding, in turn, identified 
generic principles – including ethics – that contribute to development of a global theory 
of public relations (see L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 554).  Hence, results of this study add to 
the public relations body of knowledge, inform public relations practice, and promote 
development of professionalism, ethics, and global perspectives in communication 
management. 
This study was designed to propose an ethical model of communication that 
includes coercion, elaborates the excellence theory and contributes to a developing theory 
of global public relations. To achieve this purpose, I sought to understand how a single, 
multinational organization managed public relations in various operational settings.  I 
observed and attempted to make sense of how communication decisions by NATO’s 
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senior leaders and public relations managers in Bosnia-Herzegovina were influenced by 
culture, situational factors, and personal experience or training.  I hope findings from this 
study will stimulate future research in this area, enlarge the scholarly body of knowledge 
in public relations, and provide practical applications that might be of use to public 
relations managers who face international conflict. 
Research purpose and questions should drive choice of methods (Locke et al., 
2000). Hence, I found that qualitative methodology was best suited to reveal the meaning 
of communication processes, outcomes, and lived experienced related to NATO’s 
management of public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, qualitative 
research methods also must be adapted to the personal, artistic nature of the researcher 
(H. Rubin & I. Rubin, 1995; Wolcott, 1995).  Thus, my own lived experience (including 
service with NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina), my personal interest in conflict 
management, and my deontological philosophy of public relations influenced my choice 
of method. In conclusion, I employed a case study approach that incorporated qualitative 
interviews to collect data that answered my research questions. 
Case Study Approach 
My personal and professional experience in NATO was an important factor in this 
research design. Yin (2003a, 2003b) implied that case study could be an effective 
qualitative or quantitative research strategy; however, Stake (2000) described case study 
as neither a methodology nor a method.  It is simply “a choice of what is to be studied” 
(p. 435). The reflexive nature of qualitative study places me within my research; thus, 
choice of whom I study and what I study is important. Case study provides me with an 
effective means to inquire about NATO in a historical context and examine it as a unique 
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organizational system, situated in historical context and bounded by time – features that 
are strengths of this approach (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Stake, 1995, 1998, 2000).  
I used analysis to deepen my understanding of NATO’s public relations program 
and extend the excellence theory.  I also explored NATO’s application of ethics in 
decision-making. Hence, case study added value to my study by providing a useful means 
“for refining theory and suggesting complexities for further investigation” (Stake, 2000, 
p. 448).  I employed a general research framework and incorporated Stake’s instrumental 
approach in this study – using NATO as an instrument to understand how a single 
multinational organization might apply principles of public relations. I also adopted 
Wolcott’s (1995) general approach to case study, which seeks in-depth knowledge about 
a single case instead of broad knowledge about several cases.  I use Wolcott’s retort to 
respond to those who might challenge the scientific rationale for studying only one of 
anything: “What can we learn from studying only one of anything? Why, all we can!” (p. 
171). Finally, I relied on Meade’s (1961) preference for qualitative meaning over 
objective proof in a single case study:  
As the physician and the psychiatrist have found it necessary to describe each 
case separately and to use their cases as illumination of a thesis rather than as 
irrefutable proof such as it is possible to adduce in the physical sciences, so the 
student of the more intangible and psychological aspects of human behaviour [sic] 
is forced to illuminate rather than demonstrate a thesis. (p. 260) 
Methods 
I selected three types of interviews as primary methods to collect data in this 
study: long interview, elite interview, and focus group interview.  I conducted a total of 
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14 long interviews, 4 elite interviews, and 3 focus group interviews. The original design 
of this study called for 12 long interviews, 3 elite interviews, and 3 focus group 
interviews.  Willingness of interview recruits to participate and a lower-than-expected 
mortality rate in actual interviews contributed to the increase in number of long and elite 
interviews.   
I pre-tested interview protocols during three trials.  These trials consisted of three 
additional interviews: one long, one elite and one focus group.  I will explain composition 
and outcome of the trial interviews in the procedure section, below.   
I conducted long interviews in three phases: a pre-test and three interviews in 
2000, three interviews in 2001, and eight interviews in 2004.  The first phase of long 
interviews compared excellence theory principles and NATO’s management of public 
relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The second round of long interviews 
compared the excellence theory with NATO public relations and began to explore 
emerging themes related to global public relations.  Finally, third-round long interviews 
explored principles of the excellence theory and global public relations theory and sought 
to better understand how changing situations – ranging from peace to conflict – might 
influence NATO’s management of public relations activities.  The emergence of the latter 
theme in the last round of interviews raised questions how NATO incorporated ethics in 
decisions about using various types of communication strategies and tactics.  This 
development led me to conduct elite and focus group interviews in 2004, which I used to 
refine data from long interviews and explore a proposed model of communication for use 
in conflict situations. 
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These interviews helped relate research findings to my research purpose and 
questions, forming a methodological connection strong enough to withstand rigorous and 
repeated scrutiny by my advisory committee, my colleagues, and readers of this study.  I 
will first explain the general characteristics of the interview method. I will then discuss 
individual characteristics of each interview type, describe interview participants, explain 
procedures for gaining access to and recruiting participants, and address other issues 
related to the design of this research. 
Interviews 
The interview is among the most commonly used methods of qualitative research 
(McCracken, 1988; H. Rubin & I. Rubin, 1995) because it has great value in exploring 
complicated phenomena that require thick descriptions of meaning (Geertz, 1973; Stake, 
1995).  An interview also is useful in uncovering a participant’s views about research 
topics and revealing relationships between issues, beliefs, opinions, processes, and other 
natural phenomena.  Properly constructed, interviews can increase the chance of reaching 
understanding between researcher and participant by strategic use of questions, 
responses, and probes to verify and validate meaning.  Finally, the flexible, iterative and 
continuous nature of interview research allows observations to evolve and address 
unforeseen issues as they emerge (H. Rubin & I. Rubin).   
Interviews differ in many ways, however. They vary by type, as described above.  
They also are distinguished by structure (Fontana & Frey, 2000).  Structured interviews 
follow a protocol or guide designed to elicit responses to a variety of questions of 
particular interest to the researcher, in the time allotted for an interview. Unstructured 
interviews often use no protocol, which allows the participant freedom to talk about items 
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of interest to him or her. Semi-structured interviews strike a balance, employing a general 
interviewer’s guide that the interviewer can adapt as the interview and ideas evolve.  
I used a semi-structured interview approach in this study, relying on general 
interview guides exhibited in appendices A through C.  This semi-structured approach 
afforded me the flexibility to adapt wording, number, and sequence of questions to 
changes in the interview situation and context as my research progressed.   I used the 
guides to facilitate long, elite and focus group interviews in this study.  These guides 
contained several types of interview questions described by Kvale (1996, pp. 133-134).  
Introductory questions helped open the interviews or begin discussion of themes or 
directions of interest to this research.  Probing questions encouraged elaboration by 
participants for answers that were not clearly understood by the interviewer.  Follow-up 
questions explored deeper meaning of items that were of interest to participants and the 
interviewer.  The semi-structured nature of the interviews also allowed me to employ 
techniques not evident in the guide.  These techniques included specifying questions that 
allowed me to obtain more precise descriptions, interpreting questions that allowed me to 
rephrase a participant’s response to confirm meaning, and silence or pauses that often 
encouraged participants to add significant data and meaning to their answers. 
The flexibility of this semi-structured format allowed me to adapt interviews to 
native and non-native English speakers and overcome technical challenges related to 
telephone interviews.  As Patton (1990) suggested, I found that the semi-structured 
approach offered the following advantages: 
1. Allows best use of limited time. 
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2. Provides a systematic and comprehensive approach to collecting data without 
strictly limiting issues to be discussed. 
3. Keeps interviews focused but allows individual expression of thoughts and 
experiences.  
4. Allows exploration of other topics that may emerge. (p. 283)  
Interviews, however, have weaknesses related to access, time and logistics, 
setting, and procedures. First, access to participants – especially to busy elites – is often 
limited by organizational schedules, policy, or desire for privacy.  To overcome this 
problem, I relied on my existing, professional relationships with current and former 
military officials to identify and approach potential interview participants who were 
experienced in alliances and coalitions like NATO and IFOR.  
Second, time and logistic constraints limit the number of people a researcher can 
interview. Hence, I conducted only as many interviews as needed to reach data saturation, 
or redundancy (Patton, 1990).  I will explain my rationale for sample size in the access, 
sampling, and recruiting section, below. 
Third, research-related travel time and monetary expenses can often become 
prohibitive.  Therefore, I focused recruiting efforts for face-to-face interviews on 
prospective participants who lived or worked in the Washington, DC, area, which was 
near my home and university.  I relied on telephone interviews for participants outside 
this immediate geographic area.   
Fourth, less-than-naturalistic settings (e.g., offices, interview rooms, telephone) 
can constrain interview results and interview protocols may inhibit ability to capture 
naturally occurring phenomena.  Interviews may also create researcher-provoked data 
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that “would not exist apart from a researcher’s intervention” (Silverman, 2001, p. 159). 
Therefore, I identified interview settings that helped make my participants as comfortable 
as possible, thus promoting active dialogue.  I empowered participants by using probes 
and follow-up questions that allowed them to move beyond topics contained in interview 
protocols.  I also used interpreting questions and silence to minimize the effects of my 
intervention and encourage participants to co-construct meaning during interviews.  
Finally, participants’ responses and researchers’ understanding of meaning are often 
prone to internal and external bias.  Therefore, I incorporated techniques to manage these 
biases, which I will discuss later in this chapter. 
Long Interview 
McCracken (1988) described the long interview as “one of the most powerful 
methods in the qualitative armory … [it] can take us into the mental world of the 
individual, to glimpse categories and logic by which he or she sees the world” (p. 9).  Yin 
(2003a) regarded such interviews as “one of the most important sources of case study 
information” and referred to them as “guided conversations rather than structured queries 
… fluid rather than rigid” (p. 89).  These informal, conversational qualities contribute to 
long interview’s value as a “listening technique” (Hon, 1992, p. 116), which is often 
more useful to qualitative research than social-scientific surveys, telephone interviews 
and other “eliciting techniques” (Wolcott, 1995, p. 106).   
Long interviews differ from other forms of interview in length and structure.  
Fontana and Frey (2000) illustrated variance in interview length: “An interview can be a 
one-time, brief event – say 5 minutes over the telephone – or it can take place over 
multiple, lengthy sessions, at times spanning days, as in life history interviewing” (p. 
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646).  Yin (2003a) suggested that long, case study interviews could last for 
approximately an hour.  Ultimately, length is determined by the open-ended and 
conversational structure of the interview, which follows “a certain set of questions 
derived from case study protocol” (p. 90).  Thus, I expected each long interview in this 
study to consist of a single interview session lasting approximately two hours.  I 
estimated two hours to be the maximum amount of time a participant might be available 
for a single session and the length of time that an interviewer and participant could 
sustain attention to the topics at hand.  If I found that additional time was needed to 
obtain data from a participant, I allowed room for a long interview to be extended by 
conducting several interview sessions of approximately two hours over several days or 
weeks.  
Wolcott (1995) also raised two important points regarding fieldwork that relate to 
long interviews.  First, he expressed “doubt that any observer can sustain attention for 
any length of time” (p. 98).  Second, he warned, “Time itself does not guarantee quality 
fieldwork” (p. 126) and he suggested, “The best answers are not in response to questions 
of ‘how long’ measure in time, but to questions of purpose” (p. 128).  Thus, I rejected the 
notion that interview duration should be determined by a pre-set notion of time.  Instead, 
I considered optimum duration of an interview to be somewhere between the minimum 
length of time required to achieve the interview’s purpose (e.g., as guided by an interview 
protocol) and the maximum time that an interviewer and participant could reasonably 
sustain attention span.  If time required to achieve purpose of an interview exceeds 
attention span, then one or more follow-on interviews could be required to complete the 
long interview. 
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Hence, long interview was well-suited to the purpose of this qualitative, case 
study research, which sought to gain deep understanding from descriptions of public 
relations provided by NATO leaders with experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Length of 
these interviews ranged from one to two hours, which was sufficient time for participants 
to respond to questions and for me to record data needed to achieve the purpose of the 
interview.  No follow-on interviews were required.  
Elite Interviews 
I disagree with Dexter’s (1970) notion that an elite is anyone who requires special 
treatment during an interview.  As a qualitative researcher, I value the voices of all 
interview participants and believe each is entitled to equal rather than special treatment.  
The unique conditions under which elite interviews are conducted do, however, require 
careful consideration.  For instance, elite interviews often require less time than 
traditional interviews because elite participants may have little time to devote to 
interviews and may be unreceptive to or suspicious of the researcher (H. Rubin & I. 
Rubin, 1995).  I considered elites to be those senior NATO officials who possessed the 
type of specialized knowledge needed to explain how members of NATO’s dominant 
coalition made decisions about public relations management.  I allowed approximately 
one hour for each elite interview and conducted the interview in a setting chosen by the 
elite.  Actual length of each elite interview ranged from a minimum of one hour and five 
minutes to a maximum of two hours and 10 minutes. 
Focus Group Interviews 
Focus group interviews, often called group discussions, are yet another method 
that can be used to uncover thick description and deep meaning about complicated issues. 
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Like interviews, these methods rely on participants to express their views. However, 
unlike individual interviews, a researcher focuses attention in focus group interviews on 
interaction among participants rather than on individual responses (Bogdan & Biklen, 
2003; Morgan, 1997). Focus groups offer several advantages.  First, the format reduces 
researcher-provoked influence by shifting focus from dialogue between an interviewer 
and a participant to discussion among several group members.  Second, the focus on 
group interaction helps to overcome reductionism, which reduces a process or 
phenomenon to its individual parts and examines specific parts separately.  Third, focus 
groups produce large amounts of meaningful data, gathered from diverse perspectives, in 
a relatively short period of time. Three to 5 groups of between 6 and 10 participants are 
usually enough to reach data saturation within a single discussion lasting for a period of 2 
hours (Bogdan & Biklen; Morgan).   
Focus groups also have several weaknesses.  First, focus groups usually take place 
in unnatural settings (often in specially-designed settings, while being recorded).  Second, 
the expense and logistic challenges involved with recruiting and setting up a focus group 
can be daunting.  Third, focus group discussions are less structured than individual 
interviews. This lack of structure can reduce researcher-provoked bias and lead to 
unexpected discoveries but very often group interaction will energize and move 
discussions into areas that provide little data of interest to the researcher.  Bogdan and 
Biklen (2003) also observed that group discussions could suppress information, since 
“individuals may not share important experiences they have had because they are too 
embarrassed to share them in the group” (p. 101).   
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I found that a carefully designed moderator guide and use of appropriate 
moderating techniques, including strategic probes, enabled me to achieve the purpose of 
my focus group interviews without encountering problems described above.  Each focus 
group lasted approximately two hours. 
Participants 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) observed that “waves of subsequent sampling 
decisions” (p. 72) must follow a researcher’s choice of phenomenon, population, or case.  
These decisions involve questions of purpose, access, and recruiting methods.  Finding 
adequate answers to these questions becomes crucial to establishing the credibility of 
subsequent data analysis and dependability of the study (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994). Therefore, having chosen NATO as the focus of my study, I 
considered the study’s purpose and level of access to NATO before identifying sampling 
methods, recruiting techniques and participants.  My purpose in this study was to propose 
a model of ethical communication that extends the excellence theory and contributes to 
development of a global theory in public relations.  Achieving this study required 
understanding of how NATO leaders managed public relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
between 1995 and 1996.  This understanding required access to NATO leaders. 
Access 
Geertz (1973) alluded to the prerequisite importance of access in understanding 
social phenomena, regardless of the approach taken to observing the phenomena. 
One can stay … within a single, more or less bounded form, and circle steadily 
within it. One can move between forms in search of broader unities or informing 
contrasts.  One can even compare forms from different cultures…. But whatever 
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the level at which one operates … the guiding principle is the same: societies, like 
lives, contain their own interpretations. One has only to learn how to gain access 
to them. (p. 453) 
Gaining access to social phenomena – especially for prolonged periods of time – 
can become problematic, raise questions of personal or corporate privacy, require 
permissions, and involve treading on someone’s or some organization’s “home grounds” 
(Stake, 1995, p. 57).  Fortunately, NATO once served as my home ground; therefore, I 
was able to gain immediate and sustained access to current and former NATO leaders.  
This access was carried out through letters, e-mail messages, telephone conversations, 
and personal meetings.  I was also granted written authorization to obtain internal, 
unclassified NATO documents that helped to inform my research.  Still, I was left with 
questions of sample size and how many participants to recruit. 
Sampling 
This study valued depth of understanding over breadth of observation.  Given the 
qualitative nature of this study, I did not attempt to produce representative samples from 
which I could generalize.  Instead, I determined my sample size by estimating the 
minimum number needed to provide adequate coverage of phenomena related to this 
topic (Patton, 1990).  I estimated that 12 to 15 long interviews, 3 elite interviews and 3 
focus group interviews would be sufficient for my research purposes.  This estimate 
allowed for an increase in sample size and numbers of interviews in the event that 
coverage was later deemed inadequate.  I was also prepared to conduct follow-up 
interviews if required.  I used two types of non-probability sampling (Babbie, 1991; 
Broom & Dozier, 1990) procedures to identify potential participants for long, elite, and 
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focus group interviews: purposive (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Broom & Dozier, 1990; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Locke et al., 2000) and snowball (Broom & Dozier).   
First, I identified a purposive sample of military and civilian veterans with 
NATO, IFOR, or other alliance or coalition experience who might be qualified and 
willing to participate in individual and group interviews.  This sample was drawn 
primarily from official and personal records listing veterans with public affairs 
experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Having served with many of the interview candidates 
during my active duty service with the U.S. Navy, I had first-hand knowledge of the 
professional qualifications of several individuals.  From this sample, I screened and 
selected volunteers who met the “special needs” (Broom & Dozier, 1990, p. 123) of my 
research program.  Since interviews would be conducted in English, I required all 
interview participants to have good command of the English language.  I also established 
professional experience and knowledge criteria according to needs related to each 
interview method.  
Long interview criteria.  The long interview group was designed to represent 
public relations managers who advised senior leaders about public relations and 
communication.  Long interview participants needed to have at least six months of public 
relations management experience, knowledge of strategic planning, and at least three 
months of service in NATO or IFOR operations.  These periods equated to lengths of 
time required for a temporary duty assignment in a military operation and a normal tour 
of duty in a single public relations position – time that I felt was adequate to acquire 
essential experience and knowledge.   
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Elite interview criteria.  For the elite group, I sought senior military leaders who 
had been responsible for making organizational decisions, including decisions about 
public relations and communication.  To select volunteers, I relied on criteria that 
established executive-level or dominant coalition experience (e.g., chief executive or 
senior staff), knowledge of public relations management, and service in NATO or IFOR.  
I considered 20 to 30 years of military experience to be adequate for this criterion, since 
this time equated to an average length of service for senior, career military officers.  I 
also considered as adequate two years of NATO job-related service or six months of 
IFOR experience – the equivalent of a normal assignment with those organizations.   
Focus group criteria.  Focus groups were designed to include candidates who 
lived in or near the Washington, DC, area, possessed expert knowledge about my 
research topic; and demonstrated communication skills needed to contribute to group 
discussions.  In order to avoid response bias, I refrained from disclosing to participants 
my specific research agenda and research questions.  I did, however, provide a short 
overview of the case when screening potential participants and I described the study’s 
general nature during a briefing prior to and after each discussion.  I used selection 
criteria contained in a screening guide (Appendix D) to identify these participants.  These 
criteria included at least three months of experience in a multinational political-military 
operation, knowledge of public relations and communication management, and 
experience in military leadership and decision-making.  Because I wanted to use focus 
groups to discuss the ethical nature of my proposed communication model, I also needed 
focus group members who possessed knowledge of ethics and moral reasoning.  All 
candidates had to have good English-speaking skills; however, because of difficulties 
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associated with finding single individuals who fulfilled all of these criteria, I sought 
individuals who possessed many of these traits and tried to arrange groups that combined 
all traits. 
 Second, I used a snowball sampling technique (Broom & Dozier, 1990) to 
consider other qualified interview candidates.  By asking candidates in my sample to help 
me identify other potential interview participants I was able to expand my sample size.  
This technique, which was particularly helpful in focus group sampling, allowed me to 
identify interview candidates that were “seen by others as having influence in the social 
network on a specific issue” (p. 34). 
 In terms of sample size, I followed the principle of quality over quantity. 
Kvale (1996) noted: “Some qualitative interview studies appear to be designed on a 
quantitative presupposition – the more interviews, the more scientific. In contrast, the 
present approach emphasizes the quality rather than the quantity of the interviews” (p. 
103).  Hence, I designed sample sizes to produce a sufficient number of interview 
participants to “get at the characteristics of settings, events, and processes” (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 33) that I needed to understand the NATO case.   
I used Kvale’s (1996) criterion for determining adequacy in number of individual 
interviews in this qualitative study: “Interview as many subjects as necessary to find out 
what you need to know” (p. 101). This number also represents the upper range of what 
Kvale described as the current trend in interview studies. Based on the results of pre-tests, 
I determined that 12 to 15 long interviews and three elite interviews would be sufficient 
to find out what I needed to know.  For focus group sampling, I adhered to the criterion 
established by Morgan (1977), who regarded three focus groups as the minimum number 
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needed to fulfill goals for a single research project.  If I had failed to achieve redundancy 
of data with the given sample size, I would have continue interviewing until I achieved 
redundancy, as long as time and resources permitted (Patton, 1990). Fortunately, 
additional interviews were not required for this study.  With this sampling goal in mind, I 
began to recruit participants for my study. 
Recruiting and Participant Profiles 
 As expected, I was able to recruit a sufficient number of volunteers who were 
qualified and willing to participate in individual interviews.  For each type of interview, I 
was able to select participants from a large pool of prospects.  Recruiting procedures and 
participant profiles varied by interview method, which I will describe below. 
Long interviews.  I made initial contact with long interview candidates in my 
sample in person, by telephone or via e-mail.  I provided each candidate with an 
information briefing about my research project.  During this briefing, I clearly identified 
my role as a doctoral student and research investigator, provided each candidate with a 
brief summary of my research project and purpose, disclosed minimal risks associated 
with recording interviews and publishing reports, stressed the voluntary nature of 
participation, explained the qualifications I was seeking in interview volunteers, and 
requested an opportunity to interview them about their public affairs experiences with 
NATO or other multinational alliances.  Each of the 14 candidates agreed to an interview.  
I then followed up by telephone, e-mail, and letter to provide confirmation of interview 
dates and locations, a statement of my affiliation with the University of Maryland, a 
briefing on my research project, and an informed consent form for their signature.  All 
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candidates returned signed consent forms to me in person or by mail, verifying their 
willingness to participate in an interview. 
All interview volunteers possessed required language skills, knowledge of public 
relations management, and experience in NATO or IFOR.  As I have explained, this 
qualitative study did not seek to generalize or obtain a representative sample.  Instead, I 
sought to gain deep understanding of individual perspectives and make meaning of their 
experiences.  Still, given the cultural diversity found within the NATO alliance, I 
attempted to achieve variety among interview participants.  I intended to use this variety 
to explore possible differences in the way participants expressed public relations 
worldview or managed communication based on cultural or national identity.  Thus, I 
hoped heterogeneity among interview participants and inclusiveness of various 
worldviews would yield deeper understanding about how public relations operated in a 
multinational, political-military organization.  This technique is similar to a quota or 
dimensional sampling technique described by Broom and Dozier (1990), in that I 
attempted to produce a sample that reflected distribution of nationality – an important 
characteristic or strata of the NATO alliance.  However, I did not characterize this 
approach as quota or dimensional sampling in my research design; since I created an 
approximate rather than a precise distribution of nationality represented in the actual 
NATO population. 
Recruiting produced a group of long interview participants that varied by gender, 
military and civilian status, and nationality: 1 woman and 13 men; 9 U.S. citizens, 3 
Canadians, 1 Italian, and 1 British citizen; 7 active duty military public affairs officers, 3 
retired military public affairs officers serving in civilian political-military public affairs 
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positions, and 4 retired military public affairs officers serving as public relations 
managers in private firms or corporations.  Participants had from 3 years to more than 25 
years of public relations management experience.  Each had served from between 6 
months to 3 years in NATO or IFOR.  I conducted the interviews in English, either in 
person or by phone with participants who were located in Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and in the U.S. South Atlantic, North Central, and West regions.  Geographic regions of 
the United States described in this study are defined according to U.S. Census Bureau 
terminology.  
Elite interviews.  I contacted four elite candidates by telephone to determine their 
willingness to participate in an interview.  There was no reason to screen candidates for 
elite interviews since their qualifications were already established by historical records 
and by my first-hand knowledge of their roles in NATO’s deployment to Bosnia-
Herzegovina.   
All four elites agreed to be interviewed.  All were U.S. citizens, male, appeared to 
be Caucasian, and were senior military officers with experience in executive decision-
making – including decisions about public relations and choice of communication 
strategies and tactics for NATO’s forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two of the elites had 
served for at least five months as senior commanders of NATO’s peace forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The third elite had served for three years as an immediate assistant and 
advisor to a senior NATO staff officer; he spent one of those years with IFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The fourth elite had served for more than two years as a senior public 
relations advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe – the senior military officer 
in charge of NATO’s military forces in Europe.   
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I conducted two of the face-to-face interviews in English with elites at their 
homes in states within the U.S. South Atlantic region.  I conducted two other interviews 
in English by telephone with elites at their respective homes in a U.S. South Atlantic 
state. 
Focus group interviews.  Recruiting qualified participants for focus group 
interviews proved more difficult than recruiting for individual interviews.  Again, I was 
able to select from a large pool of qualified candidates; however, the coordination and 
logistics required to schedule a discussion involving up to 12 participants was more 
difficult than scheduling individual interviews.  Therefore, borrowing from Morgan 
(1997), I adopted procedures to manage this challenge and recruit sufficient numbers of 
focus group participants – or between 6 and 10 for each group. 
First, I recruited from a purposive sample that supported the needs of my 
research.  This allowed me to select participants from concentrated groups of civilian and 
military public relations managers who worked at military installations in Maryland, 
Virginia, and Washington, DC.  For each of the focus groups, I contacted a senior 
administrative official in U.S. Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Ft. Meade, MD; 
the U.S. departments of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the Pentagon, 
Washington, DC; and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, respectively.  To 
establish alternate locations for additional focus groups, should I have needed them, I 
also contacted military officials at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, and 
NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA.  I provided officials with a 
brief summary of my research project, which was similar to the briefings provided to 
long interview and elite interview candidates.  I then requested an opportunity to hold a 
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discussion group at their facility with willing employees who met the criteria for focus 
group interviews.  Officials at each location approved my requests and, based on logistics 
related to my move from Maryland to New York, I elected to pursue focus groups at 
DINFOS, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Military Academy – reserving the other locations 
for future research. 
After approving my requests, officials at the DINFOS, the Pentagon, and the U.S. 
Military Academy announced the focus group opportunity through an internal e-mail 
message and asked interested volunteers to contact me.  When prospective focus group 
participants contacted me, I used a screening guide (Appendix D) to verify qualifications 
(including English-speaking capability), confirm willingness to participate, and identify a 
mutually-convenient time and date for the focus group.  Generally, I used the telephone 
for initial communication with prospective focus group members.  Following this initial 
call, I usually followed up and coordinated details via e-mail.  I maintained a data base 
containing contact, scheduling, and demographic information for all prospects.  I used 
this information to generate follow-up messages, reminders prior to each focus group, 
and thank you messages immediately after each discussion. 
Second, I provided incentives to participate.  I scheduled focus groups during the 
middle of the day or early evening to accommodate the work schedules of participants.  I 
also supplied volunteers with a complimentary meal and soft beverages before 
discussions.  Light food and beverages were made available before discussions to 
minimize distractions once the focus group began.  Preceding focus groups with a meal 
afforded participants a chance to relax and socialize, which contributed to an atmosphere 
that became conducive to active and sustained dialogue.  Furthermore, the meal allowed 
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participants to treat the discussion as a “working” lunch or dinner, thus reducing impact 
on work schedules and inconvenience to volunteers.   
Since participants were generally mid-level to senior executives, I elected not to 
offer monetary incentives to participate.  Instead, during the recruiting phase, I appealed 
to the professionalism of prospective volunteers and identified intangible benefits 
associated with participation.  These benefits included the opportunity for participants to 
share their public affairs experience and knowledge with colleagues.  This proved to be 
an especially strong incentive for military public affairs officers who had recently 
returned from deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Middle East nations.  Having 
just served in NATO or U.S.-led coalition operations in those regions, these participants 
were eager to discuss lessons they had learned.  Following each discussion group, several 
members commented on the therapeutic sense of enjoyment and reward they felt while 
engaging their peers in discussions about topics of deep personal and professional 
interest.  Many volunteered on the spot to participate in similar discussions that might be 
held in the future. 
Third, I planned on a reasonable size for each group.  I estimated that the goal of 
6 to 10 participants in each focus group would be large enough to sustain an active 
discussion and reveal diverse perspectives yet small enough to allow each group member 
to contribute.  Based on Morgan’s (1997) suggestion, I designed my recruiting strategy to 
account for no-shows and attempted to recruit 20% more participants than needed for 
each group.  This strategy succeeded in meeting recruiting goals and producing focus 
groups of ideal size.  
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Fourth, I used a funnel approach as a compromise between structured and 
unstructured interview approaches.  I rejected a structured approach to discussions in 
favor of a more open-ended approach.  However, restraints on time, logistics and budget 
for this research limited the number of discussions I could schedule.  I would have 
preferred to schedule additional discussions, which would have been more conducive to a 
constant comparative approach to data collection and analysis (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998).  
A constant comparative approach would have allowed me to build on data collection and 
analysis from each discussion with more data collection and analysis from subsequent 
discussions. Still, I reserve this option for future research.  Using a funnel approach, I 
used increasingly structured approaches to interviewing in each consecutive group.  The 
first group, at DINFOS, discussed broad concepts of decision-making in public relations 
and communication management.  The second group, at the Pentagon, began to focus 
more on the model of communication proposed in this study.  The third group, enriched 
by the U.S. Military Academy faculty’s expertise in law, ethics, leadership, and 
philosophy – as well as public relations – focused on issues of moral theory and ethics 
associated with the proposed communication model. 
Finally, I attempted to segment rather than randomize participants in my focus 
groups.  This approach is often less difficult than trying to produce a random sample and 
segmentation helps produce a homogeneity in focus groups that facilitates data-rich 
discussion.  In this study, I segmented three groups of discussion members according to 
their military unit affiliation: one from the DINFOS, one from the Pentagon, and one 
from the U.S. Military Academy.  All members had good English language skills.  Other 
participant characteristics are described below. 
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The DINFOS focus group consisted of seven male participants, all U.S. citizens.   
Although qualified female candidates were identified through sampling, none volunteered 
for the focus group discussion.  Six of the participants appeared to be Caucasian and one 
appeared to be African-American.  All of the participants were experienced public 
relations specialists on active duty or retired from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and 
U.S. Air Force.  Five of the participants held or retired at senior military ranks – positions 
that indicated executive management responsibility, advance knowledge, and 
specialization in public relations.  The participants had between six months and seven 
years of professional experience serving in public relations management with NATO or 
similar multinational alliances and coalitions.   
One participant worked at a military command near DINFOS and another worked 
as a senior public relations executive for a defense contractor based at Ft. Meade. The 
other five participants worked as faculty or administrative staff at DINFOS.  Given the 
association between faculty and staff members at DINFOS, most participants knew each 
other.  The DINFOS employees also knew the other two participants on a professional 
basis.  The familiar relationship between participants contributed to an active discussion.  
DINFOS, a U.S. Department of Defense organization, is responsible for educating, 
training and sustaining “a corps of professional organizational communicators who fulfill 
the communication needs of military leaders and audiences” (U.S. Defense Information 
School, 2005).  Hence, the shared occupation and knowledge of the DINFOS group, all 
of whom were well-versed in public relations education and defense public affairs policy, 
contributed to a sustained discussion of public relations management in multinational 
alliances. 
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 The Pentagon focus group consisted of 12 U.S. military public affairs officers 
who were all U.S. citizens: 10 on active duty (including one who was completing an 
internship with a large, international public relations agency) and 2 retired from active 
duty but still working in private or government public relations practices.  Five of the 
participants were affiliated with special duty public affairs branches of the U.S. Army, 3 
with the U.S. Navy, 3 with the U.S. Air Force and 1 with the U.S. Marine Corps. Three 
participants were female and nine were male.  One appeared to be African-American and 
the others appeared to be Caucasian.  All were experienced in military public relations 
management.   Participants reported an average length of public relations experience in 
multinational alliance or coalition operations of between four months and seven years.  
Six participants had public relations management experience in NATO’s deployment to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina or nearby Kosovo and three had recently returned from public 
relations assignments in Afghanistan or Iraq.   
 To achieve homogeneity in the military service affiliation of participants, I had 
originally planned to conduct three focus groups in the Pentagon: one for Army officers, 
one for Navy and Marine Corps officers, and one for Air Force officers.  I incorporated 
this design factor into my planning based on the assumption that military service public 
affairs branches had their own, unique communication cultures and perspectives.  Hence, 
I attempted to combine participants in groups that shared similar cultures, in order to 
promote an active discussion.   
However, recruiting and scheduling three separate groups became problematic.  
First, I was unable to recruit sufficient numbers of participants to satisfy the requirements 
for three discussion groups.  Second, I was unable to identify three separate dates that 
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were convenient for all volunteers.  I managed this problem by combining focus group 
volunteers from all services into a single, Pentagon-based discussion.   
Since participants in the Pentagon discussion were recruited from different 
organizations, familiarity between participants was not as close as the familiarity 
observed among DINFOS focus group members.  Still, many participants knew of each 
other on a professional basis.  Subsequently, with regard to promoting an active 
discussion, I discovered that homogeneity in terms of military service affiliation was not 
so important a factor as homegeneity of public relations experience in multinational 
alliances and coalitions.   
Military services in the United States indeed have unique cultures that influence 
their approach to communication.  However, a joint service approach to multinational 
operations, which combines military services in a single operation, seems to have an 
acculturating affect on communication worldview.  Thus, Pentagon group members 
communicated actively, regardless of their service affiliation, and seemed to find 
common ground and many topics for discussion through their mutual, multinational, 
operational experiences. 
 The U.S. Military Academy focus group consisted of seven, male, U.S. military 
officers who were all U.S. citizens and appeared to be Caucasian.  All participants were 
serving on active duty with the U.S. Army on the academy staff or faculty – hence, most 
participants knew each other on a familiar or a professional basis.  One participant, who 
had more than eight years of public relations management experience, served in a 
military public affairs position.  His experience included one year working in an 
international, private-sector public relations agency.  Another participant was a member 
  186 
 
of the clergy, performing religious duties at the academy.  A third participant was 
responsible for strategic program planning and evaluation.  The remaining four 
participants were members of the academy’s faculty.  One of the faculty members was 
considered an expert in philosophy, and he held a senior position in the academic 
department that administered the academy’s courses in philosophy and ethics.  Another 
faculty member held a law degree, served as an assistant professor of law, and performed 
duties as an ethics counselor.    
All but one participant had experience in multinational, political-military 
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or other Middle Eastern 
and European countries.  Five participants stated that they often engaged in ethical 
decision-making.  Five claimed to have experience in managing or coordinating public 
affairs – a few times or often.  Two others stated that they rarely worked with public 
affairs.  One participant without multinational experience spent more than three years in 
military command positions that required extensive decision-making knowledge and 
skill.  He also had four years of experience in strategic planning and management.   
Procedures 
 For the data collection stage of this research, I followed procedures described by 
Kvale (1996) for interview investigation: thematizing, designing, interviewing and 
transcribing.  I have already described the procedures for formulating my research 
purpose and topic.  I have also discussed my research was designed to obtain 
understanding of the case under study.  I will now explain how I framed, pre-tested, and 
conducted interviews.  All interviews were conducted in English. 
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Interview Framework 
 I developed three interview guides, which identified topics and a contained a 
flexible sequence of questions, to provide a framework for interviews. Since interviews 
were designed to be semi-structured, interview guides contained suggested, open-ended 
questions and probes rather than a rigidly-constructed script.  These guides were designed 
to provide a framework that would produce data needed to answer my research questions.  
However, this framework was flexible enough to promote freedom of interaction between 
researcher and participant and empower participants to pursue their own interests – as 
well as interests of the interviewer.  Therefore, the interview design allowed some 
questions not contained in the guide to be posed during interviews, other questions that 
were contained in the guide to be skipped over or abbreviated, the sequence of questions 
to be altered in order to preserve the conversational quality of interviews, and the ability 
to pursue topics that had not been anticipated in research design.  Specific design features 
for each interview are described below. 
 Long interviews.  The guide for long interviews (Appendix A) began with a pre-
briefing that identified my role as a researcher, general purpose of the research project, 
plans for reporting results of the research, the voluntary nature of the interview, and 
policy of confidentiality for participants.  The pre-briefing also requested permission to 
audio tape the interview.  The first question and answer in the interview were intended to 
verify consent and permission to record the interview, which were recorded on tape as 
well as in writing.  The first three questions in the guide were intended as grand tour 
questions, or general questions designed to put the participant at ease, express my interest 
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in the participant’s background, establish rapport between me and the participant, and 
reveal the participant’s level of public relations experience.   
Subsequent questions introduced topics of interest to my research.  These topics 
were generally related to principles comprising the excellence theory in public relations.  
Questions were designed to elicit practical descriptions of a participant’s public relations 
experience that might be compared with these theoretical principles.  I took care to keep 
questions general, avoid theoretical terms that could be confusing, and eliminate 
language that might allow participants to perceive the intent of questions and thereby bias 
responses.  Follow-up questions and probes followed each question, and were intended 
for use in clarifying responses as time permitted.   
Questions concluded with an open-ended query that allowed participants to 
interject topics of interest that had not already been discussed or add to responses that 
they wanted to amplify.  Finally, the guide ended with a debriefing that thanked each 
participant for his or her participation, restated the purpose of the research project, and 
provided names and points of contact for the researchers in this project. 
Elite interviews.  Structure for the elite interview guide (Appendix B) was similar 
to that of the long interview guide.  Each guide began with a pre-briefing that identified 
the researcher, research purpose, reporting procedures, voluntary nature of the interview, 
policy of confidentiality, and a request for permission to conduct and audio tape the 
interview.  The guide began with grand tour questions; proceeded through introducing 
questions, follow-up questions, and probes; and concluded with an open-ended query and 
debriefing.  Since elite interviews were designed to produce understanding about how 
senior public relations managers and NATO leaders made communication choices, the 
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elite guide contained questions that related more to factors associated with decision-
making than to principles of the excellence theory.  Questions in the guide were also 
designed to promote descriptions of how conflict situations affected these decisions and 
how elites perceived coercive communication. 
Focus group interviews.  Structure for the focus group interview guide (Appendix 
C) was similar to that of the long and elite interview guides.  Since I have already 
explained the general structure of these guides, I will indicate here how the focus group 
guide differed from the other two guides.  First, the guide was designed to produce a 
discussion between participants rather than a conversation between interviewer and 
participants.  Therefore, I incorporated design features that would quickly shift attention 
from the interviewer to participants once the interview began, allowing me to withdraw 
somewhat from discussion and record observations.  These features included a much 
more comprehensive pre-briefing.  This pre-briefing elaborated on ground rules that were 
intended to put participants at ease, encourage turn-taking, explain the moderator’s role, 
and allow participants to comfortably discuss a wide range of topics.  Since group 
interviews involved up to 12 participants, the group discussion guide began with a single 
grand-tour question instead of several questions in order to make more efficient use of 
time.  Subsequent questions encouraged participants to define and discuss concepts of 
interest to this research.  The guide included probes, which were designed to stimulate 
group member participation if discussion lagged.   
Intended topics of discussion included definitions of public relations, importance 
of public relations managers in alliances, types of communication strategies employed by 
alliances, decision-making processes used to select communication strategies, influence 
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of conflict situations on these decisions, and application of ethics and moral reasoning in 
the decision-making process.  As in long and elite interviews, the group interview guide 
allowed discussions to take place beyond the scope of these topics of interest.  Before 
concluding, the guide called for participants to review and discuss the communication 
model proposed by this research program.  Following the review and discussion, the 
guide concluded with a final open-ended question and debriefing.   
Interview Pre-tests 
To ensure that these guides would operate as designed, I conducted three pre-tests 
before beginning formal interviews: one for long interviews, one for elite interviews, and 
one for focus group interviews.   
Long interview pre-test.  I conducted the long interview pre-test with a single 
participant at a large university in the South Atlantic region of the United States.  This 
participant was a male graduate student in communication who was serving on active 
duty in the U.S. military as a public affairs specialist.  The participant was well-versed in 
the practice and theories of public relations, management, and decision-making – 
concepts that were important to my research.  He was also experienced in multinational 
public relations, having served for several months with a NATO political-military 
operation in the Balkans region near Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The interview guide proved to 
be effective and efficient in generating valuable data that revealed how NATO managed 
public relations in an operational setting and allowed comparison of NATO 
communication management and principles of the excellence theory in public relations.  
Based on results of this pre-test, I made slight modifications to the phrasing and sequence 
of questions in the long interview guide.  
  191 
 
Elite interview pre-test.  I conducted a pre-test of the elite interview guide at a 
large university in the U.S. South Atlantic region with another male graduate student in 
communication.  This individual, like the long interview pre-test participant, was also an 
active duty U.S. military public affairs specialist with expert knowledge of public 
relations, management, and decision-making in practice and theory.  He, too, was 
experienced in NATO political-military operations in the Balkans region.  Furthermore, 
by virtue of his military role as a senior public relations manager, this participant was 
familiar with moral reasoning and executive decision-making processes.  The elite pre-
test revealed that my original guide was too long, the questions were too verbose, and the 
sequence of questions lacked a logical flow.  The revised model, which incorporated 
changes suggested by the pre-test participant, proved to be effective and efficient in 
producing meaningful data.   
Focus group pre-test.  I conducted one pre-test of the focus group moderator’s 
guide at my home in Annapolis, MD.  The pre-test group consisted of four individuals 
from the surrounding community: two male undergraduate students from the U.S. Naval 
Academy and two male businessmen who owned a telecommunication company in a 
mid-sized Maryland city.  The undergraduate students had completed course work in 
political science and media relations as well as military leadership and ethics courses that 
introduced them to moral reasoning and decision-making processes.  The businessmen 
had no military service but had experience managing contracts with U.S. military 
agencies.  They were knowledgeable and experienced in professional ethics, negotiation, 
management, and communication practices related to organization-client relationships.  
Although pre-test participants lacked intimate knowledge of and direct experience with 
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multinational political-military alliances, the focus group session produced a dialogue 
related to moral reasoning and ethics in decision-making.  Results of this pre-test led to 
minor refinement in wording and sequence of questions and a simplification of the 
proposed communication model that was presented to participants for review and 
discussion. 
Interview Procedures 
 Once I framed, pre-tested, and scheduled interviews I turned my attention to 
interview sessions.  I again relied on Kvale (1996) for guidance in this regard, using his 
six quality criteria for interviews which relate to: 
• Spontaneity, richness, specificity, and relevance of a participant’s answers. 
• Brevity of my questions and length of a participant’s answers. 
• Extent of my follow-up and clarification of a participant’s meaning. 
• Interpretation of meaning throughout the interview. 
• Verification of my interpretations of meaning during the interview. 
• Self-communication of the interview, or “a story contained in itself that hardly 
requires much extra descriptions and explanations” (p. 145). 
These criteria provided useful guidelines as I met with participants and conducted 
each interview.  First, I tried to schedule interviews at times and locations that would be 
convenient for participants, helping to put them at ease.  For long interviews (telephone 
and face-to-face), most participants preferred to be interviewed in the morning of 
afternoon in their home or office.  One participant in Europe preferred to be interviewed 
at home during the evening to avoid interruptions at work.  In all cases, the settings 
chosen for the interviews seemed to provide a relaxing atmosphere that promoted 
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spontaneity.  All elites preferred to be interviewed during the day: two from their homes 
and two from their offices.  Focus groups were held mid-day or early evening in office 
settings, to allow participants to combine discussions with a light meal – thus creating a 
relaxed, working lunch or working dinner environment that made for efficient use of 
participants’ time.   
Interviews were usually conducted in comfortable chairs, in a home dining or 
office conference room, seated around a table that allowed for good interaction and high 
quality of audio recording.  I placed audio-recording equipment close to me and away 
from participants to avoid a chilling effect on participants.  I also used a low-profile, 
omni-directional microphone in the center of the table to record interviews.  The 
unobtrusive nature of this arrangement seemed to put participants at ease and help them 
forget about the recording shortly after interviews began. 
 Second, I began each long, elite, and focus group interview with a brief period of 
informal conversation, asking participants off-topic questions about their personal or 
professional lives to establish a rapport before beginning the formal part of the research 
interview.  Since I am a former colleague of many of the participants, this warm-up 
period also provided an opportunity to reestablish communication with professional 
acquaintances.  During this time, I set up recording equipment as discretely as possible, 
positioned my protocol and note pads, and eased into the interview pre-briefing.  
Remaining aware of myself as an instrument of research, I used the pre-briefing as a 
means to transit from former colleague to current doctoral student and researcher – as 
well as to provide information about the interview.  I identified my formal role as an 
interviewer, explained the purpose of interviews, obtained informed consent, and adopted 
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a more formal yet non-threatening tone as I turned on the audio-recording equipment and 
began to ask questions in the interview guide.   
By distinguishing between my roles as colleague and researcher, I was able to 
benefit from my professional access to participants while at the same time using a formal 
research protocol to establish the type of critical distance needed for scientific 
observation (see Crane, 2000; Geertz, 1973; McCracken, 1988).  Also, by using short 
questions followed by pauses to begin the interviews, I was able to further distance 
myself from conversation, shift focus of the interview to the participant and add length to 
participants’ responses.  Thus, the balanced turn-taking associated with the opening 
social dialogue quickly settled into to an exchange of short questions from the 
interviewer followed by long answers for individual interviews and sustained discussions 
between focus group members.   
 Third, I used pauses, probes, and follow-up questions to encourage participants to 
elaborate when responses or discussion lagged and to clarify answers when I was unsure 
of a participant’s meaning.  The beginning phase of interviews and discussions were 
often awkward.  Beginning interviews with general, grand-tour questions helped to elicit 
responses from participants but these responses were often brief, colorless and irrelevant 
to my research topic.  I found that I had to participate much more actively in these early 
stages of interviews and focus groups.  As my questions and probes began to introduce 
topics of interest to the participants, answers and discussions became more active and I 
was able to retreat from dialogue and engage in observation.  Still, answers and 
discussions often strayed into areas that I had not anticipated.  These discursive journeys 
created opportunities for discovery; however, at times, they also confused or obscured 
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meaning.  Therefore, I occasionally used follow-up questions or probes to encourage 
participants to clarify their meaning without leading their responses.  Simple requests like 
“Could you explain?” or “Can you give me an example?” were usually enough to 
improve clarity.   
Fourth, I attempted to interpret meaning and verify my interpretation of meaning 
throughout each interview. Stake (1995) and Kvale (1995) influenced my approach to 
meaning and interpretation in this regard.  Kvale offered a post-modern view of 
knowledge as a social construction.  As a qualitative, constructivist scholar, I considered 
knowledge gained from interviews as being co-constructed by interviewer and 
participants.  However, Stake observed that the process of social co-construction can 
produce multiple meanings, which could confuse understanding and lead to 
misinterpretation.  Therefore, to encourage social construction of meaning and strive for 
accuracy of interpretation I used pauses liberally to allow participants to speak for 
themselves.  To interpret meaning and verify my interpretations of meaning during the 
interview I used probes, follow-up questions, and interpreting questions (Kvale, 1996) to 
encourage elaboration from participants.  I rephrased certain responses from participants 
and asked participants to verify that I had accurately interpreted their meaning. Questions 
that began with “What did you mean by….” often enhanced my interpretation of 
participants’ responses. 
Finally, as I will explain in the following section dedicated to description, 
analysis, and interpretation, I encouraged participants to speak in terms that would allow 
verbatim description – rather than paraphrasing – of participants’ words.  Again, pauses, 
probes, and follow-up questions produced long answers that were rich in data and very 
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quotable.  Thus, I empowered participants to use their own voice during interviews.  This 
enabled participants to tell their own story, construct their own meaning, and contribute 
to description and interpretation in research results.  
Interview Recording 
I decided to record interviews on audiotape and prepare transcripts of interviews 
as a way to support subsequent description, analysis, and interpretation of research 
results.  I realized when making this decision that recording and transcribing qualitative 
interviews become very personal choices that are subject to debate.  First, recording 
interviews can have a chilling effect on participants.  As I explained, I tried to manage 
and reduce this effect by using unobtrusive recording equipment.  Second, preserving and 
storing records of personal dialogue obtained during interviews have important ethical 
implications.  I established and adhered to procedures to protect the confidentiality of 
participants and personal data collected in this study.  These procedures were approved 
by my university’s institutional review board and agreed to by interview participants.  
Third, knowledge that audiotapes and transcriptions of interviews will be prepared 
alleviated some of the mechanical tasks associated with note taking during an interview, 
thereby allowing me to focus on observation, sense making, and interpretation during the 
interview.  In my pre-briefings, I informed participants that audio recordings would allow 
me to “concentrate on what you have to say in our discussion” and “ensure accuracy” of 
participants’ responses.   
The degree to which audio recordings and transcripts contribute to accuracy is 
debatable.  Kvale (1996) reported that transcripts are “artificial constructions from an oral 
to a written mode of communication.  Every transcription from one context to another 
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involves a series of judgments and decisions” (p. 163).  Poor-quality audio recordings 
and transcription errors (e.g., inaudible words or phrases and phonetic rather than literal 
spelling of unfamiliar names or other words) can lead to misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations.  Furthermore, audio and transcription records often fail to capture 
contextual clues that are needed to accurately interpret meaning.  Relying too much on 
textual analysis of artificial evidence in transcripts could conceal important, naturally-
occurring evidence contained in an interview participant’s voice that might be important 
to meaning (e.g., tone, pace, volume, pitch, inflection).  On the other hand, recordings 
and transcriptions could serve as redundant forms of memory.  I chose not to employ a 
note taker in my interviews in order to create a more intimate atmosphere and reduce the 
chilling effect that extra observers might create.  Hence, I assumed responsibility for note 
taking as well as facilitating each interview – tasks which can often distract from 
observation.   
Temporal distance between interviews and analysis influenced my understanding 
and interpretation of meanings expressed in interviews.  Passage of time affected my 
ability to recall important details and thus threatened credibility of data analysis.  I was 
moved to reflect on memory and remembering by reading about the experience of other 
authors in this regard. Conroy (2002), after writing an historical account of his 1966-1967 
collegiate basketball season, wrote: 
I have forced myself to consider the perilous and shifting nature of memory itself. 
There was a time in my life when I could replay these games in my head and 
remember, with astonishing precision…. As I aged, those details have faded 
almost completely and games float within the constellations that make up 
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memory, but with a ghostly pallor and the stick-figure movements of disembodied 
teammates lost in the streams of time. (p. 393) 
In terms of research method, Kvale (1996) referred to empathic listening and 
remembering as a recording technique, which can help uncover essential meaning during 
an interview.  However, Kvale – like Conroy – noted that relying on memory for 
subsequent interpretation and analysis is limited by “the rapid forgetting of details and 
the influence of selective memory” (Kvale, p. 161).   
Hence, I acknowledged that important responses, behaviors, or facts that occurred 
during an interview could be lost over time.  My decision about documenting interviews 
was influenced further by M. Gergen and K. Gergen’s (2000) description of this temporal 
phenomenon – or “vanishing subject matter” (p. 1039) – and their warning that some data 
might not remain stable over time: 
With global proliferation of communication technologies in particular, processes 
of meaning making are also accelerated.  Values, attitudes, and opinions are all 
subject to rapid fluctuation, and with them patterns of related action.  In effect, the 
temporal relevance of a research study is increasingly circumscribed, and the half-
life of cultural analysis increasingly shortened.  (p. 1040) 
Therefore, I decided to record and create transcriptions of each interview rather 
than risk losing important subject matter that would be crucial to subsequent analysis.   I 
recognized risks associated with recording and transcribing interviews and chose to 
manage them instead of avoid them. First, I took great care to achieve a high quality of 
audio recording.  Rather than relying on a small, portable audiocassette recorder with 
built-in condenser microphone I opted for higher-quality recording equipment.  I relied 
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on a portable recorder as a back-up system but used as my primary means of recording a 
transcription deck with a remote, boundary microphone designed to pick up sounds 
throughout an interview room.  Second, I employed professional transcribers to produce a 
print record of most interviews.  Third, I reviewed each transcript and used my personal 
notes or a replay of the audio record to ensure accuracy of transcriptions.  Finally, if I had 
doubts about the accuracy of a transcribed response, I contacted the interview participant 
associated with that response to verify accuracy of the report.  Of the 21 interviews 
conducted, I had to initiate follow-up contact with participants for clarification purposes 
fewer than 5 times.   
I also recorded field notes of my observations in the form of observer comments 
as a means to add context to responses and discussions.  These notes took the form of 
memos or short summaries prior to beginning interviews, observer comments during 
interviews, and summary statements that were written immediately following interviews 
to avoid problems with recall and vanishing subject matter.  Silverman (2001) 
underscored the importance of context in conversation when he wrote, “A speaker’s 
action is context-shaped” (p. 167).  Thus, I acknowledged that the sequence of 
conversation in my interviews could not be understood apart from the context of the 
actual conversation.  Furthermore, as I have already explained, my notes helped to 
validate accuracy of audio recordings and transcriptions of interviews.  Hence, I relied on 
field notes and summary memos to record my observations and initial interpretations of 
aspects of the physical setting in which interviews took place; non-verbal 
communication, demeanor of participants, my demeanor, and thematic patterns that were 
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beginning to emerge during interviews; and other contextual clues that would support 
interpretation of meanings conveyed through these interviews. 
Other Research Design Considerations 
Description, Analysis, and Interpretation 
 I used a deductive, code and retrieve process described by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) to search data from interviews.  This process relied on a common coding scheme 
(Appendix E) to categorize themes identified during interviews and data analysis.  This 
scheme was designed to identify and group themes according to principles of the 
excellence theory in public relations. This coding scheme helped to uncover NATO 
communication activities associated with application of the excellence theory to IFOR’s 
public relations programs. Using this scheme, I first categorized data according to four 
levels of analysis used by J. Grunig (1992a) in studies of public relations excellence: 
program, department, organization, and results.  I then analyzed data to determine how 
specific characteristics of the excellence theory might relate to the practices described by 
participants.  In addition, I searched for descriptions of processes and emergence of 
contextual clues that might provide insight and enhance understanding of the data.  I also 
incorporated enough flexibility to allow for development of new categories as themes, 
patterns, or implications emerged from my analysis that my scheme did not account for.   
In the reporting section of this study, I adopted Wolcott’s (1994) approach to 
description, analysis, and interpretation, which he described as a proportion or “D-A-I 
Formula” (p. 48).  I defined these terms according to Wolcott: 
Description addresses the question, “What is going on here?”  Data consist of  
observations made by the researcher and/or reported to the researcher by others. 
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Analysis addresses the identification of essential features and the systematic  
description of interrelationships among them – in short, how things work.  In  
terms of stated objectives, analysis also may be employed evaluatively to address  
questions of why a system is not working or how it might be made to work  
“better.” 
Interpretation addresses processual questions of meanings and contexts: “How  
does it all mean?” “What is to be made of it all?” (p. 12) 
From this perspective, I used description to organize and report data as close to its 
original form as possible (e.g., reporting verbatim responses rather than paraphrasing 
participants’ words when feasible).  I followed description with analysis, transforming 
data through a logical process that relied on systematic reasoning.  Reasoning identified 
key factors, patterns, and themes among data – and their interrelationships – that helped 
construct meaning.  I then interpreted the results of this description and analysis, 
attempting to achieve a deeper understanding about what data meant.  This interpretation 
followed a constructivist tradition described by Denzin (1998). In keeping with this 
tradition, I incorporated three different interview methods to construct criteria for 
trustworthiness: “credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability” (p. 330). 
Although these different methods may not have been distinct enough to achieve 
triangulation, my efforts to employ various strategies to collect data from public relations 
managers, from elite decision makers, and from subject matter experts with experience in 
multinational alliances did achieve what Denzin described as the equivalents of validity, 
reliability, and objectivity in a qualitative study. 
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To fulfill these criteria and achieve trustworthiness in my study, I provided 
enough description (e.g., direct quotes) from interviews that readers of my report would 
be able to view, make sense of, and interpret original data.  I organized data into a 
framework that relates directly to a coding scheme derived from principles of the 
excellence theory and theories of moral reasoning. Description and analysis became 
critical means of achieving trustworthiness in this study but neither one can stand alone 
without interpretation.  Since meaning derived from qualitative interviews is often 
situated in context and influenced by the researcher, interpretation became critically 
important to results of this study.  Hodder (1998) warned that analysis and interpretation 
of these data could become problematic.  Hodder observed that during interviews “‘what 
people say’ is often very different from ‘what people do.’” (p. 113).  Thus, to enhance the 
accuracy of meaning and interpretation, I attempted to use interview techniques (e.g., 
probes, follow-up questions, interpreting questions) and ample reporting of speaker’s 
voices and naturally-occurring phenomena to ensure that the meaning of participants was 
properly described and contextualized.  I also used three different interview methods to 
support credibility of results, which I will explain next. 
Credibility 
The interview methods in this study contributed to credibility of results (Flick, 
1992; Huberman & Miles, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990; Stake, 1995).  
Multi-method approaches associated with qualitative research help to achieve a more 
accurate fix on meaning of data. This complementary approach helps manage strengths 
and weaknesses of each interview method, which in this study subsequently increased 
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credibility of results by reducing the likelihood of misinterpreting qualitative 
observations.  
Ethical Issues 
Locke et al. (2000) constructed three areas of importance to the ethical conduct of 
research: process, writing, and publication (pp. 27-40).  I found this construction to be a 
useful framework for ethical conduct of my own research, which adhered to the following 
processes. 
First, I made reasonable efforts to protect participants from potential harm.  I 
provided a plan to fulfill ethical requirements of research and gained institutional review 
board approval to conduct research involving human participants before beginning this 
study.   This plan acknowledged that inadvertent release of sensitive or proprietary 
information discussed during interviews could negatively affect the personal or 
professional lives of participants.   Therefore, I incorporated procedures to maintain 
confidentiality of participants’ identities.   
For long and elite interviews, I referred only to a participant’s rank, first name, or 
nickname when recording interviews and I used initials to identify participants when 
transcribing interviews.  When reporting results (e.g., publishing direct quotes), I did not 
associate names with direct quotes.  Instead, I attributed quotes to a participant’s generic 
title or role in an organization so readers would be unable to narrow the field and 
accurately identify a participant.   
For focus groups, I referred only to a participant’s rank, first name, or nickname 
when recording discussions.  In transcripts, I identified by name any remarks made by the 
focus group moderator.  I also identified by first name remarks by participants whose 
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voices were recognized from the personal introductions that began each discussion.  I was 
also able to identify some participant’s remarks from observer comments that I recorded 
during discussions.  For instance, I noted when a focus group participant’s identity was 
important to the context of his or her remark (e.g., when a participant’s duties, 
background, or experience were relevant to a discussion).  At times, participants also 
identified speakers heard on a recording of discussions.  Transcriptions of remarks by 
unidentifiable participants were kept anonymous.  When reporting results (e.g., 
publishing direct quotes) of focus groups, I followed procedures similar to those used for 
long and elite interviews.  I did not associate names with direct quotes.  Instead, I 
attributed quotes to generic titles or roles to protect participants’ identities.   
I also took care during organization of focus groups to send individual messages 
to participants in order to prevent someone from using a mass-mailed distribution list to 
identify members of a group.  In accordance with institutional review board guidelines, I 
protected information collected during interviews by storing data in containers or 
personal computers that were under my direct control or guarded by passwords required 
to gain access.   
Second, I disclosed my intent, identity, self-interests, and potential biases.  Kvale 
(1996) encouraged scholars to reflect on how a “researcher’s role” (p. 120) could affect a 
study.  Kvale reflected specifically on how a researcher could ensure independence in a 
study, counteract the influence of a research sponsor and lose critical perspective by 
identifying too closely with participants.  I identified closely with Kvale’s suggestions, 
given the close association between my former role as a NATO public relations manager 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and my role as a researcher investigating this topic.  I explained 
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to participants that I did not want to rely on my own recollections of NATO public 
relations activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Rather, I intended to depend on the meaning 
their lived experiences, as described during interviews, to make meaning of NATO 
public relations in the Balkans.  Occasionally, during an interview, a participant who had 
been a former colleague of mine in Bosnia-Herzegovina found it awkward to explain 
public relations activities that he or she knew I had knowledge of.  At those times, I 
restated my research purpose, reminded the participant of my role as a researcher, and 
encouraged the participant to disclose information that he or she thought would be of 
interest to readers of this research report.   
Thus, I acknowledged my dual roles, declared self-interests in this research topic, 
and disclosed potential biases.  However, I managed risks associated with self-interest 
and bias by incorporating sampling, interviewing, and reflexive writing techniques that 
helped maintain critical distance between me and my participants.  I used snowball 
sampling to help me “avoid or counteract overidentification” (Kvale, 1996, p. 120) with 
participants.  By relying on others to identify participants in this study, I was able to 
interview several individuals with whom I had not previously identified.  I also recorded 
field notes during interviews and made comments in memos before or after interviews 
that disclosed my disposition toward participants or the disposition of participants toward 
me.  Using a reflexive approach to interviewing and writing, I then adjusted methods or 
acknowledged potential biases when writing reports to preserve critical distance and 
protect the independence of my observations. 
Third, I used honest means to access samples.  As I explained in my sampling 
section, I gained access to purposeful samples by making official telephone calls, writing 
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letters, or sending e-mail messages that disclosed my purpose and identity.  I obtained 
written permission (e.g., by letter or e-mail as well as consent forms) to conduct 
interviews and to use official NATO records that might have been shared with me by 
participants.   
Fourth, I took great care to avoid coercing participants or even creating the 
appearance of coercion and I obtained informed consent from each participant.  In each 
communication, when arranging and beginning interviews, I reminded participants orally 
and in writing that interviews were voluntary, that they could decline to answer 
questions, and that they could withdraw from the interviews at any time without penalty.  
This procedure is documented in protocols used during interviews and in informed 
consent forms signed by each participant. 
Fifth, I allowed reciprocity or mutual control between the researcher and 
participants.  I worked with each participant to find mutually-convenient times and 
locations for interviews.  I used a semi-structured interview guide to allow participants to 
share control of interviews and address topics that participants felt were important.  I 
allowed participants to have access to my research results – and have invited some to 
clarify data collected during interviews.  I also provided each participant with points of 
contact for me and the primary investigator of this research, in the event participants have 
questions about the research or would like copies of the final report. 
Finally, through ethical writing in my research report, I made every effort to avoid 
plagiarism; present all relevant facts known to me; discuss or report credibly the results 
of my study; and allow readers to gain access to data, interpret results, and replicate my 
study.  In the future, I will also adhere to ethical rules of publishing results from this 
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study, which prohibit me from submitting articles to more than one publication at a time 
and require me to conduct a thorough analysis of completed research.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 I begin this chapter with an explanation of two purposes.  First, my purpose in 
embarking upon this research project was to propose a model of ethical communication 
that extends the excellence theory and contributes to the development of a global theory 
in public relations.  To fulfill this purpose, I studied and collected data that might explain 
how NATO applied principles of the excellence theory to its peace operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996.  Reaching an understanding NATO’s public relations 
behavior in Bosnia-Herzegovina – and the ethical nature of this behavior – was essential 
to fulfilling my overall research purpose.   
Second, my purpose in this chapter is to report and summarize results of data-
collection efforts during each stage of the interview process.  I will present data collected 
in chronological order of the methods that were conducted in this study (long, elite, and 
focus group interview).  This strategic order has been found to be an efficient way to 
present data (Wolcott, 1994).  Also, presenting data in this order will help the reader 
understand how data evolved over time in a systematic, flexible, continuous, and iterative 
collection process – important characteristics of qualitative research (H. Rubin & I. 
Rubin, 1995).  This chapter begins what Wolcott (1994) referred to as transforming 
qualitative data, which focuses on “using data rather than … gathering data” (p. 1).  I will 
transform data through a process of description, analysis, and interpretation that I 
borrowed from Wolcott and defined in Chapter III.  
The description represented in this chapter begins the process of understanding 
data.  Description will consist of comments reported to me by interview participants.  I 
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will also begin a descriptive phase of analysis in this chapter.  As I report results, I will 
identify essential features, concepts, and interrelationships among participants’ comments 
that might suggest important themes or patterns – or the “how things work” part of 
analysis that Wolcott (1994, p. 12) addressed.  I will conclude data transformation and 
attempt to reach understanding in Chapter V.  There, I will employ an evaluative form of 
analysis, which will suggest why NATO managed communication and public relations in 
ways described by participants.  Finally, I use discussion, analysis, and interpretation in 
the final chapter to reach understanding of research results and address how NATO might 
utilize the proposed model of communication to improve communication programs.   
Wolcott (1994) contended that a researcher should adjust the proportion of 
description, analysis, and interpretation in a study to fit the needs of a research project.  
As I explained in Chapter III, I have tried to add credibility to this study by empowering 
interview participants to describe results in their own voice and allowing readers of this 
study to have deep access to these descriptions.   
Furthermore, I have added my own voice to some but not all descriptions by 
presenting the reader with interviewer questions – and even observer comments – as well 
as participant responses.  I do so not to distract the reader’s focus from the participant or 
draw attention to my role as a researcher.  Instead, I intend to give a more active voice to 
what Hodder (1998) described as the “mute evidence” (p. 110) of texts and other written 
artifacts.  Hodder warned that meaning made from textual sources that lack context could 
be misunderstood.  Thus, context becomes important to the writing, reading, and 
interpretation of qualitative descriptions: 
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Somehow it is assumed that words get us closer to minds.  But as Derrida [1978] 
has shown, meaning does not reside in a text but in the writing and reading of it.  
As the text is reread in different contexts it is given new meanings, often 
contradictory and always socially embedded. (p. 111) 
I posit that it is also important to describe certain portions of qualitative 
interviews as conversation or dialogue rather than present faceless, isolated quotes that 
spring from the page like a chain of paper dolls cut from blank paper.  In a sense, 
“conversation is the primary medium through which social action takes place” 
(Silverman, 2001, p. 160).  Qualitative interviews represent social action: an exchange 
between an interviewer and his or her participants.  Therefore, describing some accounts 
in the conversational form of questions and answers – or turn taking – more accurately 
reconstructs the lived experience and social nature of an interview than do single voices.  
This spontaneity also provides additional context to the writing, reading, and 
interpretation of an interview account. Finally, since “a speaker’s action is context-
shaped” (p. 167), the sequence of talk cannot be understood apart from the context of the 
conversation. 
Hence, I have designed this chapter and the overall transformation of data to 
emphasize description over analysis and interpretation.  In so doing, I followed Wolcott’s 
(1994) advice by 
• Distancing myself from the research setting in order to communicate directly 
with readers. 
• Using direct quotes to report and describe, allowing interview participants to 
reveal data in their own words. 
  211 
 
• Empowering readers to use the description in this chapter to support their own 
analyses and interpretations of meaning derived from data collected in this study. 
I acknowledge, however, that the conventional form of this report does not permit me to 
describe all data collected from interviews.  Therefore, I will rely on my own perceptions 
and judgment to select and report data that I think contribute most to fulfilling the 
purpose of this research.   
I have attempted to protect this report from the potential effect of my own biases 
by describing data in sufficient breadth and depth to permit readers to arrive at their own 
conclusions.  I will also become the storyteller described by Wolcott (1994), grounding 
my description in the “observed experience” related by interview participants (p. 17).  
Finally, I will fulfill the role of Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000) qualitative researcher as a 
bricoleur, piecing together quilt-like patches of experience described by participants that 
reveal a pattern of meaning. 
Overview of Results 
To support my research purpose, I first sought to gain a deep understanding of 
how NATO managed strategic public relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  To achieve this 
understanding I used long interviews with NATO officials to produce descriptions of 
NATO’s public relations activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Data revealed by descriptions 
suggested that NATO applied principles of the excellence theory to its public relations 
programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a few exceptions (RQ1).  However, NATO’s use 
of coercive communication was identified as being among exceptions to symmetrical 
communication represented in the excellence theory.   
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Interviews also revealed that the multinational nature of NATO’s alliance of 26 
countries influenced NATO’s approach to communication and public relations 
management (RQ2).  Interviews produced data that uncovered how NATO based the 
alliance’s public relations programs on a dominant worldview of public relations yet co-
mingled various cultures and public relations worldviews within the alliance.  This 
discovery led to an examination of generic principles of global public relations, which 
were found to exist within NATO’s public relations programs (RQ3).   
These results raised important questions about how variables such as culture and 
environmental settings might influence NATO’s management of communication and 
public relations.  I found, just as culture influenced communication in NATO, that 
existing or potential conflict in NATO’s operating environment influenced NATO’s 
choice of communication strategies (RQ4).   
Elite and focus group interviews then produced data that suggested NATO leaders 
used an informal system of moral reasoning to make decisions and to judge the ethical 
nature of their communication choices.  However, they identified no formal framework 
for incorporating ethics in these decisions (RQ5).  Furthermore, senior NATO leaders 
were cognizant of the consequences associated with coercive communication.  Still, they 
seemed to follow an informal and internal cognitive process based on military training, 
experience, and intuition rather than a formal process when considering these 
consequences (RQ6).  Participants also responded favorably – with some reservations – 
when presented with the proposed model of communication as an external, moral 
framework to guide formal incorporation of ethics in communication decisions.  In the 
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following paragraphs, I will describe and elaborate on these results as they relate to each 
research question. 
The Excellence Theory in Public Relations 
Long interviews produced data that helped explain how NATO managed 
communication and public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Descriptions by 
interview participants of NATO’s public relations activities were consistent with 
principles from the excellence theory – with few exceptions.  This section represents the 
bulk of reporting on results of this study, given the 21 excellence principles and 
dimensions of those principles that will be reported on.  First, at the program level, 
NATO public relations programs were managed strategically.   
Second, at the department level, NATO public relations offices were generally 
described as single or integrated departments, which were separate from marketing 
functions.  NATO assigned senior public relations managers to head these departments.  
These managers reported directly to senior management and usually practiced a two-way 
symmetrical model of communication.  Public relations managers and their staff exhibited 
potential for excellent public relations.  This potential was demonstrated by NATO 
public relations managers who possessed decades of experience in public relations, expert 
knowledge of leadership and management, and advanced degrees in communication-
related fields.  Interviews produced scarce evidence of NATO officials who had 
theoretical knowledge of the symmetrical model in communication; however, managers 
and technicians did use two-way symmetrical communication in their public relations 
programs.   
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NATO public relations personnel also exhibited professionalism.  All were 
members of professional military organizations.  United States and Canadian citizens 
who participated in NATO were also members of an elite cadre of military public 
relations specialists who had acquired advanced communication skills and adhered to an 
ethical code of conduct.  NATO public relations managers and many of their staff also 
benefited from extensive training and education in public relations.  Some evidence did 
emerge to suggest that NATO provided equal opportunity for men and women in public 
relations.  A few NATO nations (e.g., the United States) adopted programs to admit 
women into military specialties like public affairs in greater numbers than had existed in 
past decades.  Also, women who had served in senior NATO public relations 
management roles were represented along with men in long and focus group interviews, 
albeit in proportions that were less than representative of the military population.  Still, 
participants engaged in little discussion about this principle; therefore, data were 
inconclusive with respect to gender equality.   
Third, at the organizational level, NATO seemed to have adopted a two-way 
symmetrical worldview of public relations.  Responses from interview participants 
consistently described NATO’s efforts to manage communications in ways that would 
contribute to strong, long-term, collaborative relationships with key publics.  However, 
NATO sometimes departed from the two-symmetrical communication model when using 
coercive communication to manage external threats.  Data also suggested that some 
nations within the NATO alliance held worldviews of public relations other than two-way 
symmetrical.  Still, data supported the notion that NATO adhered to the two-way 
symmetrical model as a dominant worldview of public relations.  NATO public relations 
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managers also exercised power in or with the dominant coalition of senior leaders.  In 
addition to having direct access to these leaders, NATO public relations managers 
provided advice and counsel that influenced NATO’s strategic decisions about 
communication programs, strategies, and tactics.   
Data about organizational culture and internal communication systems were 
inconclusive.  In general, interview participants described a NATO alliance that was 
authoritarian rather than participative – perhaps because of the political nature of the 
organization.  Internal communication systems seemed to vary from one NATO military 
command to another, which might reflect the influence of individual leadership in these 
sub-organizations of NATO.  The large-scale, highly complex structure of NATO 
described by participants most closely resembled the mixed mechanical/organic 
organizational model described by Dozier and L. Grunig (1992).  Finally, in terms of 
organization, NATO clearly operated in a turbulent, complex environment.  Participants 
often described NATO settings that were filled with physical threats – some lethal – and 
political pressure from external publics.   
 Fourth, participants often described public relations programs that met 
communication objectives established by NATO.  These public relations outcomes 
clearly contributed to a reduction in costs associated with NATO operations: reduced 
political pressure, international litigation, and combat fatalities or injuries to personnel.  
Finally, most participants expressed high job satisfaction with their professional role in 
NATO public relations and described NATO public relations departments that enjoyed 
high morale among leaders, managers, and employees. 
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I will now describe these data in more detail and provide descriptive examples 
that support subsequent analysis and interpretation.  I will enrich descriptions provided 
by participants with my own observations, which provide readers with important 
contextual details that are essential to sense making.  These observations were recorded 
in memories, documented in field notes, and substantiated by careful review of 
audiotapes and transcripts.  When presenting data related to the first research question, I 
will follow the framework for public relations program, organization, department, and 
effects established for the excellence theory principles and illustrated in Table 2, Chapter 
II.    
RQ1: Which principles of the excellence theory in public relations did NATO apply to its 
public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996? 
 Program level.  Accounts of NATO’s communication programs from interview 
participants described a variety of behaviors related to strategic public relations 
management.  Many of these accounts were consistent with the definition of strategic 
public relations management provided by J. Grunig and Repper (1992), which addressed 
how organizational strategies are developed to align and balance internal activities with 
external conditions.  A U.S. military public affairs officer, who was familiar with the 
excellence theory in public relations, discussed how IFOR’s public relations activities 
were aligned with NATO’s overall organizational priorities.  This alignment and 
balancing helped to produce a strategic public relations plan for the peace operation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He also referred throughout his description to strategic 
management functions such as planning, evaluation, and reprogramming: 
  217 
 
I think one of the great things that happened … in Bosnia was that the public 
information strategy was aligned with the command priorities….  We aligned the 
public information priorities with the command priorities: priorities to priority, 
strategy to strategy. 
The officer, who I observed trying to recall theoretical terms from his graduate education 
in public relations, continued: 
There was enough time to refine the plan before we went in.  I mean there was a 
lot of … activity and planning before IFOR went in [to Bosnia-Herzegovina], and 
that was good … it gave people time to figure out what they wanted to do and the 
communications people came along … they weren’t shut out.   
 A former IFOR commander, during an elite interview, provided a similar account of 
strategic planning, the central role of public relations in the organization, and the 
alignment of internal organizational functions with public relations.  Here, the 
commander acknowledged that public relations in IFOR was elevated to a strategic, 
command function rather than relegated to a staff function: 
 A commanding officer [is] responsible for everything that goes on in his 
 command and, in that regard, I felt that I was personally responsible to ensure that 
 we had … a proactive public relations and public affairs campaign – and a staff 
 that understood the importance of public affairs. 
 Several other interview participants mentioned specific behaviors that suggested 
defining characteristics of the behavioral molecule in strategic public relations 
management (J. Grunig, 2003; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; J. Grunig & Repper, 1992).  For 
instance, NATO public relations managers often talked about a responsibility to detect or 
  218 
 
stay informed about activities inside and outside of the NATO or IFOR organization. 
They would then decide which activities represented problems that might require them to 
inform senior leaders and plan a response.   One U.S. officer who served in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a senior NATO public relations manager related a story about how he 
relied on NATO intelligence and operations officers to keep him informed of potential 
problems.  
“The S3 Officer, which is operations,” recalled the officer, “would very often stop 
by and see me, give me a call, or whatever … [to] make sure I knew what was going on 
in the theater [of NATO operations] because, if he didn’t, he’d be called to task by the 
commander.”  This same officer then related how he would construct or think about the 
problem at hand and begin to consider various solutions to the problem: 
I was kept fully informed about what was going on and then could help decide – 
or decide – what was put out at a daily press conference, if we were putting out a 
press release that, you know, we were initiating [an] interview or offering 
interviews on a particular subject.  So, yeah, I would say that as the head of public 
information I was kept fully informed. 
Another NATO officer serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina observed senior leaders 
and their public relations managers engaging in environmental scanning.  This process 
involved collecting information directly from journalists – rather than relying on analysis 
of news reports – as a means to quickly detect and analyze emerging problems and issues 
within the IFOR operating environment:  “Admiral [Name of IFOR commander] and 
later his successor … did on a number of occasions have a media breakfast – a breakfast 
with invited journalists, in order to sound out their opinions.”  He added that this 
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information was valuable to the IFOR commander, who wanted to “see what they thought 
of the operation, and where we were going, and whether we were moving in the right 
direction.”  Finally, in a possible reference to scanning the environment for emerging 
issues, this officer explained that the commander liked hearing from journalists directly, 
because “he valued external opinions, as well as … what you might describe as non-
military opinions.” 
 Through an elite interview with the IFOR commander quoted in the previous 
paragraph, I was able to gather evidence confirming this account.  The ability to gain 
insight into the meanings of both officers through a coorientation approach (J. Grunig & 
L. Grunig, 2001; J. Grunig & Hon, 1999) added credibility to these reports and to the data 
that emerged from them.  According to the commander, IFOR adopted a proactive 
approach to media relations.   
 By proactive I … mean that we didn’t turn down interviews, we didn’t try to hide 
 from the press. We understood that the press was going to be there [in Sarajevo] 
 when we got there, they had been there … they probably knew more than we did 
 about what the hell was going on. 
In the following excerpt, the admiral also described a symmetrical approach to 
communicating with media, an approach based on mutual needs and an equitable 
exchange of information rather than an asymmetrical or one-way approach:  
 So what I intended to do was to try to not co-opt the press, but be available to the 
 press and make them aware of our availability….  So … they would come to 
 either the public relations … officer, me, or other responsible individuals in the 
 organization, ask bona fide questions, and get honest answers. 
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A senior U.S. military public affairs officer, who served in NATO’s Atlantic 
region, provided an account that suggested how NATO considered and defined how to 
put communication alternatives into action.  This officer also alluded to the importance of 
identifying, prioritizing, and considering the needs of key audiences – another feature of 
strategic public relations management: 
Well, we consider what the message is, and what we are trying to convey; and 
also what the needs of each audience is.  With 19 nations involved, many of our 
products need to consider that in order for a given article or press release to 
appear in a given country, generally you have to have some tie to the country.   
Another NATO officer provided an especially vivid description of how he and 
senior leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina would interact during meetings to select and 
confirm communication options based on an evaluation of potential outcomes and 
consequences: 
U.S. Officer: Yeah … not to have an inflated ego or anything, but I think the 
advice that I was able to give in these, these meetings would always be well, if 
you do that here are possible public information implications….  You know, how 
is it going to play in the press?  That was just one factor that the commander had 
to consider, but I was always asked.  You know, what do you think?  If we do 
such and such, you know, if we have a meeting with Madame Plavsic [Biljana 
Plavsic, former president of the Bosnian-Serb republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. 
Interviewer: Plavsic, yeah. 
U.S. Officer: Plavsic. 
Interviewer: Biljana Plavsic?  
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[OC: Tape One, Side A ends.  Recorder stops.  Interviewer suspends interview, 
changes sides of tape, and restarts interview.] 
U.S. Officer: Yeah, so I was saying the decision … you know … if we are going 
to have a meeting with her who should come?  Should we let the press know that 
we are doing it?  You know, what are the implications and how is this going to 
play in the Serbian press or the Croatian or the Muslin press, or what have you.  
So … I won’t say decisions were changed; it was just always a factor.   
Interviewer: Right. 
[OC: Interviewer uses a verbal pause to let officer continue his train of thought.] 
U.S. Officer: The commander always wanted to know … “What do you think 
will happen with this? Should we announce it ahead of time?  Should we 
announce it afterwards?  Should we do interviews after … meeting?  What do you 
think the person we are meeting with is going to say about the meeting 
afterwards?  Should we keep it secret, private?” 
After behaving – or implementing communication plans – NATO officers 
evaluated the results of communication activities before continuing their operations.  The 
following passage was excerpted from a long interview with a British officer serving with 
NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This excerpt revealed how NATO officers would use 
feedback from journalists and public relations managers to evaluate the outcome of 
communication activities.  This passage also suggested the direct nature and frequency of 
the evaluation process that took place between the public affairs manager and a senior 
leader: 
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Feedback that came into the PI [public information] organization from journalists 
was fed up through the chief PIO [public information officer] to the commander, 
and they met at least twice … virtually every day: early morning, late afternoon, 
or early evening … and often at other times as well.  And the commander was 
well aware of the PI and the media requirements and the pressure and considered 
it an important part of his operation.  But he also valued the feedback that came 
from that direction.  In other words, if journalists said, “This looked to us like the 
wrong thing to do, why didn’t you do it that way?” he would take that onboard 
and might take that into account when some similar circumstance arose later.   
The British officer then elaborated on the evaluation process and the importance of public 
opinions to NATO’s senior leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The officer’s comments also 
seemed to imply use of a two-way symmetrical approach to IFOR’s communication with 
news media: 
The commander was particularly keen I think to have opinions … to find out how 
our activities were seen who were not military as such, not in the military chain, 
but had some knowledge of military operations and some awareness … you 
know, they had been covering this kind of activity for some considerable time.  
So, he was particularly keen to get feedback in both directions, to brief the media, 
but also to hear what they had to say. 
The same officer then related how evaluation of feedback would be used to confirm or 
reprogram communication activities in an effort to improve public relations efforts: 
I think feedback from journalists on particular things would enable him [the IFOR 
commander] to see how others saw what we were doing, and if the external 
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perception proved to him that what we were doing was wrong or appeared wrong 
he would reevaluate and maybe try and do that same thing in a different way, 
somewhere else, or later on.   
 NATO public relations officials also exhibited excellence in their management of 
stakeholders or strategic publics.  Several NATO officers identified and discussed the 
importance of strategic constituencies (L. Grunig et al., 1992, 2002) to IFOR’s 
organizational effectiveness.  These officers distinguished between publics, placed the 
importance of these publics to IFOR in priority order, and focused IFOR communication 
activities such as media relations on strategic publics that were “most able to constrain or 
to help the organization” (L. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 95).  Strategic publics tended to be 
groups of nations, political leaders, or citizens that IFOR depended upon for support or 
affected through their military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These strategic 
constituencies included: 
1.  International publics that provided political and logistical support to the IFOR 
coalition. 
2.  Regional publics in and around the Balkans region who were influenced by 
political, military, and economic stability (or lack thereof) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
3.  Local publics in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were the focus of (and affected most 
by) IFOR’s military peace operations.  
A Canadian public affairs officer who served with IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as a media relations manager described similar publics and the channels used to 
communicate with them: 
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Canadian Officer: There were several publics.  There was … the international 
press that were right physically there and attended our daily press briefings….  
They, of course, fed the world, so you had the international public, if you will.  
And you had the, ahh, local media who were a conduit to the local … public.  And 
then there were probably, I guess, for the member countries [nations that 
contributed troops to IFOR] … target publics back home in their own countries. 
Interviewer: Okay, and whose responsibility was it to communicate with those 
publics? 
Canadian Officer: It was IFOR’s public information responsibility to 
communicate with both the local domestic Sarajevo, Bosnia audience and with the 
international audience through the news media, local news media and the 
international media that were there.  
Descriptions by NATO public affairs officers sometimes emphasized news media 
as a public or publics.  For instance, another Canadian public affairs officer with IFOR 
observed, “Our focus was on media, and it was a pretty exclusive focus.”  Descriptions 
such as this one could imply that IFOR relied on a message strategy for its public 
relations program.  However, not all participants identified news media as publics.  
Several focused on strategic publics that were informed by news media and identified 
news media as channels of communication.  In the following exchange, a U.S. military 
public affairs officer who served in Bosnia-Herzegovina identified these audiences and 
explained how they were prioritized in strategic order of importance to NATO’s peace 
operation: 
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U.S. Officer: I’m one that doesn’t consider the media to be an audience in and of 
itself.  They are the conduit that gets information to the various audiences.  So we 
had the political leadership in each one of the NATO member countries … that 
time, sixteen.  We had the general public in each of those sixteen countries.  You 
know, the Canadian general public and U.S., Iceland, and so on….  There were 
other countries that were watching and listening and supporting the effort too ... 
Indonesians … Japanese were supplying material and so forth. 
Interviewer:  Right.  I think at one time there were … 36 nations. 
U.S. Officer: Yeah.  Yeah. 
Interviewer: So, far more than just the NATO countries? 
U.S. Officer: So, yeah I don’t mean to limit it to the 16 NATO nations.  There 
was a worldwide coalition of support and so we had to be aware of all those 
audiences ...  other supporting coalitions and we talked about the political 
operations in all of those countries.   
Interviewer: How did you consider these audiences important?  Did you consider 
some audiences more important than the others?  If so, to what extent and how? 
U.S. Officer: Sure.  Yeah, I think we always, again, because of the NATO 
political … control, we always considered the sixteen NATO nations more 
important.  So if there was, I can’t really think of an instance where we had to 
make a choice …between doing something for a NATO country versus a 
supporting country or some country that had nothing to do with it … [but] I guess 
we would lean toward a … you know, a NATO country first, first choice, but I 
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think we had, we had the time, the opportunity if an Indonesian newspaper needed 
some information, or Japanese, we could, we could take care of that. 
A U.S. military public affairs officer assigned to a NATO command on the U.S. 
East Coast also described the importance of strategic constituencies to his local 
headquarters organization.  This officer seemed to describe an active public (J. Grunig & 
Hunt, 1984): local constituents that lived around a U.S. military base that hosted the 
NATO command.  The officer indicated that this constituency had become a focus of 
NATO’s local community relations activities.  NATO recognized the community support 
on which the local base depended and actively managed strategic relations with this 
constituency.  The citizens, who benefited economically by having a military base in their 
community, organized and cooperated with NATO by staging local celebrations designed 
to recognize and preserve the mutually-beneficial relationship.   
In the following excerpt, the NATO officer, who had just finished describing the 
importance of international audiences, recalled how members of the local community 
were considered a priority public.  His account also reflected the symmetrical quality of 
relationships and communication, which is a defining characteristic of strategic public 
relations management (J. Grunig & Repper, 1992): 
Here [the local command], the emphasis is on the things that this command, this 
headquarters, and the people assigned here contribute to the local economy; and 
what it, in turn, means to the local community to have this headquarters and these 
people assigned here…. The leaders of the local community … are not only very 
supportive of this headquarters, but are very proud to have it here.   
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He continued, adding to the meaning he made of the relationship between the NATO 
headquarters command and the local community: 
The relationship and pride manifests itself in many ways, but the foremost of 
which is an annual festival conducted within the city … which is basically a 
tribute to NATO and the international community that resides here, many of 
whom have direct involvement or actually work here at NATO headquarters. 
 Some participants, however, indicated that the practice of strategic public 
relations management might have been limited to upper levels of the IFOR organization.  
This could imply that different levels of the organization applied public relations 
programs in a different manner.  One interview participant, a former NATO public affairs 
officer, had served in two different IFOR public affairs offices located in Zagreb, Croatia, 
and Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He reported the following example to explain how 
the management roles and application of symmetrical communication could have varied 
according to organizational rank or level in IFOR: 
It seemed to me … at the levels I was involved in, in Zagreb [location of a 
subordinate office] … it was predominantly a press information model….  There 
wasn’t as much focus on management, I think for a number of reasons…. When I 
was in Sarajevo [location of a main NATO headquarters] … I think it was more 
managerial. 
To provide context, the Zagreb-based command was subordinate to the Sarajevo-based 
IFOR headquarters referred to in this account.  The Zagreb command was led by a U.S. 
Army general who was junior in rank to the U.S. Navy admiral who led the IFOR 
headquarters.  The respective U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
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Marines) and senior officers within those services were reported to have had different 
cultural attitudes toward media relations.  Differences in attitude also occurred as senior 
officers progressed in rank and command responsibility.    
 Department level.  All participants described their public relations departments as 
single offices, dedicated to the public relations function, and separate from marketing.  
The conventional concept of marketing from a business perspective does not apply 
directly to NATO; however, indirectly, I equated marketing to military communication 
functions like psychological operations that are associated with influencing the behavior 
or publics.  Furthermore, this research was conducted as a study of public relations, not 
marketing or psychological operations.  However, the consequences on publics produced 
by any one of these communication functions became the management responsibility of 
NATO’s public relations function – in theory and in practice.  One NATO public 
relations manager explained that the public relations functions “were concentrated into a 
[single] section … it is one public relations strategy.”   Another NATO public affairs 
officer described his office as “a single, stand-alone office.”  A third NATO public affairs 
officer who worked in the IFOR headquarters in Sarajevo said of the public affairs office, 
“It was its own separate department.”  He also elaborated on the distribution of regional 
public relations offices throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These offices were subordinate 
to IFOR’s headquarters’ public relations office – referred to here as public information 
office or PIO – but were still separate from other communication functions:  
The PIO had its headquarters’ cell within the IFOR headquarters, and then the 
various sub cells that I talked about, press information centers, in different 
locations.  They all worked for public information.  And we had … a number of 
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people working on that in Sarajevo, both in the IFOR headquarters and the ARRC 
[Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] land headquarters.   
NATO clearly established single offices for its public relations activities; 
however, these offices did not operate in isolation from other communication and 
information functions.  Some NATO officers explained that their public relations 
activities were integrated, synchronized, or coordinated with other information-related 
functions.  A former commander of IFOR talked about strategic messages that were 
developed and adapted to different stages of IFOR’s operational mission.  These 
messages were part of a public relations campaign that was included in IFOR’s overall 
operational plan.  As such, public relations strategy was integrated with and coordinated 
with other functions of IFOR’s organizational strategy.  The IFOR commander reported: 
 At various stages of the campaign we would introduce … new themes. The public 
 affairs officer and his staff developed those with the help of the operations staff, 
 because I felt that those had to go hand-in-glove. 
A U.S. public affairs officer based in Europe identified various information 
functions involved in this integration of public relations and other operational functions: 
We normally would do integrated operations … we normally would sit down with 
the psychological operations branch [PSYOPS], with the CIMIC [civil-military 
cooperation] branch, with the POLAD [political advisor], with the legal officer, 
with all of the key players … the international organizations and the NGO’s [non-
governmental organizations] … and talk to them to make sure that we were all 
coordinating … and that we were working in the proper direction. 
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This coordination effort was referred to by some participants as “information operations” 
and by others as an “information campaign.”  These terms were defined by Combelles-
Siegel (1998), who also described IFOR’s information efforts as an integrated “public 
information campaign” (p. 35).  She elaborated in detail about the relationship between 
“the three pillars of the campaign: public information, psychological operations, and 
civil-military cooperation information” (p. 7).6  
A non-commissioned U.S. public affairs officer who managed public relations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina remarked on the importance of delineating between the different 
types of information efforts during integration of these activities: “It was important for us 
to keep a clear delineation between [public affairs] and the psychological operations 
because one of the basic tenants of … military public affairs is that we are truth-based.”  
Speaking softly and deliberately, this administrator elaborated on the delineation between 
information operations (e.g., psychological operations) and public affairs (e.g., public 
relations):   
We do not try to mislead or deceive by telling any sort of falsehoods or lies to the 
news media, where psychological operations does not necessarily operate under 
those constraints.  So, we had to keep a pretty clear line between the IO 
[information operations] world and the public affairs world.  
Of note, a few participants expressed concern over emerging U.S. and NATO 
policies that govern the integration and management of public relations and other 
information activities like PSYOPS and CIMIC.  A U.S. public relations manager who 
                                                 
6 Combelles-Siegel (1998) conducted field observations of IFOR’s public relations program in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1996.  The Glossary of Terms after the appendices in this report clarifies some of the 
political-military concepts she and others have used to describe various aspects of military public relations 
programs.    
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managed NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina after IFOR’s departure from that 
region provided a detailed account of these concerns.  In his account, the manager 
expressed concern that public relations would be absorbed into an operational 
department, thus interfering with the close relationship between the senior public 
relations officer and his or her senior leadership:  
Well, one of the big … issues of debate right now, which is causing a lot of 
consternation, is how … there’s a new, a new branch if you will, or a new section. 
It’s called information operations and the [NATO] alliance is still wrestling with 
this as is America.   
He continued in a passionate tone of voice, talking in short and energetic bursts: 
The danger right now with what’s happening is … what’s called an Information 
Operation Branch, and [some people think that] under that branch should be 
[PSYOPS, CIMIC, POLAD, legal affairs, etc.], including PIO…. The Information 
Operations Branch Chief would then either report directly to the chief of staff and 
the admiral himself or would report to the J3 which is the operations officer; 
either way. 
Finally, the officer concluded that a reorganization of this type “would basically move the 
public information officer either one or two steps down the food chain and really inhibit 
the PIO’s ability.” 
 Although terms like PSYOPS are often associated with the U.S. military, concern 
over linkage between public relations and other information activities like PSYOPS did 
not appear to be unique to U.S. public affairs managers.  A British public affairs 
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manager, who served at a NATO base in Europe prior to working in IFOR, also 
expressed concern: 
We were very conscious … having worked intensely with the media whilst 
supporting the UN [United Nations] operation in the Former Yugoslavia, that 
there was no way that the public information operation should be linked to either 
… PSYOPS or CIMIC or any form of information ops.  We wanted PI to be the 
interface between the operation and the public via the media, and the plan was 
written such that PIOs would never lie to the media, would never hide things from 
the media … and, we in PI, did not want to be tainted – just in case the PSYOPS 
people were … turning the facts into a favorable sort of … perception if you like.   
 Like the previous account by a U.S. public relations manager, several other 
descriptions provided strong evidence of a direct reporting relationship between the 
public relations manager and the senior management.  Another public relations manager 
who served in Bosnia-Herzegovina described her relationship with a commanding 
general and other senior officers: “He gave his public affairs officers complete access….  
I was never excluded from anything.”  This description seemed typical of command 
relationships described by other participants. 
 One of the most precise descriptions of the formal relationship between NATO 
public relations managers and commanders was provided by a senior U.S. public affairs 
officer who served on the staff of a high-level NATO headquarters.  He explained that, 
according to the formal NATO command structure, a public information officer would 
report through a chief of staff to a deputy commander – immediate subordinates to the 
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senior military commander.  Pragmatically, the PIO reported directly to the commander 
and kept the other senior officers informed about public relations activities: 
My chain of command, by the wiring diagram, runs through the chief of staff and 
the four-star deputy supreme allied commander who is a Royal Navy admiral, to 
the four-star supreme allied commander.  As a practical matter, [the senior public 
relations official works] directly for the supreme allied commander, the Army 
four-star, and [the senior public relations official works] to ensure that the chief of 
staff and the deputy are kept informed, provided opportunities to contribute, 
oversee, critique if you will. 
 NATO’s senior public relations practitioners also practiced a two-way 
symmetrical model of communication – with some exceptions – and they served in a 
managerial role. In terms of two-way symmetrical communication, a British officer 
described how NATO public relations programs were designed to facilitate 
communication with external audiences.  This officer referred to “a concept of openness 
and a concept of helping the press.”   His reference to openness seemed to imply a 
willingness to share information and engage in collaborative dialogue rather than one-
way, distributive forms of communication.  Elaborating on this concept, the British 
officer also alluded to communication plans that were apparently designed to assist 
journalists and establish symmetrical relationships in an environment in which news 
media representatives were able to move freely about the country, observe IFOR, and 
gather information about NATO operations:  “[We] were not in a position to use 
[emphasis added] the media, not in a position to censor anything that they did … we had 
to work with them [italics added].”  In another account, a NATO official stated his 
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office’s communication goals as building “greater understanding and appreciation for 
NATO programs for the basic reasons that NATO exists.”  He went on to explain in a 
symmetrical sense that these activities were also designed to “address their [audience] 
needs” as well as those of NATO. 
Nevertheless, some participants described public relations behaviors that were 
inconsistent with two-way symmetrical communication.  For instance, one NATO public 
relations manager described public relations objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were 
designed to “compel [italics added] compliance from the former warring factions.”  
Factions referred to in this situation were Serb, Muslim, and Croat ethnic groups, living 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had been at war with each other for more than three years.  
IFOR’s mission was to separate military forces used by these factions to wage war, and to 
ensure that all Bosnian citizens complied with the peace agreement that ended this war.   
Several other participants described coercive communication tactics employed by 
IFOR.  As previously described, NATO’s general approach to communication in Bosnia-
Herzegovina appeared to be based on a symmetrical model.  However, it seemed from 
listening to participants’ reports that IFOR shifted to persuasion or coercion when 
communicating with hostile publics or in threatening situations – more consistent with a 
situational approach to communication than with symmetrical communication.  For 
instance, remarks by a Canadian public affairs officer, who was deeply involved in 
IFOR’s media relations program, provided a long and descriptive account that linked 
coercive behavior with IFOR’s mission and wartime setting: 
I mean the whole foundation of IFOR, as I mentioned earlier, was being a heavily 
armed force … the fact that you are there with a heavy physical presence – in 
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armored vehicles and airplanes and the armed troops – that itself is a form of 
coercion.   
As the officer hesitated and struggled to recall specific details of his experience in 
Bosnia, he continued his account by describing some of the military goals or milestones 
associated with coercion: 
On those various milestones on the implementation … achievement of those 
things, as I recall, you know … not only was there creating a demilitarized zone, 
but I think mines, where mines were located had to be identified by the opposing 
forces and that information turned over to IFOR.   
Pausing, the Canadian then implied that NATO incorporated a sense of fairness in 
coercive communication.  He appeared to equate fairness with neutrality, or how IFOR 
applied coercion in a balanced manner across ethnic boundaries, and with ethical or 
legitimate intent – as in carrying out a legal, international mandate.  He also suggested 
that this approach to coercion might gain trust and cooperation, increasing the chance of 
achieving milestones: 
When you are communicating … when you are seeking compliance, people will 
be more inclined to comply if they know that you are there implementing 
something that is neutral in its application, it is an international peace accord.  It’s 
been signed by all the parties, and if you are communicating to them that you are 
a neutral force that can be trusted then they are more likely to comply with you 
for that reason, but they will also comply, of course, if … you are communicating 
a message that, you know, you must comply or we will force you to comply. 
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Concluding his account of coercion, the officer provided an example of how IFOR 
applied coercion in a measured, gradual fashion and with an ethical intent to gain 
compliance without bloodshed: 
I remember there were several incidents where IFOR patrols and the DMZ 
[demilitarized zone] would encounter some other factions, armed patrol, and give 
them a few minutes to withdraw from the DMZ....  If they didn’t, then there were, 
pretty soon … aircraft circling overhead….. The local factions quickly got the 
message that they were out-gunned and out-armed, and so they would back off.   
Accounts of coercion more accurately described one-way, distributive 
communication strategies than two-way symmetrical communication.  However, several 
accounts conveyed a sense that NATO used coercion more as a short-term tactic to 
manage specific situations than as a long-term strategy.  Applications of coercion were 
also accompanied by an apparent ethical intent to support legal mandates designed to 
preserve the peace agreement and prevent further bloodshed.  If this meaning is accurate, 
then these accounts might suggest that NATO resorted to limited application of coercion 
but relied on a general framework of symmetrical communication to carry out the IFOR 
peace mission.  I will explore and interpret this notion in Chapter V. 
In terms of managerial roles, one NATO public relations officer asserted 
emphatically, “My job was definitely [italics added] as a manager.”   She also described 
responsibilities that involved the daily management of a large staff of junior managers 
and technicians who carried out technical, media relations functions.  Her comments in 
this regard were consistent with comments by most other long interview participants that 
described leadership, direction, planning, programming, evaluation, control of resources, 
  237 
 
and other management functions described by J. Grunig and Hunt (1984).  The following 
exchange between the interviewer and a senior U.S. public relations officer in NATO 
illustrated the way in which NATO PIOs performed as managers: 
U.S. Officer: What [the senior PR person does] first and foremost, I think, is to 
provide direction to this small staff, and also to ensure that we have an adequate 
flow of current information within the headquarters organization so that the very 
limited resources that we have are applied as correctly as possible, to make our 
communication as effective as it can be, given the limited number of people that 
we have assigned.   
Interviewer:  O.K. 
U.S. Officer:  A portion of my responsibility and my day does deal with resources 
and attempting to more adequately, more properly, resource this office….  And a 
portion of my day is true leadership functions … ensuring the personal and 
professional development and well-being of the personnel assigned to the office. 
Few of the long interview participants deviated from a management role.  These were 
generally less experienced public relations practitioners, immediately subordinate to 
public relations managers, who were assigned to administrative positions or specific roles 
such as spokespersons. 
 Attempts to identify the potential for excellence in NATO public affairs offices 
produced mixed results.  As evidenced by the U.S. officer’s account immediately 
preceding this paragraph, many NATO public relations managers – by virtue of their 
military training in leadership and management – had ample knowledge of the managerial 
role in organizations.  Interview participants reported few exceptions to this pattern of 
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professional knowledge.  For instance, a Canadian officer familiar with IFOR’s public 
relations managers, recalled two British army officers who were assigned to public 
relations management positions in Sarajevo:  “To my knowledge he didn’t have any 
public affairs experience, nor did the one who had been commanding the CPIC (IFOR 
Coalition Press Information Center).”  However, these officers were knowledgeable of 
strategic planning and management, and they were supervised by more senior public 
affairs officers who possessed knowledge of symmetrical communication and public 
relations management. 
Furthermore, many NATO public affairs managers expressed general satisfaction 
with levels of public relations training in their offices.  Still, most managers who 
addressed this topic expressed hope for more training or specific kinds of training to help 
manage their communication programs. The following exchange took place during a long 
interview with a senior U.S. officer who managed a public affairs staff at a senior NATO 
headquarters: 
Interviewer:  How would you describe the levels of professional knowledge and 
academic training in management and public relations within your department, 
including yourself and staff? 
U.S. Officer:  I would say that it’s adequate for the personnel that are currently 
assigned … as an across the board statement.  If we are successful in reorganizing 
and resourcing the office, one goal is to raise, a bit, the level of experience and 
preparation, and also to increase the number of individuals, and also to improve 
… the equipage and budgeting functions to allow the people to be more flexible 
and effective.   
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As the interview continued, a probe elicited an example of training needs and successes 
identified by this officer: 
Interviewer:  Could you just cite an example or two that would help illustrate 
what you would describe as professionalism within your department? 
U.S. Officer:  Well, one example that shows both a deficiency and a way we have 
overcome it is the responsibility we have for maintaining the publicly accessible 
home page.  The individual who is responsible for that in the organization arrived 
at this command with inadequate preparation and training but had an exceedingly 
willing attitude and aptitude … for that work….  Through on-the-job training and 
elected professional courses … in the last eight months … and through selective 
acquisition of proper software and hardware equipment that individual is, I would 
say, highly capable now.  We’re working to achieve an even higher level of 
performance through additional training and additional equipment procured.   
 Moreover, most NATO officers exhibited high levels of professionalism, as 
defined by J. Grunig and Hunt (1984).  All participants expressed professional values.  
They were members of strong, professional military and political organizations.  Public 
affairs personnel were guided by and required to adhere to an enforceable set of norms or 
ethical codes of military conduct within their respective nations.   As previously stated, 
NATO public affairs managers also described a system of professional public relations 
and management training; however, interviews revealed little evidence of an intellectual 
body of knowledge.  
Several NATO officers held graduate degrees in communication and were 
somewhat aware of the body of knowledge in public relations – including knowledge of 
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the symmetrical communication model.  Still, some seemed caught off guard when 
prompted to recollect this knowledge.  For example, a U.S. officer who had previously 
studied the excellence theory in a prominent, U.S. public relations graduate program said 
of IFOR: “I think it was a case study in applying principles of public information, public 
relations, and public communication in a conflict situation.”  When asked to elaborate on 
these principles, though, the officer responded cautiously, “Oh boy ... I know what, what 
I’m doing is searching for the vocabulary here and it’s been so long.”  Finally, after 
another probe, the following exchange occurred, illustrated this officer’s knowledge of 
the two-way symmetrical model of communication in public relations: 
Interviewer: That’s okay … put it in whatever terms are at the top of your head. 
U.S. Officer: Ahh, let’s, let’s take one … two-way communication. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
U.S. Officer: With the two-way communication, for example, [name of a NATO 
public affairs officer] negotiated the contract [for an international press center] 
with the Holiday Inn [in Sarajevo] to ensure we had, again, a place that was a 
crossroads and intersection, a convening mechanism for, not just the media, but 
all different parties.  [This] had the added benefit of facilitating communication 
not only between IFOR and the media and IFOR and the NGO’s [non-
governmental organizations], but between the NGOs themselves and the media … 
and anyone else who wanted to show up at the Holiday Inn. 
Interviews uncovered little evidence to indicate that NATO officers had a 
comprehensive, theoretical knowledge of public relations programs; however, ample 
evidence emerged to suggest that NATO officers had sound practical knowledge of how 
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symmetrical communication programs could benefit organizations and their publics.   
Thus, data related to potential for excellence in public relations were inconclusive. 
Finally, few data related to equal opportunity for men and women in public 
relations emerged from interviews.  Participants provided a few broad descriptions of 
how men and women from different NATO and coalition nations coexisted and filled a 
variety of public relations management and technical roles within IFOR.  These people 
were part of a coalition of approximately 60,000 military men and women from more 
than 30 troop-contributing nations.   
A British officer who served in IFOR took particular interest in this topic when it 
was raised during a long interview.  This officer had received training in the British 
armed forces to serve as an equal opportunity and diversity advisor.  Even with this 
training, however, he admitted: “When we were writing and preparing this [public 
relations plan for IFOR], that wasn’t something that we really, seriously took into 
account. It was not a big issue then.”  However, he added, “I think within the internal 
organization … there was hardly any question of any problems in equality and diversity 
terms.”  He then supported his report with a vivid description of the types of people who 
filled IFOR public relations positions: 
You could not have had people there in the operational context who were 
seriously disabled and limited in their movements.  But, other than that … there 
were plenty of females … [and] plenty of people from Asian or Black or other 
ethnic origins [in public relations positions]….  We had people from … at least 25 
different nations at one stage or another working in public information….  So, I 
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think, more unconsciously than deliberately, we had an equal ops and diversity 
policy that … worked, in such terms. 
Other participants seemed to equate issues of equal opportunity to concepts of 
culture, race, and ethnicity more than they did to the concept of gender.  When asked to 
describe the climate of equal opportunity and diversity in NATO, one officer responded: 
Well, it’s a very diverse work force in terms of nationality … ethnicity, and race.  
The Europeans, of course, tend to all be of one race.  The U.S. folks are very 
much integrated in terms of racial … breakdown … that … generally reflects, 
what the U.S. military includes.   
Organizational level.  Just as interviews produced data describing program- and 
department-level principles in the excellence theory, interviews produced ample data to 
support the notion that NATO organizations adhered to excellence principles.  First, 
numerous participants provided accounts describing symmetrical communication.  This 
approach did not appear to be limited to program- or department-level activities or 
individual practitioners.  Instead, NATO seemed to have adopted throughout its 
organization a worldview for public relations that reflected the two-way symmetrical 
model.  A review of literature that supported this case study produced evidence of 
strategic public relations plans, approved by the highest levels of NATO’s political-
military authority, which provided guidance to NATO public relations practitioners.  
Although textual analysis of these documents was not used as a method in this research 
project, the texts were consistent with accounts of a symmetrical worldview provided by 
interview participants. 
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One of the most vivid descriptions of this worldview came from a British officer 
who had been directly involved in the advanced planning of IFOR’s public relations 
program in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This planning was coordinated at the organizational, 
political-military level of NATO and not limited to IFOR’s program or department 
planning.  Throughout the interview, this officer referred to a “NATO alliance and the 
subordinate IFOR coalition,” which represented, respectively, the political and military 
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium (NATO), and the subordinate, field-level coalition 
operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR).  An intervening military authority – the 
Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) – was based in Mons, Belgium.  Working 
with senior NATO authorities in Brussels and Mons, this British officer coordinated 
public relations planning to produce a communication strategy that was based largely on 
a two-way symmetrical model.  
The following exchange depicts many of the underlying principles of two-way 
symmetrical communication.  First, the British officer talked of planning the logistics to 
support public relations activities in the theater of operations.  Rather than dwell on 
media and message tactics, this officer spoke of the importance of working with and 
understanding local audiences:  
When we moved in to take over the operation … we also took … into the IFOR 
operation a number of local civilians….  We needed translators, interpreters, and 
we needed administrators and clerks and so on.  Um, those who either were local 
or had been there some time working with the UN were very useful to us.   
In this account, I detected patterns related to symmetry of communication.  As the 
British officer continued his story, he made it clear that the utility of hiring local people 
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extended beyond the value of IFOR using these people to collect military intelligence, 
which would imply an asymmetrical communication strategy.   Instead, he talked about 
how local people (e.g., translators and interpreters) helped provide IFOR with an 
understanding of local culture, customs, attitudes, and how IFOR operations might be 
affecting local populations.  In the following narrative, speaking of information from 
local employees and local journalists, the officer distinguished between the value of 
collecting military intelligence (asymmetrical) and the importance of collecting 
information as a way to understand local audiences and the effect of IFOR operations on 
them (symmetrical): 
Whilst not necessarily, um, of great … I suppose … intelligence value [OC: 
change in voice added emphasis to the term intelligence, in a military sense], it 
was nevertheless very useful to us to, to get their information.  And I think that, 
from a PI perspective, more particularly, to get their feelings about particular 
people, particular attitudes, and actions that were going on [OC: Again, he added 
emphasis, placing importance on this term]. 
At this point in the long interview, I probed further, asking the officer, “How were 
these feelings important?”  His response again underscored the importance that he and 
the NATO organization placed on understanding key audiences: 
Well, it is, I think, um, a lot easier … to run an operation in the military sense if 
you understand … the people you’re dealing with, in one sense or another.  And, 
certainly, the commander of IFOR … and the chief PIO … the better you know 
what’s going on, the better you have a feeling for it, the more important that is. 
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An awkward moment occurred at this juncture that illustrated my dual role as a 
former participant in IFOR and as a current instrument of this research.  In the preceding 
paragraph, the British officer referred to IFOR’s “chief PIO.” At that point, he paused 
deliberately, left the scene of his story, addressed me directly, and added, “Which, you 
well know, was you.”  These moments reminded me that my former role as a supervisor, 
colleague, or subordinate of many interview participants held the potential to influence 
their responses.  When a participant would try to approach me in my former role and 
close the critical distance that I needed for my observations, I would often try to 
reestablish critical distance with an interjection.  For instance, I would reaffirm my role 
as a researcher, remind the participant that the information he or she was providing would 
be of use to readers of this research who were not familiar with IFOR, and ask them to 
provide an example that would help readers understand their communication points. 
 In this instance, the British officer continued his description of NATO’s public 
relations worldview by providing the following example: “When we were dealing with 
the senior journalists, for example, and acquiring that type of information, we were also 
working with them [italics added] to know what types of information they wanted for 
their own audiences back home.”  He then clarified that this two-way symmetrical 
approach to communication extended beyond the individual, program, or department 
level to NATO’s organizational or command level. The following passage is filled with 
themes related to principles of the excellence theory.  For instance, the references to a 
senior NATO commander’s interests in relationship building, mutual concern for 
organization and publics, and two-way communication (e.g., listening to audiences as 
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well as sending messages to them) provided evidence of the organization’s two-way 
symmetrical worldview: 
The commander rightly felt, um, that if he worked with them and built a mutual 
understanding [italics added], they would report more accurately and in a sense 
more favorably….  I think building a working relationship [italics added] in that 
sort of scenario, with the senior media figures at least, and as many as you can, 
and listening to them as well as trying to tell them things – instead of just putting 
up a spokesman, reading a statement, and going away – builds a much better 
relationship and becomes much more useful, and it does enhance the media 
reporting you get.   
In a summary of his observations about NATO’s and IFOR’s public relations 
worldview, the British officer provided a description that seemed to set NATO’s public 
relations program apart from the one-way, press agentry approach often adopted by 
government or political-military organizations (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  The following 
remarks described a worldview similar to a two-way asymmetrical or perhaps a two-way 
symmetrical approach: 
I think it’s one of the things that came over to me throughout the campaign, was 
that, umm … is that the best way to work with the media and get what you want 
out of them isn’t just to feed them what you want, it’s actually to talk to them, 
work with them, and understand them as much as you’re trying to help and make 
them understand you.  
 Data produced by interviews consistently supported a finding that NATO public 
relations directors had power in the NATO organization.  I previously reported that 
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public affairs officers had direct access to commanders.  This access led to participation 
of public relations managers in NATO’s strategic decision-making process.  A former 
commander of IFOR confirmed these descriptions of a direct-reporting relationship, 
commenting that his public relations officer was with him “all of the time.” Furthermore, 
this retired U.S. Navy admiral described in very personal terms how he would listen to 
the advice of his public relations manager and incorporate that advice into his thinking 
about the overall operation: 
 I think one of the things that a commander can do is, and probably the most 
 important thing besides taking humility pills, is to listen.  And I listened to my 
 public affairs officer, because he would say things to me like you know, we really 
 have to - you know I was so busy prosecuting this war and trying to keep the 
 peace and so forth that your time would fill up with operations.  And I think you 
 have to make time - I mean it’s not enough just to have a public affairs officer.  
 You know, I believe this.  I mean even though he is with you all of the time, even 
 though he sits in his - in your briefings, even though he knows what you know 
 and what you hear, you still have to have that dialog, that one-on-one dialog with 
 him or her. 
 Many NATO public relations managers were more junior in military rank than 
other senior managers in the dominant coalition.  However, public affairs officers 
wielded knowledge and credibility that gave them power to provide credible counsel and 
influence decisions.  One public relations officer who served with IFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the early months of the peace operation said, “I felt like I always had 
a voice, as though it was respected.”  After a brief pause, she added, “I think I had a lot of 
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credibility.”   The following exchange occurred with a U.S. military public affairs officer 
who served in IFOR’s international press center near the IFOR headquarters in Sarajevo: 
Interviewer: In general, what type of influence do you think the public 
information function or public information managers had among the senior 
leaders? 
U.S. Officer: I think significant influence, and … by significant, I would define 
that as the ability of the public information manager to influence, if not drive 
decisions on the part of the senior leadership.   
Interview participants consistently provided examples that portrayed ways in 
which public relations managers held power among members of the dominant coalition. 
When asked about the extent to which public affairs officers influenced decisions by 
senior leaders, a non-commissioned public affairs officer responded, “I think to a great 
extent.”  Describing how the IFOR commander followed advice from his public affairs 
officer, he continued: 
[He] was a … certainly a strong leader and if he made a decision … it was going 
to be his decision.  But I really do think he also weighed the advice of his senior 
staff … and … certainly seemed to take [his public affairs officer’s] 
recommendations to heart on most if not all occasions.”    
 Another NATO public affairs manager – a senior U.S. military public affairs 
officer – recalled his close observations of the interaction between the IFOR commander 
and his public affairs staff.  This officer talked of an exchange of ideas between the 
commander and his PIO, and how they influenced broad decisions.  His description 
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elevated the public relations-command relationship in NATO above a tactical level, to a 
sophisticated decision-making process that he compared to an ancient game of strategy: 
The [commander] listened to what the issues were and took a direct response or 
gave us direct guidance to … take those concerns and meet them head on: always 
in terms of the mission … he could understand the crux of the question.  He just 
didn’t listen to the words … his guidance that came back down always reflected 
the broader issue….  I always felt I was playing chess, never checkers.  
Of significance, the degree of influence that public relations managers held in 
NATO’s dominant coalition was considered by many participants as being greater than 
they had previously experienced in their military careers.  A senior Canadian officer with 
many years of experience in government and political affairs commented on the 
relationship between IFOR public relations directors and their commanders: “Well, I was 
… quite frankly … I was impressed … in terms of commanders paying attention to and 
listening to advice of public affairs people.”  This officer pointed out that public relations 
influence extended beyond the senior IFOR commanders, spreading down NATO’s 
military chain of command to subordinate decision makers throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Here, he described daily conference calls between a senior IFOR military 
commander and his subordinate commanders – a call that regularly addressed public 
relations priorities: 
In the early days of the deployment the … commander had a twice a day 
conference call with his … divisional commanders, by radio, twice a day….  We 
could listen in on them.  And I was quite impressed by the fact that [the 
commander] not only [included] on that call his division commanders, but he had 
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several of his staff officers – including the public affairs person.  And the 
commander gave public affairs direction quite often as part of that whole group 
conference call.   
Remarking on how this behavior impressed him, the Canadian concluded: 
And I was impressed by that because … the commander was aware that he needed 
to give public affairs advice to his divisional commanders as part of the 
operational order … and it had to be adjusted on a daily basis, and I was 
impressed by that.   
 With regard to organizational culture, interviews revealed few descriptions of 
NATO commands behaving in either a participative or authoritarian manner.  However, 
based on previous observations and evidence from a literature review (e.g., Combelles-
Siegel, 1998; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1998) I assumed that NATO would 
behave in an authoritarian manner, given its political-military composition and mandate.  
This assumption seemed to be supported by a description provided by a senior public 
affairs director assigned to a large, European-based NATO regional organization.  His 
account addressed the authoritarian, political influence of national capitals on NATO 
operations in the field.  The officer’s account of a journalist’s question suggested that 
NATO operations were divided along authoritarian, national lines rather than joined 
together by participatory behavior: 
When I was doing briefings … announcing that [the regional command] was 
going to once again pick up the role of … commander, if you will, for KFOR 
[NATO’s Kosovo-based peace operation], a reporter asked me, “So do you think 
this is gonna really make any difference, because right now we have MND 
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[Multi-national Division] East, which is controlled by Washington; we have 
MND North, which is controlled by Paris; we have MND Central, which is 
controlled by London; we have MND South, which is controlled by Berlin; and 
we have MND West, which is controlled by Rome.  And, they all do what they 
want to do, based on their different capitals.”  
 Another NATO public relations manager based in the United States described an 
organizational culture that seemed driven by the senior leader’s busy schedule.  While 
this senior leader was accessible to the public relations manager and other staff members, 
his travel schedule and busy office schedule represented a barrier to his open 
participation in the organization. This schedule seemed to exude a sense of 
authoritarianism.  Here was a commander operating physically apart from the rest of his 
staff members for long periods of time and operating on a very structured schedule that 
limited access to him: 
Well, the leader, the CINC [commander-in-chief] … has a very … ahhh … busy 
schedule that includes a very large amount of travel…. Given that he’s probably 
out of the building 60% of the time, it makes his in-the-office time very 
structured.  So, I wouldn’t say that an open door or a closed door exists with the 
four star but, by necessity, he has to have a very structured schedule in order to 
meet the pressing … the most pressing … needs of his office.   
Even describing other senior leaders, though, this same public affairs manager was 
hesitant to describe his organizational culture as open and participative: 
With regard to the chief of staff and the deputy, I’d say that it’s close to an open-
door policy.  You know, most days I have access to either of them within minutes 
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or hours, assuming that they’re in the building.  The deputy travels a fair amount 
of the time.  The chief of staff travels very little.  So assuming he is not on leave 
… or doing some limited amount of travel … he’s here and is extremely 
approachable.    
Several other participants described organizational culture as a dependent 
variable, influence by national culture.  Results of these findings, along with relevant 
descriptions, will be provided in the section of this chapter dedicated to RQ2.   
Exploration of symmetrical systems of internal communication produced results 
similar to those generated about organizational culture.  There were only a few accounts 
of internal communication systems used by IFOR, and these contained only sparse data 
about the symmetry of these systems.  For instance, IFOR established an internal 
newspaper, published in French and English, to inform troops about the progress of the 
NATO mission.  One U.S. public affairs officer responsible for publishing this paper 
commented, “Yeah, we were proud of that newspaper.”  However, he went on to explain 
that NATO assigned responsibility for internal communication – what the military termed 
command information – to individual member nations.   
Thus, the NATO organization seemed to pay little attention to internal 
information systems, symmetrical or otherwise, in comparison to other principles of the 
excellence theory.  Again, like organizational culture, internal information systems 
seemed to vary by national culture.  I will present additional data related to organizational 
culture and internal communication systems in more detail in RQ2 and discuss these 
results in Chapter V.   
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Interview results suggested that NATO was structured as a mixed 
mechanical/organic organization rather than an organic organization as described in the 
excellence theory.  Participants provided only a few accounts of NATO’s organizational 
structure – perhaps, because interview protocols provided limited opportunity to discuss 
organizational structure.  However, general descriptions provided by participants 
portrayed NATO as a very large, hierarchical, geographically widespread, and highly 
complex organization typical of mixed mechanical/organic organizations defined by 
Dozier and L. Grunig (1992).  A U.S. public affairs officer who directed public relations 
for a regional NATO command – one of three like it in Europe – described a large, public 
relations “office now of about 22 people.”  These people were from several different 
nations, adding to the complexity of the staff.   
Another U.S. public affairs officer, this one based on the U.S. East Coast at a 
large NATO headquarters, described a chain of command or hierarchy that required 
complex management (e.g., managed according to a matrix of offices and functions 
spread across a geographic area).  This officer reported, “That was my chain [of 
command].  But to achieve [the commander’s] goals, I felt we were matrix-managed, or 
at least matrix-coordinated with a variety of other offices in and around the area.”  
Finally, a British officer provided a detailed description of IFOR’s complex 
public relations structure within Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
The plan included an organizational structure with different press centers in 
particular locations….  When originally written it assumed we would have one in 
Zagreb, where the IFOR headquarters would be; one in Sarajevo, where the land 
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force headquarters run by the ARRC [Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] would be; 
and then three subordinate ones in each of the multinational districts.   
This officer continued his explanation, struggling to recall specific details from his IFOR 
experience, which occurred nearly nine years prior to his interview.  His explanation 
brought to mind the challenges associated with managing numerous press centers, 
populated by multinational staff members, spread across a wide geographic region, with 
individual centers located in different ethnic regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
I’m thinking on my feet now, but Tuzla, Mostar, and if I remember rightly, when 
it started, Gorjni Vakuf was the other one [subordinate press center], at first …and 
also, one or two others at crucial locations like Split, on the coast, which was 
going to be a major port for the embarkation and disembarkation of troops and 
equipment.  So we were trying to cover the whole geography of the region … 
having a press center in each of the major sort of locations we thought major 
activity would be centered. 
Before turning to results that described effects of IFOR public relations efforts, I 
will address NATO’s operating environment.  Data clearly showed that IFOR, even while 
conducting a peace operation, still operated in a very turbulent, complex environment 
with multiple pressures and lethal threats.  First, participants described types of activist 
publics (J. Grunig, 2003; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1997; L. Grunig, 1992b) that could, in 
theory, pressure an organization and create a need for excellence in public relations (e.g., 
J. Grunig, 1992a; L. Grunig et al., 2002).  For instance, a U.S. public affairs officer who 
managed NATO public relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina recounted: 
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There are a certain number of people who are going to try and pass you 
information in any means possible, in the old days they would try and call you on 
the phone, then they would fax information to you and certainly during the 
beginning of Allied Force we were clobbered with activists sending us e-mails 
trying to do one of two things: influence us or also damage our capability to 
communicate with others by overloading the system.  
Second, participants mentioned political as well as military pressures associated 
with NATO operations.  A senior Canadian public affairs officer observed:   
There was a military threat there [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] at times, and then there 
was also a highly political situation….  An international peace agreement [had 
been] brokered by outside powers and, ahh, IFOR had to implement this with the 
international community looking on to see … how it was doing….  It was an 
extremely tricky environment militarily and politically.  And plus you were 
dealing with a state that was basically a failed state and nothing worked.   
As this officer continued his account, he also mentioned pressures related to civil unrest 
and lawlessness – a physical threat that also produced political pressure on NATO:   
The news media of course … went out and started doing all of these stories about 
how there was lawlessness in the suburbs [of Sarajevo] and they do all the stand-
ups in front of the burning houses and so it looked like the whole of the Sarajevo, 
the suburbs were up in flames.  And [according to the news reports] IFOR wasn’t 
doing anything about it.  And the [IFOR] commander, I remember, was worried 
that this would put political pressure … back home … on governments to [have] 
IFOR … step in and do something.    
  256 
 
This political pressure, according to the Canadian, then produced an immediate need for a 
public relations solution:  
It wasn’t within [the IFOR commander’s] mandate to become a police force … 
our policy [was] to avoid that … so the commander posed what was essentially a 
public affairs problem to the public affairs staff saying, “How do I fix this?”  And 
I remember working … on how we would, what could we do to try and change 
that particular situation, and we came up with a plan. 
Third, interview participants provided vivid descriptions of lethal, physical threats 
that confronted NATO’s operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Canadian officer 
referred to in the previous account, described IFOR’s environment:  “It was a threatening 
environment in the sense that while it wasn’t a war operation … [we were] trying to 
separate belligerent sides … at war with each other for several years with high emotions 
and hatreds.”  He continued, identifying specific examples of physical threats in IFOR’s 
turbulent environment: “You did have rogue elements, snipers, and of course the ever-
present land mines … and populations that just absolutely hated each other and didn’t 
want to … cooperate with each other, so … it was a very tricky environment.”   
A U.S. public affairs manager who served in IFOR elaborated on the physical 
threats to NATO.  Here, he used an example of dangers that seemed etched in his 
memory: 
It certainly changed dramatically in the six months that I was there. It was 
actually a fairly small operation at the beginning in January, when I first got there 
… certainly very, very security conscious. I guess talking with [another IFOR 
public affairs manager] after I got there … he had witnessed an RPG [rocket-
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propelled grenade ] attack on a tram very close to the Holiday Inn where the CPIC 
[IFOR coalition press information center] was located.  And that was just a couple 
of weeks prior to my arrival there. There were still sniping incidents … on 
convoys throughout the first few months that I was there.  
Of note, this manager also described how the environment changed and became less 
threatening as IFOR’s peace operation evolved and began to stabilize the security 
situation in the region. 
I think as a security situation stabilized … the NGO [non-governmental 
organization] presence grew greatly.  The [country’s] infrastructure began to be 
rebuilt and, as the security situation and the economic situation improved, more 
people came flooding into the country as well as developers.  So, it was… 
evolving: The freedom of movement both for IFOR and for the local populous 
improved dramatically in six months. 
 Effects of excellent public relations. Finally, data needed to answer the first 
research question described several effects associated with excellent public relations 
programs: programs that met communication objectives, reduced costs, and promoted job 
satisfaction among employees.  Many interview participants talked of programs that met 
communication objectives.  In terms of successful completion of communication 
objectives, members of military services around the world often equate success with 
completion of an assigned military mission.   
Therefore, successful completion of communication objectives in IFOR would 
most likely refer to public relations activities that supported the completion of IFOR’s 
military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  NATO defined this mission as implementing 
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“the military aspects of a Peace Agreement, and to help create the conditions for a lasting 
peace in the former Yugoslavia” (Allied Forces Southern Europe, 2004, ¶ 3). 
Furthermore, a NATO fact sheet stated that IFOR did successfully meet the goals of its 
military mission: “The IFOR mission has been successful since its very early stages and 
substantial compliance with the Peace Agreement (PA) has been monitored” (Allied 
Forces Southern Europe, (2004, ¶ 1).  
Reports from several interview participants who were responsible for leading 
IFOR and managing IFOR’s public relations programs substantiated NATO’s claim 
about mission success.  A senior assistant to one of the most senior officers in IFOR 
responded to a question about the success of IFOR public relations.  In his response, he 
compared IFOR public relations with public relations programs in subsequent multi-
national operations and identified a possible source of IFOR’s public relations 
accomplishments: 
I think in actuality we were pretty successful: much more successful in terms of 
the management of media and information operations than either Kosovo or Iraq.  
I would characterize that as … a function of leadership … their philosophy 
seemed to be that they would rather deal with the media and deal with them in a 
forthright manner, admit when we made mistakes and again, postulate what it was 
we were going to do to overcome those mistakes.  So they were much more open 
and honest with the media than I perceive the other operations were.   
This account came from a subordinate U.S. public affairs officer who described 
his feelings as he left Bosnia-Herzegovina following a five-month tour of duty.  In his 
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report, he mentioned how accomplishing public relations objectives that helped NATO 
successfully meet the military goals of the peace operation contributed to job satisfaction: 
As we rotated and got new staff officers in that everybody felt pretty good about 
what they had done – that we had reached the goals that had been set out.  We 
certainly hadn’t solved the problem.  The three factions still didn’t like each other 
and there were still problems in Bosnia, but I think everybody felt that they had 
… done their part both militarily and from a public relations point of view.   
Another former IFOR public information officer echoed the previous sentiments 
of the U.S. officer: 
I felt the overall IFOR PI operation was pretty successful.  We had glitches, we 
had problems, but overall the messages that came out both in direct terms and in 
the way in which the operations was seen by the publics in many European 
countries and … the States and [other] places, seemed to be pretty favorable. And 
I think we did quite well. I say that, having talked to in the few months after end 
of the operation … journalists and other people in several different nations….   
The British officer corroborated his account by referring to research results from a 
survey of journalists who reported on IFOR’s operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
I also know, um, of a particular individual, who, a couple of years after the end of 
the IFOR [operation], did some research [see Väätäinen, 1997] by contacting a 
couple of hundred journalists to write a small thesis on how the journalists viewed 
the IFOR PI operation…. The overall perception of journalists was that it was a 
considerable improvement on military public information … over previous 
generations. 
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Descriptions also seemed to associate job satisfaction with meeting public 
relations objectives: receiving recognition for hard work and achieving excellent results 
improved morale.  One U.S. military public affairs officer, based in the United States, 
described the public affairs office at his NATO headquarters as “a very happy place.”  
Explaining possible sources for this emotion, he added: 
I’d say for the vast majority of individuals [job satisfaction is] exceedingly high.  
The work … that we do here is recognized and appreciated.  And we do get very 
real-term, real-time feedback and input from both leaders and peers within the 
organization, here.  People are genuinely appreciative of the work that’s done 
here, especially when they consider the very limited resources … that we have.   
An Italian NATO public relations official based in Europe described how the 
tempo of operations and degree to which public relations staff members contributed to 
the overall mission could affect morale: 
When people are engaged and they feel they are contributing to the overall effort, 
and they are in the picture, they work hard, they are right on the mark, they 
anticipate problems and they are very active.  When, instead, people perceive that 
they are put behind, they are not in the picture, the organization is not counting 
that much on them, unfortunately, that further reduces the contribution they can 
give.  Morale goes down particularly if … somebody perceives that maybe the 
organization is not doing it the best way or it’s not learning enough from past 
experience, then it’s difficult to keep the good spirit … you see that things could 
be done better … so you do it, but without the enthusiasm which would maybe 
guarantee better results. 
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Finally, NATO public relations programs reduced costs associated with the IFOR 
mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Costs in the context of the IFOR operation related to 
savings in human costs (e.g., lives), economic conditions, and expenses associated with 
conducting large-scale military operations. 
First, in the preface to this report, I attributed remarks to a former IFOR 
commander who credited public relations with preventing the loss of life during NATO’s 
peace operations.  While these data were not collected from interview methods used 
during this study, they do provide empirical evidence of claims that IFOR’s management 
of communication and public relations helped to save lives and reduce costs.  IFOR 
public relations programs helped reduce costs by promoting public understanding and 
support, building relationships, contributing to a peaceful environment, and perhaps 
reducing the strength of troops and length of time IFOR was required to remain in the 
theater of operations. 
Reports by several interview participants seemed to support this assertion.  A U.S. 
public affairs manager who served nearly six months in IFOR observed how public 
information supported peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
I think [public information] … was really vital [to the success of the operation] 
because without the support of the populace there in Bosnia it would have been 
impossible for IFOR to have the success that it had. I think that without the 
support of the taxpayers in all of the countries providing troops to IFOR, the will 
to continue would probably not have been there.  
A Canadian public affairs officer said emphatically: “I think [NATO’s public 
information program] was a success. I think there’s no other way to describe it.”  He then 
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reiterated: “I think that the mission was a success.  I mean [the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina] … it was a blood bath and … when NATO went in … that’s when the lives 
of the people in Bosnia began to get better.” 
Finally, two former IFOR commanders reflected on the success of public relations 
efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Both commanders described public relations as an 
indispensable part of IFOR’s success.  One commander indicated that the contribution of 
public relations to IFOR’s mission was as important as any other military function: 
An active public relations campaign … had to be a part of it … it was … every bit 
as important as the rifles people were toting around, as the tanks we brought in the 
theatre, as the Seabees [construction battalion] that we brought in, as the 
engineers that we brought in.  It was as important as any other element and the 
tapestry that when all wound together spells success [italics added] of what we 
were doing.  
Summarizing his remarks, the commander made this comparison between the importance 
of public relations and a contemporary U.S. credit card commercial: 
 Well, I mean in today’s world, to coin a phrase … I see public relations today in 
 the United States military … or in NATO military … or in any military … or for 
 any organization … I mean it is so important that it is your American Express 
 card. You don’t leave home without it. 
Communication and Culture 
The second research question addressed the relationship between communication 
and organizational culture (e.g., Sriramesh & White, 1992; Wakefield, 1996), and how 
variations in organizational culture influenced the management of IFOR’s 
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communication and public relations programs. The description of results pertaining to the 
first research question already addressed evidence of culture’s general influence on 
NATO’s management of IFOR’S communication and public relations programs.  
Interviews also revealed that NATO’s multicultural nature resulted in acculturation 
(Wakefield).  These societal and national cultures appear to have created subcultures in 
the NATO alliance, which may have been a product of divergence (Wakefield).  
Divergence seemed to arise from descriptions of individual leaders and public relations 
managers who attempted to retain their cultural identities, or status quo, as they joined the 
NATO alliance’s organizational culture.   
Furthermore, data from interviews suggested that societal or national cultures had 
a more profound effect on IFOR’s public relations and communication programs than did 
organizational culture.  Hence, interviews provided clear evidence that organizational 
culture did, indeed, influence communication and public relations management at various 
levels of the alliance.  However, this influence was mitigated by societal and national 
cultures to a greater extent than expected. Results of this inquiry are described in the 
following section. 
RQ2: How did organizational culture influence NATO’s management of IFOR public 
relations and communication programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
With respect to organizational culture, a few participants described this concept as 
a dependent variable within NATO, influenced by the independent national culture of 
NATO’s various member countries – perhaps by societal or even military culture.  When 
asked about NATO’s organizational culture, a Canadian public affairs officer responded, 
“Well, I find you get a mixed bag because you’ve got … an international force … 
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different military cultures all intermingling.”  He then demonstrated how intermingling of 
culture – or acculturation – influenced NATO’s management of communication:  
Information sharing, I think, varies from force to force, and so when you get a 
mélange there of different things, you tend to get a mish-mash of sharing 
information.  You get some nations [that] will sometimes hoard information for 
themselves, and others [that] share … tend to share more collegially.  And even 
within nations you get certain officers that might be more unilateral, national, than 
thinking in terms of NATO and thinking horizontally. 
When asked about the source of cultural variation and its possible influence on 
different approaches to public relations in IFOR, the Canadian elaborated in a way that 
revealed different dimensions of culture: military, national, and social.  He began by 
explaining how culture varied by military forces (e.g., armies) assigned to IFOR:  “Well, 
I think it goes by the culture within each army that is in the force.”  The Canadian then 
seemed to say that these military cultures were influenced by a type of political system 
that comprises national culture – similar to systems described by Sriramesh and Verčič 
(2001, 2003a) and Verčič et al. (1996) in a global perspective of public relations:  
I mean within NATO [today] you’ve got a wide variety of political regimes.  I 
mean they are all democracies, but some … are only brand new democracies….  
In those days [1995-1996] the countries we had in IFOR were all democracies, 
but each democracy tends to have its own culture.   
Next, the Canadian officer addressed how societies – entities that exist beyond 
national boundaries – have unique cultures.  He edified the concept of social culture by 
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referring to broad geographic regions, just as G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) 
differentiated between national and social cultures. The Canadian observed: 
Some societies, some democracies are very, very open societies and others tend to 
be more, more secretive.  I think generally speaking the continental, and I include 
the British in that, tends to be more of a closed system; whereas, North America 
tends to have a much more, we are used to a much more open, open culture and it 
is just because of the different class systems in our society or the fact that we 
don’t have a class system in North America where some Europeans do.   
Finally, he addressed sources of cultural identity.  In doing so, the Canadian suggested 
that origins of culture within NATO were like cultural roots described by G. Hofstede 
and G. J. Hofstede: “I think our own cultural upbringing [italics added] has a lot to do 
with how [communication styles change], and our armies tend to reflect that.”   
Thus, according to the Canadian, cultural traits within NATO were learned rather 
genetic or hereditary, as G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) posited.  Furthermore, 
this officer’s remarks seemed to differentiate social culture from organizational culture.  
As G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) might have explained, members of NATO 
moved into the alliance after they had acquired a cultural identity and they “did not grow 
up in it” (p. 35).     
A military public affairs officer from the United States felt that culture varied 
more along the lines of national culture and personality of each senior organizational 
leader than by organizational culture. The officer illustrated his perspective with the 
following dialogue.  Here, as the interviewer, I equated participatory culture with a senior 
leader’s openness, accessibility, and involvement in exchange of information with 
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employees.  Furthermore, I used the term command climate, a military term familiar to 
most participants, which is equivalent in a military context to the theoretical concept of 
organizational culture.  This passage also illustrated methodologically how the interview 
protocol incorporated follow-up and interpretive questions (Kvale, 1996) to clarify 
meaning: 
Interviewer:  How would you describe the command climate, if you will, in 
terms of open- or closed-door policy? 
U.S. Officer: In terms of allowing internal information activities to take place? 
Interviewer: And, yeah, up and down the chain of command, accessibility, 
openness internally within the organization. 
U.S. Officer: I think that was driven by the size of the “in box” and the attitude or 
the personality.  You know, some people are more interested in working with 
public affairs than others.  You know, from an internal stand point.  I think unit 
commanders were very interested in internal information efforts because it gave 
them a voice and a vehicle to communicate with their troops. 
Interviewer: To what extent were the senior leaders accessible? 
U.S. Officer: For internal information purposes? 
Interviewer: Well not just internal information, but internal communication.  To 
what extent were they open to information coming up from the bottom of the 
organization? 
U.S. Officer: Oh, you mean not, not as a public affairs vehicle, per se, but just  
as…. 
Interviewer: Yeah, the overall command climate. 
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U.S. Officer: Oh, okay … I felt they were very receptive.  I thought people, from 
an American perspective … let’s just start there …  I think the Americans were, 
were very sensitive to the fact that their troops were on the ground in an 
environment that was the first peace keeping, nation building, whatever you want 
to call it, peace-keeping effort since Somalia … and that we were entering 
unknown territory.   
Interviewer: Okay. 
U.S. Officer: Let me just - so, so they were, they were very sensitive of that and 
they wanted to ensure, I think, a pretty free flow of information.  On the other side 
of the fence, the rest of the nations who were there, I think there was some … 
awareness on the part of the Europeans that it took American involvement to 
move NATO in and the UN out and they were, I think very sensitive to 
criticism….   
Interviewer: But are you saying still that even with the openness within the 
organization it may have varied nation to nation? 
U.S. Officer: Absolutely!  In terms of the climate, in terms of the command 
climate within that particular country? 
Interviewer: Right. 
U.S. Officer: Yeah, well yeah.  And the evidence that I would use for that is 
the… [OC: Here, the officer concluded by illustrating his assertion with a long 
story.  The story contained personal information not suitable for reporting 
purposes.] 
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 Finally, an Italian public relations manager with experience in NATO and IFOR 
recounted public relations situations in IFOR that were characterized by different cultures 
operating together.  According to this manager, “There have been cases where there has 
been no harmony.”  The discord suggested by this lack of harmony could represent an 
example of cultural divergence (Wakefield, 1996).  However, he also implied that NATO 
seemed to accept the existence of different cultural perspectives toward public relations 
and that these differences were blended into NATO’s communication planning, which 
could represent cultural convergence (Wakefield).  Still, he, like others interviewed 
during this research project, felt that NATO’s communication programs were influenced 
primarily by national culture:  
The approach has not been the same throughout coalition activities, even 
vertically, at various levels of command.  So, strangely, we have had somehow 
different, slightly different approaches, in planning for public information….  But 
also horizontally, you still have different national approaches … in environments 
which are dominated, quote-unquote, in a sense that they are in a national 
framework … you see the approach taken by that nation influencing the overall 
approach taken by the organization at that level. 
Global Theory in Public Relations 
As explained in Chapter II, the excellence theory produced public relations 
principles that were based largely on Western concepts of organizations and public 
relations that might not apply to other regions of the world (Culbertson & Chen, 1996; 
Kruckeberg, 1996a, 1996b; Van Ruler & Verčič, 2002).  Subsequently, scholars such as 
J. Grunig et al. (1995); L. Grunig et al. (1998, 2001); Sriramesh and Verčič (2001, 
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2003a); Verčič et al. (1996); and Wakefield (1996, 1997) have collaborated on 
development of a theory of global public relations.  This theory is based on generic 
principles that could apply to most regions of the world with some adaptations.  Global 
theory was derived in part from the excellence theory; therefore, results associated with 
the first research question have already described many of the global principles that 
NATO applied to the alliance’s communication programs.   
Data from this study provided evidence that NATO applied all of the global 
public relations principles (Verčič et al., 1996) to management of alliance communication 
and public relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  First, public relations directors 
were involved in NATO’s strategic management process.  Second, these directors had a 
direct-reporting relationship with senior NATO leaders.  Third, public relations was 
integrated with other management functions and, fourth, was separated from other 
functions.  Fifth, senior public relations practitioners in NATO were knowledgeable, 
senior communication managers who directed public relations programs and staff 
members. Sixth, NATO generally adhered to a two-way symmetrical model of public 
relations when communicating with strategic publics; however, as explained in results 
related to RQ1, NATO resorted to coercive communication tactics in conflict situations.  
Seventh, NATO’s multicultural alliance embodied diversity – especially in terms of 
cultural diversity – in public relations roles.  
The two remaining principles were evident, but data related to these principles 
raised questions about how NATO applied these global principles to public relations 
programs.  For example, some participants described NATO’s employment of 
symmetrical systems of internal communication, but the degree to which these systems 
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were employed varied according to the cultural and national identity of senior leaders in 
those commands.  Furthermore, NATO public relations offices exhibited knowledge 
potential for the managerial role and symmetrical communication in public relations.  
However, NATO’s application of this principle also varied with differences in national 
and cultural identities.   
Descriptions by interview participants in this study also uncovered several of the 
external, environmental variables that could influence application of public relations 
principles: political system, economic system, level of activism, culture, and media 
systems (Verčič et al., 1996).  These systems, which are derived from national culture, 
fell into three categories:  national infrastructure, media system, and social culture 
(Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 2003a). 
I have not repeated the accounts of principles described in vivid detail by 
interview participants as I did under results of RQ1.  Instead, I have dedicated this section 
to discussion of how excellence principles that were revealed during interviews are 
associated with generic principles of global theory.  Furthermore, I will report data that 
relate to environmental variables, which could influence application of generic, global 
principles. 
RQ3: Which, if any, excellence theory principles applied by NATO to IFOR 
communication programs were associated with generic principles of a global theory in 
public relations? 
Results pertaining to RQ1 provided sufficient evidence to conclude that a close 
association existed between excellence theory principles and the following global theory 
principles in the NATO case: 
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1. Public relations directors were involved in NATO’s strategic management 
process.   
2. These directors had a direct-reporting relationship with senior NATO leaders. 
3. NATO public relations was integrated with other management functions. 
4. NATO public relations was also separated from other functions.   
5. Senior public relations practitioners in NATO were knowledgeable, senior 
communication managers who directed public relations programs and staff 
members.  
6. NATO generally adhered to a two-way symmetrical model of public relations 
when communicating with strategic publics; however, as explained in results 
related to RQ1, NATO resorted to coercive communication tactics in conflict 
situations.   
7. NATO’s multicultural alliance embodied diversity – especially in terms of 
cultural diversity – in public relations roles.  
I have already provided ample description of these principles through accounts 
provided in response to RQ1.  Therefore, I will refrain from duplicating description of 
these principles in this section.  Instead, I will dedicate the remainder of this section to a 
description of data related to the two remaining principles of global theory: 
8. NATO’s systems of internal communication.  
9. NATO’s knowledge potential for the managerial role and symmetrical 
communication in public relations.   
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I will also report accounts that revealed evidence of external, environmental variables and 
systems that could influence application of global theory’s generic public relations 
principles.   
 First, as previously mentioned, participants provided few accounts about the 
symmetrical nature of NATO’s internal communication systems.   Some interview 
participants seemed to indicate that the global, multinational nature of the NATO alliance 
influenced this result.  As one U.S. Army public affairs officer explained, NATO 
assigned primary responsibility for internal communication systems to individual 
member nations.  Under this policy, each nation managed internal information systems 
for their own contingent of troops assigned to IFOR.  The U.S. officer provided this 
account of the situation:  
 Although we had a coalition newspaper, really the internal information was left 
 up to the individual [nations].  So, you know the French were speaking to the 
 French [troops], the Germans were speaking to the [German troops, etc.].  
Thus, the existence of more than 30 troop-contributing countries in IFOR created 
multiple, nationalistic internal information systems and no clearly identifiable NATO 
internal information system.   
Second, interviews produced inconsistencies with regard to knowledge potential 
for the managerial role and symmetrical communication among NATO public relations 
offices.  NATO public relations offices exhibited some – albeit limited – potential for 
excellence in formal public relations training and education.  Senior public relations 
managers in NATO and IFOR generally possessed advanced degrees, professional 
training, or several years of experience in public relations management.  However, levels 
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of professional training were lower among more junior public relations staff members.  
One NATO public relations manager assessed levels of professional training and 
education in his office to be “adequate” but admitted the need for greater “level of 
experience and preparation.”   
In a global sense, knowledge and training among public relations staff members 
may have been adequate for NATO’s traditional Cold War mission.  However, 
deployment of NATO forces out of their geographic region and into a potentially hostile 
setting posed new challenges.  These challenges also occurred at a time of NATO 
expansion, which included the addition of new member nations who were not familiar 
with or trained in Western-style public relations.  The effect of this globalization on 
NATO was noted by some interview participants.  One participant, a retired military 
public affairs officer who helped plan and prepare public relations support for IFOR’s 
entry into Bosnia-Herzegovina, reported on this phenomenon: 
[Lack of professional public relations training] was a huge handicap, to be 
moving into, really, uncharted waters; to be having to deal with an increasing 
tempo of media interest in what we were doing; and increasing expectations 
among our leadership as to what we could do; when we really didn’t have the 
personnel with the qualifications to carry on a sound program. 
 Accounts of internal communication and knowledge potential seemed to suggest 
the influence of an environmental system and several external variables that were 
identified by Verčič et al. (1996) and Sriramesh and Verčič (2001, 2003a).  This system 
is constructed from a framework derived from national culture and operating across 
elements of national infrastructure, media system, and social culture (Sriramesh & 
  274 
 
Verčič, 2001, 2003a).  Data from this study identified political systems, economic 
systems, media systems, and national culture that fell within this framework. 
Political systems.  First several former IFOR public affairs officers described the 
ways in which public relations programs – including internal information systems – 
varied by national political systems.  Based on descriptions within this study, even within 
nations, some government public relations programs seemed to have evolved just as 
political policies have become more globalized.  One military public affairs officer who 
worked for many years in the Canadian government before serving in IFOR, observed 
how Canada’s foreign policy agenda influenced that government’s public relations 
programs.  Specifically, this officer reported that globalization of military missions 
approved by the Canadian government affected a change in civilian and military 
leadership’s perspective of public relations: 
 In my own career in the Canadian armed forces we went through periods where, 
 ahh, at least a period in the seventies and eighties when commanders didn’t think 
 public affairs were that important … because … we weren’t involved in a lot of 
 missions because of the Cold War….  But when we began in the nineties to get 
 highly involved in overseas missions, then they began to realize that if you didn’t 
 pay attention to public affairs there were consequences. 
Another Canadian public affairs officer described how many nations – especially 
new NATO member nations – have used the assignment of military personnel to NATO 
public relations positions as a means to spread national political influence.  He said, “And 
as various nations love to fight to get their own, you know, [NATO public information 
positions are] seen as a good place for these nations to be.”   
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One of the Canadian officers who served in IFOR also touched on economic 
systems that influence NATO public relations programs.  Here, the officer seemed to 
describe a situation similar to economic supply and demand.  Many nations invest little 
national capital in the training and employment of a specialized corps of military public 
affairs officers.  Nations that do invest significant economic resources in the training of a 
professional corps of government public affairs officers (e.g., the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom) must decide whether to assign these professional public affairs 
officers to NATO or to other unilateral or nationally-led coalition operations.  Thus, a 
shortage of trained public affairs officers threatens NATO’s ability to manage public 
relations programs for the alliance’s growing number of global missions in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq.  The Canadian continued:     
I mean, the Americans … obviously … are very engaged on their own front 
 within operation Enduring Freedom [U.S.-led military operations against 
 terrorism].  They don’t have people to put in, the Brits don’t have people to put in, 
 I have less people to put in.  Well that essentially begins to exhaust your… your 
 PI [public information] capability within NATO. 
Media systems.  Economic systems also seemed to influence national perspectives 
toward media systems and media relations.  These national systems equated also to 
military systems of public affairs and media relations.  Nations that invested much in 
their military public relations programs were in high demand in NATO because of their 
ability to manage media relations.  For instance, the British-led, land-based rapid reaction 
component of IFOR was considered to be proficient in media relations because of the 
U.K. national system of media and public relations: “Culturally, they’re [ARRC, or 
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Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] quite aware of… of media.  They’re quite aware of how it 
is they could serve their commander through the media, and thus the command climate 
was very positive in that regard.”   
On the other hand, participants described nations that invested little in public 
relations training for military officers as more close-minded, distributive, or asymmetrical 
in their approach toward media relations and media systems.  Hence, Western public 
relations officers like this Canadian officer were suspicious of Eastern-European national 
media systems and public information capabilities: 
It may be a, you know, Western bias, but when I compare that kind of example … 
 from a Communist-dominated society … and all that that means for ethics and 
 values in relationships with media …  [with] the ARRC, and …with the Brits … 
 Americans and … the Western nations … I get concerned.  The overlay on that, 
 NATO, you know, NATO is not training PI effectively.  It doesn’t necessarily 
 bode well for… for NATO’s future ability to [conduct public information 
 activities]. 
The Canadian officer continued his story with a description of different 
nationalities that personified differences in national media systems and military public 
affairs.  Here, expressing near disbelief, he described an account of his experiences in 
NATO public relations following the departure of IFOR from Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
My staff consisted of a Spaniard, a guy from the Netherlands, an American, 
Italian, a [member of a former Warsaw Pact nation], a [member of another former 
Warsaw Pact nation], myself, a Belgian civilian, and a German.  So a very … 
very mixed bag, and as I look at that group.  Two, the [nationality] and 
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[nationality] were from former Warsaw Pact nations: both … both incredibly 
smart people.  But … if you didn’t give them a specific task, they could 
literally… I’ve never seen this before… they could literally sit in a chair for 10 
hours, sitting there doing nothing.7   
The Canadian public affairs officer then used a hypothetical dialogue with one of his 
public affairs staff members – an officer from a former Warsaw Pact nation – to illustrate 
his account: 
 Canadian Officer: [Calling out the name of the former Warsaw Pact officer], 
 phone this reporter and give ‘em… you know … answer this reporter’s question. 
 Former Warsaw Pact Officer: Well, how do I answer it?   
 Canadian Officer: Well, here’s the talking point.   
 Former Warsaw Pact Officer: Well, I’m not, you know, I’m not… I don’t 
 really understand… I don’t really understand that.  Why would I be phoning 
 him?   
 Canadian Officer: Because you’re a media relations officer, right?  
 Former Warsaw Pact Officer: Well we don’t do it this way in our [country].   
The Canadian, exiting his hypothetical dialogue and reentering the interview, then 
explained a way that learned behavior grounded in national culture could influence media 
systems and approaches to media relations, just as G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) 
predicted: 
                                                 
7 I have chosen in this account to keep confidential the identity of the former Warsaw Pact nations.  
Considering the nature of remarks aimed at the former Warsaw Pact officers in this account, I hope to 
reduce potential harm or embarrassment to the participant or the former Warsaw Pact officers should a 
reader be able to associate the names of these countries with the officers assigned to the Canadian’s staff. 
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 It just… you know… the upbringing [italics added] of officers within that 
 [Communist] environment, at least in my experience, and I had, you know, cause 
 to deal with a  good dozen or so pretty closely, just did not prepare them for that 
 [NATO] kind of interaction…. I mean [to] actually be quoted and have their 
 name in the paper was just … beyond the pale…. And to think that, you know … 
 to provide any background or experience on or off-the-record just didn’t compute. 
Elaborating on his description, the Canadian provided additional speculation about how 
national culture influenced media systems and media relations in NATO and in NATO 
nations: 
I guess national attributes are very evident in the way in which they work.   I 
don’t think it’s a surprise to … to see that… a view of being … a view developed.  
If your experience nationally has been in a communist or socialist country where 
media are controlled, and all of a sudden you’re part of NATO and expected to, 
you know … subscribe to the … DOD [department of defense] principles of 
information, I mean, you could read them, you might be able to recap them, but 
you can’t … you don’t have the skill set … or mind set to operationalize that – 
particularly if you’ve got a command climate that, you know, that reinforces the 
old ways, if you will.  
 In this account, the officer referred to a set of defense information principles.  
Such principles are used by the U.S. Department of Defense.  Although the U.S. 
principles have no legal standing in NATO, they are representative of a Western military 
approach to public relations management.  These principles guide the application of 
public information programs and correspond with a type of ethical code of conduct for 
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such programs.  Table 4 provides the text of these principles, which are offered here to 
clarify the context of the Canadian officer’s remarks. 
 
Table 4 
 
U.S. Department of Defense Principles of Information 
 
The Principles of Information constitute the underlying public affairs philosophy for 
DefenseLINK and the Department of Defense. 
 
"It is Department of Defense policy to make available timely and accurate information so 
that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts 
about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations 
and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out that DoD policy, the 
following principles of information shall apply: 
 
"Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory 
requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid 
statutory mandates or exceptions. The Freedom of Information Act will be supported in 
both letter and spirit. 
 
"A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without 
censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their 
dependents. 
 
"Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from 
criticism or embarrassment. 
 
"Information shall be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security, 
threaten the safety or privacy of U.S. Government personnel or their families, violate the 
privacy of the citizens of the United States, or be contrary to law. 
 
"The Department of Defense's obligation to provide the public with information on DoD 
major programs may require detailed Public Affairs (PA) planning and coordination in 
the Department of Defense and with the other Government Agencies. Such activity is to 
expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DoD public 
affairs programs." 
 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has the primary responsibility for 
carrying out the commitment represented by these Principles. 
 
The Principles of Information are codified as enclosure (2) to Department of Defense 
Directive 5122.5 of September 27, 2000. 
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Note: Excerpted from the public Web site of the U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2002). 
 
 A British officer who worked in IFOR public relations related a similar account 
about differences between U.S., British, and French perspectives of media relations.  As 
he spoke, the British officer addressed the influence of national culture on a French 
officer and how the French officer adapted adroitly to the NATO public relations model 
through a process that sounded similar to convergence in acculturation:  
We also were … given, ah, a senior deputy chief by the French, and we got a 
French Army colonel; and, again, whilst he had done public information before, 
had only done so within his own national context within France.  And the French, 
at that state certainly, had a much better tighter control over the media and could 
tell the media what to print and what not to print…. [As] a NATO PIO [you had] 
to realize that we could not control the media; we had to work with them….  Soon 
he began to learn.  And actually, he was very, very good.  It’s just, you know, his 
background was such that he had to adjust – make a major adjustment I would say 
in, in the way he looked at the media. 
The same British officer also described the interrelationship between national culture and 
media systems among NATO and its member nations: 
Different nations have a different perception of what public information or PR is 
and how it should be approached and what should be done with it.  The Brits, for 
example see public information as part of what they call media operations … 
[wanting] a story to have a certain angle … [telling] the media about something in 
that way in order to put that point across.  Whereas, NATO public information, 
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much like American public affairs, believes in, more or less, telling the truth and 
telling it openly and plainly….  Um, and there are still some nations that believe 
in telling the media nothing, ah, or as little as possible.   
As he continued, the British officer added support to the notion that national 
culture could influence creation of a separate military culture, which also influences 
public relations approaches in a global sense: “So … I think the same applies in … or an 
extension of what those nations or their nation’s military believe in terms of the way the 
way they should work with the press.   
Finally, the officer provided additional evidence to support G. Hofstede and G. J. 
Hofstede’s (2005) perspective of culture as a product of experience and education.  
Speaking of the way media systems vary according to national and military culture, he 
concluded, “Ah, that’s reflected in the nature of the training that they give to their people, 
um, and whether or not they view public information as a full-time or a professional type 
of following for military officers.”   
 Cultural variables.  G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) identified several 
determinants or dimensions of national culture, which I described in the literature review 
of this paper.  Interviews generated data that were related to several of this dimensions.  
These dimensions also fall within Sriramesh and Verčič’s (2001, 2003a) category of 
social culture. 
 First, several interview participants referred to the importance of education in the 
NATO alliance.  Participants contextualized education in at least two different ways: 
professional public relations education (e.g., J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) and general 
education as an element of national infrastructure (e.g., Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 
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2003a).  NATO considered familiarity with Western-style media systems and 
government public relations programs to be an important qualification for membership in 
the alliance. Interview participants like this military public affairs officer referred to 
NATO efforts to provide such training and education to former Soviet Bloc nations:   
The fact that NATO … can’t figure out how to train PI [public information] 
 officers, the national organizations are trying to figure out how to train PI.  But 
 NATO is … now, a majority of East European… former Warsaw Pact … nations, 
 who are still trying to figure out what this whole open-ended transparency thing 
 is.   
The officer continued his remarks, establishing an apparent association between 
Western-style public relations and national culture – and forecasting problems related to 
education and training that will plague NATO: 
 There are only four or five nations that [were open-ended], arguably a 
 professional, full-time, bona fide PA [public affairs] organization.  The 
 combination of all that, you know, points to, I think, very significant problems for 
 NATO, currently and in the future, and in it’s ability to manage PI.   
 Participants also gave accounts that underscored the importance of general 
education in global public relations.  Because much of one’s learning takes place in 
school systems, education influences culture.  Also, G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede 
(2005) listed a “better educational system” among factors that determine “more national 
wealth and less dependence on powerful others” (p. 70).  Therefore, education became an 
important theme in describing differences in culture and power among nations in the 
NATO organization.   
  283 
 
 The following report by a Canadian officer in IFOR illustrated how NATO’s 
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the land forces element of IFOR, was led by 
members of a powerful nation: the United Kingdom.  According to the Canadian, British 
officers benefited from excellent schooling that enabled them, at least in part, to assume 
prestigious public relations positions in the IFOR organization: 
Within the ARRC media shop itself, a couple of dynamics are perhaps worthy of 
note: ARRC being a … the framework … from the U.K.  I had found that the 
schooling and upbringing of the majority of … some 60% of the officers being 
U.K. was just exceptional.   
 The Canadian also mentioned the importance of language, in the sense of 
speaking, articulating messages, and being understood in NATO.  Here, he implied that 
language ability is associated with national culture: 
 [The British] … you know, their upbringing is… is very much focused on their 
 ability to speak and articulate their point of view.  They’re quite, you know, as a 
 society, very open and transparent with their experiences in Northern Ireland and 
 other… and other difficult areas. 
The Canadian officer’s description supports L. Grunig and J. Grunig’s (2003) assertions 
that language is an “integral part of culture” (p. 333) and that multilingual capability is 
important to “anyone who wants to be a global practitioner” (p. 333).     
 According to Tklac and Pavicic (2003), the international nature of organizations 
“plays an important role” (p. 501) in formulating and disseminating public relations 
messages.  Moreover, “speaking the same language” (p. 501) can become a challenge for 
multinational organizations that need to communicate with multicultural audiences. 
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Participants did report that language was influential in the development and practice of 
global public relations in settings like IFOR’s peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
However, based on interviews completed during this research project, it became apparent 
that Europeans and Canadians had a much greater appreciation for the value of language 
in multinational organizations than did U.S. officers.   
 The official languages of NATO are English and French.  All of the Canadian 
officers were fluent or proficient in both languages.  Several European officers were 
multilingual.  One British officer commented on his linguistic abilities, which enabled 
him to communicate from within NATO to news media organizations from many 
different nations.  He paused during an interview and said with pride, “I am a linguist.”  
He then continued: “I speak Spanish, French, German, and Italian – as well as English. 
And I did deal with a number of journalists in different languages from different parts of 
the world.”  This officer also spoke of a “very, very good” French officer who served in a 
senior public relations management position with IFOR.  This French officer could also 
communicate in five languages: French, Italian, German, English, and Russian. 
 Hence, NATO’s perception of the importance of language in the alliance was 
consistent with theoretical concepts of global public relations.  Public relations 
practitioners in NATO did perceive that language was important to communication 
within a multinational, multicultural, multilingual alliance.   
 Finally, participants identified the importance of personality in NATO and global 
public relations.  First, Sriramesh and Verčič (2003b) identified personality as a 
determinant of culture that “refers to the traits of individuals of a society” (p. 9).  G. 
Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) wrote, “The personality of an individual … is her or 
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his unique personal set of mental programs” (p. 5), which are a product of learning and 
genetics.  Personality is influenced by culture and by learning gained through lived 
experiences. Thus, personality and culture enjoy a close association.  This association 
was evident in data collected from interviews.  
 To some participants, the individual identity of senior NATO leaders seemed to 
play a pivotal role in determining knowledge potential in public relations offices – and 
culture varied according to the many national and military identities in the alliance.  One 
of the participants in an elite interview had previous experience as a commanding officer 
of a U.S. naval station.  This officer gave his philosophy of management, which included 
a symmetrical approach to managing relationships with naval station employees and the 
surrounding community: 
Well a lot of it is what we refer to in the military as management by walking 
around.  You try and make yourself accessible and you are out in the public so 
that people can talk to you …  so they can indicate to you … again, how they 
think, literally, you are doing in your job [and] in … meeting their needs as a 
community…  Then of course it becomes the style of the individual commanding 
officer [italics added] as to how much of that does he want to hear.  My 
philosophy and I applied it in terms of command, but certainly in terms of media 
and media relations is all information is good.   
In this passage, the former commanding officer described his symmetrical 
perspective of public relations.  This perspective was characterized by his interest in 
identifying the consequences of his organization’s actions on the community and his 
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willingness to change his or the naval station’s behavior as well as affect change within 
the community: 
I might not like the specific piece of information you are bringing me, but at least 
I now know that information and I can react to it in terms of either modifying my 
programs and my behavior … or … again, evaluate it and say this is not a valid 
point and here are the reasons why this particular person’s opinions … [are] not 
valid.  So to me, that, that is always beneficial to know what is going on around 
you, whether it is good or bad.  And, again, to the extent that, you know, you 
make yourself open to that. 
In this example, a U.S. Air Force officer, who had observed one of the IFOR 
commanders in Sarajevo, attributed the commander’s worldview of public relations to his 
roots in American culture.  Furthermore, the commander’s cultural identity was allegedly 
influenced by uniquely American experiences during military operations in Somalia.  
Commenting on the source of the IFOR commander’s public relations perspective, the 
officer said, “I think because [the IFOR commander] was an American, his perception of 
the role of the media and public information in his coalition had been influenced to no 
small degree by the American experience with Somalia.” 
 Another participant, a U.S. Air Force public affairs officer, provided the 
following account of the same four-star U.S. Navy admiral who commanded IFOR: 
 One of the things that I felt best about working in the IFOR headquarters with 
 [the admiral], as opposed to many other arrangements where I’ve worked with 
 flag officers [admirals], is that he got it.  He knew what he needed to accomplish 
 through the public affairs arena.   
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The U.S. Air Force officer continued his description of the Navy admiral by adding, 
“That was not always evidenced with some of his junior [admirals], but he certainly had 
it.”  The latter comment provided additional evidence that the seniority or rank aspect of 
military culture may play a role in the development of public relations knowledge, 
worldview, and communication management style among senior military officers in 
NATO.   
 Demonstrating the contrast between an individual’s military service affiliation 
and rank, a U.S. public affairs officer who served in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the 
following anecdote about a four-star U.S. army general who commanded NATO peace 
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This public affairs officer had served with the general 
several years before they both deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  At the time this story 
took place, the senior officer was a one-star general: 
 He [a one-star Army general] said that he didn’t want to talk to any reporters …
 that we had a three-star corps commander to do that … and my job was to keep 
 him [the one-star general] … away from the  press.  When he left two plus years 
 later, at his departure ceremony, as I was going through a receiving line, I was 
 able to smile and shake his hand and said, “Sir, you didn’t talk to a reporter the 
 whole time, did you?”  So I had done my job as far as he was concerned.   
The U.S. public affairs officer then recounted how this general officer changed his 
approach toward media relations as he became more senior:   
 But there was a great transformation [from] the one-star [to] the four-star … 
 commander….  He was told … by his bosses … as he moved up in the general 
 officer rank …  you know, you will learn to deal with the media, you will make 
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 yourself available … to the media and, and so he did…  I won’t say he ever liked 
 it, but he became more comfortable with talking to the press as he moved up.  
 And [he] understood that it was a responsibility of command.   
 Thus, the multinational nature of the NATO alliance seemed to influence the 
operation of internal communication and knowledge potential and complicated the 
collection of data related to these concepts.  I will analyze and interpret these findings in 
more detail in Chapter V. 
Communication, Conflict, and Cooperation 
 As data collection progressed through a series of long interviews, evidence 
emerged that indicated NATO leaders and practitioners resorted at times to coercive 
communication tactics to manage conflict situations.  Use of coercion was inconsistent 
with the two-way symmetrical model of communication that represented a general 
framework for NATO and IFOR public relations programs.  As this qualitative research 
project evolved, I decided to explore this phenomenon.  Methodologically, I employed 
elite and focus group interviews to gain deeper understanding of how situations along a 
spectrum of peace to conflict might explain variation in NATO’s use of coercive and 
cooperative communication.  
 Elites and focus group participants, like long interview participants, confirmed 
that NATO selected distributive communication approaches to help manage certain 
situations.  Data indicated that the alliance normally used these approaches in situations 
that were characterized by threats of physical conflict, political risks that threatened the 
peace agreement, and time pressure.  These factors motivated NATO leaders and public 
relations managers to opt for one-way distributive or two-way asymmetrical 
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communication approaches that approximated the description of persuasive message 
tactics in negotiation theory provided by Gibbons et al. (1992).   
However, IFOR sometimes went beyond persuasive rhetoric and resorted to 
coercion: use of threats that Rosenbaum (1986) equated to application of force or power.  
NATO’s coercive communications were limited to short-term message tactics designed to 
protect IFOR personnel, compel compliance with the peace agreement, restore order, and 
protect long-term strategic relationships. NATO seemed to apply these tactics with 
symmetrical intent and generally adhered to a model of two-way symmetrical 
communication. 
RQ4: How did conflict situations facing IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina influence choice of 
communication strategies by senior NATO leaders? 
 First, interviews produced vivid descriptions of a turbulent environment in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  As reported, the turbulence in this environment created a need for 
excellence in public relations.  Turbulence in the context of IFOR was not limited to 
types of activist pressure described by the excellence theory and global theory in public 
relations.  Turbulence in NATO’s case in Bosnia-Herzegovina was created, among other 
factors, by post-war conditions and lethal threats.  I previously reported comments by 
IFOR’s first commander, who described the environment into which IFOR deployed as 
“an absence of war” (Smith, 1996, ¶ 15).  This description portrayed a country in a 
dangerous transition: no longer at war but not yet at peace.  The IFOR commander’s 
account of this environment was corroborated by interview participants such as this 
former Sarajevo-based IFOR public relations manager: 
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[IFOR] was an operation not as a war, but it was [war].  When you are trying to 
separate belligerent sides … at war with each other for several years with high 
emotions and hatreds … that can be difficult…. The only way IFOR was able to 
achieve that was the fact … that IFOR was heavily armed. 
This officer also associated IFOR’s use coercive communication with NATO’s mission 
to implement military provisions of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This 
mission required appropriate levels of force to contend with factions in the theater of 
operations that did not want to cooperate.  Here, the manager referred to IFOR’s 
implementation role: 
IFOR had the muscle to back up its [threats].  That is why it is called peace 
enforcement … because [IFOR] had the ability that when it met people who were 
violating elements of either side or a few sides that were violating the agreement, 
we had the military muscle to be able to threaten to use it if they didn’t comply.  
That’s why we were able to make people comply. 
 During an elite interview, another former member of IFOR also associated 
NATO’s mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the need for coercion.  This officer, who 
was not a public relations specialist, worked closely with senior IFOR public relations 
managers.  His comments reflected his sense of the IFOR military commander’s need to 
balance dual concerns: achieve the NATO political mission while using all available 
means to protect from harm IFOR military personnel and civilians in the operating area: 
I would say that … the two primary factors to me, as a commander, are mission 
accomplishment and taking care of my people.  They are not mutually exclusive, 
but in general, I will accomplish the mission at whatever cost it takes to 
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accomplish it.  I want to minimize my casualties, I want to minimize the damage 
that I do, but at the end of the day I’ve got a mission that I’ve got to accomplish. 
 In a richly detailed account, a Canadian military public relations manager 
described specific physical and political threats that concerned the IFOR commander.  
These included residual threats from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that interfered with 
implementation of the peace agreement and posed life-threatening risks to members of 
IFOR: 
You did have rogue elements, snipers, and of course the ever-present land mines 
and … populations that just absolutely hate each other and didn’t want to, 
particularly want to cooperate with each other.  So it was a, it was a very tricky 
environment.  It was highly, so it, there was a military threat there at times. 
He then added to his description by identifying political threats: 
 There was also a highly political situation, where this has been … an 
international peace agreement brokered by outside powers…. IFOR had to 
implement this [agreement] with the international community looking on to see 
whether, how it was doing.  And [it was] a very complicated situation because 
you had three warring factions, not just two.   
The officer then summarized his description of the IFOR operating environment this way:  
It was an extremely tricky environment militarily and politically.  And plus you 
were dealing with a state that was basically a failed state and nothing worked.  I 
mean … you know the phones didn’t work … [and] the economy had [dropped] 
to zero. 
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 Descriptions of IFOR’s turbulent environment were uniform.  To some 
participants who had experienced hostile threats at the beginning of IFOR operations, 
questions about the operating environment prompted a type of gallows humor.  After 
surviving for months under stressful conditions, some participants joked about the hostile 
environment of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  During a telephone interview, this British officer – 
among the first to deploy in the IFOR operation – responded with a laugh to questions 
about the operational environment he experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina:  
Hah!  [OC: He is heard chuckling.] Yeah.  A changing one is the instant response 
that comes to mind. When we first went forward into theater, um, the environment 
within  Bosnia-Herzegovina was very tense. We were there just as the Dayton 
peace agreement had been signed to affect a cease fire between the three [former 
warring] factions: the  Croats, the Serbs, and the Muslims.  Um, but that cease fire 
had not been enforced.  It, some of it, some aspects of it had been agreed with a 
considerable amount of reluctance.  
As the officer continued his account, he described elements of this hostile 
environment that were not conducive to symmetrical communication strategies: former 
warring parties, for instance, that did not want to communicate with each other or with 
IFOR.  He also described a physical scene fraught with ongoing hostility, destruction, 
fear, physical threats, food shortages, and distrust: 
People on the ground in Sarajevo, did not necessarily, actually, want to be 
friends….  And, at the time we arrived, therefore, it was a county that had been 
torn by civil war for several years….  Buildings and the structures had been badly 
damaged by bombings, mortars, shelling, and so on. A lot of the people had been 
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living in fear. There were a lot of snipers, particularly in Sarajevo, ah, and there 
had been, ah, a shortage of food.  So, it’s pretty austere.   
The British officer also spoke of the need to build relationships, which was 
indicative of IFOR’s symmetrical intent with communication and public relations 
management.  “It was very difficult in the early days, because … we were not necessarily 
welcomed with open arms … because a lot of people did not have a lot of faith in us or 
trust us,” he noted.  He then continued, “So, it was a pretty difficult situation, in which 
there was a lot of work to be done to just get settled and build a little bit of trust and build 
some relationships.” 
At this point in the interview, I recorded in a field note, “This is a recurring 
theme: importance of establishing and maintaining relationships as part of the PI program 
[for IFOR].”  It occurred to me that participants like the British officer were describing 
important patterns of relationship management: trust, mutuality of control, and symmetry.  
They were also describing a hostile environment shaped by war that prompted the need 
for excellent public relations programs.   
 Yet, participants often talked of using coercion during interviews. A British 
officer explained conditions that seemed to contravene the use of dialogue and other 
forms of cooperative communication like negotiation in the early stages of IFOR’s 
operations: 
Um, there was … still a lot of tension between the different groups, or factions, if 
you like. Uh, and trying to disarm them … hand over their arms … hand over 
their heavy weapons into cantonment areas and so on … seemed like a relatively 
easy task.  But it wasn’t because the nature of the terrain is such that those types 
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of weapons are easily  hidden. The nature of the people is such that they didn’t 
want to give them up.  And they certainly weren’t openly going to walk out into 
the street and just hand over every single weapon.  They’d go because they were 
afraid the other side … might not. 
 Participants described specific conditions and challenges associated with IFOR’s 
hostile environment that could have interfered with or prevented application of two-way 
symmetrical approaches to communication.  Some descriptions referred to 
communication choices that were available to NATO leaders, and participants even 
discussed features associated with these choices.  At this stage of research, elite, focus 
group, and additional long interviews produced more data that explained how conflict in 
IFOR’s hostile environment influenced choice of communication strategies.  
 First, a former IFOR commander talked about his preference for using persuasive 
and coercive communication (here, referred to as yelling and threatening) rather than 
using lethal military force when confronted with conflict situations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The commander began this account by describing his preference for using 
communication instead of force: 
If I allowed those guys [political and military leaders of former warring factions 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina] to get away with [violations of the peace agreement] at 
that level then they would take the next step and I didn’t want them to take the 
next step.  So it was a lot easier to yell at ‘em and to threaten ‘em and try to 
coerce them into doing something without having to use force than it would be to 
say, “Okay I’m gonna go kick your butt,” and do it.   
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The commander also talked about the importance of credibility in communicating threats 
or warnings.  He explained, “I mean they knew at the end of the day if I said, ‘If you 
don’t do this, this is what’s gonna happen.’”  He then embellished his remarks with an 
elaborate story that illustrated how IFOR, trying to defuse a threat, successfully used 
coercive communication to accomplish its mission without using lethal military force: 
I recall one time for instance, there was a situation down … near [location in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina], there was … a compound down there in which there [were] 
weapons stored and an [IFOR] army colonel wanted to get in and take a look at 
‘em and the Serbs wouldn’t let him in. This occurred in July of 1995. And … this 
colonel … said that he had [an IFOR] helicopter go down there and take a look 
around and the Serbs threatened to arm both their air defense radars [a violation of 
the peace agreement]. And we [IFOR headquarters] got wind of this and I, I 
remember telling [my military executive assistant].  I picked up the phone and 
called [IFOR’s air forces commander] and … we launched about 30 airplanes … 
heading over towards Bosnia.  I had [my executive assistant] pick up the phone 
and call the CAOC [IFOR’s combined air operations center] … I said this is … 
this is for show [of force, to deter the Bosnian-Serb threat]. 
The IFOR commander then explained that he had been prepared to follow through 
with application of lethal force if the coercive show of force failed.  This account 
resembles closely Jentleson’s (2000) concept of coercive diplomacy, which employs 
“threat or use of military force as frequently necessary parts of overall preventive 
strategies” (p. 5). During an elite interview, the IFOR commander explained with great 
conviction how he would have backed up his demands to have the Bosnian-Serbs comply 
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with the peace agreement, allow inspections of their weapons facility, and keep hostile air 
defense radars turned off.   
The commander’s story concluded with an account of how he used his knowledge 
of Serbian intelligence operations and political systems to reveal his intent, express his 
willingness to use force if necessary, promote understanding of his persuasive goals, and 
gain cooperation of Serb authorities.  The commander, who knew Serb intelligence 
eavesdropped on calls made over his open telephone lines, hoped that Serb authorities 
would find his threat credible and comply.   The commander also called the former 
president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, to encourage Milosevic to use his broad 
political influence over Serb factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina to influence them to comply 
with IFOR’s demands – thus avoiding avoid armed conflict: 
IFOR Commander: [After IFOR launches aircraft] you tell them [the IFOR 
CAOC] that if any [Bosnian-Serb] air defense radars come on line, and they are 
received by our pilots, and the pilot does not shoot them and kill them, I will 
personally court marshal the pilot that failed to take action. 
Interviewer: [Chuckles at commander’s colorful telling of the story]. 
IFOR Commander: And I did that because I knew our telephones were being 
… listened to. I also called Milosevic and I told Milosevic on an open line that we 
had gotten information that they were gonna turn on their air defense systems and 
they had threatened to shoot down a helicopter.  I said, “Let me tell you … I just 
launched 35 airplanes, they’re in route.  You’re welcome to take a look over there 
and you’ll be able to see them with your radar but I’m telling you, Mr. President, 
if those radars come up, we will take every single radar in this country out and we 
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know exactly where they are.” Very shortly thereafter we know that Milosevic 
called down to that command center down in [Bosnian-Serb military command] 
and said something to the affect of “What in the world did you do to piss that 
[IFOR commander] son-of-a-bitch off?” 
This story seemed to illustrate clearly how the IFOR commander used coercion in 
conflict situations.  According to the commander, this approach appeared to help IFOR 
achieve political military goals and promote success of the IFOR mission while reducing 
bloodshed:  “We had the three R’s of success, was a robust force, the right rules of 
engagement, and the resolve to use them.” 
One other elite, a U.S. officer with extensive experience advising the most senior 
military commanders in IFOR, observed that coercion was among a spectrum of 
communication tactics available to NATO.  According to this officer, coercion fell at one 
end of a spectrum or continuum of communication choices.  Although the elite had no 
apparent knowledge of the excellence theory in public relations, his example bore an 
uncanny resemblance to the mixed-motive continuum in communication management 
(e.g., Dozier, 1995; L. Grunig et al., 2002).  The following exchange illustrated this 
continuum: 
Elite:  I see it as there is a [communication] continuum there, and on one end of 
the continuum … people are actively supporting what you are doing and want to 
see you achieve your objective and they need no … [coercive] information 
strategies.  They need  nobody trying to push them to get it done because they are 
fully in compliance with it. 
 Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
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Elite: On the other end of the spectrum is coercive.  Where, again, there may be 
certain  things … certain actions that you need to have accomplished and the only 
way you are going to be able to affect the behavior of those individuals who you 
are trying to get to do  it is coercively.   
 From a coorientation perspective, this officer’s account was corroborated by a 
former IFOR commander.  The commander, speaking about using coercive 
communication to resolve a potential conflict, explained that IFOR usually opted to use 
communication options at the collaborative end of the continuum but gradually “escalate” 
to coercive options, depending on the circumstances.  In the following passage, the 
commander spoke of meeting with a Bosnian-Serb political leader to try and resolve 
peacefully a conflict over IFOR being denied access to a mountain-headquarters of 
former Bosnian-Serb army commander, General Ratko Mladic: 
IFOR Commander: And so I demanded a meeting with her [the political leader] 
… and I was very blunt with them and said if we are not granted access we will 
take access forcibly in whatever methodology we have to do: from bombing to 
forcible entry or whatever. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
IFOR Commander: … I didn’t talk about the … the gradual escalation, although 
that is what we would have done….   
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
IFOR Commander: And I used the public affairs officer to use, to go out with 
information.   
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As the commander continued, he expressed his intent to allow time for negotiations to 
succeed – without creating pressure from news media coverage – before escalating to 
armed tactics: 
Interviewer: So you didn’t want to escalate things at that time with the media? 
IFOR Commander:  I didn’t … I just didn’t want to make a headline … 
Interviewer: Right. 
IFOR Commander: … of how serious we were, too soon, because I wanted, I 
wanted to give the Serbs time to act.  And I had, as I recall, I had given her until 
close of business on Monday….  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
IFOR Commander: [We were allowed access to] the mountain headquarters of 
Mladic and … so the media really never, as I recall, never exposed this as the 
potential crisis that it could have been….  I can remember thinking that I did not 
want to make this, you know, I wanted to defuse it.  But on the other hand, I had 
to be ready to act [with armed force] as I had already said, and so we were 
positioning to do exactly that.  
In his description of this communication continuum, another IFOR elite interview 
participant addressed an additional dimension of excellence in communication and public 
relations management: respect for long-term relationships.  Here, he talked about 
communication’s potential influence on these relationships, and how leaders in IFOR 
considered the consequences of coercive communication in less-than ideal situations: 
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You are going to be faced with decisions where you got to do something, you 
know, for the moment.  And you are going to have to make that decision and do it 
regardless of the long term consequences.   
He then followed up on his previous thoughts and expressed his preference for 
maintaining long-term relationships: 
There are going to be instances like that [coercion], but I think what has to happen 
is – if you want to maintain a good relationship with that audience over the long 
term – if you … did something coercive you are going to have to then balance it 
off by doing something that is good for them and something where they recognize 
that you didn’t have to do it that way.   
Although the elite was not familiar with the public relations body of knowledge, 
his description of mixed-motive communication seemed to be shaped by variation in the 
conflict situation – or at least by variation in relationships with audiences.  Furthermore, 
his remarks seemed to capture the essence of L. Grunig et al. (2002), who wrote, 
“Persuasive tactics sometimes may be used to gain the best position for organizations 
within the win-win zone”; however, “such practices should be framed by a symmetrical 
worldview that respects the integrity of long-term relationships” (p. 358) 
 Finally, NATO leaders and public relations officers associated time pressure with 
choice of communication strategy.  In turn, they related time pressure to decision 
processes that were compressed by military combat and other forms of conflict.  In the 
following exchange, an elite interview participant described how NATO’s choice of 
communication strategy could vary from peaceful to hostile situations.  Specifically, the 
elite referred to the amount of time available to choose tactics and the effect of those 
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tactics.  Here, he even identified an option to jaw bone – perhaps engage in negotiation – 
instead of coerce if time permits. 
Elite: If I can accomplish the mission in a week instead of a day or two days and I 
don’t have to dislodge people or hurt them or damage property, what’s three or 
four days.  And … again, in peace keeping … how did you refer to them … as 
peace stability operations? 
Interviewer: Peace operation. 
Elite: Yeah.  You can get away with that because you’ve got time.  In combat 
operations you may not have time … to be able to, you know, try and jaw bone or 
engage somebody like that. 
Realizing that the elite had just commented on an important theme, I attempted to clarify 
his meaning by asking a follow up question:   
Interviewer: Okay.  So really the type of environment … let me phrase it in the 
form of a question rather than a statement:  How does the type of environment or 
situation influence what type of communication strategy you use? 
Elite: I think it has tremendous impact.  If you need to get something done right 
away, then you are not going to have time necessarily to, you know, implement an 
extensive communication strategy in terms of preparing people for what you are 
about to do and then managing the flow of information while you are doing it. 
The previous follow-up question proved useful in elucidating the elite’s remarks.  
The elite’s remarks added to evidence gained through other interviews, which supported 
the notion that communication decisions by NATO leaders were influenced by the 
operational setting.  This setting could rapidly change from peaceful to hostile.  Hostile 
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conditions appeared to compress decision cycles, making NATO leaders more likely to 
choose coercive tactics.  Furthermore, interview results seemed to demonstrate that 
NATO might choose between short-term communication tactics like negotiation and 
coercion that could vary from peaceful to hostile conditions.  However, NATO’s long-
term communication strategy appeared to remain symmetrical – focused on maintaining 
peace and managing long-term relationships. 
Ethics and Moral Reasoning 
 L. Grunig and J. Grunig (2003) determined, “Incorporating ethics and social 
responsibility into practice is necessary for public relations to achieve excellence” (p. 
327).  Bowen (2004) proposed ethics as a tenth generic principle in global public 
relations theory.  The results of this study add to an understanding of how ethics – or lack 
thereof – play an important role in decisions about communication and public relations. 
 Interview data confirmed that NATO leaders relied on moral reasoning and 
consider the ethical nature of their decision when choosing communication and public 
relations strategies and tactics.  Most of the participants interviewed for this study were 
educated in principles of moral reasoning, which they had learned during military 
leadership training and professional development – including training at U.S. military 
academies.   
Not surprisingly, NATO participants also provided evidence of ethical intent in 
their decisions and actions.  As a profession, most Western militaries require that all 
officers follow a strict code of ethical conduct, given the nature of their mission and 
potentially lethal consequences of their armed activities.  Participants spoke often of 
concepts that they felt defined their sense of ethics and morality: honesty, trust, and 
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integrity.  I will report these descriptions, below, and discuss their possible meaning and 
their significance to this study in Chapter V. 
Indeed, participants demonstrated a strong commitment to moral leadership and 
ethics when making decisions.  However, long interviews, elite interviews, and focus 
groups failed to identify any formal framework for applying moral reasoning and ethics 
in decision-making processes related to communication and public relations management.  
Hence, as long interviews progressed and data failed to identify a moral framework for 
making ethical communication decisions, I proposed a communication model for making 
justifiable communication choices (see Table 3 in the conclusion of Chapter II).  
Subsequently, I shared the model with focus group participants and solicited responses 
about its potential value to public relations management.  Since most of the participants 
had little or no knowledge of the theoretical body of knowledge in public relations, I 
focused on discussion of the model’s practical application to public relations and 
decision-making.   
Presentation of the model to focus group participants succeeded in generating 
extensive discussion.  The model was generally accepted as a useful tool in guiding 
decisions about communication at the level of public relations managers.  Some 
participants expressed satisfaction that this model answered a need for more structure in 
making decisions about communication and public relations – especially in the turbulent 
environment of multinational alliances like NATO.  Other participants expressed doubt 
that such a model could be of much use to senior political and military leaders, who were 
too busy to become deeply involved in the strategic decision-making process of the 
behavioral molecule in public relations.  Still others suggested ideas for improvements to 
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the model that would broaden its application to a global setting.   I will illustrate each of 
these results in the following paragraphs. 
RQ5: To what extent did NATO rely on moral reasoning to judge the ethical nature of 
decisions about IFOR communication and public relations management? 
 Several participants in long interviews, elite interviews, and focus group 
interviews expressed a general sense of ethical behavior when questioned about how they 
used moral reasoning to justify decisions about communication tactics and strategy.   
Evidence of ethics and moral reasoning.  One of the elite interview participants, a 
senior U.S. Army officer, served as a public relations advisor to NATO’s senior military 
commander in Europe (SACEUR, or Supreme Allied Commander, Europe).  This officer 
had direct access to SACEUR and often observed political-military planning and 
decision-making related to communication and public relations.  He offered this 
observation of ethics in NATO’s decision-making process: 
There were always political advisors, … lawyers … you know jumping in here 
but I think … I think we honestly had to weigh the ethics of decisions about doing 
you know public information operations.  Every time we did anything, we had to 
weigh all the various ramifications, politically, ethically, morally, … what was 
going to be the impact on … the troops, on the nations, on the leaders, you know 
all of those things were factored in … I think before any decision was made.  
Sometimes it was very methodical and other times there wasn’t a whole lot of 
time to … determine whether something was smart … wise … fair and ethical.  
Many other interview participants associated ethics with truthfulness, credibility, 
and integrity.  For instance, an IFOR officer who helped develop NATO’s public 
  305 
 
relations plan for the peace mission talked of truthfulness as being an important pillar in 
the public relations plan: 
I know from my own … experience … perhaps in the second half of the 
operation, when one had more time to actually chat to journalists … that quite a 
number of them will get upset very, very quickly if they feel they are being misled 
or lied to.  And that was one of the reasons why, going back to discussing the 
plan, we did plan on telling the truth.   
 This British officer’s perspective of truthful, open public relations seemed to 
contradict earlier reports that described a British worldview of media operations that was 
oriented toward putting a positive spin on news stories.  However, using a coorientation 
approach (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 2001; Hon & J. Grunig, 1999), I was able to find 
evidence that the British officer’s perspective may have been influenced by guidance 
from his IFOR commander.   
Here, the former IFOR commander spoke of the value he placed on ethical public 
relations – which he associated with honesty and integrity: “Well, again I go back to what 
I thought one of our major centers of gravity was [in IFOR] and that was our integrity.” 
Elaborating on the concept of ethics, the IFOR commander revealed an apparent rejection 
of situational ethics and a personal philosophy of deontological ethics: 
And you know … you’re either honest or you’re not. Ethics are not situations, and 
that’s one of the dilemmas we face right now today with this business of the 
prison scandal [OC: Here the commander refers to abuses of prisoners by U.S. 
forces at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq].  It appears that there are occasions where 
perhaps some people thought that they could bend the rules a little bit from an 
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ethical perspective because of the situation they happen to be in.  I don’t happen 
to think that ethics is a situation. And so, what you’re really trying to do is … it 
sounds so damn simple and it’s almost embarrassing to say it … but it comes 
down to what’s right and wrong.  And, one of the best definitions of integrity that 
I ever heard was being able to identify and keep your compass on true north in a 
storm. And we had a lot of storms, and I just tried to make sure I knew where true 
north [was].  
 Both of the former IFOR commanders that participated in elite interviews spoke 
about the process they used to make decisions – including choice of communication 
tactics and strategies.  One of the commanders discussed how he weighed the ethical 
nature of IFOR actions and how the outcomes of those actions could be perceived by 
strategic publics: “Whether it was not necessarily ethical or not ethical but how it would 
be perceived at the end of the day. I looked at, I mean I was always looking for people to 
tell me what they thought.”  The commander added, “I expected anybody at the table to 
be heard from or to make themselves heard if they thought there was an ethical issue or 
an issue of integrity that had not been properly handled.”  
 Role of experience and intuition in ethical decisions.  The other IFOR commander 
described a general decision-making process that relied on analytical dialogue with his 
senior staff advisors.  At one point, he referred to his use of “gut” instincts or intuition to 
guide moral decisions.  The concept of intuition is perplexing.  Its many connotations 
make it possible to view intuition (Fischbein, 1987) as “the way to reach the essence; the 
absolute truth” (p. 5) or as a “global guess for which an individual is not able to offer a 
clear and complete justification … an elementary, common sense, popular, primitive 
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form of knowledge, as opposed to scientific conceptions and interpretations” (p. 4).  
Interpretation of this concept and its importance to these data will be discussed at greater 
length in Chapter V.  Here, it is important to note that comments provided by participants 
about gut instincts suggested that commanders used an informal decision framework 
constructed from intuitive knowledge.  They seemed to have no knowledge of – or they 
rejected – a formal decision-making framework based on moral reasoning about 
empirical evidence.  A comment by a former IFOR commander illustrated this pattern: “It 
just seemed to me that virtually everything we did over there [in Bosnia-Herzegovina], 
with the exception of things that required instantaneous decisions, I just applied my 
experience and as much common sense as I could.”   
One of the elites – a U.S. Army public affairs officer who advised NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe – could not recall the existence of a formal, moral 
framework used by NATO leaders to make ethical decisions about communication and 
public relations management.  Corroborating the accounts of the two IFOR commanders, 
this officer also acknowledged the role of experience and intuition when senior officers 
made ethical decisions: 
You know … I can’t recall us ever having … I just can’t point to anything where 
we went to a rule book….  We had the Department of Defense Principles of 
Information [see Table 4]. Those certainly describe a framework of ethical 
dealings, you know, with audiences and media and just general principles of 
handling information. But I don’t know that we went through this checklist every 
time we had to do something that.  Quite frankly, I think again when you get at 
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that level [of senior NATO decision makers] … you’re talking about people 
who’ve been around for many, many years doing that kind of thing. 
Therefore, evidence suggested that IFOR commanders and other senior NATO 
leaders relied on moral reasoning, in the sense that they considered options and possible 
outcomes presented by their respective staff members.  However, the decision 
frameworks used by the commanders appeared to be based largely on intuition gained 
from experience – a less formal approach than moral decision-making models described 
in theory (Bowen, 2002, 2004; Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995).   
During an elite interview, a senior policy advisor who had observed and 
contributed to decision-making by IFOR commanders described in precise detail the role 
of intuition.  When asked about the potential value of using formal guidelines to make 
ethical decisions about coercion he replied: 
Yeah.  Don’t know if you could ever come up with a check list [for making 
ethical decisions].  I think it’s, it’s the pornography argument.  You know … you 
will intuitively [italics added] or instinctively know based upon the feedback you 
are getting from the individual … you are trying to communicate with as to 
whether or not this is going to be an effective means.  And you almost have to 
play that by ear, because I don’t think you can come up with a formula or check 
list which allows you to determine when you will or when you won’t [use 
coercion]. 
 This description of how intuitive knowledge played a role in NATO decision-
making was supported by comments from two focus group members in the Pentagon.  
One military public affairs officer said: “The standard for ethics is already, I think… first 
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of all, implanted in our hearts.  We know what is right.  It’s implanted in our Constitution, 
and it’s implanted in our standards of conduct.”  Another public affairs officer expressed 
her opinion about ethical decision-making: “To me, much of this ought to be internal and 
automatic… as result of your training.”  Such comments implied that ethics are part of a 
societal cultural trait, influenced by national political systems and learned from 
upbringing in a national or even a military culture. 
Despite participants’ frequent references to an informal sense of ethics, NATO’s 
decision-making process incorporated several formal concepts from moral theories such 
as just war theory and from J. Grunig and L. Grunig’s (1997) research on activism.  I will 
describe these next, using a framework that combines principles from just war theory and 
activist theory in public relations. 
Justifying coercive actions (jus ad bellum).  NATO’s peace operation was 
justified by legitimate authority, which took the form of a United Nations mandate and a 
NATO resolution.  These charters provided international authority for NATO to deploy 
IFOR forces to the sovereign territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and use military force to 
implement the peace agreement.  This authority included military rules of engagement, 
approved by political leaders, which deemed what military actions the IFOR commander 
could take in various situations.  One IFOR commander said of this authority, “I had a 
mandate, I had rules of engagement, and I had force.”   
However, interviews identified only a vague sense of authority that would justify 
specific application of coercive communication.  At least two interview participants 
mentioned U.S. Department of Defense principles of information, which authorized the 
conduct of U.S. public information activities.  These principles, however, are part of U.S. 
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military doctrine and have no legitimate authority in NATO.  When prompted to identify 
sources of legitimate authority needed to conduct coercive communication tactics, a 
senior IFOR officer implied that IFOR often assumed authority for selecting and applying 
coercive tactics, reporting to higher authority only when such actions might have political 
implications.  This approach sounded similar to the military concept of command by 
negation – or assuming authority to take action unless senior authority preempts such 
action.  The following exchange illustrated these data: 
Interviewer: Okay.  Now some of these tactics and strategies sound pretty severe.  
You know, taking people out, giving them no option to communicate, etc.  In your 
experience within IFOR, did any of these types of options, these public relations 
approaches, communication approaches, the threats, warnings, or let’s say moving 
to preemption without having any communication at all, require approval from 
any higher authority? 
IFOR Officer: I would say approval, but again we tried to, we made the higher 
authority aware of when we were taking operations or there was potential for 
operations that, again, would have a political impact…. 
Interviewer: What would happen in a case where, let me start over. 
IFOR Officer: Sure. 
Interviewer: … Let’s say higher authority didn’t approve of [a coercive act].  
What kind of effect would that have? 
Interviewer: Well, first of all you wouldn’t do it.  I mean if your immediate 
superior in chain of command tells you, “You can’t take that action,” then you are 
not going to take that action.  You will then have an opportunity to go back to that 
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higher chain of command with either a modification of your plan, or at a 
minimum, rationale for why it is you need to do what it is that they have refused 
you the authority to do.  And give them an idea of what the implications or 
consequences are going to be.  If they are willing to accept those implications and 
consequences, then their actions stands.  However, if they are not, then they might 
modify them and allow you to do something.  You know, maybe not as drastic or 
as forceful as you wanted to, but you would still be able to make a point without 
necessarily exercising the same level of force. 
Interview participants also indicated that IFOR’s coercive acts were a limited 
response to an act of aggression.  As I have already reported, several officers expressed a 
desire to use dialogue before coercion and coercion before lethal force.  Comments such 
as “I think in almost all cases we would rather use the threat or the coercive, or use the 
threat and achieve the desired condition without having to use the force” from a senior 
IFOR advisor seemed to imply that NATO leaders adhered to the notion of 
proportionality when applying coercive communication tactics.   
 NATO leaders interviewed during this project also expressed a philosophy that 
coercion should only be carried out with just intentions, and even then only after 
diplomacy and other options failed or were explored.  For some, such as this former 
IFOR commander, protection of life justified use of coercion and even military force:  
Well, frankly at the bottom line is loss of life and there is nothing more precious 
than life and frankly if you can solve anything diplomatically it is better.  On the 
other hand, I believe that diplomacy with a big stick is a hell of a lot better than 
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diplomacy with no stick….  If the diplomatic path doesn’t work, what is your next 
step?  [It is,] operationally, to try and force diplomacy to work.   
As IFOR leaders selected coercive tactics, however, they sensed the need to reveal their 
intentions behind use of coercion.  Here, an IFOR elite spoke of openly communicating 
the intent behind using a threat:  “And therefore when you made a threat you were 
perfectly, perfectly willing and prepared to carry out whatever coercive methods you had 
indicated you were going to do.” 
An IFOR commander also addressed the final principle of jus ad bellum: only 
carrying out coercion if it provides a reasonable chance of success.  Here, the 
commander expressed his preference for less confrontational options than coercion or 
military combat; however, he added that sometimes coercing and fighting provide the 
only options for success: “The idea is to always force this without having to fight.  But 
you always have to be prepared to fight, otherwise it won’t work.” 
Justifying application of coercive communication (e.g., jus en bello).  Interview 
participants often referred to military rules of engagement that guided application of 
military force – similar to the principle of jus en bello, which identifies justifiable 
conduct in war.  One IFOR commander discussed these rules of engagement and 
commented on how they limited his application of force and discriminated between 
combatants and non-combatants in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  During an elite interview, the 
commander was asked, “To what extent would it be useful to have some kind of a moral 
framework other than … gut instinct … that you could use to help incorporate ethics into 
your decisions [about coercion]?”  After the commander paused to collect his thoughts, 
he talked about limited actions: 
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I think that’s kind of what rules of engagement are, but they allow you to use 
force in certain circumstances and it kind of spells them out and, it’s a way of just 
sort of providing a political guidance for when you can and cannot cross that line 
and … take offensive action.  
He then added his thoughts about difficult decisions related to avoiding collateral 
damage while waging war, or discriminating between innocent civilians and military 
targets: 
But then again, there are ethical dilemmas, for instance collateral damage, is … an 
ethical dilemma. And we know that collateral damage is something that we tried 
very hard to limit in Bosnia.  
Again, the commander paused, seeming to collect his thoughts.  He then continued to 
report deep feelings about his responsibility as a military commander to protect not only 
the lives of innocent civilians in war, but also the lives of people that served under his 
command:  
I think ethics extends beyond objecting to offensive power.  Ethics in my view 
also incorporates protecting the people … that are serving under you…. At some 
point [a commander] makes a decision and he is responsible for that decision … 
and you can’t get away from it. 
Finally, evaluation becomes an important part of public relations management 
and of establishing a tradition of justifiable actions.  A senior U.S. Navy officer during an 
elite interview provided an elaborate description of how IFOR conducted after-action 
evaluation.  This description included references to several concepts of strategic public 
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relations management: environmental scanning, issue management, symmetrical 
communication (collecting feedback from publics), and reprogramming: 
And then [there is] post-accomplishment, trying to go back and clean up whatever 
you did wrong in an information management sense and try and rectify the 
problems that you encountered.  If it is something that is more long term or it is 
something where you don’t have a physical confrontation or a potential conflict, 
an immediate conflict, then you have time to manage that.  You have time to put 
in place a program whereby you can raise the public’s awareness to a particular 
issue or problem, make them aware of it.  Then you’ve got time to indicate to 
them how you think this problem could be resolved.  Allow some time for 
feedback so that you may modify your plan based upon what you are hearing back 
from the community prior to execution and you can be much more leisurely in the 
matter in which you implement that plan. 
 Proposed model of just communication. Given the lack of evidence to identify a 
formal framework for applying ethics to decisions about public relations, I proposed a 
model for use in justifying communication choices.  Two of the elites and several focus 
group participants provided useful comments about this model.  I will interpret these 
comments in Chapter V and incorporate them in a subsequent revision to this model. 
 First, two former IFOR commanders addressed the proposed concept of an ethical 
framework for justifying communication choices.  One expressed reluctance at having to 
draft or having to adhere to a rigid moral framework, but he admitted there might be a 
practical need for having such a framework: 
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I’m not sure that I would want to be the one to try to draft that ethical framework; 
nor would I want someone to give it to me and tell me to follow it … because 
again I don’t think ethics is situational.  But then again, there are ethical dilemmas 
[that provide incentive for having such a framework]. 
Another former IFOR commander also identified the need for such a 
communication model.  Commenting on his past role as a military commander, he 
recalled, “Often times what is missing … are rules of engagement for public affairs for 
particular circumstances.”  He also implied that it might be time for the military to move 
beyond informal rules governing public relations and communication management that 
are simply “in someone’s head.”  He then continued, describing the need in NATO 
operations for formal rules that extend up and down the military chain of command: 
IFOR Commander: All too often you don’t get those rules of engagement, 
public affairs rules of engagement down to the levels where the colonels and the 
lieutenant colonels and others are, are comfortable with them.  And I think we 
lose something in the opportunity to communicate our part of the story.  I mean 
brilliant, by fault or otherwise, there is, you know, having an imbedded media in 
this last go around with Iraq.  You know, I have got to believe they had rules of 
engagement for them. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
IFOR Commander: And I think it ought to be a standard practice that you have 
the rules of engagement and not in the sense of constraint of what you can say and 
what you can’t say is that other people would interpret that that way as though it 
is constraining.  I think it is, it is what you can do, not what you can’t do. 
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As my elite interview with the commander continued, he differentiated between 
the legal and ethical nature of communication decisions, once observing that an act might 
be legal but still might not be the right thing to do.  Also, the commander expressed a 
reliance on teamwork, experience, and intuition when making decisions.  However, he 
also recognized the need for a more formal framework for guiding decisions about public 
relations: 
You can’t go out and just wing it or do it ad hoc.  You’ve got to have, you’ve got 
to have that session with your team and if your public affairs goes out and 
represents you then he kind of knows your thinking, the team’s thinking and so 
forth and I would, I would, you know, he should never be put in a position and I 
would hope you never were, to where he didn’t know how far he could go. 
Second, focus groups provided an opportunity to deeply explore the proposed 
communication model.  Participants commented at length on the model and offered 
numerous suggestions.  Several patterns emerged from these group discussions.   
  Lack of universal framework for military public relations.  Focus groups were no 
more fruitful than long and elite interviews in identifying any formal, ethical framework 
used by NATO to guide decisions about communication and public relations.  During a 
discussion at the U.S. Defense Information School (DINFOS), I asked group members to 
identify a framework they might have used in the past to advise a military commander 
about communication choices.  One member replied bluntly, “My gut.”  Trying to elicit a 
more detailed response from the participant, I followed up, “Your gut?” He reiterated, 
“Right, I mean that.” 
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As the discussion progressed around the conference table, another DINFOS 
participant elaborated: “The closest we’ve come is ... I think … a class on command 
messages….  But we’re still wrestling with it because there’s … really [no framework] to 
draw from.”  Another participant – a DINFOS faculty member – commented on the way 
in which DINFOS teaches ethics and moral reasoning.  This comment also evoked 
images of an informal rather than formal approach to application of ethics in military 
communication decisions: 
I mean the ethics are taught … we have kind of a discussion about ethics.  You 
know, we try and lace it throughout the instruction so that it’s not so much a 
deliberate box to check … but that it is part of an almost unspoken, uncrystalized 
thing, that it’s just woven into the nature of how we work the process.  
Ethics as a political-military process.  Focus groups also generated much 
discussion about ethical processes and political-military responsibility for ethics in an 
alliance like NATO.  Some participants felt that military public affairs officers should act 
as the conscience of an organization.  Others disagreed.  One faculty member at DINFOS 
described ethics and credibility as “a process, not a decision.”  In the opinion of this 
faculty member, that process – like public relations – should be the ultimate 
responsibility of the most senior member of an organization: 
If you have to say somebody in the room is defined as the ethics officer … you’ve 
lost already….  I would submit that if the military has decided … well we have to 
be ethical about this, that’s gotta be done at the very, very top – or you’re 
doomed. 
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 As the DINFOS discussion neared its end, I called for more discussion of the 
proposed communication model.  I asked, “Looking one more time at the model … if 
such a model could be useful, [at] what level of the chain do you see this being 
implemented?” 
One group member responded, “The highest.”  Another explained, “If it happens at the 
highest levels it will evolve down, have a much higher rate of success evolving down to 
the lower levels.”   
 The sentiment that military commanders should be responsible for ethics in their 
organization was also expressed in focus group discussions, elsewhere.  For instance, 
members of the Pentagon focus group were in resounding agreement that the senior 
military commander must make ethical decisions about use of coercion.  The Pentagon 
group engaged in the following discussion about reporting information versus coercing 
adversarial publics in a hypothetical case: 
Interviewer: Let’s … talk about an enemy.  You have a choice between coercing, 
threatening … let’s say coercive diplomacy.  A threat of military force if you guys 
don’t comply… 
Female:  If we are accurately reporting what our government is communicating to 
the world at large with the objective being that the enemy is part of that audience, 
that’s… that’s reporting. 
Interviewer: Right.  But understand now… this threat is conditional, if you don’t 
do this, we will do that.  So your communication, your participation in that 
strategy now conveys a certain weight, as opposed to taking a less aggressive 
approach and maybe just informing, putting out a news release, etc. 
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Male:  It depends who says it, too.  Does the PAO say it, or does the commander 
say it? 
 Male: The commander says it. 
Interviewer: Okay, well then that’s my question.  Who makes these kinds of 
decisions? Do you simply inform or do you now threaten? 
 Male: The commander does. 
 Female:  The commander, yeah. 
 Male: The commander does. 
 Continuing the discussion, this officer suggested that the commander may make 
the decision about ethical use of communication but the public relations manager must 
make a recommendation: 
Male:  You know, [the IFOR commander] did that several times, even at a tactical 
level, in Bosnia.  You know, if you don’t move this tank over to this parking lot 
by tomorrow, I’m going to move it for you. [OC: Laughter heard.]  You know … 
the PAO helps relay that … information … supporting the commander. 
 Several discussion group members added comments that expanded on the 
responsibilities of organizational staff members to advise senior leaders about ethics.  
The following dialogue took place at the Defense Information School.  Members here 
discussed conflict that often emerges over advice given by the public affairs officer and 
other members of a military staff:  
Interviewer:  Who makes those ethical decisions on the staff in your models of 
strategic planning? … Chaplain, lawyer, public defender’s office, commander? 
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DINFOS Group Member: More often than not, the PA [public affairs officer] on 
my side has been the ethical pulse where … you know …the colonel’s … are yea, 
yea, yea go, go, go, [take action] and you get to the PA and you know like … well 
let’s not do that. 
DINFOS Group Member: Because of the consequences. 
DINFOS Group Member: We’re really gonna be hurtin’ later. 
DINFOS Group Member:  The arbitrator is the commander. 
DINFOS Group Member:  That’s right … and the public affairs officer has to 
be, has to be firm and he he’s probably the only one that’s gonna really be the 
compass there. 
Summarizing this discussion another DINFOS member added, “When I look at this I see 
this as more of a political solution … and not a military solution.” 
 During the Pentagon discussion, a retired U.S. Army public affairs officer with 
experience in NATO and IFOR described how alliance public relations managers and 
commanders interacted.  Her description of this interaction resembled a reasoning process 
that was used to evaluate potential communication options, contemplate possible 
outcomes of decisions, and consider the ethical nature of consequences on publics 
affected by those decisions: 
Even apart from media interactions, the PAO, as an advisor, tells the commander 
what the media impact and the public impact is going to be of other actions that 
he’s contemplating.  If he’s planning on doing a weapons sweep in a certain area, 
the PAO may be aware that there are some sensitivities in that area or that the 
press is going to be staged in that area and whatnot, and give him some heads up 
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and some advice on how to direct … the operation be conducted.  He assimilates 
that … along with the advice and counsel he gets from everybody else … and 
then decides what he wants to do. 
 Two of the focus groups assigned ethical responsibility to levels above a military 
commander.  In the opinion of some members in the DINFOS and Military Academy 
groups, political leaders must assume ultimate responsibility for the legal and ethical 
nature of military communication options like coercion.  The rationale used by these 
members seemed to be that coercive communication tactics, like armed combat tactics, 
must be authorized by the same political entities that approve military operations like war 
– since military options are considered by most Western nations to be an extension of 
political policy.  This view seemed to support the jus ad bellum principle of just war 
theory that requires legitimate authority to declare war.   
 A member of the DINFOS focus group located this level of ethical responsibility 
at “the highest levels, probably more on the political side than the military side.”  An 
officer in the U.S. Military Academy focus group agreed by saying, 
As well as remembering that rules of engagement should be the commander’s 
rules first and foremost … rules of engagement are political, they’re operational 
considerations, and last but not least, they’re law.  
Another member of the Military Academy focus group commented on political 
responsibility for armed conflict: 
Again, it’s controversial in some sectors … the moral authority of soldiers.… 
People think that soldiers are judged simply by their conduct, not by a political 
war itself because it is a political responsibility.  
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This officer then associated communication tactics with military tactics that are subject to 
rules of engagement.  He suggested here that both communication tactics and military 
tactics that involve application of force should require political and legal approval: 
Once we acknowledge the government sent us to war, what we have to do is 
decide whether or not the means we’re using are appropriate and communication 
would be no different than artillery for instance….  Nonetheless you notice once 
we started the war we still tried to restrain ourselves to law and … [be] 
discriminating. 
 Culture and universal ethics.  Focus group discussions also provided extensive 
data related to cultural aspects of ethics and raised questions about the practicality of a 
universal code of ethics.  These discussions seemed to spring from an appreciation among 
discussion group members for difficulties associated with questions of value in 
multinational settings.  For instance, G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) reported on a 
number of “value-laden problems” (p. 372) associated with culture.  They also observed, 
“Both what is ‘rational’ and what is ‘ethical’ depend on cultural value positions” (p. 373), 
which are complicated by special interests.  Furthermore, “There is a strong tendency in 
international politics to use different ethical standards toward other countries than toward 
one’s own” (p. 373).   
This theoretical concept was operationalized – in the context of communication – 
in vivid detail by a U.S. Army officer with significant multinational experience who 
participated in the U.S. Military Academy focus group: 
Among Western nations … there’s a common acceptance of what is morally 
acceptable for the most part when we talk about combative operations.  Well … I 
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go back now to cultural understanding of Islam, which is not universal.  There are 
sects within Islam … there are digressions within it … but … I can be sitting next 
to a Turkish officer who is a Muslim and sitting next to a Saudi officer who is a 
Muslim and I will guarantee you one of these two gentlemen will have differing 
moral understanding, based on their culture, of what is morally acceptable and 
just in terms of communication. 
The statement by this officer prompted agreement among several other group 
members.  These members added their emphatic support to this notion and expanded on 
the discussion of a cultural dimension of ethics – including ethical relativism: 
U.S. Army Officer 1: Well that’s the same though with any [thing] … 
U.S. Army Officer 2: Well that’s true, absolutely, absolutely! 
U.S. Army Officer 3:  To me that’s another reason to divorce this [proposed 
communication model] from even the terms moral and ethical to more cultural.  I 
felt that it’s cultural considerations the commander needed to make and … usually 
you can, may divide it up into two different cultural considerations: one is you 
know in context of Iraq … and then the other context would be coalition partners.  
They may include or exclude then the NGOs or other U.S. departments.  But then 
you don’t get into the quagmire of talking about relative morality. 
 The Defense Information School focus group also engaged in a lively discussion 
about the cultural and situational dimensions of the proposed model of communication.  
Again, several members spoke with emotion about the difficulties associated with 
interpreting and making ethical decisions in a multicultural environment.   
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DINFOS Group Member: Only thing that immediately comes to mind, I might 
not think this is an interesting model, I can’t possibly digest it thoroughly here but 
I think this, Mark, will require very sophisticated definition of the term 
coercive…. 
Interviewer: Uh huh…. 
DINFOS Group Member: And the reason I say that is that I do not think … that 
it’s intuitively obvious what that means in all situations … I mean, one person’s 
coercion is another person’s truth…. I think it requires a good situational review 
of the term moral. 
At this point, another member – a DINFOS faculty member with experience as a 
military public affairs officer – interrupted the discussion.  He interjected his thoughts 
while glancing at a copy of the proposed communication model and following the steps 
outlined in the model: 
DINFOS Faculty Member: If you take this thing [model] and overlay it on two 
places, Iran and North Korea. 
Interviewer:  Right. 
DINFOS Faculty Member:  They’re following this same pattern now [steps in 
the model], at least in the political realm.   They’re doing this, you know what, 
when they get back up to here [OC: He refers to a step in the model.] … they’ve 
accomplished nothing. Because you cannot, you can’t do this to two cultures that 
don’t understand what ethical communications is all about…. 
DINFOS Group Member: They’re very pragmatically driven in the way they 
use information…. 
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DINFOS Faculty Member: Yes, yea. 
 As the DINFOS discussion continued, group members embarked on a dialogue 
about the universality of ethics – or the lack of universal ethics.  Data that emerged from 
this conversation could be valuable when considering ethical principles in a global theory 
of public relations – a theory that might be applied across many cultures.  DINFOS 
members seemed to suggest that the absence of a universal code of ethics complicates 
communication management from a global perspective: 
DINFOS Group Member:  But it [the model] does not translate … that’s the 
point, it does not translate to another culture, they … don’t see the logic.  
Interviewer:  You know you’re addressing a difficulty of achieving a universal 
ethic -- which no one has found yet.  
DINFOS Group Member: There isn’t any. 
DINFOS Group Member:  Well, I just think that we Americans fail to see that 
and say well it makes perfect sense to all of us around the table … but … you 
know, you bring in an Iraqi or someone from the Middle East or someone from 
the Far East and … they don’t get it at all.  They don’t know what you’re talking 
about.  
DINFOS Group Member:  You can bring a Russian in and they won’t know.  
DINFOS Group Member:  I was gonna say … Europeans, members of 
NATO…. 
DINFOS Group Member:  Right, when it comes to the French … [laughter]. 
A member of the Pentagon focus group also expressed skepticism that a universal 
code of ethics existed.  She mentioned professional, international, communication 
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organizations that have produced such codes and mentioned U.S. Navy efforts to codify 
ethics in regulations governing Navy public affairs.  She also joked about difficulties 
associated with identifying such a code, but she did acknowledge the need for universal 
norms to help guide public relations practice and to help professionalize the field: 
Pentagon Group Member:  The International Association of Business 
Communicators – IABC – does have a … code of ethics.  And, they tried to put 
one into our Navy Public Affairs regs [regulations], which, God help us all, will 
be published this year.  We need help, you know.  Ethics of public affairs, and 
you know, you can well imagine in a group discussion … how are ya’ gonna pin 
that one down.  But I do believe … that we don’t have … we’re not a profession, 
though we’re always going to be considered tacticians, unless we have some norm 
that we all agree on that is recognized.   
 Questions of conceptual precision and legitimacy.  Members of the U.S. Military 
Academy focus group shared many concerns of DINFOS focus group members about 
culture.  The academy group, however, seemed to be most concerned about precision of 
language and associated cross-cultural interpretations of concepts like legitimacy that 
were expressed in the proposed model.  Influenced, perhaps, by opposition to ongoing 
U.S.-led military operations in Iraq, one U.S. Army officer at the Military Academy 
raised questions about legitimate, international authority to wage combat operations: 
We quite clearly in most of the world opinion do not have a plurality of support 
for operation Iraqi Freedom. So we do not have legitimacy in the eyes of the 
United Nations … so this proves to be a stumbling block, not one to throw away 
the model but one that bears some examination upon making a recommendation. 
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 Another U.S. Army officer in the Military Academy focus group observed that the 
current U.S. administration’s policy of preemption might fall outside principles of just 
war theory.  Furthermore, this policy may be viewed by other nations as unethical.  
Hence, the officer seemed to use this example to illustrate how legitimate international 
authority for military operations might be denied for actions that are perceived as 
immoral, unilateral, and outside the bounds of a moral framework. The officer began by 
commenting on the U.S. preemptive policy:   
There may not be a legitimacy internationally speaking.  There’s been a 
significant shift within the national planning to the extent I’m not even certain 
that just war theory takes [the current situation] into consideration. It’s been clear 
we made the decision … there’s a shift to … a preemptive doctrine … that 
basically says we take our national interest, for lack of a better phrase [and say] 
almost “To hell with the rest of you,” I mean we are, this is now a national 
doctrine. 
The officer then addressed how this type of situation could interfere with 
international understanding, acceptance, and legitimacy for communications associated 
with unpopular, unilateral policies that are perceived as unethical: 
A U.S. standpoint which is not acceptable ... you add to … not only having 
legitimacy, we may not even have a common cultural understanding and 
acceptance of what is morally correct in communications.  
A member of the academy discussion – with a background in international law 
and experience in multinational military operations – then added a concern emanating 
from his knowledge of legitimacy’s linguistic roots and the concept’s legal interpretation: 
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With regard to the confirmed stuff, confirming legitimate authority … what we 
believe to be a legitimate authority may not be what others believe to be 
legitimate. So you may use a different term with regards to authorized, or 
permissible, as opposed to legitimate … because you still have the root word of 
legis of law from Latin, which implies that there is a duly constituted authority 
who has created a rule, which allows you to do what you are to do….  When you 
have conflicting authority then … you’re stopped at step #5, confirmed.  
 Complexity of communication model.  Several focus group members commented 
on the complexity of the proposed model of communication.  A member of the DINFOS 
focus group said after reviewing the model for approximately five minutes, “I can’t 
possibly digest it thoroughly here.”  A member of the Military Academy focus group, 
after his initial review of the model, seemed put off by complexity of the formal 
framework.  Here, he seemed to favor a simpler, more intuitive approach based on values 
learned through military experience: 
It could be of use, but in this age of information … overloaded commanders 
having yet another layer of considerations put on top of them … aside from the 
private [lowest enlisted military rank] level onward … we all should be imbued 
with a sense of what’s right and what’s wrong – to the extent that he can keep 
things simple and say, “Act legally, morally, and ethically.” 
Upon brief reflection, however, the officer – who had experience as an ethics 
advisor in the U.S. Army – added support for the model and then proposed 
improvements: 
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You have an excellent model here.  I have to say I often over complicate 
matters…. I will propose to you off line perhaps a simpler model, [one with] four 
steps as opposed to eight … and certain of the steps that you have here could be 
consolidated or further simplified. 
As the officer continued, it became apparent that the concept of asymmetrical 
communication might confuse military officers who commonly associate this concept 
with asymmetrical threats and warfare:   
As outstanding at this may be sir, that you may reconsider for instance talking 
about limiting asymmetric communications in justifiable situations…. This may 
not be doctrinally correct nor would it be practical where the whole nature of 
asymmetric warfare is such that you counter a threat not with force on force but 
you counter vulnerability, so you may not want to hold off asymmetric targeting 
until you absolutely have to, you may want to be proactive in that.  
 Value of an ethical model.  Finally, one theme emerged consistently in all three 
focus groups: the value of the proposed model of communication to ethical decision-
making in military public affairs.  A member of the Pentagon focus group said, “I 
certainly like the idea of having [formal public relations guidelines].”  She added, 
however, “I don’t know if ethics is the right word, but some norm … [laughter] … public 
relations indicators of professionalism or something.” 
A member of the DINFOS group, after briefly examining the model, praised its 
value in clarifying ethics in decision-making: “I think it’s certainly a model that would 
provide some clarity.”  He then continued, “Sometimes you just need a little guidance, a 
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little … you know … somebody saying, ‘This is the way we’re gonna go,’ then I can go 
there.”   
Other focus group members expressed similar sentiments. During the DINFOS 
discussion, another member talked of the need for something beyond an internal sense of 
ethics when making decisions.  This model, he thought, would provide a valuable 
external framework to guide ethical decisions:  “I would say to a certain extent this … in 
some respects … this is trying to make overt something … in the morality and ethics 
piece … that we say is supposed to be inherent to our profession.”  He warned, however, 
about the framework simply becoming a checklist instead of a reasoning process. “There 
may be some value in trying to make that a more overt … item,” he observed.  “I guess 
my concern … and I don’t think that’s the intent of this [model] … my concern is that if 
we reach the point where we have … ethics as a checklist item.”  As the DINFOS 
discussion evolved around an evaluation of the model, one participant said, “Everybody 
here’s trying to do the right thing, the moral thing, the ethical thing.  But, it’s probably 
worth our while to more formally look at this from the standpoint of ethical standards.” 
 A Pentagon focus group member also valued the proposed model for its potential 
use in preventing a process of situational or selective ethics from creeping into decision-
making. Observing that the military public affairs “profession has changed in the past 
decade,” she commented on the risks of relativity associated with making ethical 
decisions without a moral framework for justifying decisions: 
I mean there’s nothing … you know, there’s nothing … written down that really 
defines what is morally correct when it comes to the dissemination of 
information.  We naturally assume that we tell the truth, but more often we 
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selectively manage the truth based upon our own biases and opinions. 
 The proposed model also seemed to fill a current need for a more formal 
framework than intuition in ethical decision-making.  Probes designed to reveal current 
models of moral reasoning in communication that might already be in use within military 
commands failed to produce evidence that any models existed.  This dialogue took place 
with a U.S. Army public affairs officer during the Military Academy focus group: 
Interviewer:  Do you have a moral framework, an ethical framework, a legal 
framework that guides, you know, when do I use that course of message as 
opposed to when do I use other means or use dialogue? 
U.S. Army PAO:  Nothing that’s clear and written other than our base doctrine of 
philosophies and the values that we prescribe to as an army. 
Interviewer: I’m talking about an operational setting where you might have to 
move quickly. 
U.S. Army PAO:  In an operational setting … the only thing … and I’ll just call 
them advisors okay, they’re sitting around the table with that commander. 
Interviewer:  If you could expand and elaborate on the guidance you just 
mentioned, what is it, how does it work, maybe how it’s lacking or is it sufficient?  
U.S. Army PAO:  If this was the table here [OC: Officer gestures to the table in 
front of the focus group members.] … and we’re sitting around it and you’re the 
commander … then I as your public affairs advisor have to take the next step and 
say, sir we’ve got a lot of other implications here….  My question to you is as 
your professional communicator is, what is the message you want to send?  And 
what’s the second and third order effects if we send that message? 
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The officer concluded the dialogue on this topic after describing a hypothetical scenario 
that required an ethical decision regarding public relations.  Again, he denied knowledge 
of a moral framework for such decision-making currently in existence: “I don’t think 
there’s a piece of paper or doctrine out there that exists, and if there is I don’t know about 
it.” 
Communication Consequences and Social Responsibility 
Results of this study demonstrated that NATO leaders were aware of the 
consequences of communication choices.  They considered these consequences when 
making decisions about communication and public relations.  They also assumed 
responsibility for the consequences of their choices on strategic publics.   
NATO leaders did not appear to behave in an arbitrary manner when making 
choices between dialogic and coercive communication.  Data also clarified how 
participants made meaning of the moral and ethical issues related to application of 
coercive communication to convey powerful and sometimes lethal threats.  
Rubin and Brown (1975) observed that persuasion and coercion both convey 
information relevant to bargaining.  However, persuasion and coercion could have 
different outcomes.  Threats generally have a more immediate effect and are more likely 
to gain compliance but they often promote hostile feelings toward the originator of 
threats. Therefore, results of this section are important to an understanding of how NATO 
leaders made communication choices – especially in conflict situations. 
RQ6: What perceptions did senior military leaders hold about consequences associated 
with coercive communication?    
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Results of inquiry into the fourth research question showed that conflict situations 
often influenced NATO leaders and public relations managers to employ coercive 
communication tactics.  A literature review revealed potential consequences of these 
tactics on audiences and demonstrated the need for organizations to take social 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions on strategic publics.   Several 
participants in long, elite, and focus group interviews talked about communication 
choices, the potential influence of these choices on strategic relationships, and how 
leaders in IFOR considered the consequences of their communication choices.  For 
example, one of the elites, a senior U.S. Navy officer who advised NATO leaders in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, talked about facing decisions, considering consequences, and taking 
action regardless of consequences.  He reported, “You are going to be faced with 
decisions where you’ve got to do something … for the moment, and you are going to 
have to make that decision and do it regardless of the long-term consequences.”   
Consideration of communication choices.  The naval officer also referred to the 
spectrum of communication choices available to NATO leaders.  As reported for RQ4, 
these choices ranged from “rosy” dialogue in settings characterized by cooperative 
relations to coercion at the other end of the spectrum: 
Again, to me I go back to the continuum or the spectrum.  In communication there 
are, there are all, you know there is a spectrum on the communication line of 
means of communication and manners of communication.  And it seems to me 
that one of them has to be coercive.  If for no other reason it’s got, you got to, 
what is at that end of the spectrum?  The other end of the spectrum is everything’s 
rosy and you know I’ll do whatever you want because you are asking me to do it. 
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Also, as reported earlier, NATO leaders considered the consequences of their 
communication choices and demonstrated a preference for cooperative approaches.  
Again, the elite explained that dialogic communication activities might require “a week 
instead of a day or two days” to produce desired effects,” but cooperative communication 
tactics did not require IFOR to “dislodge people or hurt them or damage property.”  
Referring to situations in which harm to strategic audiences could be avoided, the elite 
asked rhetorically, “What’s three or four days … in peace keeping?” 
The elite admitted, however, that IFOR considered coercion to be necessary when 
other communication tactics failed.  These situations seemed unavoidable in peace-
keeping operations, and IFOR at times had to coerce – regardless of the consequences on 
long-term relationships – in order to protect the peace agreement: 
But there are certain people that the only means of getting them to do it will be to 
either tell them they have to do it and then coerce them if they don’t do it.  I don’t 
see how you get around that because there are those persons … there are those 
personalities, there are those governments, there are those institutions that, that 
don’t react. 
 Consideration of consequences.  NATO leaders were not cavalier in their 
approach to coercion, though.  It became obvious from results of elite interviews that 
IFOR commanders and their advisors were well aware of coercion’s potentially serious 
consequences.  A NATO elite described these coercive consequences as having 
“disastrous implications down the road.”  He also remarked that coercion would require 
IFOR to look “for an opportunity to reverse” harmful consequences.  Furthermore, 
NATO leaders considered carefully these consequences in their decision-making process.  
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In this account, a NATO elite described how IFOR leaders considered consequences of 
coercive acts before making decisions about communication: 
Are we in fact going to use those coercive methods or was it merely a threat that 
we didn’t intend to follow through on?  That would be determined by, again, the 
consequences of carrying out the coercive action.  One would like to think that 
you would not make a threat unless you had already considered what the 
consequences were going to be and the negative implications of it.   
Interviews also produced several examples of coercive effects.  During 
interviews, NATO leaders and advisors identified such things as loss of life and 
organizational credibility as potential consequences of coercion. 
Loss of life.  Several interview participants referred to the protection of lives – 
lives of IFOR military forces and lives of civilians – as an overriding concern when 
conducting peace operations.  These participants also acknowledged that coercion could 
threaten lives – especially if threats failed to produced a desired result and military action 
was required to carry out the threat.  This former IFOR commander stated his desire to 
use diplomacy rather than coercion – in order to avoid the armed consequences of a failed 
threat:  
Well, frankly, at the bottom line is loss of life … and there is nothing more 
precious than life.  And … if you can solve anything diplomatically it is better.  
On the other hand, I believe that diplomacy with a big stick is a hell of a lot better 
than diplomacy with no stick….  Any smart commander is planning for both 
eventualities….  If the diplomatic path doesn’t work, what is your next step? 
Operationally, to try and force diplomacy to work.  The idea is to always force 
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this without having to fight.  But you always have to be prepared to fight, 
otherwise it won’t work.  So it is a two-edged sword here. 
 Loss of credibility and support.  One elite participant mentioned the risks to IFOR 
associated with using coercive threats that NATO was not prepared to back up.   During 
the interview he registered his concern over potential loss of IFOR’s organizational 
credibility.  Here, he equated loss of credibility to a reduction of support or capability 
needed to carry out IFOR’s peace mission: 
I think that, again, the bad things about threats are … if you make it you have to 
be prepared to carry it out.  You cannot make a threat and … when somebody 
says okay, I’m not going to do what you wanted me to do, not act on that.  The 
level of support you are going to get when you make threats is going to be much 
less….  So, you know, I don’t think that threatening is always the way you want 
to go.   
A former IFOR commander also talked about loss of credibility in terms of a 
political foe’s personal face.  G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) defined face as a 
“concept bred in the collectivist family … [that] describes the proper relationship with 
one’s social environment” (pp. 89-90).  According to the Hofstedes, “the importance of 
face is the consequence of living in a society very conscious of social contexts” (p. 90).  
Furthermore, Balkan groups like Bosnian-Serbs are considered to be part of collectivist 
societies that place high value on social context (p. 83).    
Therefore, the IFOR commander’s remarks – regardless of whether or not he was 
aware of the theoretical implications of face – seemed to express his practical awareness 
of the face-saving need to maintain cooperative relations with political leaders in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina.  Thus, he understood coercive consequences could embarrass civilian 
leaders that NATO depended upon to implement political provisions of the peace 
agreement.  The consequent loss of face among those leaders could therefore imperil 
progress toward accomplishment of the peace mission.  Conversely, careful use of 
communication – considering effects on IFOR and publics they affected – could produce 
beneficial consequences.  This probe and response from an IFOR commander illustrated 
the importance he placed on protecting relationships with Bosnian political leaders: 
Interviewer: Well, was your intent in using the communication only to get the 
results you wanted?  Because you mentioned before the importance of 
maintaining the relationships of Plavsic [former Bosnian-Serb president] and 
others. 
IFOR Commander: No, no.  Of course, the benefits are [to] reassure … it builds 
a relationship. 
The commander also elaborated on his notion of using diplomacy rather than 
force, when possible, in order to respect face and thereby protect strategic relationships: 
And … my gut was I just … to go as gradual as I could to give … Plavsic time to 
work.  Because I didn’t want to have the Serbs backed into a corner to where it 
was us or them losing face, those kinds of things … I wanted the diplomatic way 
to work rather than the use of force. 
 This theme was also revealed in remarks by another elite, a senior U.S. Navy 
officer who sometimes provided advice to the commander.  Here, again, awareness of 
coercive consequences and respect for face and relationship management is evident in the 
officer’s account: 
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I think in the vast majority of cases, most military people would tell you if I can 
achieve the mission and achieve it without having to use force, I would rather do 
it that way.  And again, for obvious reasons you create a lot of ill will, you create 
a lot of bad feelings, you create potential problems in the future when you use 
force.   
Finally, two elite interview participants described the reasoning process used 
when IFOR leaders chose between collaborative and coercive communication tactics.   
First, a former IFOR commander described how his decisions were influenced by a “war 
counsel” of senior advisors who, in a crisis situation, would openly discuss military 
options and assign priorities to the options that were based on an assessment of 
consequences: 
I had a war counsel and I used the war counsel frequently.  I had people that I 
trusted that I called in when we had to make decisions.  When we had concerns 
we would talk things over, we would kind of understand the complete 
implications of an action that we might take, we tried to game it out and … take it 
out to second, third order. We tried to [understand] the consequences of our 
actions in … the later on.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
As this study concludes, I recall the purpose of my research: to propose a model 
of ethical communication that extends the excellence theory and contributes to the 
development of a global theory in public relations.  In this chapter, I will explain how this 
study has fulfilled its purpose.  However, beyond fulfilling its theoretical purpose, this 
study has also helped fulfill a purpose that gives meaning to my life.  As I described in 
the preface, my professional public relations experiences in the U.S. Navy and in NATO 
led me on a search for non-violent means of communication to help manage deadly 
conflict.  My education and experiences as a scholar have shown me how to conduct this 
search. 
James Thurber (1956) moralized about his fable, The Shore and the Sea: "All men 
should strive to learn before they die what they are running from, and to, and why" (p. 
174).  So it is with my life’s experiences from sea to shore and finally to the purpose of 
this study: running from, to, and why.  I have run from the screams of dying men in the 
Persian Gulf, through peace fields in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to a course of rigorous 
research.  Now, as I conclude this phase of research, I will explain what this case study of 
NATO public relations activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina means to theory, to practice, and 
to society.  Before I finish, the analysis and interpretation contained in this section will 
help answer, “Why is this important?” 
Summary of Significant Findings 
Of the many research findings in this study, the five most significant are worth 
summarizing before I proceed.  First, during peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
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NATO conducted public information activities that were consistent with most principles 
of the excellence theory in public relations.  I found direct evidence of these principles at 
all levels of NATO public relations: program, department, organization, and effects.   
NATO public relations programs were managed strategically, by single or 
integrated public relations departments that were separate from psychological operations, 
civil-military information, and other military information activities that were treated as 
the equivalent of marketing functions in this study.  These departments were led by 
senior public relations managers who reported directly to NATO leaders and exerted 
influence over strategic organizational decisions.  Furthermore, NATO public relations 
programs were characterized by a two-way symmetrical communication strategy 
designed to manage long-term relationships.  This strategy incorporated a mixed-motive 
continuum of collaborative and coercive communication tactics to manage threats in the 
turbulent, post-war environment of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  NATO public relations 
departments also exhibited professional knowledge of public relations and management, 
and public relations personnel enjoyed high levels of morale.  Finally, there was 
widespread evidence that NATO public relations programs met communication 
objectives and reduced costs by helping to implement the peace agreement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina without resorting to lethal and costly military force. 
NATO did behave inconsistently with some principles of the excellence theory.  
For instance, data regarding gender among NATO public relations practitioners were 
insufficient to judge equality of opportunity; however, NATO did not appear to achieve 
requisite variety in terms of gender.  Still, there were ample data to conclude that NATO 
public relations offices were diverse in terms of ethnic and cultural qualities.  Data 
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related to organizational culture and internal systems of communication also exhibited 
some inconsistencies in terms of symmetry.  The organizational culture of NATO was 
influenced by a mixture of national culture, military culture, and the personality traits of 
individual leaders who headed various NATO military commands.  This finding revealed 
that some NATO leaders held asymmetrical worldviews of communication, perhaps 
because of learned or inherited cultural traits.  Furthermore, since NATO assigned 
responsibility for internal communication programs to member nations, data were not 
available to completely evaluate the symmetrical nature of internal communication 
systems.  Finally, the large, complex nature of NATO suggested that the alliance was 
structured as a mixed mechanical/organic organization rather than an organic 
organization.  
Second, NATO’s application of excellence principles to its public relations 
programs corresponded with nine generic principles in global public relations theory.  
Data also identified empirical evidence of cultural variables related to national 
infrastructure, media systems, and societal culture that influenced the application of these 
principles.  These findings have important implications for managing strategic public 
relations in multinational organizations that operate in global, multicultural settings. 
Third, NATO resorted to the use of coercive communication tactics, which at first 
seemed inconsistent with the symmetrical model of communication associated with the 
excellence theory.  After repeated interviewing and deeper examination of data, I 
discovered an important pattern that explained how this behavior was, in fact, consistent 
with the excellence theory.  This pattern revealed how NATO preferred to use 
collaborative communication but resorted to coercive communication when faced with 
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hostile threats that posed risks to lives or to the peace agreement.  Hence, this pattern was 
analogous to the mixed-motive communication continuum in the excellence theory.  
Furthermore, NATO used coercion as a limited, short-term tactic to support a long-term, 
symmetrical strategy: establishing a peaceful environment and restoring collaborative 
relationships in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Fourth, I found that NATO leaders routinely engaged in moral reasoning when 
choosing between collaborative and coercive communication tactics.  Through this 
reasoning process, they considered options and took into account the consequences of 
their communication acts on strategic publics.  They acted with ethical intent, limited 
their actions in order to protect lives and property, favored dialogue over coercion, and – 
even when they coerced – revealed the intent of their communication activities.   
However, NATO leaders followed no formal framework to guide their reasoning 
process.  This was inconsistent with other types of reasoning related to military 
operations in NATO.  For instance, whenever NATO engaged armed adversaries with 
lethal military force, alliance leaders typically followed a formal, external, legal 
framework that incorporated rules of engagement (ROE), which required approval by 
political authorities.  However, when engaging in coercive communication – which could 
result in armed conflict – NATO leaders relied almost exclusively on informal, internal 
reasoning from intuitive knowledge.  Interviews did reveal the existence of a framework 
for U.S. principles of military public information; however, these principles were of little 
use to a moral-reasoning process and held no legal standing in multinational, political-
military operations.  This finding led to an assumption that intuitive methods of moral 
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reasoning that relied upon incomplete cognitions of personal experience might be 
susceptible to ethical relativism.   
 Fifth – and finally – a proposed model of communication based on ethical 
communication and moral theories gained general acceptance among senior military 
leaders, public relations managers, lawyers, clergy, ethicists, and educators.  This model 
was viewed by interview participants as having value in guiding moral-reasoning 
processes used to select communication tactics and strategies – especially in conflict 
situations. In particular, participants believed that the formal structure of the model made 
application of ethics in these decisions more overt than internal cognitive processes.  
Hence, the model showed promise in helping to apply ethics, justify choices, and avoid 
the problem of relativism when making communication decisions.   
Critical feedback from interview participants also suggested ways to improve the 
model.  In particular, more work was needed to clarify concepts in the model, thus 
making the model more global (and less Western) in theory and in practice.  The model 
also required more parsimony, to make it more useful to managers and leaders who 
operate under compressed decision cycles in time-sensitive crisis situations.  Next, I will 
elaborate on the significance of each of these findings. 
Conclusions 
Excellence Theory in Multinational Public Relations 
Which principles of the excellence theory in public relations did NATO apply to its public 
relations programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996? 
I was motivated to undertake this research, in part, by my interest in looking 
beyond country-specific studies to find out how the excellence theory might be applied 
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by multinational organizations.  I was also eager to investigate claims that the excellence 
theory did not represent how public relations was practiced in non-Western nations (J. 
Grunig & Jaatinen, 1998; L. Grunig et al., 1998; Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 2003a; Van 
Ruler & Verčič, 2002; Van Ruler et al., 2004; Wakefield, 1996, 1997).  I felt that results 
of this type of research held strong potential to support the theory’s positive as well as 
normative value and extend the excellence theory to a global perspective. 
Having chosen NATO as an instrumental case for this study, I was immediately 
concerned with the political-military nature of this alliance.  I assumed that NATO might 
use a one-way, public information approach to communications because J. Grunig and 
Hunt (1984) reported that public information “is nearly always the model used in 
government agencies” (p. 26).  Furthermore, political and governmental agencies are 
often considered authoritarian; and J. Grunig and L. Grunig (2001) observed, “The two-
way symmetrical model of communication … is a model that organizations can use but 
often do not use because an authoritarian dominant coalition sees the approach as a threat 
to its power” (p. 320).  Therefore, I assumed that NATO might reject principles of 
symmetry in the excellence theory that senior political and military leaders could regard 
as threats to their authority.   
I was interested, therefore, to find that NATO did apply most principles of the 
excellence theory, including the two-way symmetrical model of communication.  
Furthermore, I found that NATO’s application and adaptation of these principles to the 
Eastern and Western cultures of the alliance’s member nations provided strong normative 
and positive support for the excellence theory.  Hence, contrary to previous claims (e.g., 
Culbertson & Chen, 1996; Kruckeberg, 1996a, 1996b; Van Ruler & Verčič, 2002), I 
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found that NATO public relations programs based on principles of the excellence theory 
were well-suited to societies outside of the Western hemisphere.  Given these findings, I 
began to interpret their meaning.   
Data provided few surprises with regard to findings about excellence principles at 
the levels of program, department, or effects.  NATO was similar to other political-
military organizations that typically adhere to a strategic management approach to 
problem-solving, employ professional managers, and invest in types of training and 
education that promote professional development among their employees.  These 
organizations are often structured in a hierarchical fashion, with clear divisions between 
functions and direct-reporting relationships.  A British officer who participated in a long 
interview described this phenomenon in NATO as a “stovepipe” system, which allows 
for communication to proceed directly in a vertical path from lower levels of the 
organization to both NATO and to national political authorities.  Also, operational 
functions within these organizations are often coordinated closely.  Several military 
participants in focus group interviews referred to matrix planning, which is typical of the 
way military organizations coordinate various activities during planning of military 
operations. 
The most interesting finding within the first research question related to how 
NATO adopted a two-way, symmetrical worldview and applied two-way symmetrical 
communication – despite its authoritarian culture, mechanical/organic structure, and 
occasional use of coercion.  Because NATO’s coercive behavior was closely associated 
with conflict, I will defer discussion about coercive communication to the section in this 
chapter devoted to conflict, ethics, and moral reasoning.   
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With regard to the remaining questions of symmetry, a possible answer to the 
dichotomy referred to in the previous paragraph lies within NATO’s charter.  First, as 
Pien (1994) reported, alliances and coalitions like NATO often are produced by conflict 
and exist to “collectively address” (p. 11) and resolve issues that matter to stakeholders 
and diverse groups.  Van Dyke (2003b) also reported alliances and coalitions exist to 
promote “collective action and cooperation” (p. 14).   
NATO’s founding document, the Atlantic Charter, which was written in 1949 to 
prevent a recurrence of world war, provides practical support for observations by Pien 
(1994) and Van Dyke (2003b).  The NATO alliance is today still united in a mission to 
preserve “security through mutual guarantees [italics added] and stable relations [italics 
added] with other countries” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1998, p. 23).  Hence, 
collective action and consensus among NATO member nations are important principles 
to the alliance.  In fact, one NATO public relations officer, during a long interview, 
described the way in which IFOR’s public relations plan was created: “The IFOR plan 
was written and briefed to all the [NATO member] nations and copied to them well in 
advance … in an attempt to get some form of consensus.”  Thus, the NATO public 
relations plan for peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was born out of consensus, 
designed for collective action and cooperation, and enacted to achieve stable relationships 
even in coercive situations.   
A theoretical understanding of consensus could also help explain how NATO 
applied two-way strategies to its communication programs, even when engaged in 
asymmetrical military or political situations. For instance, Gilbert (1997) identified 
concepts of agreement, consensus, attachment, and inclusion as among the most 
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important aspects of coalescent argumentation (p. 63).  Marsh (2001) also identified 
“unification and consensus” (p. 88) as defining qualities of Isocratic rhetoric.  Finally, 
Toth and Heath (1992) explained that rhetoric, even with its persuasive roots, is not 
inherently a one-way communication process.  Rhetoric could also represent a dialogic 
communication “exchange by which interested parties seek to induce agreement and 
action” (p. xii).  The rhetorical concepts therefore explain how NATO, which often 
engages in political negotiation and argumentation, could adhere to principles of two-way 
symmetry in the excellence theory even when the alliance communicates persuasively.   
Investigation into NATO’s application of excellence principles produced one 
other significant finding that required further analysis and interpretation: efforts to 
integrate military public relations with psychological operations.  First, many participants 
expressed concern and confusion over a movement within the U.S. government to 
combine public relations (e.g., public affairs and public information) with psychological 
operations and other types of strategic communication.   
The product of this combined communication approach was described by many 
participants as information operations, which I have defined in the Glossary of Terms.  I 
reexamined data from interviews in an effort to learn more about this concept.  
Discussion of information operations occurred in some long interviews and, most 
frequently, in focus groups.  These interviews involved senior public relations managers 
who had been involved in recent planning efforts related to information operations.  In 
the next few paragraphs, I will interpret the meaning of this term and assess its 
significance to this study.   
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According to participant descriptions, the concept of information operations is 
very similar to the concept of integrated marketing communication in private-sector 
public relations.  Just as integrated marketing communication has become a controversial 
concept in the private sector (see Hutton, 2001), so has information operations generated 
controversy in government and military agencies.  Interview participants feared that 
combining public relations with psychological operations – considered by many to be a 
propaganda tool – could subordinate public relations to other functions, sever the direct 
reporting relationship between public relations and senior leaders, and damage the 
credibility of public relations activities. 
One senior U.S. Navy public affairs officer who managed public information for a 
NATO command in Europe described with grave concern the efforts to establish a NATO 
information operations function: 
Well, one of the big … issues of debate right now, which is causing a lot of 
consternation, is how, there’s … a new branch if you will or a new section: it’s 
called Information Operations.  And the alliance is still wrestling with this as is 
America. 
As this officer continued to express his concerns, he explained how he made meaning of 
information operations, which was consistent with explanations of information operations 
provided by other participants: 
Right now, information operations is supposed to be a coordinating mechanism…. 
We normally would do integrated operations anyway, we normally would sit 
down with the psychological operations branch, with the CIMIC [Civil Military 
Information Coordination] branch, with the POLAD [political advisor], with the 
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legal officer, with all of the key players … all coordinating our focus of … 
operations … working in the proper direction.  
He then expressed his fear about the influence of information operations on public 
relations as he interpreted the difference between coordinating public relations with other 
information functions and subordinating public relations to information operations: 
The danger right now with what’s happening is there are some people that think 
that the information operations person should fall in what’s called an information 
operation branch, and under that branch should be all of these people that I’ve just 
described earlier – including PIO [the public information officer].  And, this 
particular person, as the information operations branch chief, would then either 
report directly to the chief of staff and the admiral, himself; or, would report to 
the J3, which is the operations officer. 
The Navy officer then seemed to identify his primary concern: the subordination of the 
public relations function and elimination of the existing direct-reporting relationship 
between NATO public relations managers and senior military commanders. “Either way, 
it would basically move the public information officer either one or two steps down the 
food chain,” the officer reported, “and really inhibit the PIO’s ability to get command 
information, strategic commander kind of information quickly.”  
Other participants reported that a similar integration of public relations and 
propaganda functions is occurring at high levels of the U.S. government.  One of these 
officers described this integration in current U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq 
(anonymous, personal communication, April 11, 2005).  Two senior U.S. Army officers 
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exchanged ideas on this topic during the U.S. Military Academy focus group.  One 
officer, who had experience in public affairs, defined military public relations: 
In a purely military function, what we call public affairs has four basic 
disciplines.  You have … employee communications … community relations … 
public information or media relations … and then the last one … that you start to 
see come out … in the past few years is strategic communications. 
Another Army officer followed up immediately on the previous statement and 
interjected a question: 
I had a question about that last one actually … the strategic piece.… I’ve seen a 
lot of heated discussions going back and forth in PA circles about being used as 
an asset or tool to help influence certain target audiences – you know as opposed 
to PSYOP….  Where do you think it’s going to go? 
This question led to another comment by an experienced military public affairs officer, 
who said with conviction: “You hit on a key point there, and that’s the PsyOps-PA 
integration.  And the IO [information operations] community is wrestling with this … 
right now.”  This comment prompted a U.S. Army officer with many years of experience 
in law, public relations, and ethics to say:  
The reality of the joint, combined,8 interagency realm is such that even at the 
tactical or the operational level you have fusion cells, you’ll have a symbiosis of a 
variety of different information operations which cannot be conducted without 
having a close coordination between PsyOps as well as the public affairs assets … 
it is not the law that prohibits the integration, it is simply national policy. 
                                                 
8 The term joint defines operations of one nation that involve more than one military service.  Combined 
operations involve more than one allied nation.  These concepts are defined in the Glossary of Terms. 
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After careful review of this exchange between U.S. Military Academy faculty and 
staff, I extended my analysis to include an interpretation of national policy – trying to 
identify to which national policy this officer referred and to determine how this policy 
might affect public relations in the context of this study.  After a brief literature search, I 
located two references to government management of information that related to 
comments made by interview participants.  The two references, both news reports, 
described efforts among some government agencies to integrate information activities.  
The reports quoted several senior, U.S. government officials who expressed concerns 
similar to those of interview participants in this study: Blurring the demarcation between 
public relations and psychological operations could lead to loss of credibility of military 
public relations. 
First, a New York Times report by Shanker and Schmitt (2004) reported, “The 
Pentagon is engaged in bitter, high-level debate over how far it can and should go in 
managing or manipulating information to influence opinion abroad, senior Defense 
Department civilians and military officers say” (p. A1).  The report added, “Critics … say 
such deceptive missions could shatter the Pentagon's credibility” (p. A1).  Second, the 
Los Angeles Times (Mazzetti, 2004) reported, “‘The movement of information has gone 
from the public affairs world to the psychological operations world,’ one senior defense 
official said. ‘What's at stake is the credibility of people in uniform’” (p. A1).   
Shanker and Schmitt (2004) also reported failed efforts by the U.S. Department of 
Defense to establish an “Office of Strategic Influence” (p. A1).  This office, which was 
reportedly designed to “provide news items, possibly including false ones, to foreign 
journalists in an effort to influence overseas opinion” (p. A1), was closed after receiving 
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intense criticism.  Corroborating an account by one U.S. Military Academy focus group 
participant, Shanker and Schmitt reported that this effort had extended to military 
operations in Iraq: 
Within the Pentagon, some of the military's most powerful figures have expressed 
concerns at some of the steps taken that risk blurring the traditional lines between 
public affairs and the world of combat information operations. 
These tensions were cast into stark relief this summer in Iraq when Gen. George 
W. Casey Jr., the top commander in Iraq, approved the combining of the 
command's day-to-day public affairs operations with combat psychological and 
information operations into a single ‘strategic communications office.’ (p. A1)  
Quoting the U.S. armed forces’ highest-ranking military official, Shanker and 
Schmitt (2004) summarized concerns of many military public affairs officials and senior 
leaders: 
In a rare expression of senior-level questions about such decisions, Gen. Richard 
B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a memorandum warning 
the military's regional combat commanders about the risks of mingling the 
military public affairs too closely with information operations. (p. A1) 
Quoting the chairman’s letter, the news report continued, “‘While organizations may be 
inclined to create physically integrated P.A./I.O. offices, such organizational constructs 
have the potential to compromise the commander's credibility with the media and the 
public,’ it said” (p. A1). 
What does this finding mean and how is it significant to this study?  The current 
controversy over mixing military public affairs and psychological operations has, to now, 
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been largely driven by the United States.  However, the influence of this issue is 
spreading to multinational operations led or supported by the United States.  If concerns 
expressed by interview participants and other government officials are realized, 
combining public relations and psychological operations under a single functional 
manager would contradict principles of the excellence theory – the application of which 
enhance the credibility, autonomy, and strategic value of public relations.  This issue 
warrants further research.  However, findings from this study suggest that efforts to 
combine public relations with other information functions – moving away from principles 
of the excellence theory – could have disastrous consequences on the ability of military 
public relations efforts to help organizations like NATO achieve communication 
objectives. 
Culture and Global Theory in Public Relations 
 The finding that culture influenced the management of communication and public 
relations in NATO was not surprising.  There is ample evidence from previous studies to 
demonstrate interdependence among culture and communication (Sriramesh & White, 
1992).  Moreover, studies have shown that organizational culture (Dozier, 1995), which 
arises from societal culture (G. Hofstede, 1980, 2001; G. Hofstede & G. J. Hofstede, 
2005), affects organizational communication management by shaping the worldview of 
public relations (J. Grunig, 1992b).  Worldview, in turn, shapes decisions made by 
organizational leaders, including the choice of public relations models and 
communication strategies (Sriramesh et al., 1992).   
Hence, this study found that organizational culture is a key element in public 
relations management.  First, NATO’s organizational leaders and the decisions they made 
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were, as Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) found, “key to the effectiveness of the overall 
change process” (p. 433).  Second, choice of symmetrical communication was a “key 
choice” (J. Grunig, 1992b, p. 24) in effective management of the NATO organization.   
However, I found that organizational culture and communication in NATO’s 
multinational setting had a more complex relationship than previously reported in studies 
of national organizations.  For instance, acculturation produced by a confluence of 26 
national cultures in NATO seems to have had a much more profound effect on 
organizational culture and worldview than described in less culturally diverse 
organizations.  The complexity of NATO’s cultural diversity is depicted in Figure 6 on 
the next page, which represents the flags of NATO members along with some political 
and military elements of member-nation governments (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 2005).  
Furthermore, the acculturation in NATO was apparently influenced by cultural 
determinants such as personality (G. Hofstede & G. J. Hofstede, 2005) and external 
variables such as national infrastructure and media systems (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2001, 
2003a).  I also discovered a military culture that I have not seen identified as a 
determinant of organizational culture and worldview in previous studies of public 
relations.  Since these cultural factors are so closely related to principles of global public 
relations, I will analyze and interpret results of both the second and third research 
questions in this section.    
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Legend: 1st : parliament, 1st chamber; Sen: senate, 2nd chamber; Gov: government; 
State Head: head of state/president; PM: prime minister/chancellor; MFA: ministry of 
foreign affairs; MOD: ministry/department of defense; MIL: military/chief of staff; 
DEL: national delegation to NATO 
 
Figure 6. NATO Member Countries (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2005).  
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How did organizational culture influence NATO’s management of IFOR public relations 
and communication programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
J. Grunig (1992b) and Sriramesh et al. (1992) identified the influence of culture 
on worldview and organizational decisions about public relations. These authors referred 
to organizational culture in a singular or broad sense, as in “a broad base of worldview, 
meanings, and values that affect all decisions in the organization” (Sriramesh et al., p. 
579).  Findings of this study suggest that organizational culture in multinational 
organizations is a much more discrete concept, discriminated by several variables.  I 
found that the organizational culture of NATO was comprised of many subcultures, 
rather than a single, broad culture.  These subcultures operated at various levels of 
NATO’s organization as distinct pillars instead of a broad base that supports 
organizational decisions.  J. Grunig and Repper (1992) referred to subcultures as 
“population segments” (p. 141) or social groupings that are useful to strategic 
management of publics.  The authors also differentiated between narrow subcultures and 
“broad national cultures” (p. 143). 
My analysis led me to interpret NATO’s organizational culture as a divided 
culture (Keyton, 2005) characterized by a system of subcultures or groups.  According to 
Keyton, “To the extent that different sets of artifacts, values, and assumptions develop in 
these groups, an organization’s culture is said to have subcultures” (p. 57).  Furthermore, 
“the way in which subcultures coexist creates the culture” (p. 57) of the organization. 
Descriptions of NATO’s organizational culture provided by interview participants are 
strikingly similar to a description of a divided culture by Keyton, who wrote: 
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Subgroup distinctions often occur along functional or occupational roles; 
geographical locations; product, market, or technology distinctions; and 
hierarchical levels.  In addition, subcultures can develop and be sustained when 
two or more organizations merge or work together in a joint venture or strategic 
alliance. 
Keyton (2005) also identified two types of phenomena in divided cultures: 
differentiation and fragmentation.  Differentiated subcultures occur along the lines of 
managers and technicians, different types of employees, and “any of the dimensions 
along which organizational members identify and organize themselves into language 
communities” (pp. 60-61).  In fragmented subcultures, “organizational members are part 
of shifting coalitions, forming and reforming based on shared identities, issues, and 
circumstances” (p. 63).  According to Keyton, fragmentation, because of its shifting and 
ambiguous nature, often impedes the creation of a broader, organizational consensus. 
Keyton (2005) differentiated a divided approach to organizational culture from a 
consensus approach.  She explained, “A consensus view of organizational culture is 
based on the congruence of artifacts, values, and assumptions jointly held or shared by 
organizational members” (p. 53).  From a consensus approach, an organization’s culture 
grows more consensual as it becomes more unified and more consistent in the 
interpretation of culture among its members.  Keyton referred to this phenomenon as a 
“powerful culture” (p. 53).  She also explained that powerful cultures are often associated 
with strong leaders who shape an organization’s value system and use strategic 
communication to propagate an integrated culture.  She identified the U.S. Marine Corps 
as an example of a unified or strong culture. 
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Keyton’s (2005) comparison of the U.S. Marine Corps with strong culture was 
relevant to findings in this study.  The presence of a military subculture was one of the 
most intriguing aspects of NATO’s organizational culture.  Many participants described 
different approaches to public relations management that they associated with national 
and societal culture.  Moreover, participants described a military culture within a national 
culture, and they further segmented military culture into subcultures associated with 
different branches of the armed forces within a country.   
A Canadian officer described changes in NATO perspectives of communication 
and public relations management that occurred when military leadership of the peace 
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed.  After the first year of operations, NATO 
shifted command of its peace forces from a U.S. Navy admiral to a U.S. Army general.  
The Canadian, who witnessed the transition, described how perspectives of public 
relations management changed immediately from an open approach to media relations 
under the admiral to a much more closed approach under the general.  Several other 
accounts provided descriptions of how public relations perspectives varied among U.S. 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force cultures.  From all accounts, this military 
subculture seemed to have a profound effect on NATO’s overall organizational culture 
and, by extension, to NATO’s management of communication and public relations. 
I interpreted a military culture as part of national infrastructure described by 
Sriramesh and Verčič (2001, 2003a), rather than as a separate cultural entity.  I reached 
this conclusion after considering that military services in democratic nations (e.g., NATO 
member nations) are part of national political systems under the authority of  elected or 
appointed civilian leaders.  As such, military subcultures in NATO, as a component of 
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national culture, seemed to operate as yet another variable that influenced public relations 
and communication management.  
My interpretation rejects perspectives that identify NATO as a single or broad 
universe of worldview, meanings, and values that influence public relations management.  
Instead, my interpretation treats NATO as an organization that is culturally divided and 
differentiated according to Keyton (2005).  Thus, NATO is constructed from what I have 
termed an organizational constellation of cultures, which is derived from unique 
subcultures rather than a unified culture.  However, the coexistence of these differentiated 
subcultures – unlike fragmented subcultures – create a consensual culture within NATO 
that subscribes to a dominant paradigm of mutual understanding, consensus, 
collaboration, and collective action. 
Part of NATO’s cultural constellation is depicted in Figure 6, which contains 
symbols representing flags and various elements of national infrastructure associated with 
NATO member countries.  These elements identify political and military systems: heads 
of government, parliamentary systems, ministries of foreign affairs, and ministries of 
defense.  G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) and Sriramesh and Verčič (2001, 2003a) 
identified many of these institutions as cultural variables that influence management of 
public relations and communication. Hence, I consider these elements to be like celestial 
bodies, each orbiting a cultural constellation that represents NATO’s organizational 
environment.  Furthermore, just as celestial bodies in an astrological constellation exert 
gravitational influence over other bodies, the basic elements that comprise NATO’s 
cultural constellation influence the alliance’s worldview of communication and public 
relations. 
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After identifying these subcultures, I determined that they produced acculturation 
at all levels of the NATO alliance.  Furthermore, acculturation produced signs of both 
convergence and divergence.  A British officer provided an account of convergence when 
he recalled the French public affairs officer who adapted to NATO-style media relations: 
“His background was such that he had to adjust – make a major adjustment I would say 
in, in the way he looked at the media.”  A U.S. Army officer who managed public 
relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided a similar account of a French officer on his 
staff who attempted to learn from and help the French military adapt to NATO media 
systems: 
[He] collected every field manual, paper that I could provide him … and sent [the 
information] back to France because they wanted to institute a public information 
program within the French military and training for their senior officers like we 
had in the United States and like we were doing at NATO in Bosnia. 
On the other hand, an Italian public relations manager in NATO related a much different 
perspective of acculturation.  In what appeared to be a description of divergence, he 
talked of the lack of “harmony” among levels of NATO public relations, which he 
attributed to “different, slightly different approaches, in planning for public information.”   
Thus, the concept of organizational culture seems to be dynamic in NATO.  For 
instance, according to theoretical perspectives of culture, changes in leadership or 
membership in NATO would prompt changes in national traits and national infrastructure 
within the alliance’s cultural constellation.  The NATO worldview toward 
communication and public relations seems to remain based largely on Western concepts 
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of symmetrical communication, cooperation, and collective security – because of 
NATO’s collective security charter.   
However, even subtle changes in the national composition of leaders and 
members must inevitably influence the characteristics of NATO’s subcultures at various 
levels of the organization.  These alterations in subcultures would then influence changes 
in the way alliance leaders and public relations practitioners manage communication at 
subordinate levels of NATO.  This interpretation seems consistent with J. Grunig and 
Repper’s (1992) observation of the “circular” (p. 143), changing nature of organizational 
culture’s influence on decision-making and public relations.   
The changing nature of NATO’s organizational culture and the alliance’s 
subcultures may also be subject to other theoretical interpretations.  First, NATO’s senior 
leadership positions are often assigned to Western nations that hold a two-way 
symmetrical worldview of communication.  This leadership might influence adoption of a 
dominant worldview or corporate culture that values symmetrical communication – just 
as Schneider (aka L. Grunig, 1985) observed that messages from the top of an 
organization could influence the entire organization.  However, an organizational culture 
based on cooperation and collective agreement could prompt NATO to adjust to or 
accommodate a plurality of worldviews held by individual member nations.  A similar 
phenomenon has been described by Verčič et al. (1996) and by Brinkerhoff and Ingle 
(1989), who explained that organizations often make adjustments that provide them with 
“structured flexibility” (Brinkerhoff & Ingle, 1989, p. 32) needed to cope with changes in 
their environment.  Second, divergence theory might explain how member nations of 
NATO might resist the imposition of a monolithic, dominant culture and try to retain 
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their own worldview of public relations and communication, with some adaptations 
(Wakefield, 1996).  
 Deeper analysis of results related to questions of culture revealed sources that 
produced subcultures.  These sources related closely to concepts associated with a global 
theory of public relations. 
Which, if any, excellence theory principles applied by NATO to IFOR communication 
programs were associated with generic principles of a global theory in public relations? 
NATO applied nine generic principles of global public relations described by 
Verčič et al. (1996).  Data related to two of the principles warrant further analysis: 
NATO’s employment of symmetrical systems of internal communication and the 
existence of knowledge potential for the managerial role and symmetrical communication 
in public relations.  I will also interpret data related to external, cultural variables that 
could influence application of generic, global principles. 
Internal communication.  First, I equated internal communication to the U.S. 
military’s concept of command information or internal information.  Military internal 
information systems are designed to promote dialogue between senior military 
commanders, middle managers, junior enlisted personnel, civilian employees, and family 
members of service members – up and down a military chain of command.  NATO’s 
peace implementation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina did publish an internal “command 
information” newspaper designed to keep members of the peace force informed about the 
progress of the IFOR mission.  Some participants mentioned the newspaper and 
expressed pride in its long record of success as an information tool that still helps to 
promote morale among peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, publication of 
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this paper seemed to be a departure from NATO policy, which traditionally assigned 
responsibility for internal information to individual NATO nations and coalition partners. 
I interpreted this finding to be a function of limited economic resources and 
educational values.  First, NATO seemed to dedicate most of its public relations 
resources to media and community relations – activities that NATO perceived as keys to 
mission success.  Assigning responsibility for internal relations to member nations spared 
NATO the responsibility for dedicating funding and personnel to this function.  
Furthermore, production and management of internal information products required 
specialized training and equipment.  United States military forces like the U.S. Army 
have dedicated units that train and deploy with their forces to produce command 
information products.  I found no evidence that the NATO alliance had any such 
capability.  Therefore, I concluded that the low value assigned by NATO to command 
information training and equipment contributed to a lack of symmetrical systems of 
internal communication.   
Knowledge potential.  As reported, knowledge potential in terms of professional 
education and training in management and theoretical communication concepts seemed to 
diminish below the level of senior or deputy public relations managers in NATO.  
Furthermore, according to participant accounts, only the United States and Canada 
maintained a corps of trained, military public relations professionals needed to fill NATO 
posts.  A small number of European countries (e.g., United Kingdom) provided some 
professional public relations training for officers but had no dedicated cadre of military 
public information specialists.  According to some participants, lack of professional 
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knowledge in public relations among military officers is becoming problematic for a 
NATO alliance undergoing rapid changes in membership and cultural identity. 
As I analyzed these data, I concluded that national differences in values applied to 
public relations education might explain this phenomenon.  For instance, L. Grunig et al. 
(2002) reported that public relations practitioners in the United Kingdom placed 
significantly less importance on public relations education than practitioners in the 
United States.  Culbertson (1996) observed the same trend, noting that the United States 
led the world in terms of the value placed on formal, public relations education.  
Therefore, lack of formal education in public relations and related management 
disciplines could inhibit the acquisition of knowledge needed to select and apply two-
way, symmetrical communication in excellent public relations programs.  Pratt and 
Ogbondah (1996) also concluded that globalization requires nations to develop new 
knowledge about other cultures and their social systems – including communication; yet, 
such knowledge is lacking.  Without this knowledge, the potential for professional 
excellence in public relations is limited.  
Personality.  Several participants described in vivid detail how the personalities of 
individual military commanders and senior public relations managers influenced the 
application of public relations programs.  This finding was apparently related to two 
factors: military culture and determinants of societal culture.  First, participants 
sometimes described how military culture influenced development of public relations 
perspectives as military leaders achieved seniority and assumed higher levels of 
command responsibility.  For instance, a senior U.S. Army public affairs officer 
described changes in his commander’s personality and attitude toward media relations 
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over a period of several months in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He attributed the change to 
“command influence” and added, “[He] may have been influenced by his bosses to be 
more open and available.” 
Second, G. Hofstede and G. J. Hofstede (2005) described culture as “mental 
programming” (p. 4).  Among the determinants of this programming, or culture, is 
personality.  According to the Hofstedes, personality is both inherited and learned.  It is 
learned in the sense that “unique personal experiences” (p. 5) modify culture.  
Furthermore, Sriramesh and Verčič (2003b) identified personality as a determinant of 
societal culture.  Therefore, I interpreted accounts about personality traits as support for 
Sriramesh and Verčič’s notion that cultural determinants can influence development and 
application of global public relations programs.   
Managing International Conflict:  
Moral Reasoning, Ethical Communication, and Social Responsibility 
 Analysis of data related to NATO’s management of international conflict led to 
some of the most meaningful results to emerge from this study.  Conflict in IFOR’s 
turbulent operating environment influenced NATO leaders to select coercive 
communication tactics.  However, leaders selected these tactics only after a moral 
reasoning process that applied ethics to the decision-making process and considered 
consequences of coercive actions.  In view of the ethical, socially-responsible intentions 
of IFOR leaders, I interpreted their use of coercive communication to be part of a mixed-
motive communication continuum that remained consistent with the excellence theory.   
Still, important questions remained after my initial analysis.  First, was NATO’s 
application of coercive communication appropriate to the situation?  Second, when 
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engaged in moral reasoning, NATO military leaders used an internal reasoning process 
that relied on intuitive knowledge to make decisions.  What did reliance on this intuitive 
process mean in terms of ethical behavior?  Finally, given the lack of a formal framework 
to guide moral reasoning, what were the possible consequences of NATO’s coercive 
actions?   
How did conflict situations facing IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina influence choice of 
communication strategies by senior NATO leaders? 
Given the conflict situations faced by IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I analyzed 
NATO’s coercive behavior from a perspective that combined moral philosophy, 
communication theory, negotiation theory, and game theory.  Based on this analysis, I 
interpreted NATO’s application of coercive communication to be appropriate to the 
conflict situations that the alliance faced in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
First, trying to understand how NATO leaders reasoned about their 
communication choices, I interpreted NATO’s actions using two Western philosophical 
approaches that are commonly used to evaluate coercion from a human rights 
perspective: teleology or utilitarianism (e.g., Mill, 2000) and deontology (e.g., Kant, 
1949).   In a general sense, I reasoned from both perspectives that NATO’s coercive 
tactics were justified.   
From a utilitarian perspective, “individual liberty may rightly be restricted for the 
sake of some more important benefit like the prevention of harm or suffering” 
(Rosenbaum, 1986, p. 19).  I reported earlier that IFOR commanders often engaged in 
coercion to avoid “loss of life.”  Therefore, I interpreted IFOR’s coercive actions as an 
outcome of NATO leaders rationalizing that saving lives far outweighed consequences 
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associated with limited restriction of personal liberty.  This approach would seem 
consistent with the type of utilitarian calculations described by Seib and Fitzpatrick 
(1995) in the context of public relations ethics.  These calculations consider factors such 
as emotional intensity, duration, uncertainty, remoteness, future, purity, and numbers of 
affected people.  Hence, utilitarian calculus associated with coercion versus military force 
would likely move NATO leaders to choose less lethal forms of power to protect lives.  
NATO’s coercive actions were more difficult to justify from a deontological 
perspective.  For instance, Kant associated moral action with good will “by virtue of its 
volition” (Kant, 1785/1949, p. 141) rather than the goodness of an action’s outcome.  His 
moral imperative also judged actions ethical if they complied with universal law and 
were found to be acceptable by all rational people.  Coercive acts like those applied by 
NATO are not generally associated with good will, nor is coercion seen as universal or 
rational.  In fact, according to Rosenbaum (1986), Kantian ethics are often associated 
with an independence from arbitrary coercion.  However, “Possession of a basic right 
also gives the title-holder a ‘title to compel respect’ for the right in question” 
(Rosenbaum, 1986, p. 20).  Therefore, even from a deontological perspective, leaders 
might justify IFOR’s use of coercion, since NATO’s international mandate authorized 
them to compel compliance with the peace agreement and save lives that were under the 
protection of the peace agreement. 
Second, from a communication perspective, I also interpreted NATO’s coercive 
actions as justified.  Organizations coerce through powerful acts – including the 
communication of threats and promises – that are designed to exercise control over 
others.  Coercive communication acts could be associated with one-way, distributive 
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communication strategies.  However, NATO leaders did not view coercion as a strategic 
choice.  Instead, they saw coercive communication activities as short-term tactics that 
were part of a longer-term, symmetrical strategy to manage relationships that were 
needed to establish and preserve a peaceful environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
To elaborate on this interpretation, I applied accounts of NATO’s use of coercion 
to a framework for activism in public relations theory provided by L. Grunig (1992b) and 
J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1997).  First, the hostile elements in IFOR’s operating 
environment seemed to fit the definition of activist publics: former warring military 
forces; local, national, and international political factions; Muslim, Serb, and Croat ethnic 
rivals; and even terrorist organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These and other factions 
seemed to represent groups of “two or more individuals who organize in order to 
influence another public or publics through action that may include education, 
compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics, or force” (L. Grunig, 1992b, p. 504).  
Furthermore, these activist publics often became “initiators of … public relations 
programs” (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1997, p. 35) as well as targets of IFOR’s coercive 
communication efforts.  Organizations like NATO must attend to these groups because 
they can “create issues and threaten organizational autonomy” (J. Grunig, 2003, p. 94). 
During the peace mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, different political and non-
governmental political groups mounted international pressure on NATO to pursue and 
capture military and political leaders of former warring factions who had been indicted 
for war crimes.  A senior U.S. Navy officer who served in IFOR recounted this pressure 
and how IFOR often had to communicate in response to this pressure: 
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An issue that comes to mind is the apprehension of persons indicted for war 
crimes (PIFWC), which is an on-going issue even as we speak today.   There was 
certainly a movement in the international community for IFOR to apprehend these 
persons indicted for war crimes, or PIFWCS as they are called.  [The IFOR 
commander] made it very clear to both political and military authorities in NATO 
that his mandate did not call for him to actively go out and apprehend these 
people.   
Given the existence of activism within Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR then 
recognized a need to respond through communication.  Piecing together different 
accounts from interview participants and analyzing IFOR’s action from the perspective of 
J. Grunig and L. Grunig’s (1997) activist theory helped reveal how IFOR acted ethically, 
even when using coercion.  First, IFOR public relations practitioners used a situational 
theory approach to identify threatening publics (e.g., activists who threatened the peace 
agreement or IFOR’s autonomy) as well as members within the NATO coalition that 
shared responsibility for the issue.  Second, the existing IFOR coalition, which was 
granted authority to implement the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was 
normally powerful enough – politically and militarily – to manage the issue.  Third, 
evidence from interviews demonstrated that the IFOR coalition usually attempted to 
communicate symmetrically with activist groups before resorting to coercive 
communication.   
When symmetrical communication resolved the issue, IFOR continued using 
symmetrical approaches to communication.  When dialogue failed, IFOR resorted to 
asymmetrical communication, including coercion, “to force” (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 
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1997, p. 40) or compel an activist group into compliance.  Once compliance was gained, 
IFOR again returned to symmetrical communication, established cooperation, and 
continued to work toward long-term relationships that were essential to implementing the 
peace agreement.  IFOR’s coercive communication behavior was characterized by two 
other ethical actions identified by J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1997): IFOR began with 
symmetrical communication attempts and, when symmetrical communication failed, 
IFOR disclosed the intent of its persuasive communication tactics.  Hence, I interpreted 
IFOR coercive communication to be ethical from a communication perspective. 
 Finally, I broadly interpreted IFOR’s use of coercion as ethical from the 
perspectives of negotiation theory and game theory.  Although I did not conduct an in-
depth analysis of IFOR’s coercive behavior from these perspectives, my review of 
principles from negotiation and game theory provided support for IFOR’s actions.  For 
instance, J. Grunig (1989b) favored negotiation over coercion in conflict resolution.  
However, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1997) subsequently demonstrated that even 
application of force (e.g., coercion) can become an acceptable means of conflict 
resolution if guided by ethical rules.  Gibbons et al. (1992) defined coercion as an 
element of negotiation, or “the exercise of power through the use of particular tactics that 
aim to reward and punish the opponent” (p. 160).  Furthermore, as Gibbons et al. 
prescribed, IFOR tended to use threats, rewards, and other “coercive tactics [as] a 
measure of last resort” (p. 160). 
 The concepts of threats and warnings from negotiation and game theory were of 
special interest to my analysis.  For example, several participants provided accounts of 
how IFOR issued threats as a means to coerce activist groups into complying with the 
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peace agreement.  IFOR’s communication plan also seemed to incorporate messages 
designed to inform audiences about threats related to violating the peace agreement and 
the rewards associated with working toward peaceful relations.   
 Therefore, I concluded that IFOR’s coercive behavior resembled Schelling’s 
(1980) notion about “the strategy of conflict” (p. 3), which treats conflict as a game in 
which participants try to win.  Within this theoretical context, strategic games consider 
the variable nature of decisions and alternating player actions.  From this perspective, 
data in this study seemed to describe how IFOR entered into games of conflict 
management and considered strategic moves, calculations about actions by other players, 
and implications of coercive communication actions.  This approach was similar to 
Jentleson’s (2000) concept of coercive diplomacy, which employs military threats as 
“preventive strategies” (p. 5) 
Upon further analysis, I was also able to clarify the meaning of IFOR’s coercive 
actions.  Based on my interpretation of participant accounts, it did not seem that IFOR 
expressed threats as a strategic move to achieve a win-lose position in a zero-sum game.  
Instead, threats issued by IFOR seemed to represent NATO moves that were designed to 
achieve a win-win position: attainment of peaceful relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
would benefit all parties.  This approach, described by many participants, appeared to be 
consistent with Schelling’s (1980) view of winning in international conflict, which “is not 
winning relative to one’s adversary” (p. 4).  Instead, IFOR’s notion of winning in peace 
operations was more closely associated with “the avoidance of mutually damaging 
behavior” and concern for “the common interest” (p. 5) of all parties in a conflict.  In this 
regard, IFOR’s use of coercion seemed to be consistent with the goal of mixed-motive 
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communication in the excellence theory: to achieve a position within the win-win zone 
(Dozier, 1995).   
Concepts of threats and warnings in negotiation merit further analysis and 
interpretation as they relate to IFOR’s coercive communication.  IFOR seemed to rely 
primarily on threats when attempting to coerce (e.g., as compelling compliance by 
placing someone under threat of military force).  As previously explained, threats and 
warnings, however, have different connotations as well as potential outcomes.  IFOR 
leaders expressed several concerns about potential outcomes of coercive actions.  Since 
my analysis of this issue is related primarily to outcomes, I will defer further discussion 
of threats and warnings to the subsequent section dedicated to consequences of 
communication actions.    
To what extent did NATO rely on moral reasoning to judge the ethical nature of decisions 
about IFOR communication and public relations management? 
The use of internal, moral-reasoning processes by NATO military leaders merits 
special consideration and interpretation.  I considered NATO’s use of moral reasoning in 
communication decision-making to be a positive indicator of excellence in public 
relations – as it provided evidence of ethical behavior.  L. Grunig and J. Grunig (2003) 
determined that ethics and social responsibility are essential to public relations excellence 
but, as I have already explained, more research – like that of Bowen (2000, 2004) – is 
needed to establish a principle of ethics in public relations theory.  
However, reliance of NATO leaders on intuition and the leaders’ lack of a formal 
framework for guiding moral decisions raised questions about the reliability of this moral 
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decision-making process.  First, I will analyze the use of intuition by NATO leaders and, 
second, I will interpret the meaning of this phenomenon.   
First, honor, integrity, and a sense of moral behavior have been important values 
in the education of military leaders for centuries.  For instance, the U.S. Revolutionary 
War hero Commodore John Paul Jones – considered as the founding father of the U.S. 
Navy (U.S. Naval Academy, 1997) – once remarked:   
It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy be a capable mariner.  He 
must be that, of course, but also a great deal more.  He should be as well a 
gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the 
nicest sense of personal honor.  He should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, 
firmness, and charity…. In one word, every commander should keep constantly 
before him the great truth, that to be well obeyed, he must be perfectly esteemed. 
(Buell, 1991, p. 37) 9 
Montor and Ciotti (1984) also noted that moral responsibility for a naval unit has 
been placed on the commanding officer of that unit since the publication in 1775 of Rules 
for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of North America.  Furthermore, 
Montor and Ciotti wrote: “If they are to meet their obligations to the country, the navy 
and marines must continually reemphasize the assumption of moral responsibility and 
leadership.  The type of leadership practiced and taught in the naval service must always 
have a moral foundation” (pp. 70-71).  According to another textbook on military 
leadership, “A professional who lives by an ethical philosophy understands the 
importance of assuming authority, fulfilling responsibilities, and being accountable for 
                                                 
9 The exclusive use of masculine gender by Jones must be considered in its historical context.  Jones served 
at a time when women were excluded from serving aboard ships of the line at sea; therefore, naval officers 
were exclusively men. 
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his [or her] actions” (Montor, McNicholas, Ciotti, Hutchison, & Wehmueller, 1998, p. 
518).  Scholars of ethics have gone so far as to define ethics as “the moral basis of the 
military profession itself” (Cook, 1998, p. 35).   
Second, what did it mean for NATO leaders to rely so heavily on an internal, 
intuitive process for moral decision-making?  I interpreted this phenomenon among 
military leaders in NATO as a product of their military upbringing, education, and 
experience. As such, a NATO military leader’s sense of honor and predisposition to 
follow a strict code of ethical conduct seemed to be a trait of his or her military culture.   
Clearly, current and former military service members who participated in this study 
demonstrated a strong commitment to moral leadership and ethics.  However, I 
interpreted their reliance on intuition and lack of any formal framework for making 
ethical communication decisions as a major weakness in the moral-reasoning process 
used by NATO leaders.  A conceptual understanding of intuition helps to reveal this 
weakness.  Fischbein (1987) explained: 
Intuition summarizes experience, offers a compact, global representation of a 
group of data, helps overcome the insufficiency of information, introduces 
behaviorally meaningful interpretations in a reasoning process, and thus confers 
on the mental activity, the qualities of flexible continuity, of firmness and 
efficiency which characterize an active, adaptive behavior. (p. 12) 
Intuition may be flexible, firm, and efficient; however, Fischbein (1987) also 
pointed out that intuition can lead to invalid assumptions about ethical behavior: 
Intuition remains a potential source of error because it does not represent a simple 
duplicate of practically given conditions.  Its role is to offer behaviorally 
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meaningful representations, internally structured, of intrinsic credibility, even if 
these qualities do not, in fact, exist in the given situation. It is highly possible that 
the process of rendering intuitive will produce a distorted representation of the 
original reality and the predictions made could be totally or partially wrong. (p. 
12) 
Furthermore, in terms of a guide for moral reasoning, Fischbein observed that intuition 
could lead to “an a priori knowledge” (p. 4) of actions that are right and wrong. 
Because of intuition’s potential for inaccuracy, I concluded that NATO leaders’ 
reliance on intuitive knowledge without using a formal framework to guide moral 
decisions could lead to harmful consequences, which I will discuss in the next section.  
What perceptions did senior military leaders hold about consequences associated with 
coercive communication? 
NATO leaders considered the consequences of communication actions and they 
perceived many of the positive and negative outcomes of coercion.  These leaders 
understood the ethical importance of revealing the intent of threats and conveying 
“information about a bargainer’s preferences” (Rubin & Brown, 1975, p. 279).  They 
understood that coercive tactics could increase the chances of quickly achieving 
compliance (De Dreu, 1995; Rubin & Brown, 1975), which became especially valuable 
to leaders who faced crises that placed time constraints on decision-making processes.  
They also understood the importance of using coercion as a last resort, thus preferring to 
use cooperative communication strategies that promoted “the development of trust and a 
mutually beneficial, cooperative relationship” (Rubin & Brown, 1975, p. 263). 
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NATO leaders were also aware of coercion’s negative consequences: that 
choosing coercive rather than collaborative tactics could “tend to elicit greater hostility” 
(De Dreu, 1995, p. 652).  They expressed concern over having to follow through on 
threats, which implied they understood Schelling’s (1980) position that a threat could 
require a leader to “do, in a contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the 
contingency occurred” (p. 123).  They also understood that not following through on a 
threat could damage NATO’s credibility and, thus, reduce the chances for success of 
future coercive communication tactics.  
The question of whether NATO leaders were able to distinguish between concepts as 
finite as threat and warning was, however, unclear.  I was unable to interpret whether 
NATO leaders understood the consequences of their reliance on intuition as a basis for 
moral reasoning.  First, it appeared from my analysis that NATO leaders would benefit 
from a more precise understanding of differences between threat and promise as coercive 
communication tactics.  I based this conclusion on several ethical principles.  For 
instance, conditional threats attempt to exert control and they deny personal freedom.  
Such tactics would be more difficult to justify from a deontological perspective. Threats 
also reduce the number of strategic moves or choices available to a decision maker.  As 
Schelling (1980) pointed out, a failed conditional threat forces reduces a decision 
maker’s strategic alternatives to two: act on a condition one would prefer not to carry out, 
or balk and destroy credibility.  Either alternative, according to Schelling, “makes one 
worse off than he need be” (p. 123).   
A warning, unlike a threat, is issued without condition.  According to Schelling 
(1980), a warning provides information about consequences that could be “painful to the 
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adversary if the latter fails to comply” (p. 123). However, since a warning is issued 
without condition, there is no requirement on the part of the transmitter to follow through 
on actions that could make both parties worse off.  Hence, the transmitter of a warning 
preserves a wider range of choices than the transmitter of a threat.   
Furthermore, threats could be seen as more ethical from a philosophical 
perspective.  A threat “is designed to alter the beliefs and actions of others in a direction 
favorable to yourself” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p. 120).  A warning plays “an 
informational role” by merely conveying factual information or indicating intent without 
condition (p. 126).  In summary, both coercive threats and warnings could be considered 
ethical means of avoiding deadly conflict.  However, warnings might be considered more 
ethical than threats by virtue of their symmetrical communication structure, their use in 
promoting mutual understanding, and the unconditional nature that permits greater choice 
in avoiding unwanted consequences.  
Second, I viewed the apparent inability of NATO leaders to identify a formal 
means for justifying communication choices and their over reliance on intuition as 
justification for the model of communication proposed in this study.  Intuition’s 
vulnerability as a “potential source of error” (Fischbein, 1987, p. 12) invalidates its 
usefulness as a sole or primary source of moral guidance.  Errors in intuitive reasoning 
could lead to decisions that produce unwanted communication consequences. 
Furthermore, basing moral decisions on intuitive knowledge developed from a set of 
personal experiences, cognitions, or beliefs could introduce into the moral reasoning 
process risks of subjectivity or ethical relativism.   
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However, intuitive knowledge could be, as Fischbein (1987) wrote, “a method, a 
sort of mental strategy [sic] which is able to reach the essence of phenomena” (p. 3) or 
designate “forms of immediate knowledge” (p. 4).  In this context, intuitive knowledge 
could become a useful means of triangulation when used in conjunction with more 
credible, external, and formal means of moral reasoning.  As a result of this 
interpretation, I have concluded this discussion section with a proposed model that could 
be used to formally guide a moral-reasoning process, incorporate ethics in 
communication decisions, and justify communication choices. 
Toward a Theory of Just Communication 
 At the conclusion of the excellence study in public relations, L. Grunig et al. 
(2002) cited the need for research “to develop a theory of ethical decision making in 
public relations” (p. 554).  This study moves ethics research in public relations beyond 
the personal ethics of practitioners to a level that represents the “ethical conscience of an 
organization” (p. 554).  Moving in this direction brings public relations – in theory and 
practice – closer to “a management function primarily responsible for introducing moral 
values and social responsibility into organizational decisions” (p. 554).   
 The following model has been revised from the initial model presented in Table 3, 
using feedback obtained during elite and focus group interviews.  This model has been 
modified to support decision-making at the senior public relations manager level; in 
national, multinational, and global settings; and in a variety of situations, from peace to 
conflict.  This model also incorporates suggested axioms, rules, and principles for an 
ethical theory of public relations adapted from L. Grunig et al. (2002, pp. 554-556): 
1. A strategy that supports an understanding of organizational, member, and 
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stakeholder values; and an understanding of how strategic choice should be an 
ethical process. 
2. A moral imperative to manage relations with publics affected by organizational 
decisions and to value dialogic (symmetrical) communication over other forms of 
communication. 
3. An ethical approach that: 
a. Considers the consequences of organizational decisions on affected 
publics (teleology). 
b. Accepts a moral obligation to disclose consequences of organizational 
decisions on affected publics and to manage those consequences through 
dialogic communication (deontology). 
4. Includes stages of moral reasoning that affirm: 
a. The organization is acting based on moral reason (and not for reasons 
based on politics, monetary gain, or self-interests). 
b. The organization considers implications for publics as well as for the 
organization. 
c. The organization considers its social responsibilities to the organization, 
to strategic publics, and to society. 
d. The organization relies on symmetrical communication throughout the 
decision-making process. 
A Model for Making Justifiable Communication Choices 
 The following model represents a revision to Table 3.  The revised model 
incorporates concerns and suggestions communicated by interview participants. 
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Table 5 
 
Revised Model for Making Justifiable Communication Choices 
 
1. Detect and Construct.  Use strategic public relations management to detect 
threats and construct the situation.  Identify and prioritize key publics. Evaluate 
relationships and compare perceptions held by the organization and publics of 
each other.  Organize or strengthen coalitions to empower collective action.  
Base communication on dialogue (two-way, symmetrical). 
2. Define available communicate strategies and tactics. Evaluate each 
communication option, using a formal reasoning process that considers ethics, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of options.  Ensure that concepts and process are 
culturally appropriate.  Define a public relations strategy. Continue dialogue.  
Identify and evaluate secondary communication options. Consider asymmetrical 
communication tactics such as coercion only as a short-term tactic if dialogic 
communication fails.  Base overall communication strategy on dialogue, which 
values collaboration and long-term, mutually-beneficial relationships. 
3. Select primary and optional communication strategies and tactics, guided by the 
following principles: 
a. Select tactics appropriate to the situation that can be justified cross-
culturally. 
b. Implement persuasive communication tactics such as coercion only if 
intentions can be justified cross-culturally. 
c. Use persuasive communication tactics such as coercion as a last resort, 
after all other options have failed or been considered. 
  381 
 
d. Do not use persuasive communication tactics unless they stand a 
reasonable chance to succeed in establishing, restoring, or protecting just 
values (e.g., freedom in large, long-term relationships).  The concepts of 
value and freedom must be understood across cultures. 
4. Confirm communication alternatives. Obtain approval or ensure that approval has 
been received from an appropriate authority (e.g., legal, political, military) before 
employing coercive means of communication. Avoid indiscriminate use of 
coercive tactics – even those limited to non-physical acts.   
5. Behave by implementing strategies designed to communicate with affected 
publics through dialogue. If a public responds dialogically, continue two-way, 
symmetrical communication. If a public responds asymmetrically or refuses to 
communicate, consider using negotiation or employ persuasive tactics – 
including coercion, if necessary – to restore dialogue. While communicating, 
adhere to the following constraints: 
a. To remain ethical, disclose the intent of communication. 
b. Limit persuasion or coercion to a level commensurate to the most severe 
threat associated with the situation. For instance, use warnings rather than 
threats if the less invasive tactic is sufficient to restore dialogue. 
c. Discriminate between publics when implementing persuasive 
communication. Do not use persuasive communication (e.g., 
psychological operations, coercion) that could have unintended 
consequences on publics not involved in the situation. 
  382 
 
6. Evaluate and Scan.  Evaluate communication outcomes and effects.  If dialogue 
and relationships have been restored, continue dialogue.  If conflict remains, 
reevaluate and reprogram.  Conduct research and report lessons learned that 
promote better understanding of how strategic communication and public 
relations contribute to conflict resolution and relationship management.  Once 
conflict is resolved, continue to scan and manage relationships with dialogue 
until another conflict situation is identified. 
This revised model is illustrated in Figure 7 on the following page. 
Evaluation 
My goal for this qualitative study was to arrive at a deep understanding of a 
complex social phenomenon: the case of how NATO managed public relations during 
peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1995 and 1996.  I have arrived at that 
understanding, which is a much deeper than the understanding I had previously achieved 
as a former participant in these peace operations.   
To achieve my goal I used a “systematic, empirical strategy for answering 
questions” (Locke et al., 2000, p. 96) and relied on two of the unique strengths of the 
qualitative research genre: exploration and description (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).  I 
avoided potential biases by rejecting the credibility of my experiences during peace 
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Instead, I situated other participants in the social 
context of NATO’s peace operations and described their experiences.  By reporting the 
descriptions of others, I was able to provide support for the analysis and interpretation of 
results in this study: my “warrant for a claim” (Locke et al., p. 117).  
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Figure 7.  Moral Framework for Justifying Communication Choices (Revised) 
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My research strategy ensured that I remained logical, rigorous, and scientific in 
my “search for facts” (Barzun & Graf, 1992, p. 13).   This strategy incorporated a clearly 
stated research purpose and questions.  Thanks to advice offered by my committee 
members, I was able to revise and state this purpose in concise terms.  I then used my 
purpose like an internal compass to point the way as I progressed through various 
research stages.  I also used an extensive literature review to identify the theoretical 
foundation for this study and explain how relevant concepts would be operationalized in 
the social context of my research setting.  I employed long interview, elite interview, and 
focus group interview methods to answer research questions.  Combining these three 
types of interviews helped to make my results more credible (McCracken, 1988; Stake, 
1995).  Finally, as I have explained in depth, I relied on Wolcott’s (1994) approach to 
description, analysis, and interpretation as a means to report this study’s results in a way 
that both readers and researcher would understand. 
I have exercised great care and discipline in adhering to my research strategy.  I 
believe this approach produced a credible research report that will withstand rigorous and 
repeated scrutiny.  Yes, I rejected objectivity in this study; however, I avoided pure 
subjectivity by recognizing my role as an instrument of research and by revealing and 
managing my potential biases.  I documented and evaluated my role and my potential 
biases through reflexive writing in memoranda, in observer comments, in summaries of 
interviews, and in sections of this report.  I also adopted “an attitude of detachment” 
(Vidich & Lyman, 1998, p. 42) to distance myself from interview participants with whom 
I had former professional and personal relations.  This detachment enhanced the 
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credibility of research results by allowing me to more accurately observe participants 
from a critical distance (Crane, 2000; McCracken, 1988). 
I have also fulfilled important goals in this research by acknowledging and 
protecting participants from the minimal risks associated with conducting and reporting 
the results of interviews.  I gained approval from my university’s institutional review 
board to conduct human subject research and I adhered to ethical rules that apply to this 
research.  I have explained procedures that I used to implement these protections 
elsewhere in my paper, and I have provided in the appendices examples of how I 
disclosed these risks to participants through interview protocols. 
Limitations 
Along with the many successes associated with this research, I recognize some 
limitations of this study.  First, as an instrumental case study, this research was limited to 
observation of a single multinational organization: NATO.  Some critics may wonder 
what can be learned from only one organization.  This study has been carried out in the 
spirit of Wolcott’s (1995) answer to that question: “Why, [we learn] all we can!” (p. 171).  
My intent was not to generalize, except to theory.  My intent was to gain deep 
understanding of NATO and of the theoretical concepts that NATO applied to its public 
relations programs.  However, understanding how public relations management operates 
in a global sense could be enriched by studies of multinational organizations other than 
NATO. 
Second, my access to the natural field of study was limited.  Douglas (1998) 
advocated, “Get out and do it” (p. 157).  His appeal referred to the direct experience of 
working with naturally occurring data in the field, which Douglas viewed as “the most 
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reliable form of knowledge about the social world” (p. 7).  Unfortunately, it is no longer 
possible to “get out” and observe IFOR.  IFOR, NATO’s peace implementation force, 
was recreated in 1996 – under different leadership and public relations management – as 
a peace stabilization force, SFOR.  Therefore, I had to rely on interviews with former 
IFOR members to gain access to an organization that no longer existed.  Organizational 
documents and historical texts could have provided other forms of evidence that would 
restore some of IFOR’s “vanishing subject matter” (M. Gergen & K. Gergen, 2000, p. 
1039).  However, the delimiting of methods necessary to achieve the desired scope in this 
study did not allow such inquiry.  
Third, like vanishing subject matter, qualified participants who could recall their 
experiences in IFOR are dispersing throughout the world and are becoming more difficult 
to locate as time passes.  Hence, this study was subjected to sampling limits.  I relied on 
convenience samples of participants who fulfilled interview criteria.  These criteria 
included location (e.g., participants who lived or worked near my home, or participants 
who could be located and contacted by telephone) and language ability (e.g., participants 
who were able to contribute to a discussion in English).  Even for participants who could 
be located, passing time and deteriorating recall of lived experiences in Bosnia-
Herzegovina reduce the credibility of their reports.  Second, my interview criteria limited 
participation in interviews to English-language speakers.  This was necessary to for me, a 
native English speaker, to uncover meaning – especially in focus groups.  However, this 
language criterion prevented me from accessing the experiences of IFOR members from 
other, non-English speaking nations.  The experiences of these individuals could have 
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contributed in important ways to a deeper understanding of the IFOR case, especially 
with regard to cultural and global public relations issues. 
Fourth, the interview methods chosen for this study were limitations as well as 
strengths.  While interviews did help uncover deep meaning, they also took place in 
unnatural settings: homes and office spaces rather than in IFOR’s field of operations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, this was unavoidable, given the vanishing nature of IFOR’s 
direct experience. 
Fifth, my sample of NATO public relations managers who served in Bosnia-
Herzegovina between 1995 and 1996 was limited in terms of gender.  Most of the NATO 
military public affairs managers who deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period 
were male, since most senior military public relations positions in NATO were held by 
males at that time.  During this research project, I interviewed two of the only women 
who deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina to serve in senior NATO public relations 
management positions between 1995 and 1996.  The disparity between numbers of 
female and male participants in my study posed a potential problem: lack of requisite 
variety.  Requisite variety in terms of racial, ethnic, and cultural demographics was 
evident in my sample of interview participants.  However, the disproportionately low 
number of women interviewed for this study fell below the gender threshold of requisite 
variety between NATO and the alliance’s key publics – an important characteristic of the 
excellence theory.   
As I have previously explained, I did not attempt to achieve a representative 
sample of interview participants in this qualitative study.  Instead, my research design 
relied on convenience, purposive, and snowball samples, which are non-probability 
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sampling techniques. Still, the lack of female voices in this study could have obscured the 
meaning that women made of public relations experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina and led 
to a male-biased description of NATO’s peace implementation operations there.  In 
retrospect, I could have employed quota or dimensional sampling (Broom & Dozier, 
1990) to increase the number of women in my study.  These non-probability techniques 
focus on important criteria or strata of a population (e.g., gender) to ensure that the 
sample reflects key characteristics of that population. 
After considering the strengths and limitations of this study, I have found the most 
important aspect of this research to be its theoretical contributions.  I have overcome 
limitations and used the strengths of this research to help build theory in at least two 
ways.  First, I have proposed an ethical model of communication that extends the 
excellence theory in public relations.  Second, I have identified generic principles and 
environmental variables that contribute to development of a global theory in public 
relations.  Next, I will explain these implications and their significance to theory, 
practice, and society. 
Evaluation of Self as Instrument of Research 
In Chapter I, I reflected on issues that related to my dual roles as a former NATO 
public relations manager and as a researcher.  As a qualitative researcher, I also discussed 
how my role as an instrument of research – including my interactions with participants in 
this research – could influence results of this study.  Furthermore, I identified actions or 
“coping strategies” (Wolcott, 1995, p. 159) that I would employ (e.g., writing reflexive 
memoranda) to manage the potential effects of this influence. 
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Wolcott’s (1990, 1994, 1995, 2001) perspective of qualitative research as science 
and art influenced my approach to this study.  As I became immersed in my research, I, 
like Wolcott (1994), tried “to understand [what I was observing], rather than to convince” 
(p. 369) other scientists.  Although I endeavored to establish the credibility of my work, I 
focused more on the communication and construction of meaning in my study than I did 
on searching for validity and reliability (Kvale, 1995; Wolcott, 1994, 1995).  I rejected 
the concepts of validity and reliability from a qualitative perspective but I wrestled with 
the notion that bias may have crept into my study and I may not have “gotten to the 
bottom of things” (Wolcott, 1995, p. 126). Wolcott (1995) summarized this notion: 
We can never get all the possible detail into the figurative canvases we set out to 
paint, and of what we do get, as Geertz reminds us, we can never escape the 
suspicion that we are not quite getting it right. (p. 126) 
As I neared completion of this dissertation and became more confident in 
applying the scholarly knowledge and research skills learned in the academy, I enjoyed a 
greater sense of freedom and independence in the field than I had previously experienced 
as a student in the classroom.  However, I also recalled Wolcott’s (1995) prediction that I 
would “have to return to academia, and thus to academic scrutiny, to gain an audience” 
for my research results (p. 142).  This realization was especially important for this study, 
given the nature of dissertation research and the need to satisfy an audience represented 
by dissertation committee members – all respected scholars.   
Hence, I anticipated that readers would question my research and ask how I could 
produce credible results from the study of a single case (e.g., NATO’s management of 
public relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina) – especially a case that had such personal 
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meaning for me.  By disclosing potential sources of bias and describing how I would 
manage effects of bias I hoped to establish the credibility of my research results. 
Still, after rigorous efforts to identify, disclose, and manage potential biases, some 
readers may yet fault the credibility of this study’s results – especially in light of the 
exceptionally good fit that resulted between my research questions and the study’s 
results.  While I was elated to find that data fit so well, I realized such results could lead 
to claims that I allowed ego involvement to contaminate my findings.  Ego involvement 
could, indeed, explain how data fit research questions so precisely.  According to Meyer 
(2001), “ego involvement in understanding happens when people let the human side of 
them dictate their findings” (¶ 7).  This is often the case with “members of a researched 
group” (¶ 7).  Thus, my involvement in NATO’s peace-implementation operations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996 and a sub-conscientious need to justify the 
outcome of public relations programs that I formerly managed could have influenced my 
analysis and interpretation of data in this study.   
In retrospect, exercising reflexivity and creating critical distance helped me to 
avoid the influence of ego involvement during my study.  However, I could also have 
employed other researchers to assist with the data analysis phase of my study.  
Incorporating a team approach to data analysis would have strengthened credibility of 
results and provided a stronger case for rejecting claims of ego involvement. 
I concluded, however, that a good fit between data and research questions was not 
necessarily the result of researcher bias.  It is plausible that this study’s sound research 
methods and accurate description, analysis, and interpretation of data revealed empirical 
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evidence of excellent public relations in the case of NATO’s operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. I offer the following warrants for this claim. 
First, I managed potential biases by carefully creating critical distance between 
interview participants and me.  I was diligent in disclosing my role as a researcher and 
identifying the purposes of this study.  I gave participants voice, I remained open to their 
perspectives, and I provided opportunity for new discoveries.  Even while interpreting 
participants’ responses, I resisted imposing my selective judgment on their descriptions 
of experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina.    
Second, I used three different interview methods: long, elite, and focus group.  
Long and elite interviews were similar in terms of protocol; however, these two interview 
methods were vastly different in terms of participants.  Long interviews were conducted 
with public relations managers.  Elite interviews were conducted with senior leaders – 
members of NATO’s dominant coalition – who made decisions based on advice from 
public relations mangers.  By probing each of these organizational levels I was able to 
achieve co-orientation and determine how managers and senior officials thought of each 
other and interacted to plan and conduct NATO’s public relations activities.   Focus 
group discussions added breadth to the deep understanding achieved during one-on-one 
interviews.  Breadth revealed dimensions of ethics, culture, and law not observed during 
long or elite interviews.  Still, despite differences in interview methods, data obtained 
from long, elite, and focus group interviews were strikingly consistent.  
Third, strong evidence of matching themes or patterns in data, which I discussed 
in Chapters IV and V, supported the credibility of findings.  These patterns were revealed 
early in the interview schedule, after approximately six long interviews.  Patterns were 
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also consistent across organizational levels and cultural boundaries.  Patterns were similar 
among public relations managers and senior leaders and did not vary between nationality 
and other demographic differences.  Additional interviews – including elite and focus 
group interviews – confirmed that data saturation or redundancy was achieved. 
Fourth, following Wolcott’s (1995) advice, I established a reliable “paper trail” 
(p. 127), which consisted of transcripts, observer comments, memoranda, and other 
records of interviews.  This paper trail could be used by other researchers to replicate or 
extend this research study and develop their own interpretations. 
Fifth, the length of this study was more than sufficient to collect, analyze, and 
interpret data – and produce credible results.  Wolcott (1995) established three months as 
the minimum period for field research (p. 110) and one year as the ideal period (p. 77).  I 
began interviews in 2000 and concluded interviews in 2005.  This span of fieldwork 
allowed my qualitative research to develop over time and benefit from cumulative 
comparison of data that were collected as interviewing progressed.  Valuable insights 
were gained from scholarly critiques of papers that reported initial results of this research.  
These insights were used to improve research design and add to credibility of the final 
results.  The iterative nature of this process and strength of the cumulative comparison 
approach to data collection and analysis thereby minimized the effects of ego 
involvement or other potential biases.   
Finally, I am satisfied with the results of this research effort.  I accept that others 
may come to their own conclusions about my findings.  Scholarly dialogue over 
differences in interpretation of these results can only contribute value to this research 
program and add more to the public relations body of knowledge. 
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Implications 
In the introduction to this research, I explained how I would apply Marshall and 
Rossman’s (1999) framework to determine how this study was significant. This study has 
generated several implications that are of significant value to public relations theory, to 
public relations practice, and to society.   
Implications for Theory 
This study began as an exploratory study that sought to understand and describe 
how NATO, a multinational, political-military organization, applied principles of the 
excellence theory in public relations.  As I continued to collect, analyze, and interpret 
data, new theoretical questions – and answers – became apparent, as often is the case 
with qualitative research.  Taking advantage of the iterative, continuous nature of 
qualitative methodology, I sought to understand how this multinational organization used 
coercion in strategic public relations management.  From this investigation emerged new 
understanding of excellence in public relations.  This understanding revealed how the 
multinational NATO alliance used coercion within a framework of symmetrical 
communication to manage lethal conflict, establish or restore relationships, and achieve 
excellent public relations outcomes with ethical intent.  Finally, this study identified a 
theoretical framework for moral reasoning that helps leaders and managers avoid 
relativism while incorporating ethics into decisions about communication and public 
relations. Hence, this study evolved from an exploratory study of excellence principles to 
an explanatory study that advances an ethical principle of excellence and extends the 
excellence theory to international conflict situations.   
  394 
 
What do these results imply for the public relations body of knowledge?   First, 
these findings explain how public relations managers and senior leaders can include 
coercive communication in a symmetrical model of communication.  This integrated, 
coercive-collaborative model of communication (similar to the mixed-motive 
communication continuum) has normative and positive value in managing asymmetrical 
conflict situations in which one or more parties demonstrate no willingness to cooperate.  
This represents a major theoretical leap forward from previous perspectives of the 
excellence theory that viewed communication primarily as a symmetrical model.  This 
coercive-collaborative communication model of excellence in public relations still values 
the establishment and maintenance of long-term, symmetrical relationships. Moreover, 
this extension of the excellence theory demonstrates how symmetrical outcomes can be 
achieved through ethical application of short-term coercive as well as collaborative 
communication tactics.   
Second, these findings respond to criticism of the excellence theory as a 
normative theory that has limited application to practice.  For instance, advocates of 
contingency theory have claimed that adherence to a symmetrical model of 
communication renders the excellence theory inadequate to help organizations manage 
asymmetrical situations.  However, other scholars have rejected contingency approaches 
to public relations, citing the risk of ethical relativism.  The findings of this study bridge 
the theoretical gap between excellence and contingency theories.  The integrative 
approach to coercive and collaborative communication can help manage a wide range of 
contingencies; and the proposed ethical framework for moral reasoning can help 
overcome problems of relativism.  Furthermore, this approach can be carried out while 
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remaining within the behavioral molecule of strategic public relations management and 
the basic principles of the excellence theory. 
Third, this study contributed to development of a global theory in public relations.  
Findings that NATO applied nine generic principles of public relations provided strong 
support for development of global theory.  Furthermore, this study identified several 
external, environmental variables described by a global theory that influence the 
application of public relations in multinational, multicultural organizations.   
Finally, this study has contributed to a deeper theoretical understanding of 
organizational culture.  The multicultural setting of this study revealed the existence of an 
organizational constellation of cultures that represents how divided cultures operate in 
multinational alliances and coalitions.  This discovery is especially significant to research 
that combines the study of communication and culture in a multinational context. 
Implications for Practice 
This study’s findings have several implications for public relations practitioners.  
This instrumental case study focused on a single organization: NATO.  However, the 
implications of this study apply to any multinational organization that faces conflict.  
Whether an organization is political, governmental, non-governmental, military, public or 
private, these findings apply to senior leaders and managers who make ethical decisions 
about communication as a means to build strategic relationships and reduce costs 
associated with regulation, litigation, and pressure group campaigns. 
First, results demonstrated that senior leaders and public relations practitioners in 
NATO depend on an informal sense of personal intuition to guide ethical decisions about 
communication practices.  This study produced a formal model that combines a moral-
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reasoning process with a strategic public relations management process.  This model 
provides a reliable means to incorporate ethics into decision-making, which helps to 
justify selection of communication choices – including coercion in conflict situations.  
 Second, research results demonstrated how subcultures in multinational alliances 
form, interact with, and shape organizational worldview and communication.  This study 
and others have demonstrated the powerful cultural influence of senior leaders and public 
relations managers who formulate and distribute communication strategy throughout an 
organization.  Hence these results have important implications for practitioners who 
manage global communication activities in multinational organizations. 
 Third, interview participants expressed concerns over a possible merger of 
military public relations and psychological operations into a single function.  This 
merger, as it was described by participants, appeared to be similar to the debate over 
integrated marketing communication in the private sector, which combines public 
relations with marketing (see Hutton, 2001).  This study focused on public relations 
management and did not attempt to explore in depth this allegation or other 
organizational communication functions.  However, such mergers of public relations with 
other communication functions like marketing or psychological operations could damage 
the credibility and efficacy of public relations.  Hence, the proposed model of ethical 
communication and lessons learned about NATO’s application of excellence principles 
could represent important considerations for any organization planning such a merger. 
Implications for Society 
 Perhaps this study’s most significant contribution is the way in which it 
demonstrated how political-military organizations like NATO can contribute to society 
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by managing international conflict in an ethical manner.  Testimony from participants in 
this study has shown how ethical, excellent approaches to communication and public 
relations management can help to deter violent conflict, manage conflict, reduce costs to 
an organization, and – most significantly – preserve human life.  Given the current 
international security situation and international efforts to combat terrorism, I believe it is 
essential to develop ethical and pragmatic communication strategies that organizational 
leaders and communication practitioners can use to manage asymmetrical threats to 
societies around the world. 
Future Research 
Building on this study of NATO, I would like to move from a single, instrumental 
study to a collective case study of several multinational organizations.  Studies of similar 
alliances – the United Nations or the Organization of American States, for example – 
could contribute to development of a global theory of public relations.  Furthermore, 
results of a collective study might help to generalize further about the excellence theory 
in public relations by demonstrating in a variety of multinational organizations how 
excellence principles are conceptualized and applied.   
I also intend to continue research efforts that contribute to the development of an 
ethical theory of public relations.  The coalescent argumentation approach by Gilbert 
(1997) shows promise as a framework for symmetrical communication strategies that 
incorporate persuasion and coercion as short-term tactics.  Also, more study is needed to 
extend my proposed model for justifying communication choices across cultures. 
The way in which NATO’s multinational, political-military alliance incorporated 
subcultures also offers fertile ground for future studies.  I believe there is a lack of public 
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relations research in multicultural, multinational organizational communication.   Given 
the powerful influence of globalization on our society, more knowledge of how divided 
organizational cultures influence communication is needed.  This knowledge could 
contribute significantly to development of global public relations theory and suggest 
ethical communication practices that apply to most regions of the world. 
Finally, the reported debate over U.S. military efforts to combine public affairs 
and psychological operations functions is worthy of attention.  Already, reports of U.S. 
government efforts to establish an office of strategic influence and the placement of 
military public affairs under a U.S. information operations office in Iraq have brought 
into question the credibility of military public relations.  Such initiatives, which seem to 
violate principles of the excellence theory in public relations, could have long-term 
consequences for the credibility of public relations practice in all professional sectors.  It 
may prove valuable to conduct a study of how the behavior of combined public affairs-
information operations departments is associated with principles of the excellence theory; 
or how a model of just communication might be used to examine the ethical nature of 
information activities that mix public relations with propaganda activities.   
Finally, after more than four years of study, I still have left largely untouched a 
virtual treasure chest of historical, organizational documents that describe NATO’s 
management of public relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996.  Since access 
to IFOR’s natural setting is limited, textual analysis of IFOR documents may provide 
additional access to data and insight into the strategic communication behavior of this 
organization.  Van Dyke (2003a) used historical-critical method to analyze how NATO 
rhetorically constructed IFOR’s identity.  This study helped to explain how NATO 
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developed and carried out IFOR’s public relations strategy.  In this study, I incorporated a 
strategic approach to historical-critical analysis proposed by Medhurst, Ivie, Wander, and 
Scott (1997), who noted, “A strategic approach … is predicated upon a realist view of the 
world; not the world as it ought to be or as we might wish it to be, but the world as it 
currently exists with its varying political systems, governmental philosophies, economic 
assumptions, power relationships, and dominant personalities” (p. 19).   Future studies of 
this type could provide even greater understanding of the strategic intent behind NATO’s 
management of public relations in Balkan peace operations. 
Concluding Remarks 
 I have explained how NATO strategically managed public relations programs that 
supported peace operations in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996.  This 
explanation has provided a deeper understanding than existed before of how NATO 
leaders and public relations managers chose communication tactics and strategy.   
The understanding produced by this study has helped me to achieve my purpose.  
I have proposed and tested a model of ethical communication that scholars and 
practitioners could use to justify decisions about public relations and communication. 
This model extends the excellence theory and contributes to development of a global 
theory in public relations.  These results fill important theoretical gaps and provide useful 
applications for practitioners.  
Moreover, results of this study have answered important personal questions – 
answers that could also be of use to readers of this study.  I began this study with a 
general assumption, based on personal experience and anecdotal evidence, that NATO 
had achieved excellent outcomes through the IFOR’s public relations programs in 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina.  At least, if the number of lives saved by NATO’s peace operations 
in that country were any measure, IFOR’s public relations programs certainly met the 
goals of NATO’s communication goals.  This study provided empirical evidence that 
IFOR did apply the excellence theory and achieve excellent communication outcomes.   
However, I still did not understand how IFOR might have applied principles of 
the excellence theory to their public relations programs without knowledge of the 
excellence theory.  In one of the last meetings with my advisor, before I submitted this 
dissertation to my committee, Dr. James E. Grunig answered the latter question.  During 
our meeting, he reminded me, “People don’t have to know about a theory to behave in a 
manner consistent with that theory” (J. Grunig, personal communication, May 2, 2005).  
His sage advice seems to have been exemplified by a comment from one of this study’s 
long-interview participants.   
As I concluded my interview with this Canadian public affairs officer who served 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I asked him if there was anything else he would like to say.  His 
answer seemed to reflect general principles of the excellence theory and capture the 
essence of successful communication in multinational, multicultural organizations.  His 
reply also seemed to emerge from his own personal convictions, perhaps from his cultural 
roots, influenced by his upbringing and education – and even more by his deeply moving 
experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Regardless, without expert knowledge of the 
excellence theory, he demonstrated here how IFOR acted in accordance with the 
excellence theory, which helped this coalition succeed in their public relations mission, 
and helped save lives: 
I do think that the … examination of the cultural factors and influences, of IFOR 
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particularly, are worth… real scrutiny….  I don’t see that experience duplicated.  
And you know, through the combination of the factors that we discussed before.  
You know, as an example of excellence in PI … when you look at some of the 
academic theoretical constructs, you could make the case that … the IFOR 
experience fits that, but I think that through an understanding of the 
communications theory, it underplays … the real … strengths [of IFOR public 
relations]: one’s values and ethics and culture [italics added]… factor[s] worthy 
of further exploration. 
 This concludes my dissertation – and the scholarly journey that moved me from 
“the realms of subjectivity, historical passions, and emotional relationships” (Crane, 
2000, p. xi) to a scientific understanding of what happened with IFOR’s public relations 
programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina … and why this is important.  
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW GUIDE -- PUBLIC RELATIONS PRINCIPLES 
 
LONG INTERVIEWS 
 
Pre-brief 
 
My name is Mark Van Dyke and I am a Ph.D. student in the Communication Department 
at the University of Maryland.  I am collecting information for a research project related 
to the roles, responsibilities, and activities of public relations (public information) 
practitioners in the NATO alliance and IFOR coalition.  I also am interested in how 
NATO’s and IFOR’s public relations programs might compare to the theory of 
excellence in public relations.  The information I obtain from this interview will be 
incorporated in my research report and may be quoted for academic purposes.  This 
information also may be used in professional articles, conference papers, or other 
publications in the future.  However, your name will not be associated with any of these 
direct quotations.  I will record this interview on audiotape in order to ensure accuracy 
when I later review and analyze your responses.  Do you have any questions before I 
proceed? 
 
Consent 
 
1.  Do I have your permission to conduct and audio record this interview?  (For face-to-
face interviews, obtain signature.  For telephone interviews, read informed consent form 
and state date and time.) 
 
Interview 
 
2. Please tell me your first name and current position, duties, and responsibilities. 
 
3. What kinds of experience have you had with public relations.  (Number of years?  
Types of organizations? Positions held?)  
 
4. What about experience in alliances/coalitions? (Number of months or years? Type of 
organization?  Position held?) 
 
5.  In your experience, how would you describe the types of public relations programs 
that you have worked with and what has been your role in these programs? (What were 
some of the functions and activities that best describe these public relations programs and 
roles?) 
 
6.  Tell me about the public relations/information departments you have been part of. 
(Was it a separate function?  Integrated with other information activities?  How did you 
communicate with your publics?  Other?  How so?   
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7.  Who is/was the senior person in your PR/PI department?  (Please describe.) 
 
8.  Who does/did this person report to?  Please describe the relationship that you/senior 
PR person have/had with the senior management in this organization? What type of 
influence did you/he/she have?  Please explain. How many times did you/she/he meet?   
 
9.  How would you describe the levels of professional knowledge and training in 
management and public relations/information in the department?   
 
10.  Within this alliance/coalition organization, how would you describe the view held by 
the senior leaders and others of public relations/information?  Did you and your bosses 
share an understanding of PR/PI?  How was your organization structured? What is/was 
the communications “climate” within the organization?  Do/Did leaders have an “open 
door” or “closed door”? 
 
11.  What kinds of audiences or publics influence/influenced your organization?  What 
type of environment does this organization operate within? 
 
12.  How would you rate the overall results and effects of this public 
relations/information program?  How do you believe this program influences/influenced 
the organization and its goals? 
 
13.  How would you characterize morale and job satisfaction in the public relations 
department?  Organization?  To what would you attribute this level of morale?  How 
would you describe the organizational climate for equal opportunity/diversity?  
 
14. Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
Debrief 
 
This concludes the interview.  Thank you for your participation.  Again, the purpose of 
my study is to evaluate the roles, responsibilities, and activities of public relations (public 
information) practitioners in NATO and IFOR, and to determine how public relations 
theory might apply.  Your participation in this study and the information you have 
provided has been very useful.  Please contact my advisor, Dr. James E. Grunig, or me, 
using information on the copy of the consent form that has been provided to you, if you 
have questions or comments about this study. 
 
Mark A. Van Dyke 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742-7635 (USA) 
Phone: (301) 405-8976; E-mail: mavd@umd.edu 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – ETHICS & MORAL REASONING 
 
ELITE INTERVIEWS 
 
Pre-brief 
 
My name is Mark Van Dyke and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of 
Communication at the University of Maryland.  I am collecting information for a research 
project related to the roles, responsibilities, and activities of public relations (public 
information) practitioners in the NATO alliance and IFOR coalition.  I also am interested 
in how senior leaders and public relations managers in multinational alliances and 
coalitions make decisions about communication and public relations strategies.  I may 
incorporate information and quotes from this interview in my research report, but only for 
academic purposes. I also may use this information in professional articles, conference 
papers, or other publications in the future. However, your name will not be associated 
with any direct quotations.  I will record this interview on audiotape in order to ensure 
accuracy when I later review and analyze your responses.  Do you have any questions 
before I proceed? 
 
Consent 
 
1.  Do I have your permission to conduct and audio record this interview?  (For face-to-
face interviews, obtain signature.  For telephone interviews, read informed consent form 
and state date and time.) 
 
Interview 
 
2. For the record, please state your first name, current position, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
 2a. Just out of curiosity, where did you grow up? 
 
3. What kinds of experience have you had with public relations.  (Number of years?  
Types of organizations? Positions held?)  
 3a. Probe: If you don’t consider yourself to be a public relations specialist, have 
you supervised public relations managers or programs?  
3b. Probe: If so, in what capacity? 
3c. Probe: How would you describe the kinds of public relations practiced by 
your organization and how is/was public relations valuable to your organization? 
 
4. Please talk about your experience in NATO, IFOR, or other alliances or coalitions like 
them. (Where? Number of months or years? Type of organization?  Position held?) 
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5.  In your past or present position with NATO/IFOR (or other alliance/coalition), to what 
extent did you consider, select, or authorize choices of communication or public relations 
strategies or tactics associated with your organization? 
 5a. Probe: How would you describe your responsibilities in this regard (e.g., 
considering, selecting, or authorizing these strategies or tactics)?   
 5b. Probe: How did these decisions depend on other members of your alliance or 
coalition?  In other words, to what extent did you coordinate decisions between your 
organization and other members of your alliance or coalition? 
 
6. Please describe the type of communication or public relations strategies and tactics you 
most often approved or relied on to communicate with your organization’s public 
audiences. 
 6a. Probe: By strategies I mean a general approach to communication; by tactics I 
mean the specific methods or activities you used to communicate. 
 6b. Probe: Why did you choose these strategies or tactics? 
 6c. Probe: Who were your primary audiences; and what relationship did you have 
with those audiences? 
 6d. Probe: How did you normally communicate with them? 
  
7. Probe: How did your audiences communicate with or respond to you and your 
organization?   
7a. Probe: How important was having feedback from these audiences to your or 
your organization? 
 7b. Probe: What kinds of relationships did you have with these audiences? 
 7c. Probe: How did the type of relationship you had with each audience (e.g., 
friendly or hostile, important or unimportant) affect the communication strategy or tactics 
you used to communicate with them? 
 
8. Please describe the process you used to identify and select different strategies and 
tactics you might use to communicate with your various audiences. 
 8a. Probe: How did these options relate to or support the overall strategy, goals, 
and objectives of your organization? 
 8b. Probe: To what extent did ethical considerations influence your choice of 
communication strategies and tactics? 
 8c. Probe: How did you make ethical decisions in your organization; and which 
staff members contributed to those decisions? 
 
9. To what extent did conflict situations, as opposed to peaceful situations, affect your 
choice of communication strategies and tactics?   
9a. Probe: What other factors influenced your choice of communication strategies 
and tactics?  
9b. Probe: Could you provide an example? 
 
10. If you had to deter or stop someone from taking an action you wouldn’t want them to 
take, how would you communicate with them?  Please give your first choice, second 
choice, third choice of communicating, etc.   
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 10a. Probe: Again, how would you select and decide on these options? 
 10b. Probe: What factors influence your choice? 
 10c. Probe: Please give me your opinion about the pros and cons of using 
coercive communication (like threats) as opposed to other forms of communication like 
dialogue, negotiation, and collaboration? 
 
11. To what extent did you require approval from higher authority to use aggressive 
forms of communication like threats (or even psychological operations)? 
 11a. Probe: What kind of authority did you need to communicate in this way? 
 11b. Probe: How might you have been restricted in using these kinds of 
communication with certain audiences – friend or foe? 
 11c. Probe: What other limits did you have on communicating in this way? 
 11d. Probe: How important was it for you to disclose the intent of these 
communications before using them against an audience? 
 
12. Please explain how you evaluated the outcomes of your various public relations and 
communication programs or identify lessons learned? 
 12c. Probe: When you conducted evaluations of this kind, did you place greater 
weight on the goals you achieved or on the means used to achieve those goals? In other 
words, were you most interested in achieving goals or doing the right thing? Explain. 
 12b. Probe: How would you compare the importance of achieving your 
organization’s strategic goals to maintaining good relationships with your publics? 
  
13. What lessons have you learned from your own experiences with public relations? 
 
14. Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
Debrief 
 
This concludes the interview.  Thank you for your participation.  Again, the purpose of 
my study is to evaluate the roles, responsibilities, and activities of public relations (public 
information) practitioners in NATO and IFOR, and to determine how the theories of 
public relations and moral reasoning might apply.  Your participation in this study and 
the information you have provided has been very useful.  Please contact my advisor, Dr. 
James E. Grunig, or me, using information on the copy of the consent form that has been 
provided to you, if you have questions or comments about this study. 
 
Mark A. Van Dyke 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742-7635 (USA) 
Phone: (301) 405-8976; E-mail: mavd@umd.edu 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – ETHICS & MORAL REASONING 
 
FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS 
 
Consent 
 
Prior to beginning, have participants complete consent forms and initial a sign-in sheet. 
 
Pre-brief 
 
Hello, everyone, and thank you for agreeing to participate today.  My name is Mark Van 
Dyke from the University of Maryland, and I will moderate our discussion. Information 
collected from this discussion will support a study that examines how senior leaders and 
public relations managers in multinational alliances and coalitions make decisions about 
communication and public relations strategies. Let me begin by reviewing a few things 
before beginning introductions. 
 
I am very interested in your ideas and opinions, and there are no right or wrong answers, 
so please participate actively in our discussion. I may incorporate information and quotes 
I obtain from this interview in my research report, professional articles, conference 
papers, or other publications in the future. However, this information is being conducted 
on background, which means I will not associate your name with any direct quotations. I 
hope these rules will help you feel comfortable and allow you to speak candidly about a 
variety of topics today. If you are uncomfortable about these rules, please let me know at 
this time. [Pause, check participants.] 
 
Moving along, I want to concentrate on what you have to say in our discussion, so I am 
audio taping our discussion and taking brief notes.  I will get the details I need from the 
audiotapes and notes later. Since we are recording, it will be very important for everyone 
to speak clearly and at least as loudly as I am speaking now.   
 
I have many questions to cover and I’d like to hear from each of you.  I may interrupt you 
at some point to move on to another topic.  If I must cut you off, please don’t take 
offense. I will try to come back to you later on.  I’m simply trying to manage our 
discussion so that we can finish within two hours and not waste any of your time. 
 
Does anyone have questions before we begin? Great, I’ll turn on my tape recorder, and 
then we will start with introductions.  
 
[TURN ON TAPE RECORDER] 
 
1. Beginning here [select participant], please tell us your first name only, where you 
grew up, and where you live and work now. 
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Discussion 
 
Okay, great. I want to start with general terms that relate to our discussion. Let’s begin 
with public relations, which the U.S. military and many other nations refer to as public 
affairs or public information.  In my study, I refer to this term as public relations. During 
our discussion, feel free to use the term you are most familiar with.  
 
2. How would you define public relations?  
2a. Probe: Please describe how you or the alliance or coalition organization you 
were associated with practiced public relations. 
2b. Probe: How was public relations of value to these organizations? 
 
3.  In alliances or coalitions, how important is it for public relations managers to be 
responsible for considering, selecting, or authorizing choices of communication or public 
relations strategies and tactics? 
 3a. Probe: Please give some examples: How would you describe some of your 
experiences in this regard?   
 3b. Probe: To what extent should decisions about alliance or coalition public 
relations strategies be coordinated with other organizations? 
 
4. Please describe the type of alliance or coalition communication or public relations 
strategies and tactics most often used to communicate with public audiences. 
 4a. Probe: By strategies I mean a general approach to communication; by tactics I 
mean the specific methods or activities you used to communicate. 
 4b. Probe: How are these strategies or tactics chosen? 
 4c. Probe: Who were your primary audiences; and what relationship did you have 
with those audiences? 
 4d. Probe: How did you normally communicate with them? 
  
5. Probe: How did your audiences communicate with or respond to you and your 
organization?   
5a. Probe: How important was having feedback from these audiences to your or 
your organization? 
 5b. Probe: What kinds of relationships did you have with these audiences? 
 5c. Probe: How did the type of relationship you had with each audience (e.g., 
friendly or hostile, important or unimportant) affect the communication strategy or tactics 
you used to communicate with them? 
 
6. Please describe the process you used to identify and select different strategies and 
tactics you might use to communicate with your various audiences. 
 6a. Probe: How did these options relate to or support the overall strategy, goals, 
and objectives of your organization? 
 6b. Probe: To what extent did ethical considerations influence your choice of 
communication strategies and tactics? 
 6c. Probe: How did you make ethical decisions in your organization; and which 
staff members contributed to those decisions? 
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7. To what extent did conflict situations, as opposed to peaceful situations, affect your 
choice of communication strategies and tactics?   
7a. Probe: What other factors influenced your choice of communication strategies 
and tactics?  
7b. Probe: Could you provide an example? 
 
8. If you had to deter or stop someone from taking an action you wouldn’t want them to 
take, how would you communicate with them?  Please give your first choice, second 
choice, third choice of communicating, etc.  
 8a. Probe: What factors influenced your choice? 
 8b. Probe: Please give me your opinion about the pros and cons of threatening 
publics as opposed to having a dialogue with them? 
 
9. To what extent did you require approval from higher authority to use aggressive forms 
of communication like threats (or even psychological operations)? 
 9a. Probe: What kind of authority did you need to communicate in this way? 
 9b. Probe: How might you have been restricted in using these kinds of 
communication with certain audiences – friend or foe? 
 9d. Probe: How important was it for you to disclose the intent of these 
communications before using them against an audience? 
 
10. Please explain how you evaluated the outcomes of your various public relations and 
communication programs or identify lessons learned? 
 10a. Probe: When you conducted evaluations of this kind, did you place greater 
weight on the goals you achieved or on the means used to achieve those goals? In other 
words, were you most interested in achieving goals or doing the right thing? Explain. 
 10b. Probe: How would you compare the importance of achieving your 
organization’s strategic goals to maintaining good relationships with your publics? 
  
11.  Before we conclude our discussion, I want to take a moment for you to look at a 
model for moral reasoning that is being developed to help senior leaders and public 
relations managers make ethical choices when selecting public relations and 
communication strategies.  [PASS OUT COPIES.] Take a few minutes to read this over 
and then I want to ask for your reaction. [Allow time for participants to review the 
model.] 
 
Alright, I would like you to offer your initial reaction to this model.  Could this model be 
useful in selecting certain kinds of aggressive communication strategies – yet remain 
ethical – in, let’s say, a conflict situation?  Why or why not? 
 
12.  That’s all the time we have for our discussion.  Before I end, is there anything you 
would like to add that we haven’t already discussed? 
 
[If yes, continue discussion. If no, continue to debriefing.] 
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Debrief 
 
This concludes the discussion. Please give me the copies of the model I provided you.  
The model is still under development and I don’t want to release copies until my study 
has been completed.  [COLLECT COPIES.]  
 
Thank you for participating.  Your contributions will be very valuable to my research.  
Again, the purpose of my study is to evaluate the roles, responsibilities, and activities of 
public relations (public information) practitioners in NATO and IFOR, and to determine 
how the theories of public relations and moral reasoning might apply.  Your participation 
in this study and the information you have provided has been very useful.  Please contact 
my advisor, Dr. James Grunig, or me, using information on the copy of the consent form 
that has been provided to you, if you have questions or comments about this study.  
Thank you again.  Our discussion is adjourned. Please help yourself to refreshments on 
the way out. 
 
Mark A. Van Dyke 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742-7635 (USA) 
Phone: (301) 405-8976; E-mail: mavd@umd.edu 
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APPENDIX D 
SCREENING GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS  
 
ETHICS & MORAL REASONING 
 
This is Mark Van Dyke, from the University of Maryland, and I’m returning your [call/e-
mail] about the research project and discussion group that you volunteered for.  Is this a 
convenient time to talk? 
 
• [If no:] When could I call back to discuss your possible role in a discussion 
group? 
 
• [If person wants to press for brief details now:] I’m sorry, but I need about five 
minutes to obtain information from you that will help determine your eligibility 
for participation in a discussion group and to explain procedures for the 
discussion group.  Do you have five minutes now? 
 
o [If no:]  When could I call back?  Also, before we hang up, I need to 
confirm your phone number [e.g., this one and/or a cell phone or other 
phone] and an e-mail address that I can use to communicate with you. 
 
[If yes, I have time to talk now:]  First, thank you for your interest. I’m a doctoral 
student, working on my dissertation research with Dr. Jim Grunig, who is my advisor and 
a professor in communication at the University of Maryland. I want to bring people 
together for discussions about how senior leaders and public relations managers in 
multinational alliances and coalitions make ethical decisions about communication and 
public relations strategies. Each discussion group will last up to two hours.  You would 
participate in only one discussion group.  Participants will be provided with a light meal 
during discussions. Discussions will be conducted on background and participants in this 
project will remain confidential. By this I mean that you only need to use your first name 
or a nickname during discussions and I will not associate your name with any direct 
quotations that I may publish in my study.  Participation in this project also is voluntary.  
You may withdraw at any time without penalty. Does that sound okay? 
 
• [If no:] Thank you, anyway, for your time.  We appreciate your interest.  
Goodbye. 
 
Good. Second, I’d like to ask you a few simple questions to obtain information that will 
help us to organize discussion groups.   
 
1. Do you have current or previous experience working in a senior leadership or public 
relations management position in multinational, political-military alliances or 
coalitions?  How about experience with teaching or applying ethics to decision-
making? 
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• [If no, reply:]  I’m sorry; due to the nature of our research we are seeking 
participants who have this type of experience.  Thank you for your time, but I 
am afraid you cannot participate in this particular study. If you wish, I can 
write down your first name and a way to contact you, in case you might be 
eligible to participate in a future study.  [Write info down.]  Thanks again, 
goodbye. 
 
[If yes, continue.]   
 
2. Where are you employed now and what are your duties?   
 
3. How many years of experience do you have working with public relations?  Ethics?  
In what capacities (types of organizations, positions held, etc.)? 
 
[At this point, assess the English ability of the prospective participant?]  
 
POOR____ [If poor:] I should inform you that English will be the only language 
spoken during these discussion groups. All participants must be able to express their 
views clearly and quickly in the discussions.  We also must be able to obtain 
detailed information and understand each participant during discussions.  Perhaps it 
would be best if I take your name and a way to contact you, in case we schedule 
future groups in which other languages will be spoken. [Write info down.] Thank 
you very much for your time.  Goodbye. 
 
GOOD____ [If good, continue.]  
 
4.  What is your rank or title and FIRST NAME, or how do you prefer to be addressed?  
 
Thank you.  We’ll be using only first names or ranks and titles during this project to 
ensure that participants remain confidential. 
 
5.  What is the best way to contact you to set up a time and date for the discussion group? 
[Telephone, E-mail, etc.:] ________________________________________________ 
 
6.  When is the best time to try and contact you? 
 
7.  We are planning groups for weekdays and weekends during morning, lunchtime, and 
evening hours. In the next month, how many of these general times and days will you be 
available for a discussion group? Please allow three hours for your participation in this 
group.  This time would include getting to and from the group. [Check all that apply:] 
 
a. Which days of the week are best for you? 
 
Weekday _____ [If weekday, which days of week are best?]  
Weekend _____ [If weekend, is Saturday or Sunday best?]  
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b. On these days, which times are best? 
 
Morning _____ [During what times?]  
Lunch _____ [During what times?]  
Evenings _____ [During what times?]  
 
Okay, I just have a couple more questions to help place you in the appropriate discussion 
group. What do you consider to be your ethnicity? ___________________ 
 
8.  [CHECK FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS] I have one question about your experience in 
public relations management.  I will ask the question and then give you a set of possible 
answers to choose from. 
 
In your professional experience, how often would you say you have been in situations 
where you were responsible for selecting, carrying out, or approving public 
relations/public affairs decisions?  
 
Would you say:  
Often    ____ 
A few times    ____ 
Rarely     ____ 
Never   ____ 
 
9.  [CHECK FOR ETHICS] I have one question about your experience in the practice or 
teaching of ethics.  I will ask the question and then give you a set of possible answers to 
choose from. 
 
In your professional experience, how often would you say you have been in situations 
where you were responsible for teaching or applying ethics in decision-making?  
 
Would you say:  
Often    ____ 
A few times    ____ 
Rarely     ____ 
Never   ____ 
 
 
[Identify gender:] MALE ______    FEMALE ________    
 
[If can’t tell, ask:] This next question seems silly, but I am required to ask everyone their 
gender.  Are you a male or female?  MALE: _________ FEMALE: _________ 
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10.  Will you be able to get to the discussion group [identify location] on your own or 
with the assistance of someone else? 
 
• [If no:]  I’m sorry, but participants in these discussion groups must arrange 
for their own transportation to and from discussions.  However, I will keep 
your first name and contact point on file in case you are able to join us for 
future groups.  Thank you for your interest. 
 
[If yes, continue.] 
 
11.  Do you need directions to the discussion group? 
 
• [If yes:]  Provide general/specific directions and contact information. 
Telephone:  
Web:  
Or give general directions:  
 
[If no, proceed to final paragraph:] 
 
Those are all the questions I have for you.  Do you have any questions for me?    
 
• [If yes, try to answer questions without revealing nature of research.] 
 
[If no:] Well, thank you for your time.  I will be back in touch with you in the next week 
or so to confirm a time and date for your discussion group.  In the meantime, feel free to 
contact me by telephone at [GIVE NUMBER] or by e-mail [GIVE E-MAIL].  I should 
add that e-mail is probably the best way to contact me. 
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APPENDIX E 
CODING SCHEME FOR INTERVIEWS AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
PRINCIPLES OF EXCELLENCE THEORY 
 
 
Themes: Characteristics of Public Relations Excellence 
 
I. Program Level 
 I1 Managed Strategically 
 
II. Department Level 
 II2 Single or integrated PR department 
 II3 Separate function from marketing 
 II4 Direct reporting relationship to senior management 
 II5 Two-way symmetrical model 
 II6 Senior PR person in managerial role 
 II7 Potential for Excellence in PR, as indicated by: 
   Knowledge of symmetrical model 
   Knowledge of managerial role 
   Academic training in PR 
   Professionalism 
 II8 Equal opportunity for men and women in PR 
 
III. Organizational Level 
 III9 Worldview of PR reflects two-way symmetrical model 
 III10 PR director has power in or with the dominant coalition 
 III11 Participative rather than authoritarian organizational culture 
 III12 Symmetrical system of internal communication 
 III13 Organic rather than mechanical organizational structure 
 III14 Turbulent, complex environment with pressure from activist groups 
 
IV. Effects of PR Program 
 IV15 Programs meet communication objectives 
 IV16 Reduces costs of regulation, pressure, and litigation 
 IV17 Job satisfaction is high among employees 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Civil Affairs (CA):  According to the U.S. Marine Corps (2000), civil affairs 
“encompass the relationship between military forces, civil authorities, and people in a 
friendly country or area” (pp. 1.8-1.9).  Civil affairs experts usually focus their 
information efforts on establishing acceptance and support for military activities among a 
foreign civilian community, and promoting civil-military cooperation.  
 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC): Sometimes referred to as civil affairs in the 
United States, this term was defined by Combelles-Siegel (1998) as “the means by which 
allied commanders establish and maintain formal relations with the national authorities, 
populations, international, and non-governmental organizations in their area of interest” 
(p. 191). 
Combined: This term describes military operations, activities, organizations, agencies, or 
other aspects of military affairs that involve the participation of two or more allied 
nations (see Federation of American Scientists, 2005).  
Information Campaign (IC): This is an “official NATO term for the multimedia 
campaign designed to influence the attitudes of people in [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and 
shape their behavior in favor of IFOR troops and operations” (p. 191).  This campaign 
was originally designed as a psychological operations effort, “but political sensitivities 
toward the term ‘PSYOP’ [among NATO nations] prevented the use of the term” (p. 
191).   
Information Operations (IO): Defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as “actions 
taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s 
own information and information systems” (U.S. Air Force, 1999, p. 38). 
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Integrated Information Campaign (IIC):  A NATO term similar to Information 
Campaign used in Bosnia-Herzegovina to describe the coordination of separate 
information functions like public relations, CIMIC, and PSYOPS.  
Joint: This term describes military operations, activities, organizations, or other aspects 
of military affairs that involve the participation of more than one service from one nation 
(see Federation of American Scientists, 2005). 
Political Advisor (POLAD): The NATO term used to describe a senior political advisor 
assigned to the staff of a military commander.  The POLAD, usually a senior diplomat 
from NATO headquarters’ political structure or a nation’s foreign affairs branch, reports 
directly to the military commander and provides advice and counsel on political and 
diplomatic affairs.   
Public Affairs Officer (PAO):  The term used to describe a U.S. military, public 
relations specialist (commissioned officer, non-commissioned officer, petty officer, or 
civilian) who has responsibility for managing public relations activities such as media 
relations, internal relations, community relations, planning, and evaluation.  Senior PAOs 
usually serve as advisors to executive-level U.S. military and civilian leaders. 
Public Information Officer (PIO): Defined by Combelles-Siegel (1998) as an “officer 
in charge of conducting media relations (and to a much lesser extend command 
information).  The PIO is equivalent to a U.S. Public Affairs Officer” (p. 192). 
Public Relations (PR): Defined by J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) as “the management of 
communication between an organization and its publics” (p. 6).    
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Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): These activities are “planned operations to 
convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, 
groups, and individuals” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2000, p. 1.8).  The U.S. Marine Corps has 
differentiated between military psychological operations, civil affairs, and public affairs.  
The Marines declared that these concepts differ in both their intent and in their intended 
audiences.  According to the Marine Corps, “Where the intent of PSYOPS and CA is to 
influence the target audience, the intent of public affairs is only to inform and educate” 
(p. 1.9).  Furthermore, “Although public affairs does influence people, any such influence 
is a by-product – the result or effect of people being informed – rather than the design or 
intent of the communication” (p. 1.9).  Finally, the Marines noted, “PSYOPS and CA 
involve forms of communication directed primarily at foreign audiences.  Public affairs 
may involve communication at either foreign or domestic audiences, or both” (p. 1.9).  
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